1. This is an appeal by the Government of Saurashtra, against the order of acquittal of the accused, who was charged with the offence of entering India from Pakistan without a permit, under Section 4, Junagadh Influx from Western Pakistan Act, No. 35 [xxxv] of 1948, and also under Sections 466 and 471, Penal Code.

2. The accused, who was a resident of Junagadh, had gone to Pakistan in September 1948 in order to fetch the members of his family to Junagadh. He returned to Junagadh on or about 5th November 1948, with some members of his family, with a permit which gave permission to the accused as well as to the other five members of his family, to enter the Indian Dominion from Pakistan. The accused was allowed to enter, and the various officers who were in charge of the inspection of the permit, seem to have examined it, and put their initials on the same without finding any fault with it. It appears that some time thereafter, the High Commissioners Office in Karachi had made a report to the Government of India, stating that a book containing 50 forms of permit bearing NOS. 18851-18900 had been lost from the office of the High Commissioner for India in Karachi. The permit in this case bears the No. 18878. On account of this correspondence, investigation about the permits bearing any of the numbers of this book, as well as for the permit bearing No. 18878 was started. The accused was thereupon charged with the offences mentioned above on the grounds that the permit was not a valid one, inasmuch as (1) the book out of which this permit was given had been stolen, and (2) that the rubber stamp of the official of the High Commissioners Office as well as that of the office itself, seemed to have been forged by somebody along with the contents of the permit, and that the accused must have knowingly used the forged permit for the purpose of entering the Indian Dominion.

3. The only evidence for proving that the permit book was lost was some correspondence between the High Commissioners Office in Karachi and the Government of India. No person from the High Commissioners Office has been examined to prove under what circumstances the book had been stolen, whether the rubber stamps were affixed on the permit before it was stolen, and who were in charge of the book. Nobody was also examined to prove that the handwriting of the person, who purports to have written the permit, was not the handwriting of any clerk whose duty it was to prepare the permits. On the face of it the permit seems to be a valid one. The only circumstance that may put any one on enquiry was that the permit on the printed form purports to be a temporary permit for entry in the Indian Dominion, while column portion of the visit is filled up in ink as permanent. If, therefore, this permit was meant to be a permanent one, presumably it would not have been filled up on such a printed form. In spite of this fact, however, no officer through whom the permit passed, enquired into the matter, and but for the correspondence from the High Commissioners Office in Karachi, the accused would not have been charged with these offences. The learned Judge is of the opinion that the accused cannot be convicted of these offences merely on the correspondence, which shows at the most that a permit book containing the permit form in question, along with other permit forms, had been stolen from the High Commissioners Office in Karachi, and we entirely agree with him that this circumstance alone would be insufficient to convict the accused of the offences.

4. The accuseds case is that he sent his Adatia or Agent to procure the permit, and that it was given to him by an official of the High Commissioners Office. The prosecution has not examined any witnesses to show under what circumstances this permit had come in the possession of the accused, and that being so, we must accept the accused a version that he got it through his Agent from the High Commissioners Office in Karachi. Even assuming that the permit book was stolen, there is nothing whatever in the present case, to connect the accused with the alleged theft, and that being so, we cannot say that even if any unauthorised person filled up the form, the accused was aware of that circumstance and used the permit with the knowledge that it had been forged.

5. The learned Advocate General concedes that the stamp of the official signature, as well as the stamp of the office on this permit, do not show in any way that somebody used a different stamp, because both the stamps tally with the stamps which were affixed on valid permits. It was attempted to be argued that if the stamp was valid, it would bear the sign of the Ashoka Pillar, but it was found out that in some valid permits which had been issued formerly, the Ashoka Pillar was not in the stamp, and so on that ground it cannot be said that the stamp had been forged by anybody. The fact, therefore, remains that the permit in question purports to be on a duly stamped form, and contains the names of the accused and the other members of his family correctly. There is nothing to arouse any suspicion so far as this permit is concerned and merely because there was correspondence between the High Commissioners Office and the Government of India that the permit book was stolen, we cannot hold that the accused was necessarily privy to the transaction of the theft, or that he secured the permit after having known that it was given to him by somebody who was a party to the theft of the permit book. It may be stated here that the correspondence produced in this case does (not) show anything more than the fact that a report had been made by the High Commissioners Office to the Government of India, that the permit book had been stolen, but beyond that it would not prove any other circumstance against the accused. As the rubber stamps are genuine, it cannot be said that the permit has been forged by anybody, or that even if it was forged, the accused came into possession after having known that it was forged. For all these reasons, we agree with the learned Judge that the prosecution has not satisfactorily proved its case against the accused, and therefore, he was entitled to acquittal. We, therefore, confirm the order of acquittal and dismiss the appeal.