Das, J.This appeal arises out of a knit instituted by the respondents for recovery of a sum of RS. 513 from the defendants. The claim has been allowed by both the Courts below.

2. The facts of the case are these. On the 26th of September 1918, Sada Ram Kishum Dayal, a firm carrying on business in Calcutta, made over a consignment of 450 bags of salt at Sulkea to the defendant Company, for carriage of the same to Giridih, The Railway Receipt No. 79161 was made out in the name of Kishun Dayal. It appears that Sida Ram Kishun Dayal sold the goods to the plaintiffs and made over the Railway Receipt to the plaintiff; but it also appears that the Railway Receipt was lost. The goods actually arrived in Giridih on the 3rd October 1918. The plaintiffs, on getting information of the arrival of the goods on the 5th October 1918, applied for delivery of the goods to them and offered to execute a bond of indemnity in favour of the Railway Company. The Station Master of Giridih however, refused to deliver the goods to the plaintiffs pending an enquiry by the Railway Administration as to the claim of the plaintiffs. The Railway Administration was subsequently satisfied as to the bona fides of the claim of the plaintiffs, and on the 19th October 1918 made over the goods to the plaintiffs on payment of Rs. 513 by the plaintiffs as demurrage. The plaintiffs say that the Railway Company was not entitled to charge the demurrage from them. The Courts below, agreeing with the contention put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs, have allowed the claim in full as against the Railway Company.

3. Section 67 of Act IX of 1990 appears to be the relevant section. That section provides (omitting all immaterial matters): where receipt given for the goods is not forthcoming, the Railway Administration may withhold delivery of the goods until the person entitled in its opinion to receive them has given an indemnity to the satisfaction of the Railway Administration against the claims of any other person with respect to the goods."

4. Now Railway Administration has been defined to mean the Railway Company. Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullicks argument is, that the Station Master was incompetent to accept the indemnity offered by the plaintiffs and that he was bound to refer the matter to the Railway Administration, in other words, to the Railway Company, which, in this particular case, under the rules framed under the Act, would be the Divisional Traffic Manager. There is no doubt that under the various rules that have been framed under this Act the Station Master was incompetent to make over the goods to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as they did not produce the Railway Receipt to the Station Mastar, and it may be that the time taken by the Railway Administration in holding the enquiry into the claim of the plaintiffs was a perfectly reasonble one in the circumstances of the case. The question still remains whether the Railway Administration was entitled to charge demurrage from the plaintiffs for the time occupied by it in making a proper enquiry into the plaintiff claim.

5. Under the Rules framed by the Governor General in Council under the provisions of the Act a wharfage charge may be levied it respect of all goods not removed from Railway premises before closing time of the day following that on which they are made available for delivery; and demurrage at a particular rate may be charged on all loaded vehicles requiring to be discharged by owners which are not discharged after the expiry of nine hours of daylight from the time of being placed in position for unloading.

6. The question which we have to determine in this case is, when were the goods made available for delivery, and whether the owners were required to discharge the goods at any time prior to the 19th October 1918. In my opinion the goods were not available for delivery until the 19th October 1918. The proper person had applied for delivery of the goods so far back as the 5th October 1918, it is quite true that that proper person did not produce the Railway Receipt and that the Railway Administration was entitled to make an enquiry into the bona files, of the claim made by the plaintiffs), But the result of that enquiry was entirely satisfactory to the claim of the plaintiffs. It must follow, therefore, that the proper person had applied for delivery of the goods on the 5th October 1918 and that the Rail way Administration refused to deliver the goods to that person pending the result if the enquiry made by it; in other words, according to the view taken by the Railway Administration itself, the goods were not "available for delivery" until they were satisfied as to the bona fides the claim put forward behalf of the plaintiffs.

7. On the question of demurrage they were not required to discharge the goods until the Railway Administration was satisfied that they were the owners and ought to discharge the goods. In my opinion the view taken by le Courts below is entirely correct.

8. The case referred to by the Court of first instance, the case of the B.B.C.I. Ry. Co. v. Jacob Elias Sassoon 18 B. 231 : 9 Ind. Dec. 662, entirely supports case of the plaintiffs. Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick argued before us that that case was wrongly decided. Well we are not prepared to dissent, from the view taken by Mr. Justice Parsons in that case. We must accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.

9. A question was raised by Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick as to whether the Railway Company are entitled to reasonable warehouse rent for the time the goods remained with them. This claim has never been put forward on behalf of the Railway Administration, and we cannot adjudicate on it in this Court in second appeal when the fasts are not before us, If they are entitled to any reasonable warehouse rant, they are entitled to enforce that claim in a properly constituted suit against the plaintiffs, We cannot entertain the claim in this appeal.

Adami, J.

10. I agree.