Arun Kumar Sharma, J.

1. The appellant-defendant having lost in both the courts below have filed the instant appeal.

2. The instant Second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-defendant being aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2020 passed by 15th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur (MP) in First Civil Appeal No. 1313/2019, whereby learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 16.03.2018 passed by 8th Civil Judge Class-I, Jabalpur (MP) in R.C.S. A. No. 543/2017.

3. The facts of the case, succinctly stated are that the respondent-plaintiff Rakesh Kumar Chadar filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction with respect to the land situated in village Rimjha, Revenue Mandal Maharajpur, District Jabalpur, Patwari Halka No. 79 bearing khasra no. 37 ad-measuring 0.110 hectare; khasra no. 84 ad-measuring 1.420 hectare and khasra no. 153 ad-measuring 0.910 hectare, total three in number is ad-measuring about 2.44 hectare, against the defendants Ankur Jaiswal and State of M.P.; inter alia contending therein that the disputed land is ancestral property of the plaintiff and the same belongs to his forefather who was Kotwar (village safeguard) and the land in question was given by Malguzar as a source of his bread and butter in exchange for the duties performed by his forefather. The disputed land was entered in the name of his forefather and after his death, it was entered in the name of his son from the year 1905 to 2015-16 and after the death of Kanchedilal, father of the original plaintiff Rakesh Kumar Chadar and the land was mutated in the name of original plaintiff-respondent no. 1 herein. It was also asserted that his forefather had become owner of the land at the time of enforcement of the Act i.e. M.P. Land Revenue code, the land in dispute was mutated in his forefather's name as "Marushi Krishak". The appellant and respondent no. 2 are trying to obtain the land illegally as they are developing the land as green land by planting trees and digging holes for the same, therefore, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 herein filed the suit for declaration of title and also for permanent injunction.

4. On summons being issued, respondent no.2/defendant filed his written statement but not disputed the details of the disputed property. The appellant-defendant did not take any pain to file written statement.

5. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed as many as four issues and after recording the evidence and hearing both the parties, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 16.03.2018 holding that the suit property is belonging to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is title holder and possession holder of the disputed property and the defendants are also restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondent no.1 herein. Being aggrieved thereof, First appeal preferred by the appellant/defendant has been dismissed by learned 15th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur vide impugned judgment dated 23.11.2020. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant/defendant has preferred the instant second appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant contended that learned both the courts below have committed error in passing the impugned judgment. Both the courts below have not appreciated the documents and material evidence on record in accordance with law. The delay occurred in filing of the first appeal was purely due to administrative reasons and the same was not intentional or deliberate. In order to substantiate his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on Improvement Trust, Ludhiana vs. Ujagar Singh and others (2010) 6 SCC 786 [LQ/SC/2010/597] and prayed that second appeal be allowed by setting aside the judgments and decree passed by both the courts below.

7. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant and minutely perused the judgments passed by both the courts below.

8. The State has posed two substantial questions of law. The substantial questions of law posed by the State are itself defective and are not the substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The very first question proposed by the State is based on procedural delay. It is settled law that the party should be vigilant to approach the Court. If one is not vigilant then he has no right to seek any kind of relief. Procedural delay itself is not sufficient to see whether the order impugned is correct or not. There is no explanation submitted by the State what was the procedural delay and even if there was any procedural delay, the State was responsible.

9. Second question posed is whether the judgment passed by the courts below is contrary to the provisions of law. Learned Government Advocate for the State has failed to point out any of the provisions of law which has been violated by the first appellate court. The case law relied upon by the State, the Apex Court has held that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out. In the present appeal also, no sufficient and good grounds have been made out by the State.

10. The conduct of the State can be seen from basic facts that while before the trial court in the suit, the State has not chosen to file and submit written statement. Besides that the appeal was filed after one year 8 months and 24 days and for that also, there is a finding of the first appellate court that no explanation has been given except contending that the delay is bona fide. The first appellate court in detail has dealt with the matter and has given categorical finding that throughout the proceeding, the counsel for the State was present even on 6.2.2018 while filing Vakalatnama they filed an application under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC which was accepted by the trial court on 15.2.2018. This itself makes it clear that the State was not vigilant. Here in the present appeal also, the conduct of the State further elaborate the fact that the present second appeal was also filed almost after one year and five months. Though this Court on 16.8.2022 has condoned the delay but the lethargic attitude of the State continues even in filing the second appeal before this Hon'ble court.

11. The Supreme Court in the case of Narayanan Rajendran and Another vs. Lekshmy Sarojini and others in Civil Appeal No. 742 of 2001 has broadly discussed about the admissibility of the second appeal. The Court observed as under:-

"38. In Kamti Devi (Smt. ) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311 [LQ/SC/2001/1306] the court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding."

12. From the aforesaid discussions, it is clear like crystal that the Appellant State has totally failed to explain the delay by showing "sufficient cause" while the State was competent enough to have taken timely action. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. This court does not find any merit in the contention advanced by learned counsel for the State. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for adjudication in the instant second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in limine.

13. A copy of this order along with record be sent back to the courts below for information and its compliance.