Burn, J.

This is an appeal by the Provincial Government from the acquittal of the respondent in Sessions Case No. 45 of 1937 tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Kurnool. The respondent was charged with the murder of a woman named Pedda Narasamma on the 14th August 1937. The prosecution case was that the woman left home between 9 and 10 in the morning to gather cow dung and did not return alive. The same evening her corpse was found in a lonely spot on a jungle road called Pedda Banda Rastha about two miles from the village. There were eighteen injuries upon the corpse including thirteen incised wounds and there is no doubt about the fact that the woman was intentionally killed.

The evidence against the respondent was in the main circumstantial. It was proved that some hours before the woman went along the Pedda Banda Rastha, the respondent had gone in the same direction to cut brushwood for fuel. There was evidence that when he was found on the outskirts of the village the next morning, his dhoti was spotted with blood. There was the evidence of one witness (P.W. 8) that he had been seen with the woman at the place where the corpse was found. P.W. 8 said that he saw the respondent and the woman struggling together from some distance but he did not go nearer to find out exactly what was happening, because he surmised that some amorous adventure was afoot. Besides this there was the evidence of the Police Inspector P.W. 18, the Karnam P.W. 15 and another witness P.W. 16 that on the 16th August, the respondent made a confessional statement to the Inspector which led to the discovery of a wood chopper and an axe with which the respondent was alleged to have killed the woman.

The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 8 and held that the remaining evidence was not sufficient to warrant a conviction of the respondent. The learned Public Prosecutor has contended that this decision was wrong. But after carefully going through the evidence we are unable to differ from the conclusion at which the learned Sessions Judge arrived. We think the evidence that the respondent went in the same direction as the woman on the morning of the 14th August is true. We are unable to believe the evidence of P.W.

8. His conduct was wholly unnatural. In the Court of the Committing Magistrate this witness admitted that he had known Narasamma for two months before her death and even said that he had been fed by her at a time when he was working for her husband. He admitted in the Court of the Committing Magistrate that Narasamma was a woman of good character. But in the Sessions Court in order to excuse his non-interference he pretended that he did not know the woman before and that he suspected her to be a woman of loose character and even that she had invited the respondent to approach her. The evidence regarding the information said to have been given by the respondent leading to the discovery of the woodchopper (M.O. 4), the axe-head (M.O. 3) and the axe-handle (M.O. 3-a) was, we think, not admissible under S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The whole story is entirely artificial. The Karnam P.W. 15 and P.W. 16 both say that on the 16th August they were sent for to go to the Police Station at Kolimigundla where the respondent was kept in custody. When they arrived there, the respondent was brought out of the lock-up and examined by the Circle Inspector in their presence. This means that the Circle Inspector knew beforehand precisely what the respondent was going to say. His procuring the presence of P.Ws. 15 and 16 and three others who signed the Mahazar Ex. G-2 was a mere farce. It is impossible to say that anything was discovered in consequence of the statement made by the respondent to the Inspector in the presence of P.Ws. 15 and

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6. We have had occasion to deprecate this manner of manufacturing evidence before and we shall if necessary continue to do so. S. 27 of the Evidence Act is not designed by the Legislature to encourage proceedings of this sort. S. 27, as we have frequently held, is quite simple; it says that where any fact is deposed to as having been discovered in consequence of information given by a person in custody accused of an offence, so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved whether it amounts to a confession or whether it does not. Apparently the Circle Inspector (P.W. 18) like so many of his fellow officers was afraid that if he went into the Court and said that he had received such and such information from the accused, the Court would not believe him. He therefore found it necessary to have more trustworthy persons than himself present as witnesses when the information should be disclosed. This is a regrettable attitude on the part of any Police officer and much more on the part of an officer of the grade of Circle Inspector. The Circle Inspector ought to expect to be believed when he gives evidence on oath. We think that the evidence regarding the statements made by the respondent and embodied in the panachayatnama (Ex. G-2) and spoken to by P.Ws. 15, 16 and 18 was wholly inadmissible.

If that be excluded, it is clear that the mere presence of a few spots of blood upon the dhoti of the respondent at the time he was arrested could not do more than lead to some suspicion against him.

There was evidence that when the respondent was arrested he had some scratches on his face and other parts of his person and the suggestion by the prosecution is that these injuries were sustained by him in a struggle with the woman. This may or may not be so. If the respondent is the person who murdered the woman, it is quite possible that he came by these scratches in that way; but the presence of scratches is not by itself sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he murdered the woman. This is also, we may note, quite inconsistent with the evidence given by P.W.

8. If Narasamma was able to inflict as many as nine scratches on the person of her assailant, it is obvious that she had plenty of time to scream and cry out for help. P.W. 8 says that he did not hear her scream and adds that the wind was blowing from him to her. As the distance between himself and the woman according to his own account was only between 50 and 60 yards, it is a singularly futile excuse for not having heard the womans cry.

For these reasons we think that the acquittal of the respondent was right on the evidence recorded in this case. The respondent must be set at liberty forthwith. We may note that the learned Sessions Judge erred in excluding certain statements which the learned Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court wished to elicit from P.W.

8. From a note of the learned Sessions judge in the deposition of this witness it appears that the prosecution intended to cite one Gurrappa to corroborate P.W. 8 and the corroboration was to consist in a statement by Gurrappa of what the witness had told him the same night. The learned Sessions Judge thinks that the interval of time between the murder and the statement of P.W. 8 to Gurrappa was too long. But since the murder occurred only about the middle of the day and the witnesss statement to Gurrappa was said to have been made the same night, we think that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong. This is sufficient proximity in time to warrant the application of S. 157 of the Evidence Act.