(Prayer: Petition (disposed of on 11-7-1947) praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith the High Court will be pleased to excuse the delay in filing S.R. No. 20240 of 1946 A.A.O. sought to be preferred to the High Court against the order of the District Court, Coimbatore, dated 22-9-1945 and made in O.P. No. 17 of 1944 (Compensation Case No. 2 of 1944).)

Patanjali Sastri, J.

This appeal arises out of an award of compensation made by an arbitrator appointed under S. 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, which provides for the payment of compensation in accordance with certain principles for compulsory acquisition of immoveable property etc. The appeal was filed admittedly beyond the time prescribed by Art. 156 of the Limitation Act for an appeal to this Court. The appellant, while maintaining that the said article is not applicable to the case, also applied under S. 5 of that Act for admission of the appeal even if it was considered as presented after time, but that application was rejected on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown for not presenting it within the prescribed period. The appeal is now posted before us for determining whether, as contended by the appellant, no time limit has been provided for an appeal of this kind and it must accordingly be deemed to have been duly filed.

The contention is based on two grounds: first, that Cl. (g) of S. 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, has the effect of excluding the application of the law of limitation to arbitration proceedings under that section and, secondly, this is neither an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure nor an appeal from a decree or order and consequently does not fall under Art. 156. We are of opinion that the contention must be accepted on the first ground, and that it is unnecessary to consider the second which the Government Pleader for the respondent, seeks to repel on the strength of Ramasami Pillai v. The Deputy Collector of Madura (43 Mad. 51) [LQ/MadHC/1919/141] .

Sub-S. (1) of S. 19 provides, inter alia , that when no agreement can be reached regarding the amount of compensation the Central Government shall appoint as arbitrator a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court [Cl. (b)]. The arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act so far as they can be made applicable [Cl. (e)]. An appeal shall lie to the High Court against an award of an arbitrator except in certain cases [Cl. (f)]. Cl. (g) on the true construction of which th e question turns reads as follows:

Save as provided in this section and in any rules made thereunder, nothing in any law for the time being in force shall apply to arbitrations under this section.

Sub-Ss. 2 and 3 confer on the Central Government the power to make rules prescribing, inter alia , the principles to be followed in appointing the costs of proceedings before the arbitrator and on appeal [Cl. (b)].

It is manifest that the words of exclusion in Cl. (g) are very wide and must cover the Limitation Act as to which no saving provision is to be found in the section and none has been brought to our notice in any of the rules. It is, however, urged by the Government Pleader that the exclusion operates only in respect of proceedings before the arbitrator and that an appeal to the High Court cannot be regarded as an arbitration within the meaning of the clause. Reliance is placed on Cl. (b) of Sub-S. 3 where proceedings before the arbitrator are referred to as being something distinct from proceedings on appeal. We are unable to accept the argument. In our opinion arbitrations in Cl. (g) covers the entire proceedings from their commencement before the arbitrator to their termination in the High Court on appeal where an appeal has been preferred. Although the appeal is given to the High Court under Cl. (f), the appeal is against the award of the arbitrator, and it seems to us that the High Cour t in hearing and deciding the appeal acts essentially as an arbitration tribunal, no less bound than the arbitrator under Cl. (e) to have regard to the considerations referred to therein. We find nothing in Cl. (b) of Sub-S. 3 militating against this view. As that clause contemplates provisions being made by rules for the apportionment of costs incurred before the arbitrator and on appeal reference had to be made to the proceedings in the two separate stages but such reference cannot in our view import any distinction in the nature of the proceedings in their different stages.

In the analogous case of an award of compensation by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act from which an appeal lies to the District Court in the first instance and then to the High Court the entire proceedings from beginning to end were regarded by the Privy Council as arbitration proceedings. Distinguishing their decision in Rangoon Botatoung Co., Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon (39 I.A. 197=40 Cal. 21), their Lordships observed in Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (43 I.A. 192=39 Mad. 617=4 L.W. 486), as follows:

In the Rangoon case a certain award had been made by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act. This award was affirmed by the Court, which under the act meant a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Two Judges sat as the Court and also as the High Court to which the appeal is given from the award of the Court. The proceedings were, however, from beginning to end ostensibly and actually arbitration proceedings.

These observations support the view which we have expressed above.

It follows that no bar of limitation is applicable to the appeal which is accordingly in time.