(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act to set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 18.02.2003 in W.P.No.11729 of 1998.) M.M.SUNDRESH, J 1. This Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant aggrieved against the order passed by the learned single Judge in allowing the Writ Petition filed by the respondents 1 to 10 by setting aside the order passed by the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.357, Revenue (Land Reforms II (3) Department, dated 30.04.1998 by which the application filed by the appellant was allowed granting permission to hold an extent of 20.58 < acres of land. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: i. The appellant herein is a Trust created by a registered deed dated 03.12.1984. It acquired an extent of 20.58 < acres of land in Kurudampalayam Village, Coimbatore North Taluk, Coimbatore District, through various sale deeds between 1985 and 1987. Proceedings have been initiated by the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore, by issuing a notice under section 20-A of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as Act 1958 of 1961) as amended by Act 37 of 1972) to show cause as to why the purchase made by the appellant Trust shall not be declared as null and void having acquired contrary to the provisions contained in the Act. ii. After considering the reply given by the appellant dated 15.02.1990, a final order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore in Reference No.8405/88/E dated 09.06.1990 declaring an extent of 20.58 < acres of land as having vested with the Government. The appellant filed a revision before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Reforms, Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005, challenging the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under section 20-A of the Act. An application was also filed by the appellant on 21.06.1990 to the Government namely the respondent No.11 herein seeking permission under section 37-B of the Act to hold the excess land already purchased for the establishment and running of educational institutions as well as for hospital purposes. iii. The revision filed by the appellant before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Reforms, Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005, challenging the order passed under section 20-A of the Act was returned directing the appellant to approach the proper forum. Thereafter, it preferred a revision before the Land Commissioner, (Land Reforms) namely, the respondent No.12 herein, challenging the order of the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore passed under section 20-A of the Act. The revision filed by the appellant was dismissed by the 12th respondent on 13.12.1990 as time barred. iv. The application filed by the appellant under section 37-B was returned by the 11th respondent by letter dated 01.02.1991 for certain compliance. Since the appellant has not rectified the said defects and represented the application filed under section 37-B of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore sought for instruction to take over the possession of the surplus lands covered under section 20-A of the Act. Accordingly, the respondent No.11 granted permission in and by the proceedings dated 20.12.1994 to proceed in accordance with law consequent on the orders passed under section 20-A of the Act. v. Proceedings have been initiated by the Deputy Commissioner of Land Reforms under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Disposal of Surplus Land) Rules, 1965 by calling for applications towards the assignment of land. Accordingly, publications have been made under the Rules in important places such as the office of the District Collector, Revenue Divisional Officer, Tahsildar, District Adi Dravidar Welfare Officer, ex-service men land office and the Panchayats. After the receipt of all applications, 21 persons have been selected, comprising of three categories namely, scheduled caste, backward community and ex-service men, being landless poor and the lands have been assigned in their favour in the year 1995 (on payment of charges). In pursuant to the said assignment, possession was handed over to the assignees and the mutation was effected in the adangals as well as in the patta pass book. Chittas have been issued in their name. vi. The appellant filed a Special Revision Petition before the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, challenging the order of the 12th respondent dated 13.12.1990. The Tribunal in and by its order dated 07.12.1995 in S.R.P.No.75 of 1995 was pleased to set aside the order of the 12th respondent herein with a further direction to dispose of the revision petition filed by the appellant on merits. When the said revision was pending, the appellant made another request for permission under section 37-B of the Act on 12.07.1995. The Commissioner and Director of Land Reforms made a recommendation to the 11th respondent recommending permission to be granted in favour of the appellant. The said recommendation did not contain the earlier facts such as the proceedings dated 06.02.1995 initiated by the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore and the consequential assignment as well as the possession in favour of 21 persons who have been granted the said assignment. vii. Based upon the same, the revision filed by the appellant before the 12th respondent was disposed of by the order dated 05.04.1998 by directing the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore to pursue further action in the light of the orders of the Government to be under section 37-B of the Act. After the disposal of the said revision which was filed challenging the order passed under section 20-A of the Act, the respondent No.11 has granted permission under section 37-B of the said Act to hold an extent of 20.34 < acres of land. It is also to be seen from the records that even in the order passed under section 37-B of the Act by the 11th respondent there is absolutely no reference about the earlier proceedings which resulted in the assignments in favour of 21 poor landless persons. After coming to know of the said factum of granting permission by the respondent No.11 in favour of the appellant, the respondents 1 to 10 who are some of the beneficiaries and the assignees filed the Writ Petition in W.P.No.11729 of 1998 to quash the Government Order passed in G.O.Ms.No.357, Revenue (Land Reforms II (3) Department, dated 30.04.1998. viii. The Writ Petition filed by the respondents 1 to 10 was allowed by the learned single Judge on the ground that the power under section 37-B cannot be exercised by the respondent No.11 after taking possession under section 20-A of the Act. It was further observed that it cannot be said that the appellant was holding the lands as defined under section 3(19) of the Act. The learned single Judge was further pleased to hold that the Land Commissioner has not set aside the order passed under Section 20-A but only observed that action can be taken in pursuant to the decision to be taken by the respondent No.11. The contention of the appellant that it was acting as an "intermediary" as referred under section 3(19) was also rejected. The fact that the possession was taken and handed over to the respondents 1 to 10 with subsequent mutation was also taken into consideration for rejecting the contention of the appellant regarding possession. Finally the learned single Judge has held that from the assignment deeds executed in favour of respondents 1 to 10 as well as petitioners in W.A.M.P.No.26 of 2010, they cannot be cancelled on any other ground than those mentioned thereunder. Accordingly, the Writ Petition filed by the respondents 1 to 10 was allowed. Challenging the said order, the present Writ Appeal has been filed. The petitioners in W.A.M.P.No.26 of 2010 who are also the assignees like that of the respondents 1 to 10 have filed the said application seeking to implead themselves as party respondents in the appeal. 3. Submissions of the appellant: 3.1. Shri.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned single Judge has committed an error in holding that the appellant has made an application seeking permission under section 37-B only on 12.07.1995. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the appellant made an application as early as on 21.06.1990 itself. The appellant challenged the order passed under section 20-A before the Special Commissioner. Thereafter, the appellant again filed the revision before the respondent No.12 which passed the final order after the directions of the appellate Tribunal. The order passed by the 12th respondent would amount to setting aside the order passed under Section 20-A of the Act. The appellant had also enjoyed the benefit of stay in the revision filed before the 12th respondent. The 11th respondent has correctly exercised the power under Section 37-B of the Act. Further on the ground of law and equity, the appeal will have to be allowed. 3.2. The learned senior counsel also opposed the impleading petition filed by the proposed respondents on the ground that the said petition will have to be dismissed for laches. It is contended that the impleading petitioners having not filed any Writ Petition challenging the order passed by the 11th respondent in G.O.Ms.No.357, Revenue (Land Reforms II (3) Department, dated 30.04.1998 they cannot be permitted to place their submissions in the appeal. Hence, the learned senior counsel submitted that the appeal will have to be allowed and the impleading petition will be dismissed. 4. Submissions of respondents 1 to 10: 4.1. Shri.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 10 submitted that, the assignments granted in favour of respondents 1 to 10 were never challenged. The assignments have been made after following the due procedure and after receipt of the required payments. In pursuant to the assignments made to the needy persons, possession have been taken and mutations have been made in the revenue records. The appellant has not pursued the earlier application made on 21.06.1990. The averment made in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 11 and 12 would exemplify the fact that the possession has been taken and handed over to the assignees. Neither in the recommendations made by the Commissioner of Land Reforms nor in the order impugned, there is any reference to the accrued rights of respondents 1 to 10. Once the possession is taken by the appellant it would become a persona non grata and therefore has no locus standi to maintain the application under Section 37-B of the Act. There is no power or authority for the 11th respondent to pass the Government Order. The respondents 1 to 10 have not been heard in any other proceedings and in such an eventuality the order passed would become a nullity. In support of his said contentions, the learned senior counsel has made reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Honourable Apex Court in 2010-5-L.W.592 [SULOCHANA CHANDRAKANT GALANDE v. PUNE MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT AND OTHERS] and the judgment of the Division Bench rendered in 2008 (4) CTC 193 [MALARKODI v. THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU]. The senior counsel submitted that the Writ Appeal is devoid of merits and therefore, the same will have to be dismissed. 5. Shri.A.M.Packianathan Easter, learned counsel appearing for impleading petitioners submitted that inasmuch as the order impugned passed by the 11th respondent having not communicated to the impleading petitioners, they cannot be non-suited on the ground of laches. The appellant after filing a revision challenging the assignment granted to the needy persons ought to have impleaded all the persons. The impleading petitioners are the necessary parties and the order impugned passed by the 11th respondent would take away their vested rights. An order of assignment is a document of title and therefore the same cannot be set aside in proceedings in which the impleading petitioners were not made as parties. The proposed respondents have taken possession and necessary mutations have been made in the revenue records. They came to know about the proceedings only in the year 2003, in view of the interim order obtained by the appellant due to which the revenue authorities have refused to accept the payment of kist from them. Inasmuch as the order impugned passed by the 11th respondent is one without authority there is no question of delay. Hence, the learned counsel prayed that the impleading petition have to be allowed and the Writ Appeal will have to be dismissed. 6. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 11 and 12 submitted that the order under section 20-A has been correctly passed inasmuch as the appellant Trust has purchased land in violations of the provisions of the Act. The learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that, it is a fact that lands have been distributed to the poor and needy persons, which fact has not been taken into consideration while passing the order impugned. Therefore, it is submitted that appropriate orders will have to be passed by this Court. 7. We have heard the arguments of Shri.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, Shri.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 10, Shri.A.Arumugam, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 11 and 12 and Shri.A.M.Packianathan Easter, learned counsel appearing for proposed respondents 13 to 22. 8. Analysis of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961: 8.1. The Act has been enacted with the social objective of distributing the lands to the landless persons. It also provides fetters on the right to hold lands paving way for equitable distribution among the citizens. Considering the scope and reasoning behind the enactment, a wider interpretation will have to be given to a welfare legislation. The Court will have to adopt a goal oriented approach by acting as an activist and a catalyst. The Honourable Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of the Act in (1980) I MLJ 34 [AUTHORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR v. NAGANATHA AYYAR] has held as follows: "1. The short point of law decided in the long judgment under appeal may justly be given short shrift. But the batch of Civil Revision Petitions allowed by the High Court involves a legal issue of deep import from the angle of agrarian reform and surplus land available for distribution under its scheme that we deem it proper to discuss the core question at some length. If the statutory construction which found favour with the High Court be correct the risk of reform legislation being condemned to functional futility is great, and so the State has come up in appeal by Special Leave challenging the High Courts interpretation of section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (for short, the Ceiling Act). Presently, we will set out the skeletal facts relating to the civil appeals and the scheme of the Act designed for distributive justice in the field of agricultural land ownership, sufficient to disclose the purpose of the legislation, the mischief it intends to suppress, the reverse effect of the construction put on the key section (section 22) in the judgment under appeal and the consequent stultification of the objective of the Ceiling Act. While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform, the Court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgrimage to destination social justice should be helped, and not hampered, by judicial interpretation. For, the story of agrarian redistribution in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere, has been tardy and zig-zag, what with legislative delays, judicial stays and invalidations, followed by fresh constitutional amendments and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions, holding up, for decades, urgent measures of rural economic justice which was part of the pledges of the freedom struggle. It is true that judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters: but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution being one of the trinity of the nations appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order. The judiciary, in its sphere, shares the revolutionary purpose of the constitutional order, and when called upon to decode social legislation must be animated by a goal-oriented approach. This is part of the dynamics of statutory interpretation in the developing countries so that Courts are not converted into rescue shelters for those who seek to defeat agrarian justice by cute transactions of many manifestations now so familiar in the country and illustrated by the several cases under appeal. This caveat has become necessary because the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme." 8.2. Therefore, we are of the considered view that a wider interpretation has to be given, considering the object of the Act and on a proper reading of the provisions contained. 8.3. The appellant Trust was created as per the Trust Deed dated 03.12.1984. Act 37 of 1972 came into force with effect from 01.03.1972. Section 2 of the said Act prescribes that the provisions of the Act would not apply to the lands held by an existing public trust. Section 2(1) in specific terms states that the provisions of the Act would not apply to the lands already held by an existing trust at the time of coming into force of the Act. Therefore, when an immovable property is purchased by a trust which has come into existence after 01.03.1972 and the said purchase was also made in excess of the ceiling limit after the said period then the provisions of the Act would clearly apply. In other words, the exemption of the Act is only for the properties held by the Trust before coming into force of the Act and not subsequently acquired thereafter. Admittedly in the present case on hand, section 2 does not have any application as to the existence of the Trust and the purchase are subsequent to 01.03.1972. 9. Sub-section 19 of Section 3 reads as follows: "3(19)."to hold land", with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means to own land as owner or to possess or enjoy land as possessory mortgage or as tenant or as intermediary or in one or more of those capacities." 9.1. A reading of the above said Section would throw light on the fact that to hold a land one has to be a owner, mortgagee, tenant or intermediary or in one or more of those capacities. Considering the scope of the enactment a wider import cannot be given to give the benefit to any other person. The definition of the word hold or held has been considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in A.G.VARADARAJULU v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [(1998) 4 SCC 231] [LQ/SC/1998/359] wherein it has been held as under: "26. The word hold or held in the context of land has come up for consideration in several cases before this Court. In State of U.P. v. Sarjoo Devi6 while dealing with the said word in Section 3(14) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as follows: (SCC p.8, paras 8 and 10) The word held occurring in the above definition which is a past participle of the word hold is of wide import. In the Unabridged Edition of The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, the word hold has been inter alia stated to mean to have the ownership or use of; keep as ones own. *** In Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Second Edition), it is stated that in legal parlance the word held means to possess by legal title. Relying upon this connotation, this Court in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux7 interpreted the word held in Section 9 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as meaning possession by legal title.(emphasis supplied) Again in State of A.P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin8 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 4, para 8) According to Oxford Dictionary held means: to possess; to be the owner or holder or tenant of; keep possession of; occupy. Thus, held connotes both ownership as well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term held only in the sense of possession. The word holds was again interpreted in Hari Ram v. Babu Gokul Prasad where it occurs in Section 185(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. It was observed: (SCC p.611, para 5) The word holds is not a word of art. It has not been defined in the Act. It has to be understood in its ordinary normal meaning. According to Oxford English Dictionary, it means, to possess, to be owner or holder or tenant of. The meaning indicates that possession must be backed with some right or title. 9.2. Therefore, the words owner, mortgagee, tenant and intermediary will have to be read on the principle of ejusdem generis and there is no scope for giving any other interpretation to include all other persons. Further, Section 3(21) defines the word intermediary which only means that a person who acts in between as a broker, agent or negotiator, between the two parties, which is not the position of the petitioner in the present case. 9.3. Section 7 of the Act deals with ceiling on holding land, which is extracted hereunder: "7. Ceiling on holding land.-On and from the date of the commencement of this Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area: Provided that while calculating the total extent of land held by any person, any extent in excess of the ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall, irrespective of the assessment of such land, be excluded." 9.4. The said Section is both restrictive and prohibitive in nature. While it restricts the right of a person concerned, it declares that no person shall be subject to the exception, be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. Therefore, the object of the enactment is very clear that no person shall be allowed to have more lands than what is permissible under the Act. 10. Section 20-A deals with a penalty for future acquisition in contravention of the provisions of the Act. 10.1. Chapter III of the Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961 deals with ceiling of future acquisition and restriction of certain transfers. Section 20-A of the Act speaks about the penalty for future acquisition in contravention of the Act. It specifically provides for the contravention of Section 2(2). If such a contravention has been made by a party concerned, any transaction by which an excess land was acquired shall become null and void and such a land by way of a penalty would be deemed to have been transferred to the Government with effect from the date of such acquisition. Therefore, a reading of section 20-A would make it clear that a transaction made in contravention of the Act would become null and void. Thereafter, the land which is the subject matter of such transaction would be deemed to have been transferred to the Government with effect from the date of acquisition based upon a declaration made by the authorised officer. Hence, section 20-A can be divided into two parts. The first part being the transaction becoming null and void having contravened the provisions of the Act and the second part being the property which is the subject matter of the transaction would vest with the Government in pursuant to the declaration made by the authorised officer. Therefore, applying the said provision to the facts of the case, the transaction admittedly being a void transaction having contravened the provisions of the Act, thereafter, in pursuant to the declaration made by the authorised officer, the property involved in, got vested with the Government. 11. Scope of Section 37-B of the Act: 11.1. Section 37-B of the Act speaks about a consideration of the application made by public trust seeking permission to hold or acquire land for educational or hospital purposes. A perusal of the said section would exemplify the fact that an application has to be made prior to the proposed acquisition. The application is only for seeking a permission to hold or to acquire the land which cannot be construed to ratify the sale already effected in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Admittedly in the present case on hand, the appellant has made the application initially in the year 1990 and after not following such procedure, thereafter made another application in the year 1995. The possession was also taken after the proceedings under section 20-A and the lands were no longer held by the appellant thereafter. Section 37-B is subject to the provisions contained under section 73 of the Act. Section 73 of the Act which comes under Chapter-IX deals with exemption. Section 73 would come into effect only after an order is passed under section 37-B provided the permission granted therein would continue to be in force. 11.2. Therefore, the above provisions would make it clear that what is required in law is only to seek a permission for the proposed purchase and not to ratify a contravention made by way of a sale already effected. In the present case on hand, it is not in dispute that the appellant has made the application after the order was passed under section 20-A of the Act by the Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Coimbatore. Hence, as observed by the learned single Judge, the respondent No.11 does not have the power, authority or jurisdiction to invoke section 37-B in favour of the appellant after passing orders under section 20-A of the Act. 11.3. Admittedly, the land has been taken possession after following the due procedure and given to the landless poor. The proceedings in favour of the landless poor have become final and there is no clause in the assignment deed towards cancellation on any other ground other than the conditions mentioned therein. The appellant is neither a owner nor an intermediary and he is a persona non grata having no right to invoke the provisions under section 37-B of the Act. Section 37-B of the Act is only for an intending purchaser and therefore the same cannot be used for validating an illegal act done by a party concerned. 11.4. It is a well settled principle of law that an exemption is an exception to the provisions of the Act. In such an eventuality it is for the appellant to prove that he is entitled to invoke the exemption under section 37-B read with section 73 of the Act. Such a power cannot be exercised for a mere asking but has to be exercised with utmost care and caution by the authority concerned. Therefore, a clause containing exception will be strictly interpreted and such a clause will have to befriend the general provision and disfavour the exception. The Honourable Apex Court in PROJECT OFFICER, IRDP AND OTHERS v. P.D.CHACKO [(2010) 6 SCC 637] [LQ/SC/2010/557] has held as follows: "14. An exception clause is normally part of the enacting section, unlike a proviso which follows an enacting part. Crawfords Interpretation of Laws (1989), p.128, speaks of exception as follows: "91. Exceptions and provisos.-... The exception, however, operates to affirm the operation of the statute to all cases not excepted and excludes all other exceptions; that is, it exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the statute." 15. It is trite law that an exception clause has to be strictly interpreted and cannot be assumed but be proved. An exception clause is always subject to the rule of construction and in case of doubt, it must befriend the general provision and disfavour the exception. If any category of person claims exception from the operation of the statute it must establish that it comes within the exception." 11.5. Therefore on a consideration of the provisions discussed above, we are of the view that the learned single Judge was perfectly right in holding that the exercise of power under section 37-B by the 11th respondent is totally without power, authority and jurisdiction. 12. Non-application of mind: 12.1. The order impugned passed by the respondent No.11 is also liable to be set aside for a total non-application of mind. Admittedly, the application was made seeking permission under Section 37-B after the orders passed under section 20-A of the Act. The order passed under section 20-A of the Act has not been set aside, modified or varied. The revisional authority only observed that inasmuch as the proceedings have been initiated and pending under section 37-B, no further adjudication under section 20-A is required. The respondent No.11 has not at all considered the fact that the possession has been taken from the appellant and distributed to the landless poor by way of assignments. The effect of the third party rights and entitlement to be heard was not considered. No records have been placed before the respondent No.11 while passing the order impugned. Further the appellant has not pursued the earlier application made under section 37-B and the order impugned in the Writ Petition was passed only based on the subsequent application by which time third party rights have arisen and steps have already been taken to distribute the lands. 12.2. On the contrary, a report has been sent by the Commissioner and Director of Land Reforms, dated 26.03.1998 recommending permission in favour of the appellant. Even in the said recommendation there was no reference about the assignments made in favour of the respondents herein. The 11th respondent has also not considered the scope of section 37-B and satisfied himself about the availability of the jurisdiction to exercise his power. It is a settled position of law that an assignment granted under enactment is a document of title inasmuch as it has been transferred by the Government being the owner of the property in favour of the assignee and the same cannot be cancelled except for the violation of the conditions mentioned therein. 12.3. Hence we hold that the order impugned passed by the respondent No.11 is also liable to be set aside on the ground of non-application of mind. 13. Whether the order impugned would become a nullity: 13.1. Admittedly by passing the order impugned the assignment given in favour of the respondents 1 to 10 and the impleading petitioners have been set aside. The respondents 1 to 10 and the impleading petitioners have not been heard. It is a well established principle of law that an order passed having the civil consequences without hearing the party and without serving the same is a nullity in the eye of law. It is also to be seen that once the land is vested with the Government the erstwhile land owner becomes a persona non grata. Until and unless the statute permits, such a person does not have any legal right to seek restoration of the land and it is for the Government to dispose it of in the manner known to law. 13.2. In AIR 1985 SC 1416 [LQ/SC/1985/223] [UNION OF INDIA v. TULSIRAM PATEL], the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows: "the principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that Article." 13.3. The said judgment of the Honourable Apex Court was also followed by a Division Bench of this Court in 2008 (4) CTC 193 [MALARKODI v. THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU], wherein it has been held as follows: "43. That being the settled position in law, it can no longer be said that before cancelling patta no hearing is necessary. In the instant case, admittedly hearing was not given. As such, the order of cancellation cannot be upheld. Apart from that it is an admitted stand of the Government that the order of cancellation was never dispatched by the State Government. So it had not been served on the persons whose pattas are allegedly cancelled. It is well settled that an order which has not been communicated but is kept in the file, is of no effect [See State of West Bengal v. M.R.Mondal and Another, 2001 (8) SCC 44, Para.16, page 455 of the report]. Factually also, the order of cancellation does not stand on a sound footing." 13.4. The Honourable Apex Court in the judgment in 1996 VOL.II L.L.J. 296 [STATE BANK OF PATIALA AND OTHERS v. S.K.SHARMA] has held as follows: "29....In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity." To illustrate - take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in RIDGE v. BALDWIN). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid - or void, if one chooses to use that expression (CALVIN v. CARR). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officers report MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. B.KARUNAKAR or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L.Tripathi) it would be a case falling in the latter category - violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice - in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing......." (emphasis added) 13.5. The said ratio of the Honourable Apex Court was also followed by the Division Bench of this Court in INDIAN NETWORK FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS v. UNION OF INDIA [(2009) 3 MLJ 791] [LQ/MadHC/2008/5760] and YAHOO! INC (FORMERLY OVERTURE SERVICE INC.) v. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD [2010 (5) CTC 625 [LQ/MadHC/2010/3855] ]. 13.6. Considering the above said ratio laid down in the above said pronouncements, we are of the view that the order impugned is a nullity having its civil consequences for taking away the rights of the respondents 1 to 10 as well as the impleading petitioners without even hearing them. 14.W.A.M.P.NO.26 OF 2010 14.1. Admittedly the order impugned has got civil consequences. In so far as the impleading petitioners are concerned, they have not been heard and the adverse order has not been served on them. The impleading petitioners have been granted assignment in accordance with the rules. They came to know about the proceedings only after the revenue officials refused to receive the kist in view of the interim order obtained by the appellant. Further, the appellant being aware of the fact of the assignment granted in favour of the impleading petitioners in having filed a revision challenging the order dated 06.02.1995, ought to have impleaded them in the appeal on its own accord. 14.2. The Honourable Apex Court in (1978) 1 SCC 405 [LQ/SC/1977/331] [MOHINDER SINGH GILL v. CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER] has held that everything that affects the person in a civil right is a civil consequence and such a person is entitled to agitate his grievance in a court of law, wherein it has been held as follows: "66. It was argued, based on rulings relating to natural justice, that unless civil consequences ensued, hearing was not necessary. A civil right being adversely affected is a sine qua non for the invocation of the audi alteram partem rule. This submission was supported by observations in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., (1970) 1 SCR 472 [LQ/SC/1969/198] , Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha, (1971) 1 SCR 791. [LQ/SC/1970/295] Of course, we agree that if only spiritual censure is the penalty, temporal laws may not take cognizance of such consequences since human law operates in the material field although its vitality vicariously depends on its morality. But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, bypassing verbal booby-traps Civil consequences undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence...." 14.3. Hence we are of the view that the impleading petition will have to be allowed. 15. Whether the Writ Appeal is to be allowed on the ground of equity: 15.1. It is a well established principle of law that between equity and law, the law has to prevail. When the law totally prohibits a particular action then the Court cannot grant the relief based upon equity alone. Further in this case, we do not find any equity in favour of the appellant and if there is any equity apart from the legal position the same has to be exercised in favour of the respondents 1 to 10 as well as the impleading petitioners. The Honourable Apex Court in (2009) 9 SCC 92 [LQ/SC/2009/1708] [VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA] has held as follows: "22. In our opinion, when the language of the statute is plain and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is only when the language of the statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict, etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a conflict between the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As stated in the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law"." 15.2. Hence considering the said ratio, we are of the view that the appellant cannot seek any equity in its favour. 16. In fine, the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.A.M.P.No.26 of 2010 is allowed.