1. The present writ petition is filed seeking for the following reliefs:

“1. Call for entire records.

2. Issue a writ, the order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari, quashing the order dated 29.6.2017 passed by Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore in Appeal No.318/2014, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner produced at Annexure-A.

3. Issue a writ or certiorari quashing the order passed by the 1st respondent dated 18.9.2011 in Old dispute No.JRD/UBF/2167/2010-2011, New Dispute No.JRD/UBF/T-3732/2013-14 vide Annexure-B and dismiss the dispute in the interest of justice and equity.

3. Pass such other order/orders as this Hon’ble deems fit, in the fact and circumstances of the case, including cost, in the interest of justice.”

2. The relevant facts necessary for consideration of the present petition are that the second respondent (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘employee’) was appointed as an Accountant in the petitioner – Hanumanthanagara Co- operative Bank Ltd., (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘society’) on a probation for a period of 2 years on 22.3.1998. On 31.5.2000 the probation period was declared as satisfactory. It is the case of the society that having regard to various complaints of misappropriation, the response of the employee was sought consequent to which the employee vide explanation dated 22.6.2001 admitted to having committed the misappropriation and took responsibility for the same. Hence, by order dated 12.7.2001 the society passed an order of punishment and demoted the employee to the post of Junior Assistant with immediate effect. Subsequently, on the ground of unauthorized absence, the employee was suspended on 25.2.2005. An enquiry was held, consequent to which, vide order dated 8.3.2006 the order of suspension dated 25.2.2005 was revoked and a punishment of permanently stopping two annual increments was imposed and the suspension period was treated as suspension with subsistence allowance. Consequent to the said order, the employee was reinstated to the post of Junior Assistant.

3. Subsequently, an enquiry was held against the employee on the ground of unauthorized absence and vide order dated 24.4.2009 the employee was dismissed from the services of the society. Challenging the said dismissal, the employee filed a petition under section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Society Act, 1959 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) in Dispute No.614/2009-10 to set aside the order of this dismissal dated 24.4.2009 and for reinstatement together with full backwages. The first respondent - Joint Registrar vide order dated 28.3.2011 allowed the said dispute, set side the order of punishment dated 24.4.2009 and reinstated the employee together with 50% back wages. Being aggrieved, the society filed Appeal No.395/2011 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’). Pursuant to a memo for withdrawal dated 12.7.2011 filed by the society the said appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

4. During the pendency of Dispute No.614/2009-10, on 9.12.2010 the employee filed a dispute under Section 70 of thein Dispute No.2167/2010-11 challenging the order dated 12.7.2001 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘order of demotion’). Along with the said dispute, an application was filed for condonation of delay. The dispute as also the application of delay was contested by the society. The first respondent - Joint Registrar by order dated 5.5.2011 dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently, dismissed the said dispute as barred by time.

5. Being aggrieved, the employee preferred Appeal No.593/2011 before the Tribunal. By order dated 6.3.2013, the Tribunal allowed the Appeal, condoned the delay and remanded the matter to the Joint Registrar for fresh consideration. After the remand, the dispute was re-numbered as Dispute No.3732/2013- 14 and vide award/order dated 18.9.2014 the order of demotion dated 12.7.2001 was set aside and the employee was directed to be continued in the position as he was prior to the order of demotion with payment of basic pay together with all consequential financial benefits. Being aggrieved, the society preferred Appeal No.318/2014. The Tribunal, vide order dated 29.6.2017 dismissed the said appeal. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition is filed.

6. Learned counsel for the society contended that the second dispute filed by the employee challenging the order of demotion ought not to have been entertained having regard to the fact that he was aware of the factum of his demotion during the time when he prosecuted the proceedings wherein his dismissal from service was challenged. That the employee having been reinstated back into service consequent to the settlement arrived at in Appeal No.593/2011, the order of demotion was not liable to be interfered with. He further submits that although the order condoning the delay has not been challenged, the society is entitled to urge the said aspect while challenging the main order on its merits. In support of his contentions, he relies on the following judgments:

"i) Haryana State Co-op., Land Development Bank v. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91;

ii) SBI v. M.J.James (2005) 5 SCC 91;

iii) Sayadhyan Ghosal & Ors., v. Smt. Deorjin Debi AIR 1960 SC 941;

iv) Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (1981) 2 SCC 103;

v) Sankaranarayanan Potti v. K.Sreedevi (1998) 3 SCC 751;

vi) Achal Misra v. Rama Shanker Singh (2005) 5 SCC 531;

vii) Kores (India) Ltd., v. Bank of Maharashtra (2009) 17 SCC 674;

viii) H.P.R.T.C. v. Hukam Chand  (2009) 11 SCC 222"

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the employee vehemently contends that the order of the Tribunal dated 6.3.2013 condoning the delay and remanding the matter not having been challenged by the society, it is not open to the society to maintain the present writ petition seeking for the suitable reliefs. It is further contended that the employee has set out adequate reasons for not challenging the order of demotion within the stipulated time and the said reasons having been accepted and the delay having been condoned, the same cannot be held against the employee in proceeding where the merits of the dispute is adjudicated. That the joint Registrar and the Tribunal having concurrently held in favour of the employee, the same ought not to be interfered with by this Court in the present writ petition. Further, the employee having been appointed to the post of Accountant, cannot be demoted to the post of Junior Assistant to which he was not originally appointed. Hence, he seeks for dismissal of the petition. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relies on the following judgments:

"i) S.Rudrappa v. Secy., The Mysore Merchants Co- op., Bank Ltd., & ors., ILR 2001 KAR 14;

ii) Nyadar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 1979."

8. The submissions of both the learned counsel have been considered and the material on record has been perused. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the orders passed by the Tribunal and the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies are erroneous and liable to be interfered with

9. The necessary factual aspect regarding the employee having been appointed to the society as an Accountant on 22.3.1998 and his probation period having been declared satisfactory on 31.5.2000 is undisputed.

10. It is the contention of the society that due to various reasons a complaint against the employee with regard to the misappropriation of funds which was received on 14.6.2001 (Annexure-G to the writ petition), a notice was issued to the employee on 15.6.2001 seeking for an explanation. The employee furnished his explanation dated 22.6.2001 (Annexure- G1 to the writ petition) admitting the charges of misappropriation made against him. Consequently, the society by order dated 12.7.2001 (Annexure-G2 to the writ petition), demoted the employee to the post of Junior Assistant.

11. Since the employee was unauthorizedly absent from 24.2.2005, he was placed under suspension from 25.2.2005 and an enquiry was held against him, wherein the charges against him having been proved, by order dated 8.3.2006 (Annexure-H to the writ petition) the order of suspension was recalled and it was ordered that two annual increments of the employee be stopped permanently.

12. Subsequently, in the year 2009, an enquiry was held on the employee being unauthorizedly absent from 16.2.2008 to 26.6.2008. By order dated 24.4.2009 (Annexure-J to the writ petition) the employee was dismissed from service.

13. Being aggrieved by the order dated 24.4.2009 dismissing the employee from service, the employee preferred dispute in Dispute No.JRD/UBF/614/2009-10 to set aside the order of dismissal dated 24.4.2009 and for reinstatement into service. The society entered appearance in the said proceedings and contested the same. By order dated 28.3.2011 (Annexure-L to the writ petition) the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies allowed the dispute and set aside the order dated 24.4.2009 dismissing the employee and ordered for reinstatement together with 50% backwages from 24.4.2009. Being aggrieved by the same, the society preferred an appeal No.395/2011 before the Tribunal.

14. It is relevant to note that during the pendency of dispute No.614/2009-10, on 9.12.2010, the employee filed a dispute under Section 70 of theto set aside the order dated 12.7.2001 and to grant all eligible benefits from 11.7.2001. Along with the said petition, the employee preferred an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the delay in filing the dispute. The society entered appearance in the said proceedings and contested the same. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, vide interim order dated 5.5.2011 (Annexure-N2 to the writ petition) dismissed the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently, dismissed the dispute as not maintainable.

15. In the meanwhile, the society filed a memo for withdrawal of Appeal No.395/2011 placing on record that the dispute is settled out of Court between the parties and hence, sought for dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn. Accordingly, the Tribunal, by order dated 12.7.2011, taking on record the memo filed by the society dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.

16. The employee preferred Appeal No.593/2011 being aggrieved by the order dated 5.5.2011 passed in dispute No.2167/2010-11. The Tribunal by its order dated 6.3.2011 (Annexure-O to the writ petition) allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 5.5.2011 and remanded the matter to the Joint Registrar with a direction to dispose of the dispute on merits in accordance with law. The Joint Registrar, consequent to the order dated 6.3.2013 numbered the dispute as 3732/2013 and by order dated 18.9.2014 (Annexure-B to the writ petition) set aside the order dated 12.7.2001 and directed that the employee be continued in his position as he was prior to 12.7.2001 with basic pay as he was getting as on the said date with all consequential benefits. Being aggrieved, the society preferred appeal No.318/2014. The employee entered appearance before the Tribunal and contested the same. By order dated 29.6.2017 the Tribunal dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the order dated 18.9.2014 passed by the Joint Registrar. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition is filed.

17. It is relevant to note that while the employee was working as an Accountant, the society received complaints regarding certain acts of misappropriation. Upon receipt of the said complaints, the employee was issued with a notice to provide an explanation. The employee furnished his explanation dated 22.6.2001 admitting the misappropriation (Annexure-G1 to the writ petition) and sought for pardon. The employee also paid the entire misappropriated funds to the petitioner-society. The society, acting on the said explanation of the employee, wherein he admitted the misappropriation, passed the order dated 12.7.2001 demoting the employee to the post of Junior Assistant. The employee continued to work as a Junior Assistant without any demur or protest till the order dated 12.7.2001 was challenged by the employee on 9.12.2010 by filing the dispute No.2167/2010-11.

18. It is relevant to note that the dispute was filed after a lapse of more than nine years from the date of the order of demotion. Further it is relevant to note that even at the present stage of proceedings, the employee does not dispute in any manner the reply dated 22.6.2001, wherein he admitted the acts of misappropriation. He further does not dispute the fact that he returned the misappropriated funds to the society. The employee challenges the order dated 12.7.2001 only on the ground that no enquiry was conducted before he was demoted from the post of Accountant to the post of Junior Assistant and also that he could not have demoted to the post of Junior Assistant. It is forthcoming that when the employee filed the dispute No.2167/2010 he also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. A copy of the said application filed by the employee together with the objections filed by the society to the said application has been placed on record along with a memo dated 15.12.2023 by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is deposed by the employee that he did not challenge the order dated 12.7.2001 apprehending that the society may choose to take severe drastic action of imposing punishment of dismissal, if he challenges the same. He further deposed that he was unaware of the consequences that flow from passing of the order and he was ignorant of the law to go against the society. Hence, he had no other alternative but to sustain the punishment so imposed. He further deposed that later on he came to know that the order of reversion is illegal without conducting an enquiry as contemplated under the Rules and his reversion to the post of Junior Assistant to which he was not appointed is also contrary to law. Hence, he questioned the same. The society in its objections to the said application has denied the averments made in the affidavit accompanying the application and has further categorically stated that the employee has studied Masters Degree and he knows all the Rules and Regulations. It has further stated that the employee preferred another dispute challenging the order dated 24.4.2009 in Dispute No.614/2009- 10 and at that time also he did not challenge the order dated 12.7.2001. That the dispute No.2167/2009-10 has been filed after two years of the employee filing the earlier dispute . It is further placed on record that the society has passed the order reverting the employee form the post of Accountant to Junior Assistant consequent to a detailed enquiry by the Enquiry Officer and directions of the Reserve Bank of India and since the employee himself admitted for having misappropriated the funds of the society/bank and he having paid the misappropriated amounts to the society.

19. It is further forthcoming that the Joint Registrar in the order dated 5.5.2011 has noticed the contentions put forth by the respective parties regarding limitation and further noted that as per Section 70A of thethe dispute relating to disciplinary action was required to be filed within 12 months from the date of the order and hence, noticing that the order dated 12.7.2001 was challenged in the dispute filed on 9.12.2010 i.e., after a lapse of more than 9 years and 4 months and having noticed that the reasons set out by the employee in the affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay are not tenable and cogent, has dismissed the application.

20. The Tribunal vide order dated 6.3.2013 while considering the correctness of the order dated 5.5.2011 has noticed that the position of law that a dispute is required to be filed within 12 months from the date of the order was subsequent to the amendment to the proviso to Section 70A of theand prior to amendment the period of limitation was 3 years.

Further, the Tribunal has noticed that without recording evidence of the employee or affording an opportunity to the employee to lead the evidence on the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the said application having been disposed of on merits, the order is erroneous. The said order dated 6.3.2013 passed by the Tribunal is ex facie erroneous having regard to the fact that it is not the case of the employee that he made a request to adduce evidence on the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay and that despite a request having been made, the same was not afforded to the employee by the Joint Registrar. Further, there is no provision of law pointed out by the employee which specifically mandated opportunity to adduce evidence on the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the Joint Registrar.

21. It is further relevant to note that the Tribunal while setting aside the order dated 5.5.2011 and remanding the matter to the Joint Registrar to dispose of the dispute in accordance with law has not allowed the application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal has also not set aside the reasoning of the Joint Registrar that the delay as stated by the employee in the accompanying affidavit is not tenable or cogent. The Tribunal has further not recorded any finding that the delay has been adequately explained by the employee in his application filed for condonation of delay. In this context, it is relevant to note that the delay in filing the dispute No.2167/2010-11 was an inordinate one of 9 years 4 months. The said delay ought to have been adequately and in detailed explained by the employee. The only averment made by the employee to condone the delay was that fearing severe drastic punishment of imposing dismissal from service, he continued in service without challenging the said order dated 12.7.2001. The averments made in the affidavit accompanying the application clearly demonstrates that the employee was completely aware of the nature of the order dated 12.7.2001 as also its effect.

22. Further, the contention of the society that the employee has studied his Masters Degree has not been denied by the employee. The employee has nowhere disputed the fact that he has not misappropriated the funds as alleged by the society. Further, the employee does not dispute the assertion of the society that he has returned the misappropriated amounts. The only contention on which he has filed the dispute No.2167/2010-11 is that no enquiry was conducted as required under the Rules of the Society and hence, the action taken vide order dated 12.7.2001 is in violation of the principles of natural justice as the procedure contemplated has not been followed. It is further contended that the employee having been appointed to the post of Accountant, the order of punishment reverting to the post of Junior Assistant is contrary to law.

23. As noticed above, it is the assertion of the society that consequent to the complaints received by it with regard to misappropriations done by the employee and having regard to the directions of the Reserve Bank of India with regard to such misappropriations, the employee was notified, who offered his explanation and admitted to the misappropriation and requested for pardon as also paid the entire misappropriated funds to the society/bank. The factual aspect resulting in the order dated 12.7.2001 has not been denied by the employee. Under the circumstances, the employee having been completely aware of the nature and effect of the order dated 12.7.2001 and having accepted the allegation of misappropriation, no ground has been made out by the employee to explain the inordinate delay in filing the dispute No.2167/2010-11. Even if the period for filing a dispute is 3 years, the employee was required to explain the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the dispute which has not been done.

24. It is the vehement contention of the employee that the society not having challenged the order dated 6.3.2013 passed in appeal No.593/2011 by the Tribunal remanding the matter to the Joint Registrar, it is not open for the society to question the aspect regarding the delay in filing the dispute No.2167/2010-11.

25. In response the learned counsel for the society submits that the order dated 6.3.2013 is passed on the interlocutory application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the employee and the said order being interlocutory in nature, the society is entitled to challenge the same while challenging the final order passed on the merits of the dispute No.2167/2010-11. In support of the said contention, he relies on the following judgments:

i) In the case of Sayadhyan Ghosal (AIR 1960 SC 941) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether the order passed on an interlocutory application in an earlier stage of the litigation can be agitated in a higher Court at a later state on the same litigation, has after in detail considering the relevant statutory provisions as well as earlier judgments of the Privy Council has held as follows:

“22. In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order. We hold therefore that the appellant is not precluded from raising before us the question that Section 28 of the original Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act came into force. On this question we have already decided, as already indicated above, in Mahadeolal Kanodia case [(1960) 3 SCR 578] that Section 28 after its omission by the amending Act is not available in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance of 1952.”

(emphasis supplied)

ii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose (1981) 2 SCC 103 and in the case of Sankaranarayanan Potti10 has followed its earlier judgment rendered in the case of Sayadhyan Ghosal (AIR 1960 SC 941) .

iii) In the case of Achal Misra (11 () the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering a similar question has held as follows:

“12. In Sheonoth v. Ramnath [(1865) 10 MIA 413] the Privy Council reiterated that a party is not bound to appeal from every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads to a final decree. It is open on appeal from such final decree to question an interlocutory order.

13. This principle is recognised by Section 105(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and reaffirmed by Order 43 Rule 1-A of the Code. The two exceptions to this rule are found in Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that a preliminary decree passed in a suit could not be challenged in an appeal against the final decree based on that preliminary decree and Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which precludes a challenge to an order of remand at a subsequent stage while filing an appeal against the decree passed subsequent to the order of remand. All these aspects came to be considered by this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [(1960) 3 SCR 590 : AIR 1960 SC 941. Ed. : Seealso(1981) 2 SCC 103, (2004) 12 SCC 754 and (2005) 3 SCC 422] wherein, after referring to the decisions of the Privy Council, it was held that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from a final decree or order. It was further held that a special provision was made in Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards orders of remand where the order of remand itself was made appealable. Since Section 105(2) did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court could examine even the correctness of an original order of remand while considering the correctness of the decree passed subsequent to the order of remand. The same principle was reiterated in Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1658] and in other subsequent decisions.

14. It is thus clear that an order notifying a vacancy which leads to the final order of allotment can be challenged in a proceeding taken to challenge the final order, as being an order which is a preliminary step in the process of decision- making in passing the final order. Hence, in a revision against the final order of allotment which is provided for by the, the order notifying the vacancy could be challenged. The decision in Ganpat Roy case [(1985) 2 SCC 307] which has disapproved the ratio of the decision in Tirlok Singh and Co. [(1976) 3 SCC 726] cannot be understood as laying down that the failure to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there, would result in the loss of right to the aggrieved person of challenging the notifying of vacancy itself, in a revision against the final order of allotment. It has only clarified that even the order notifying the vacancy could be immediately and independently challenged. The High Court, in our view, has misunderstood the effect of the decision of this Court in Ganpat Roy case [(1985) 2 SCC 307] and has not kept in mind the general principles of law governing such a question as expounded by the Privy Council and by this Court. It is nobody's case that there is anything in the corresponding either to Section 97 or to Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 precluding a challenge in respect of an order which ultimately leads to the final order. We overrule the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the present case and in Kunj Lata v. Xth ADJ [(1991) 2 RCJ 658] that in a revision against the final order, the order notifying the vacancy could not be challenged and that the failure to independently challenge the order notifying the vacancy would preclude a successful challenge to the allotment order itself. In fact, the person aggrieved by the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available. Either to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there by way of a writ petition or to make the statutory challenge after a final order of allotment has been made and if he is aggrieved even thereafter, to approach the High Court. It would really be a case of election of remedies.”

(emphasis supplied)

iv) In the case of Kores (India) Ltd., ((2009) 17 SCC 674) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

“17. ……… A litigant is not bound to appeal against every interlocutory order passed against him; he can wait until the final order is passed and in appeal against that final order challenge all orders leading to the final order and affecting that decision. Stated the Privy Council in Moheshur Sing v. Bengal Govt. [(1859) 7 MIA 283] : (MIA p. 302)

“… We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting forever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities.”

18. The two exceptions to the rule are Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure which precludes an order of remand being challenged at a subsequent stage, while challenging the decree passed pursuant to the order of remand and Section 97 of the Code where while filing an appeal from the final decree, a litigant is not entitled to question the preliminary decree on which it is based and which had earlier become final.

19. Since the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in terms to the Supreme Court, it was held by this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. DeorajinDebi [AIR 1960 SC 941 : (1960) 3 SCR 590] and in Lonankutty v. Thomman [(1976) 3 SCC 528 : 1976 Supp SCR 74 at p. 81] that even Section 105(2) of the Code, did not preclude this Court from examining the correctness of the earlier order of remand passed by the High Court in an appeal arising from the decree passed subsequent to the remand…….”

(emphasis supplied)

26. It is clear from the settled position of law as noticed above that the order dated 6.3.2013 being on an interlocutory application, the society is entitled to challenge the same in the present writ petition, wherein the order passed in dispute No.2167/2010-11 has been challenged.

27. Learned counsel for the employee attempts valiantly to contend that the delay in filing of dispute No.2167/2010-11 has been adequately explained which having been accepted by the Tribunal ought not to be interfered with. However, as noticed above, having regard to the relevant pleadings made in the application for condonation of delay, there was absolutely no basis or justification for the application for condonation of delay to be favourably considered.

28. Learned counsel for the society further relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H.P.R.T.C. (2009) 11 SCC 222 , wherein it has been held as under:

“12. Compliance with the principles of natural justice, either by holding an enquiry or by giving the employee an opportunity of hearing or showing cause, is necessary, where an employer proposes to punish an employee on a charge of misconduct which is denied, or when any term or condition of employment is proposed to be altered to the employee's disadvantage without his consent.

13. On the other hand, if there is an admission of misconduct, or if the employee pleads guilty in respect of the charge, or if the employee consents to the alteration of any terms and condition of service, or where the employee himself seeks the alteration in the conditions of service, there is no need for holding an enquiry or for giving an opportunity to the employee to be heard or show cause. Holding an employee guilty of a misconduct on admission, or altering the conditions of service with consent, without enquiry or opportunity to show cause, does not violate the principles of natural justice.”

(emphasis supplied)

29. In this context, as already noticed above, the employee has not disputed the factum of him having admitted in his reply dated 22.6.2001 regarding misappropriation committed by him. Further, the fact that he has repaid the amounts misappropriated by him is not disputed. Further, the assertion made by the society with regard to the education qualification of the employee is also not disputed by the employee. Hence, it is clear that he has voluntarily accepted the order dated 12.7.2001 and has discharged his duties as a Junior Assistant for a period of 9 years and 4 months before filing the dispute No.2167/2010- 11. The said factual matrix is detrimental to the case of the employee.

30. Learned counsel for the employee placing reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of S.Rudrappa (ILR 2001 KAR 14) contends that the act of the employee in not challenging the order dated 12.7.2001 within the stipulated time cannot be held against the employee.

31. The reliance placed on the case of S.Rudrappa (ILR 2001 KAR 14) will not aid the case of the employee having regard to the fact that in the said case the employee who was compulsorily terminated from the service, questioned the same by filing a dispute under Section 70 of the. The dispute was rejected on the ground that he had accepted the retirement benefits which was affirmed by the Tribunal and a learned Single Judge of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court held that the employee might have taken the retirement benefits on account of his poverty and set aside the orders passed by the Joint Registrar, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge of this Court and restored the dispute. The factual matrix of the said case is entirely different from the present case.

32. Learned counsel for the employee places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nyadar Singh (AIR 1988 SC 1979) to contend that the employee having been appointed as an Accountant cannot be reverted to the post of Junior Assistant as the said post was not the one for which he was originally appointed to. The said case will also not aid the case of the employee having regard to the fact that in the case of Nyadar Singh (AIR 1988 SC 1979) the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the relevant Rules of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India held that all reversions are not reductions and a person working in a higher post on officiating basis can, for valid reasons, be reverted to the substantive post. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a case where the persons appointed to a specific post were reverted to a post for which they did not have the requisite qualification. It is clear that the facts of the said case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. It is not the case of the employee that he does not have the requisite qualification to discharge the duties as a Junior Assistant. The fact that he has discharged his duties for a period of 9 years and 4 months before dispute No.2167/2010-11 was filed itself falsifies the case of the employee in this regard.

33. The Joint Registrar and the Tribunal merely on the ground that no enquiry has been held have passed orders dated 18.9.2011 and 29.6.2017. Having regard to the findings recorded above that no grounds has been made out by the employee to explain the delay of 9 years and 4 months in filing the dispute No.2167/2010-11 the said order dated 18.9.2014 and 29.6.2017 are liable to be set aside. Hence, the question framed for consideration is answered in the affirmative.

34. In view of the aforementioned, the following:

ORDER

i) The above petition is allowed;

ii) The order dated 29.6.2017 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore in Appeal No.318/2014, is set aside;

iii) The order dated 18.9.2011 passed in New Dispute No.JRD/UBF/T-3732/2013-14 (Old dispute No.JRD/UBF/2167/ 2010-2011), by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies – respondent No.1, is set aside;

iv) In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties to bear their respective costs.