P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.These eight tax revision cases filed by the assessees pertaining to the assessment years 1975-76 to 1978-79 both under the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the APGST Act") and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the CST Act") raise a common question whether the supplies of cement made to the K.C.P. Sugar Factory at Vuyyur (A.P. State) and K.C.P. Engineering Works, Madras, are "sales". The disputed turnovers are as follows :

2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner is a division of the K.C.P. Limited, which is a public limited company having its registered office at Madras. The said company has at least three divisions or units, i.e., (i) K.C.P. Engineering Works, Madras, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of machine tools ; (ii) K.C.P. Sugar Factory, Vuyyur, engaged in manufacture and sale of sugar ; and (iii) Ramakrishna Cements, Macherla (petitioner), carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of cement. Each one of them is separately registered as a dealer under the respective Sales Tax Acts. The petitioner, namely, the K.C.P. Limited (Ramakrishna Cements), Macherla, is a registered dealer within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Tax Officer, Piduguralla, Guntur district. The petitioner is registered under the APGST and CST Acts. The petitioner after obtaining the permits from the Cement Controller, transferred certain quantities of cement during the relevant years to the K.C.P. Sugar Factory, Vuyyur and K.C.P. Engineering Works, Madras, for the purpose of consumption by transferee units. No invoices were issued in respect of these supplies. However, the accounts disclosed that the cost of cement despatched was debited to the accounts of the transferee-concerns and credited to the account of the petitioner. It is stated by the appellate authority (the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes) that the amount credited to the petitioners account included the sales tax chargeable on the value of the cement as well. However, it is to be mentioned that there is a controversy on the question whether in fact sales tax was also taken into account.

3. The Commercial Tax Officer made these assessments or reassessments treating the transactions as "sales" in respect of the supplies made to the K.C.P. Sugar Factory, Vuyyur. The value of the cement reflected in the accounts of the petitioner was subjected to sales tax under the APGST Act. In regard to the cement supplied to the K.C.P. Engineering Works, Madras, tax was levied under the CST Act at 10 per cent. The first appellate authority confirmed these assessments. Thereupon, the petitioner preferred second appeal to the Tribunal. As the Tribunal dismissed the appeals confirming the orders of the lower authorities, the present tax revision cases are before us.

4. The Tribunal took the view that merely by virtue of the juristic personality of a corporate body, the petitioner cannot claim immunity from taxation having regard to the clear provisions of the taxation statute. The Tribunal referred to the definition of "dealer" under the CST Act, and the APGST Act and the relevant provisions dealing with the registration of dealers. The Tribunal concluded that there was transfer of property in goods for consideration having regard to the entries in the accounts and that in view of the diverse manufacturing activities of the three units, the transaction was not merely in the nature of transfer of goods from one business place to another. The Tribunal observed that the assessee itself had treated the transaction as sale by making appropriate entries in the account books. The Tribunal further observed that the fact that the registered office at Madras submitted a single return in respect of all the units under the Income Tax Act, is a totally irrelevant consideration for deciding the sales tax liability of the petitioner. It is the correctness of these conclusions of the Tribunal that are in question in these tax revision cases.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated before us the contentions urged before the Tribunal. He contends that there is no transfer of property in goods from one person to another, which is an essential ingredient of sale inasmuch as all the three units are only divisions of a single company which has a separate legal personality. He submits that neither separate registration under the Sales Tax Acts nor the accounting procedure adopted by the petitioner, does really make a material difference for the purpose of judging the question involved. The learned counsel also contended that for the subsequent years, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal dissented from the view expressed in the impugned order and held that supply of cement to the two units at Vuyyur and Madras did not amount to sale. The learned counsel placed particular reliance on Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Indokem Private Limited, , U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, and State of Orissa v. Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd. [1983] 53 STC 329 (Ori) . It may be noticed that in the later order of the Tribunal, reliance was placed on the judgments of the Allahabad and Orissa High Courts referred to above.

6. The learned Government Pleader while drawing our attention to the findings of the Tribunal contended that the assessee has not placed any material to show that the supplies of cement are not in the nature of sales. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the intention of the assessee was to treat the transaction as sale, as evident from the accounts maintained and the sales tax charged. According to him, the different activities of the three units and the recognition of each one of the units as separate assessable entities, imbues the entire transaction with the character of sale. He has cited [1950] 1 STC 282 (Pat) [Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar] in support of his contention.

7. Before we proceed to consider the issue on hand, let us refer to the relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act. The expression "sale" is defined to mean by Section 2(n) of the APGST Act as :

"every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or commerce, for cash, or for deferred payment, or for any other valuable consideration (and includes any transfer of materials for money consideration in the execution of a works contract.......) or in the supply of distribution of goods by a society (including a co-operative society), club, firm or association to its members, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation or pledge of, or a charge on goods."

Section 2(g) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, defines "sale" as follows :

"Any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, and includes a transfer of goods on the hire-purchase or other system of payment by instalments, but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of or a charge or pledge on goods."

"Dealer" according to Section 2(e) of the APGST Act means, "any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods, directly or otherwise, whether for cash or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration.....".

8. According to Section 2(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, "dealer" means, "any person who carries on (whether regularly or otherwise) the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods, directly or indirectly, for cash, or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, and includes--

(i) a local authority, a body corporate, a company, any co-operative society or other society, club, firm, Hindu undivided family or other association of persons which carries on such business....".

9. Section 12(2)(a) of the APGST Act, casts an obligation on every dealer carrying on business in all or any of goods mentioned in Schedules I to V, to get himself registered under the Act irrespective of the quantum of his turnover in such goods. We are not concerned with the exceptions envisaged thereunder. It may be noted that cement is one of the commodities specified in the First Schedule. Clause (d) of Section 12(2) enjoins that a dealer having more than one shop or place of business other than a place used merely for the storage of goods, shall apply for registration and obtain a separate registration certificate in respect of each such shop or place of business. According to Rule 29(1) read with Rule 29(4), every registration certificate in respect of the dealer carrying on business in goods specified in Schedules I to III other than a dealer in rice shall cover one place of business (other than the place used merely for storage of goods). However Sub-rule (5) says that where a dealer has more than one place of business other than the place used merely for storage of goods, a single application may be submitted for registration for all places of business.

10. Rule 3(2) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, lays down that where a dealer has more than one place of business within a State, he shall make a single application in respect of such places named in such application.

11. Having referred to the relevant provisions, we will now take up the consideration of the only issue arising in these revisions, namely, whether there is sale of goods by the petitioner--K.C.P. Ltd. (Ramakrishna Cements) in favour of (1) K.C.P. Ltd. (Sugar Factory), Vuyyur, (2) K.C.P. Ltd. (Engineering Works), Madras.

12. It is axiomatic that sale can only take place between two persons. There cannot be any sale to ones self unless, of course, he acts in a different capacity. The definition of "sale" both under the APGST Act as well as the CST Act makes it crystal-clear that in order to constitute a sale, there must be transfer of property in goods for consideration by one person to another . The concept of sale in the Sale of Goods Act is no different. Section 4 contemplates a seller and buyer to be parties to a contract of sale. When a sale takes place, the seller is divested of the property in goods and the buyer acquires the property in the goods transferred. In this process, the title to the goods vested in the seller gets transferred to the buyer.

13. In Halsburys Laws of England, "sale" is defined as the transfer of ownership of a thing from one person to another for a money price. In Chalmers Sale of Goods Act, it is stated that "the essence of sale is the transfer of the property in a thing from one person to another for a price". These passages were referred to with approval by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. [1958] 9 STC 353.

14. The crux of the problem here is, whether the transfer of cement from the petitioner, one unit of K.C.P. Ltd., to the other two units of K.C.P. Ltd., would amount to transfer of property by one person to another. In our opinion, it does not. It is not in dispute that the petitioner--a cement manufacturing unit at Macherla, the sugar factory at Vuyyur and the engineering workshop at Madras are all integral parts of the K.C.P. Ltd., having its registered office at Madras. K.C.P. Ltd., is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Undoubtedly, an incorporated company has a distinct legal personality. In Gowers Principles of Modern Company law, it is stated :

"The fundamental attribute of corporate personality--from which indeed all the other consequences flow - is that the Corporation is a legal entity distinct from its members. Hence, it is capable of enjoying rights and of being subject to duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by its members. In other words, it has legal personality and is often described as an artificial person in contrast with a human being, a natural person."

15. The company may have several units or divisions located at different places engaged either in the same line of manufacture or trading or in different manufacturing or trading activities. Normally, the units or divisions will have no separate identity of their own, much less a distinct legal entity. There may be separate establishments, separate planning and separate management, but these aspects by themselves do not detract from the basic characteristic of communion with the corporate body that had created these units or divisions. They can claim no independent existence apart from the company itself. The property of these units or divisions is legally held by the company. The profits generated by the units form part of the companys income and will go to the benefit of general body of shareholders of the company. So also, the liabilities or losses incurred by the individual units, in ultimate analysis, will have to be borne by the company. It is the company (the K.C.P. Ltd.) that can sue for the recovery of property or dues or be sued for the outstandings due on account of dealings of the units. It is on record that a single balance sheet is prepared by the company in respect of all the units and divisions owned and controlled by the company. The balance sheet for the year ending on 30th June, 1977, which is found in one of the assessment files bears testimony to the fact that the assets, including the raw material, stock-in-trade and finished stocks, are treated as the property of the company itself as a whole. So also the liabilities of various units are consolidated and shown as those of the company. A report regarding the operation and working results of these three units is given in the balance sheet for the information of the shareholders.

16. It is to be noted that this is not a case of "holding" and "subsidiary" companies--in which case, there could have been some debate on the question whether they are independent entities. Besides, there is nothing to show nor any findings are recorded to the effect that notwithstanding the apparent garb which they wear as component elements of the company, they were in fact conducting themselves as truly separate and independent entities dissociated from the juristic personality of the company. There is no remotest hint anywhere that a colourable device has been adopted by the company for the purpose of avoiding sales tax liability in setting up diverse units and integrating them with the company.

17. The only circumstance on which the appellate authorities have relied upon are that (1) the petitioner as well as the other two units are registered as dealers under the Sales Tax Acts and such registration shows that each unit is separate and independent of the other, and (2) the petitioner itself treated the transaction as a sale by effecting debit and credit entries in the accounts in respect of the cost of the cement despatched and that even sales tax was charged. We agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that these factors by themselves do not invest the transactions in question with the character of sale within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the APGST Act and Section 2(g) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The registration under the Sales Tax Acts does not necessarily mean that the registered dealer becomes a separate legal entity different from its creator, viz., the company proper. It is to be remembered that the company--K.C.P. Ltd., has its registered office at Madras. It carries on business in Andhra Pradesh State through its two units, namely, cement factory and sugar factory. Both these units ought to be registered separately under the existing Rules. Rule 29(4) of the APGST Rules enjoins that every registration certificate shall cover one place of business only (other than a place used merely for storage of goods). Thus, even in a case where a single person has two places of business in the State, two registration certificates are granted. On that account, it cannot be said that each place of business of that person is a separate and distinct legal entity. The position is no different here. Notionally, the different units of a company doing business at separate places may be regarded as separate dealers for the purpose of administrative convenience or for assessment purpose. But, that does not mean that each unit would thereby become an independent legal personality different from the company itself. If the test of registration as a dealer under the Sales Tax Acts is taken as the true index of the separate juristic personality of the registered unit or concern, it would lead to anomalous and unintended results. Even the stock transfers from head office to the branch or from one branch to another could then be taken as sales on the ground that there is transfer of property from one dealer to another by virtue of the separate registration of the branches. But, that is not what is contemplated by Section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act. The separate registration of various unite of a single company under the respective Sales Tax Acts may be necessitated either on account of geographical location of the units or by reason of statutory obligation imposed under the relevant provisions to obtain a separate registration certificate for each place of business.

18. The registration certificate obtained by each branch or unit may, at best show, that they are separate assessable entities. But it has no bearing on the question whether they are distinct and different legal entities capable of transferring property in goods from each other. It is to be noted in this context that the language used in the provision defining "sale", either under the APGST Act or the CST Act is not "from one registered dealer to another", but "by one person to another". If the person--either natural or legal is the same, it could hardly be said that there is a transfer of property or title in goods. The very idea of transfer of property or title connotes that by virtue of transfer, change in the ownership is brought about. Obviously, that result does not ensue in a case where, for instance, the goods are transferred from one place of business of the dealer to another place of business of the dealer, though by virtue of the special provision governing registration, both of them may be registered dealers. Separate registration certificates issued to the units or branches of an incorporated company have never been considered to be sufficient to confer the legal personality on such units and branches.

19. In Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited and Another Vs. Commercial Tax Officer and Others, , the Supreme Court while discussing the question whether the transaction was an inter-State sale within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, observed :

"It is urged that the registered office and the branch office were separately registered as dealers under the sales tax law and transactions effected by the branch office could not be identified with transactions effected by the registered office. The movement of the goods from Hyderabad to the branch office, it is said, was only for the purpose of enabling the sale by the branch office and was not in the course of fulfilment of the contract of sale. We are unable to agree. Even if, as in the present case, the buyer places an order with the branch office and the branch office communicates the terms and specifications of the orders to the registered office and the branch office itself is concerned with the sales, despatching, billing and receiving of the sale price, the conclusion must be that the order placed by the buyer is an order placed with the company, and for the purpose of fulfilling that order the manufactured goods commence their journey from the registered office within the State of Andhra Pradesh to the branch office outside the State for delivery of the goods to the buyer. We must not forget that both the registered office and the branch office are offices of the same company, and what in effect does take place is that the company from its registered office in Hyderabad takes the goods to its branch office outside the State and arranges to deliver them to the buyer. The registered office and the branch office do not possess separate juridical personalities."

20. So also, in English Electric Co. of India Ltd. and Another Vs. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others, , the Supreme Court while considering a similar question, observed :

"The appellant has branches at different places. The appellant-company is one entity and it carries on business at different branches. Branches have no independent and separate entity. Branches are different agencies. The contract of sale is between the appellant-company and the Bombay buyer."

21. In our view, there is no warrant in law to limit and confine the observations only to the branches or units carrying on similar line of business or manufacturing activity. In principle, we find no distinction between the units or divisions engaged in similar activities and those engaged in different activities though forming integral part of a single company, more so, when as we have already noticed, there is no material whatsoever to suggest that these units were truly independent of the company.

22. The learned Government Pleader has relied upon the decision of the Patna High Court in Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1950] 1 STC 282. He relied upon the judgment of Das, J., at page 296 with reference to question No. 2. In that case, the assessee claimed deduction under Sub-clause (ii), of Section 5(2)(a) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act.

23. Under that clause the sales to a registered dealer of a goods specified in the purchasing dealers certificate of registration as being intended for resale, etc., were liable to be deducted from the turnover of the selling dealer. The sales were made by the assessee to the Imperial Tobacco Company of India Limited. The said company with only one place of business in the town of Muzaffarpur was a registered dealer for the resale of cigarettes. The sales were made to the Imperial Tobacco Company of India Limited through its place of business in Calcutta but not at Muzaffarpur. Considering the definition of registered dealer in the Act read with the relevant rules, one of the learned Judges (Das, J.) rejected the contention that for the purpose of taxing statute, the company should be deemed to be one unit and the registration certificate issued to the company with its place of business at Muzaffarpur should be taken as a registration certificate to the company with all its places of business inside and outside Bihar. It was in that context the learned Judge observed :

"If the provisions of Section 7 are read with the rules made under the taxing statute, then it is clear that the only registered dealer within the meaning of the taxing statute of 1944 is the Imperial Tobacco Company of India, Limited, with its place of business at Muzaffarpur. One can easily realise the anomaly or difficulty which will arise if one were to take the Imperial Tobacco Company of India, Limited, as one entity for the purposes of the taxing statute, though the company with its place of business in Calcutta or other places outside Bihar was not registered at all."

24. Thus, the question that arose for consideration in that case was altogether different and it cannot be cited as an authority for the proposition which we have to decide in this case.

25. In our view, the second aspect relied upon by the appellate authorities, viz., the adoption of a particular accounting procedure which is normally adopted for a sale, is not very material. It may be that by reason of a mistaken legal impression, the petitioner effected entries in the account books just as it is done for a sale transaction. But it is a well-settled principle of law that the true nature of transaction is not determined by the method in which the entries are made in the account books.

26. In Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax , West Bengal, the Supreme Court while repelling a similar argument observed :

"The fact that the appellant credited the amount received as sales tax under the head sales tax collection account would not, in our opinion, make any material difference. It is the true nature and the quality of the receipt and not the head under which it is entered in the account books as would prove decisive. If a receipt is a trading receipt, the fact that it is not so shown in the account books of the assessee would not prevent the assessing authority from treating it as trading receipt. We may in this context refer to the case of Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Simla, . In that case certain amounts received by the assessee were described as security deposits. This Court found that those amounts were an integral part of the commercial transaction of the sale of liquor and were the assessees trading receipt. In dealing with the contention that those amounts were entered in a separate ledger termed empty bottles return security deposit account, this Court observed :

So the amount which was called security deposit was actually a part of the consideration for the sale and therefore part of the price of what was sold. Nor does it make any difference that the price of the bottles was entered in the general trading account while the so-called deposit was entered in a separate ledger termed "empty bottles return deposit account" for, what was a consideration for the sale, cannot cease to be so by being written up in the books in a particular manner."

27. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal I Vs. India Discount Co. Ltd., in Commissioner of Income Tax v. India Discount Co. Ltd., wherein it was observed :

"It was said that the assessee had itself credited the amount of Rs. 43,925 to the profit and loss appropriation account and thereafter transferred the same to a reserve fund in the accounting year ending September 30, 1966. No adjustment was made in the share purchase account on account of the receipt of dividend. But it is well-established that a receipt which in law cannot be regarded as income cannot become so merely because the assessee erroneously credited it to the profit and loss account [See Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I Vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas and Co., ]."

28. The first appellate authority referred to the fact that the sales tax was also charged while debiting the cost of cement to the account of the transferee-concern. The learned counsel for the petitioner has disputed the correctness of this observation. However, even assuming that sales tax was also debited to the account of the transferee-unit, a non-sale transaction cannot become a sale on that account. The inclusion of sales tax in the cost is again attributable to an erroneous impression or a doubt on the part of the assessee that the transaction might be regarded as a sale. In Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, , the Supreme Court observed :

"The form in which the invoice is made out is not determinative of the contract between the company and its customers. If, apprehending that it may have to pay sales tax on the freight, the company collected sales tax on the freight, the true nature of the contract between the company and the purchasers cannot on that account be altered."

29. Keeping all these aspects in view, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the transfer of cement from the petitioner to its units at Vuyyur and Madras is not in the nature of sale as there is no transfer of property involved from one person to another. We are fortified in this view by at least three judgments which are cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

30. The first one is the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1979] 43 STC 476. In that case, the assessee, a cement factory known as Churk Cement Factory, owned by the State Government supplied cement for construction of another newly established cement factory at Dalla. The Churk Cement Factory raised bills on Dalla Cement Factory and the Dalla unit paid for the same. Notwithstanding the same, in the course of assessment proceedings, a stand was taken that the transactions did not amount to sales. That contention was rejected by the sales tax authorities. On reference to the High Court, it was held that there was no sale inasmuch as both the units were owned by the State Government. The following observation made by the learned Judge are quite apposite :

"Transfer of property, unless a particular statute expressly provides otherwise, contemplates passing of title from one person to another. It has, as such, to be held that even under the U.P. Act, two entities must be involved before a transaction would fall within the category of sale. Sri V.D. Singh, with his usual ingenuity, urged that the transaction in question should not be treated other than sale, because the assessee had billed the Dalla Cement Factory and has charged the price of cement supplied by it. The billing of Dalla Cement Factory and the payment of price of the cement was only a method of accounting adopted by the two units owned by the State Government, and this method of accounting cannot alter the true character of the transaction : (See Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. [1962] 46 ITR 44 . The residuary contention made is that as both the units were registered dealers, they should be treated as separate entities for the purpose of the Act. So far as the Dalla Cement Factory is concerned, that was registered as a dealer in February, 1971............ So far as the assessment years from 1967-68 to 1969-70 are concerned, this argument is of no avail to the department. It is also inconsequential so far as the remaining assessment years are concerned, the reasons being that the registration of the Dalla Cement Factory as a dealer will entitle the department only to tax the turnover of Dalla Cement Factory separately ; but will not clothe it with a separate juristic personality for the purposes of Section 2(h), inasmuch as both the units continued to be owned by the State Government during all the relevant assessment years. The conclusion is inescapable that the transactions of supply of cement by the assessee to the Dalla Cement Factory were not sales and, as such, were not liable to sales tax."

31. This judgment was cited with approval by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Government Wood Works v. State of Kerala [1988] 69 STC 62. In that case, the Kerala State Small Industries Development and Employment Corporation Ltd. (SIDECO) had transferred furniture from its workshop at Calicut to its other units. The Corporation as well as its units were separately registered as dealers under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The learned Judge held :

"The existence of two entities, different from each other, capable of transferring property in goods from one to the other is therefore the desideratum of a transaction of sale. SIDECO is a corporate entity, wholly owned by the State of Kerala. It has different units in different parts of the State, carrying on various activities. These units are parts of the same legal entity, namely, the SIDECO. They do not have any separate existence apart from SIDECO. They carry out the objects of SIDECO, carry on the business of SIDECO and their receipts are pooled into the tills of SIDECO. When goods are transferred from one unit to another, there is no passing of property from one person to another. There is no seller and there is no buyer as goods are passed only between the same entity. There is therefore no sale of the goods at all."

32. The next case which deserves reference is the decision of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in [1983] 53 STC 329 (State of Orissa v. Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd.).

33. In that case, the assessee was a public limited company engaged in transport business in which the State of Orissa held major interest. The assessee had different units. Fuel and lubricants were transferred from one unit to another and adjustment entries were made in the accounts regarding them as sales. The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court held that there was no sale within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The learned Judges held that all the units having been owned by the assessee, there was no change of ownership in the goods transferred from one unit to another. The learned Judges also held that merely because for accounting purpose, the transactions were treated as sales, they would not amount to sales in the eye of law.

34. These judgments fully support the view taken by us. We are in respectful agreement with the observations made in these judgments.

35. In view of the foregoing discussion, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal confirming the orders of the lower authorities, is set aside and the tax revision cases are allowed. No costs.