Ramesam, J.

[1] These second appeals arise out of two suits by the Rajah of Vizianagram to resume certain lands on the ground that they are service inam lands held by the defendants as remuneration in lieu of wages for private and personal services to be rendered and therefore resumable at the will of the Zamindar. It is admitted that the suit lands were part of the assets of the Zamindari of Vizianagram, that the suit lands were granted in 1831 and therefore are what are generally known as dharmilla inam lands. But the Courts below found with reference to Exhibits I and I-A that the suit lands were burdened with service and therefore not resumable. Mr. Venkatesa Aiyangar appearing for the appellant strongly contends that the presumption is that the lands being dharmilla inam lands are resumable. In Lakhamgavda v. Keshav Annaji (1901) ILR 28 B 305 it was held that the burden of proving resumability is on the person seeking to resume; but this principle is subject to what has been laid down in a series of decisions in this presidency, namely, in the case of dharmilla inam lands granted for services, they are prima facie resumable. The presumption put in this form is very slight and it is not likely we will have a case where no further information is available except that it is a service inam land granted subsequent to the Permanent Settlement. If it further appears that the service is public, the lands are not resumable--see Radha Pershad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (1895) ILR 22 C 938. But if the service is private or personal, a presumption arises that the lands are held in lieu of cash salary for the private service and therefore resumable--see Vadisapu Appandora v. Vyricherla Veerabhadraraju Bahadur (1911) 30 MLJ 132 and Visweswara Nissenka Bahadur v. Gorla Budaradu (1910) 8 MIA 438 at 464. But it must be remembered that this is only a presumption. The presumption can be rebutted--see Mrutyunjayadu v. Rajah of Pittapuram (1915) 30 MLJ 1

32. Even where the lands are dharmilla inam lands and services are private and personal, if the terms of the grant show that they were given partly for past services and partly for future services, then it would be more a grant burdened with service rather than a grant as remuneration for future services. In Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 MIA 438 at 464 the grant was for partly past and partly future services. No doubt in that case the service was public and the grant was prior to the settlement. In this case, the District Judge has found relying upon Exs. I, I-A and B that the grant was for partly past and partly future services. Exs. I and I-A are accounts prepared by the Freeze Committee in 1835. The use of the word Akaram in these documents show that future services were also expected to be rendered. The finding also is that future services have been rendered. These documents show that past services that were rendered also entered into the motive of the grant. Sitting in Second Appeal, I cannot say that the District Judge has misconstrued any of the documents in the case and I am bound to accept the finding. I wish to guard myself against accepting the dictum of Venkatasubba Rao J., in Thiruvenkatacharlu v. Shaik Altoo Sahib (1925) 27 Crlj 321 where he says there is no presumption that when the grantor proves that the services are personal, the grant is made in lieu of wages. The decisions in this Presidency show that such a presumption may arise provided nothing more appears. In the present case we have got documents showing that the grant was made for partly past and partly future services.

[2] The result is, accepting the finding of the District Judge, the second appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.