1. The common question that arises for determination in these cases is - Whether a claimant is entitled to claim re-determination of the amount of compensation paid for land acquired from his possession, under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the for short), on the basis of an award passed by a Lok Adalat

2. The facts that are required to be noted for the purpose are the following :

The petitioners in these cases are all persons whose lands had been acquired for a public purpose. They are all persons who own properties in Vythiri Taluk of Wayanad District. The properties in all these cases were acquired as per a common notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, for the Karapuzha Irrigation Project. They were all paid compensation by the common second respondent, who is the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition). The petitioners herein had not sought for enhancement of the compensation paid to them under Section 18 of the.

3. On 10.12.2011, at a Lok Adalat organised by the Taluk Legal Services Committee, Sulthan Bathery, L.A.R.No.1 of 2008 of the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery was settled by the District Collector, Wayanad agreeing to pay an amount of 11,394/- (Rupees Eleven thousand three hundred and ninety four only) on or before 26.12.2011, failing which, the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 15% per annum, till the date of realisation. According to the petitioners, compensation was paid to the claimant in the said case, one Sri.K.V.Joseph, on the above basis. Ext.P2 in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012 is a copy of the said award. Copies thereof have been produced in the other writ petitions also. Shortly thereafter, the petitioners submitted applications under Section 28A of therequesting for re-determination of the compensation paid to them on the basis of Ext.P2 award referred to above. Ext.P3 in W.P.(C). No.28422 of 2012 is the application dated 09.01.2012, which has been acknowledged receipt of as per Ext.P4 by the second respondent on the same day itself. As per identical orders issued, one of which is Ext.P5 in the writ petition referred to above, the second respondent has rejected the requests. In the other writ petitions, the orders are evidenced by Ext.P3 therein. The said orders are all under challenge in these writ petitions. As per the impugned orders, the second respondent has taken a stand that, Section 28A is applicable only to cases where enhancement in compensation has been granted on the basis of a judgment of court. Since an award passed by a Lok Adalat is on the basis of agreement between parties, no claim for enhancement of compensation or re- determination thereof was maintainable under Section 28A of the. It is further stated that, a decision had been taken on 03.04.2012 at a meeting held in the Collectorate that, such awards need not be considered for the purpose of granting additional compensation. The additional Government Pleader has also advised against granting enhancement in compensation. The petitioners have filed these writ petitions challenging the said orders of rejection of their applications by the second respondent.

4. According to Adv.Dr.George Abraham, who appears for the petitioners in all these cases, an award passed by a Lok Adalat is a deemed decree as per the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Legal Services Authorities Act for short). Such awards have also been clothed with finality and are not made subject to an appeal. Therefore, it is contended that, the stand taken by the second respondent in the impugned orders is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

According to the learned counsel, Section 28A was introduced to the with the object of ensuring that proper compensation was paid for lands acquired, to all land owners irrespective of whether they had sought for a reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of theor not. In the present cases, the respondents had agreed to pay enhanced compensation to one of the claimants as per the award of the Lok Adalat. Therefore, they are liable to pay the said compensation to other similarly placed land owners also. Otherwise, a situation would arise where the State would be paying different compensation for similar lands. Such a situation would be arbitrary and unsustainable. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that, applications for re-determination of compensation have been submitted within the period stipulated by the Statute and therefore, the rejection of the said applications was without any justification. The learned counsel, therefore, seeks interference with the impugned orders.

5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the contentions in the said counter affidavit reflects the stand of the respondents in all these cases. According to the counter affidavit, the petitioners in these cases have sought for re- determination of their compensation on the basis of an award passed by a Lok Adalat. It is contended that, an application under Section 28A of theshould be based on an award of a Court. The award passed by a Lok Adalat was based on the mutual agreement between the parties and therefore, cannot be a ground for re- determining the compensation under Section 28A of the. It is further pointed out that an award of the Lok Adalat is treated as a decree of the Civil Court only for the purpose of execution of the terms thereof and not for any other purpose. It is further contended that, the re-determination of compensation that is stipulated by Section 28A is only regarding the land value that was awarded. Therefore, for the purpose of entitling a person to a re- determination of the land value, such land value should be specifically fixed in the award. What appears from the award of the Lok Adalat in these cases is only that, a lumpsum amount has been agreed to be awarded as compensation. No land value is specifically mentioned therein. Since the award does not specifically mention the land value, the same cannot be the basis for re-determination under Section 28A of theas sought for by the petitioners. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in L.I.C. of India v. Suresh Kumar [2011 (2) KLT 970 (SC)] and Interglobe Aviation Ltd. v. N.Satchidanand [2011 (3) KLT 295 [LQ/SC/2011/832] ] to contend that, the claim of the petitioners in these cases is only to be rejected.

6. Heard. It is not in dispute that, the lands in all these cases as well as the land of Sri.K.V.Joseph, Kotteparambil House, Kambalakkad P.O., who was the claimant in L.A.R.No.1 of 2008 of the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery, were acquired as per the same notification under Section 4(1) of the. According to the petitioners, their lands are also similar to that of Sri.K.V.Joseph. It is not disputed that, Sri.K.V.Joseph had disputed the compensation amount that was paid to him and had sought for a reference under Section 18 of the. Accordingly, the case had been referred to the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery and had been numbered as L.A.R.No.1 of 2008. It was from the said court that the case was referred to the Lok Adalat organised by the Taluk Legal Services Committee, Sulthan Bathery. The claim of Sri.K.V.Joseph is seen to have been settled as per Ext.P2 award in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012. The question is whether the said Ext.P2 award could form the basis of a claim for re-determination of the compensation payable to the petitioners herein, under Section 28A of the. In order to consider the above question, an examination of Section 28A of theis necessary. The provision comes within Part III of the which deals with "Reference to Court and Procedure thereon." The said provision is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference :

"28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub- section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." The provision applies in a situation where in an award under Part III of the, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section II. In such cases, a right is created in favour of all persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub section (1) to seek re- determination of the compensation payable to them provided they are aggrieved by the award of the Collector. The provision has been enacted for providing an opportunity to persons, who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 of the Act, to claim enhanced compensation on the basis of an award made by a court in the case of another claimant. The above provision applies to :

i) all persons who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 of the;

ii) who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector ;

iii) provided they make an application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the court ;

iv) claiming that the compensation due to them may be re- determined on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court.

In these cases, as already noticed above, the award of the Lok Adalat was on 10.12.2011. The petitioner in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012 has submitted the application on 09.01.2012. In all the other cases, the applications are seen to have been made on 26.12.2011. Therefore, all the petitioners are seen to have submitted their applications within the time limit stipulated by Section 28A of the. Therefore, the stipulations in Section 28A stand satisfied. The further question that requires to be considered is whether an award passed by the Lok Adalat could be considered as an award of a court, for the purpose of Section 28A of the. In the above context, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act.

7. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act reads as under :

"Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).

(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award."

As per the above provision, an award of a Lok Adalat is deemed to be "a decree of civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court". Therefore, an award of the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a civil court or an order of any other court. Section 2 (aaa) defines the expression "court" as follows :

"(aaa) "Court" means a civil, criminal or revenue court and includes any tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions;"

As per the above definition, court includes civil, criminal or revenue court, any tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force. The above definition would bring within its sweep all courts, Tribunals or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 22 of themakes the position further clear by providing that, Lok Adalat shall have the same powers of a Civil Court. The said provision is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference :

"22. Powers of Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat.- (1) The Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:-

(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath;

(b) the discovery and production of any document;

(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any court or office; and

(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it.

(3) All proceedings before the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)."

It is clear from the above provision that, the award of a Lok Adalat is for all purposes deemed to be a decree of a court. In the present case, admittedly the case of Sri.K.V.Joseph was pending before the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery as L.A.R.No.1 of 2008 having been referred to the Sub Court under Section 18 of the. Therefore, the award of the Lok Adalat, on which reliance is placed in these cases, has to be deemed to be a decree of the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery, which is the reference court under Section 18 of the.

8. The scope and effect of the deeming provision under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act has been considered by the Apex Court in a number of decisions. In the decision reported in Thomas v. Thomas Job [2005 KHC 1168 : 2003 (3) KLT 936 [LQ/KerHC/2003/735] ], the Apex Court had to consider whether an award passed by a Lok Adalat could be treated as a decree of a court. The case involved the dispute between two brothers with respect to partition of the properties left behind by their late father. There was a theatre in one of the properties, a portion of which was located in the property alloted to one of the brothers. He filed a suit seeking mandatory injunction for removal of the theatre portion. Recovery of possession was also prayed for. The suit was decreed as prayed for. When the matter was pending in appeal, the dispute was referred to the Lok Adalat and was settled, upon one of the brothers agreeing to sell the property to the other for consideration. When the settlement was not honoured, he initiated execution proceedings and sought to compel the other brother to execute a sale deed as agreed. With respect to the binding nature of the award of Lok Adalat, the Apex Court has in paragraph 16 of the judgment held as follows :

"16. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be decrees of Court and therefore the courts have all the powers in relation thereto as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself. This, in our opinion includes the powers to extend time in appropriate cases. In our opinion, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the court itself though arrived at by the simpler method of conciliation instead of the process of arguments in court. The effect is the same."

The question has been again considered by the Apex Court in Govindan Kutty Menon K.N. v. C.D.Shaji [2011 (4) KHC 722 [LQ/SC/2011/1503] :

2011 (4) KLT 857]. The said case involved proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. During the pendency of criminal proceedings before the Judicial First Class Magistrates Court, the parties appeared before the Lok Adalat and the matter was settled upon payment of an amount that was agreed to. The amount was to be paid in instalments. Upon default in payment of the instalments, an Execution Petition was filed before the Munsiffs Court, Ernakulam for enforcement of the award. The Execution Court held that an award passed by a Lok Adalat on reference from the Magistrates Court cannot be construed as a decree executable by the Civil Court. The said order was unsuccessfully challenged before this Court in a writ petition. This Court had, speaking through a Single Bench of this Court, held that since the award of the Lok Adalat was passed in criminal proceedings, the same was not executable and that, the decree to which reference is made in Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act was a decree of civil court. Thereafter, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court overruled the said decision and held that the deeming provision in Section 21 would take in any award and one passed in criminal proceedings also. Speaking for the Court, P.Sathasivam, J. (as he then was) has held in paragraph 14 of the said judgment as follows :

"14. A statutory support as evidenced in the statement of Objects and reasons of the would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular Courts, but would also take justice to the door steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one which was referred by a Civil Court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred by a Criminal Court it will only be an order of the Criminal Court and not a decree under S.21 of the. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a Civil Court and Criminal Court. There is no restriction on the power of Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a case referred by a Criminal Court under S.138 of the NI Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a Civil Court. In this regard, the view taken in Subash Narasappa Mangrule (supra) and M/s. Valarmathi Oil Industries (supra) supports this contention and we fully accept the same."

The Court has thereafter, summed up the propositions laid down in paragraph 17 of the said judgment which reads as follows :

"17. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge:

1. In view of the unambiguous language of S.21 of the, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and as such it is executable by that Court.

2. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a Civil Court and Criminal Court.

3. There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal), Tribunals, Family Court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature.

4. Even if a matter is referred by a Criminal Court under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a Civil Court."

9. It is clear from the judgment referred to above that, upon a reference being made to the Lok Adalat, a case even loses its distinction as civil, criminal, etc. Once a dispute is settled before the Lok Adalat, what follows is an award which is deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. As already noticed above, in view of Section 22 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, the Lok Adalat has also been conferred with powers of the Civil Court. The Supreme Court has held that, by virtue of the deeming provision, an award passed by the Lok Adalat is a decree of a Civil Court capable of being executed.

10. The resultant position that emerges is that, the award of the Lok Adalat in the present case evidenced herein by Ext.P2 in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012 has become a decree of a Civil Court. Section 28A of theapplies in all cases where, in an award, the Court allows to the applicant any compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector. In the present case, the court has, in view of Ext.P2 award referred to above, awarded compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the District Collector to Sri.K.V.Joseph, who was the claimant in L.A.R.No.1 of 2008 of the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery. There is no difference between the decree passed by a Civil Court and an award of the Lok Adalat, in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to above. Consequently, the petitioners in these writ petitions are all entitled to claim re-determination of the compensation paid to them, invoking Section 28A of the.

11. The common second respondent in all these cases seriously erred in rejecting the applications of the petitioners by the impugned orders. It is also worth noticing that, the said Sri.K.V.Joseph has been awarded compensation in excess of what has been awarded to the petitioners herein. It is not right on the part of the State to grant different compensation to similar lands or to deny the rightful compensation due to a claimant, after acquiring his property. In the above view of the matter also, the petitioners are entitled to succeed.

12. Though the learned Government Pleader has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in L.I.C. of India v. Suresh Kumar [2011 (2) KLT 970 (SC)] and Interglobe Aviation Ltd. v. N.Satchidanand [2011 KHC 4556 : 2011 (3) KLT 295 [LQ/SC/2011/832] ], the said decisions have no application to the facts of the present cases for the reason that, there the question was regarding the power of a Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under Section 22B of the Legal Services Authorities Act. No such question arises for consideration in these cases.

In the result, these writ petitions are all allowed. The impugned orders, evidenced by Ext.P5 in W.P.(C).No.28422 of 2012 and Ext.P3 in W.P.(C).Nos.31084, 31181, & 31138 of 2016 respectively are quashed. The second respondent, Special Tahsildar, is directed to consider the applications submitted by the petitioners in accordance with law and to pass appropriate orders thereon, as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of six weeks of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The petitioners shall also be at liberty to produce certified copies of this judgment before the second respondent for prompt compliance.