Ramaswami, J.—These are a batch of second appeals preferred against the decrees and judgment of the learned District Judge of West Tanjore in A.S. Nos. 73 to 102 of 1954, confirming the decrees and judgment of the learned Deputy Collector, Kumbakonam, in S. S. Nos. 1 to 4, 6 to 27 and 29 to 32 of 1952.

2. The facts are : The plaintiffs in these suits alleging themselves to be occupancy ryots filed the suits under Sec. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act for issue of pattas. The Hanuman Bank Ltd., (in liquidation) represented by Official Liquidators, Brahmayya and Co. is the defendant in each of these suits. The liquidation ordered by this High Court is in progress. Both the Courts below held that the Deputy Collector, Kumbakonam, could not dispose of the suits by virtue of the provisions of Ss. 45-A, 45-B and 45-O of the amended Banking Companies Act, 1949, read with Sec. 11 of that Amending Act, that came into force on 18-3-1950. These suits were filed on or after 5-5-1951. Hence these second appeals by the defeated plaintiffs.

3. Before discussing the points raised before me by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the appellants, I shall set out the relevant provisions of law to be considered.

4. Part III-A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, deals with the special provisions for speedy disposal of winding up proceedings. Secs. 45-A, 45-B and 45-C of the said Act are as follows:

45-A : The provisions of this Part and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), or the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908) or the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898) or any other law for the time being in. force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law but the provisions of any such law or instrument in so far as the same are not varied by, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Part or rules made thereunder shall apply to all proceedings under this Part. Part III-A to over-ride other laws.

45-B: The High Court shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in Sec. 45-C have exclusive to entertain and decide any claim made by or against a banking Company which is being wound up (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) or any application made under Sec. 153 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), by or in respect of a banking company or any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company, whether such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company or before or after the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. jurisdiction Power of High Court to decide all claims in respect of banking companies.

45-C. (1) Where a winding up order is made or has been made in respect of a banking company, no suit or other legal proceeding, whether civil criminal, in respect of which the High Court has jurisdiction under this Act and which is pending in any other court immediately before the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, or the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company, whichever is later, shall be proceeded with except in the manner hereinafter provided. Transfer of pending proceedings.

2. The Official Liquidator shall, within three months from the date of the winding up order or the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, whichever is later, or such further time as the High Court may allow, submit to the High Court a report containing a list of all such pending proceedings together with particulars thereof.

3. On receipt of a report under sub-sec. (2), the High Court may, if it so thinks fit, give the parties concerned an opportunity to show cause why the proceedings should not be transferred to itself and after making an inquiry in such manner as may be provided by rules made under Sec. 45-U, it shall make such order as it deems fit transferring to itself all or such of the pending proceedings as may be specified in the order and such proceedings shall thereafter be disposed of by the High Court.

4. If any proceeding pending in a court is not so transferred to the High Court under sub-section (3), such proceeding shall be continued in the court in which the proceeding was pending.

5. Nothing in this section shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court.

Section 11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, runs as follows :

'Transfer of pending proceedings in winding up to the Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act' : Where any proceeding for the winding up of a banking company or any other proceeding whether civil or criminal, which has arisen out of or in the course of such winding up, is pending in any court immediately before the commencement of this Act, it shall stand transferred on such commencement to the court which would have had jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding if this Act had been in force on the date on which the proceeding commenced, and the court to which the proceeding stands so transferred shall dispose of the proceeding as if this Act and the amendments made thereby were applicable thereto.

5. Articles 245 to 255 of the Constitution of India, deal with the respective powers of the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures and the subjects assigned to each of those legislatures with reference to legislation. Schedule VII of the Constitution divides these subjects under three lists, List I dealing with the subjects over which the Parliament has exclusive powers of legislation, List II, the subjects over which the State Legislature has exclusive powers of legislation, and List III dealing with subjects over which both the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures have concurrent powers of legislation.

The scheme of the Articles is to provide against repugnancy and overlapping between States Legislation and Union legislation, and various provisions have been made with a view to prevent such contradictions and repugnancies. It may be said generally that a subject under the Union List relates to a matter of general interest affecting the entire Union with reference to which it is prudent and necessary that the Parliament of the Union should have the exclusive control of legislation, and that a subject under List II is essentially a local or provincial matter normally liable to be regulated by the local conditions and exigencies peculiar to a constituent State.

The concurrent list consists of those subjects with reference to which conditions are expected to so occur as to make the legislature of a State or that of the Union have a predominant voice with reference to any of those subjects, subject to the provision that, whenever there is repugnancy, the Union Legislation should prevail. There are two departures from the general resemblance between the provisions of the present Constitution and the provisions of the Government of India Act, of 1935, with reference to the distribution of legislative subjects, and these are (1) that the residuary power to legislate in respect of matters not coming under any of the Lists is given to the Union Parliament, while in the 1935 Act the power vested with the Governor-General to initiate legislation in respect of such residual subjects not specifically provided for; and (2) that the Union Parliament can legislate with reference to a Provincial subject whenever the Council of States by a special majority resolves that such legislation with reference to any constituent State must be undertaken by the Union Parliament.

As regards the Concurrent subjects with reference to which both the Union Parliament and the State Legislature have powers of legislation, the possible repugnancy is sought to be avoided by a provision that if a State Legislature legislates after the consent of the President, then that Legislation will prevail even over an existing Union legislation.

We shall now examine the three lists in so far as the subject-matter on hand is concerned.

List I - Union List

43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including co-operative societies.

45. Banking.

95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List;

List II - State List

18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural loans, colonisation;

65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in this list.

There is no evidence that in regard to this subject-matter of enquiry there is nothing in the Concurrent List to be referred to.

6. The distribution of legislative powers is set out in Art. 246 of the Constitution as follows :

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Cls. (2) and (3) parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'Union List')....

(3) Subject to Cls. (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for each State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'State List').

7. Part III-A of the Banking Companies Act containing Ss. 45-A to 45-H was first inserted in the Act by the Amendment Ordinance of 1949 Which was replaced by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950. This part was overhauled and recast and all those sections were deleted and new Ss. 45-A to 45-X were inserted by the Amendment Act of 1953. The new S. 45-B was included in the Banking Companies Act by the Amendment Act of 1953 and this section together with Ss. 36-A, 38 to 44 and 45-C to 45-J and 45-N to 45-W forms part of one group dealing with the special law relating to the winding up of banking companies. These sections override the provisions of any other law but are not the whole of the law and to a great extent the general law of winding up of companies as laid down in the Indian Companies Act and interpreted by the Courts applies (See S. 45-A).

The object of S. 45-B is that, as by the original Ss. 45-A and 45-B and S. 11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, the legislature intended all powers to be concentrated in one court for the purpose of the winding up of a banking company, and, irrespective of the fact that creditors or contributories might be outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, the legislature wanted to emphasise the necessity of expeditiously carrying out the winding up than any inconvenience that might be caused to creditors, debtors or contributories (See S. 36-A also).

8. The expression 'relating to winding up' is wide and does not admit of any narrowing down; it is wider and more extensive than the expression 'arising out of winding up' and in fact matters relating to winding up include an application for winding up.

9. Thus an analysis of this S. 45-B shows that exclusive jurisdiction is given to the High Court to entertain and decide (a) any claim made by a banking company which is being wound up; (b) any claim made against a banking company which is being wound up (c) any question of priorities arising in the course of the winding up of a banking company and (d) any other question whatsoever of law or fact which, may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company.

It does not matter whether the claims in question be by or against a particular branch of the banking company so long as the branch is situated in India and the claim or question has arisen or arises before or after the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company or before or after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1953.

10. The expression 'relating to winding up' which is wide and does not admit of any narrowing down has been construed to cover the following questions.

In Corporation of Calcutta Vs. S.B. Trading Co. Ltd., the facts were: The petitioners before the High Court filed a suit for partition against the defendant bank which has its registered office at Calcutta for partition of certain immovable properties. A preliminary decree by consent was passed on 24-6-1948 and a Commissioner for partition was appointed. It appeared that the petitioners by subsequent transfer became the sole owners in respect of certain properties. Thereafter a compulsory winding up order of the bank was made and a liquidator was appointed.

The liquidator was added as a party to the suit. Subsequently the petitioners made an application to the court for an order on the Commissioner of partitions to file the final report in respect of the partition of the properties. It was held that the court had no jurisdiction over the suit as the same stood transferred to the High Court, that under S. 11 of the Amendment Act, 1950, the transfer was automatic, that no order of court was necessary and that on formal information from the High Court the records of proceedings must be sent to the High Court.

In Dhakuria Banking Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sm. Surabala Debi and Others, , it was held that S. 45-A and S. 45-B of the Banking Companies Amendment Act override S. 42, C. P. Code, and that accordingly the High Court should exercise exclusive jurisdiction and the words of the statute cannot be controlled by consideration of higher costs of execution or absence of machinery of execution.

In Surendra Nath Dutta Vs. Mohini Mohan Chakravarty, , two points were dealt with under Ss. 45-A and 45-B of Act X of 1949 and S. 11 of Act XX of 1950 and S. 45-F of the Banking Companies Act X of 1949. In the former case where execution proceedings were started on 8-8-1950, i.e., four months later than the Amending Act XX of 1950 which came into force on 18-3-1950, in the Court of the Munsif, it was held that Ss. 45-A and 45-B and S. 11 of Act XX of 1950 did not apply and the execution proceedings did not automatically stood transferred to the Original Side of the High Court and that the Munsif's court had the jurisdiction to deal with the execution proceedings according to law.

In the latter case, in respect of a decree passed on 11-8-1938 the last execution petition by the decree-holder bank was on 8-8-1950 and the Original Side of the High Court appointed the Official Receiver as liquidator of the decree-holder bank on 7-9-1950 and the Official Receiver applied under S. 151, C. P. Code on 26-4-1951 for setting the dismissal of execution proceedings and the judgment-debtors objected that the decree-holder was attempting to revive a decree which had become barred, it was held that under S. 45F which provides special period of limitation in case of certain proceedings, one year immediately preceding the date of the order for winding up of banking company could be excluded and on 26-4-1951 when the application under S. 151, C.P. Code was filed, the execution case had not become barred.

In H. Naik v. Jitendranath Das, AIR 1954 Orissa, 139 (D), it was held:

Section 45-B(1) , Banking Companies Act, is very similar in language to S. 4 (1), Provincial Insolvency Act, with two important distinguishing features. Firstly, the opening words of Section 45-B(1) make it absolutely clear that even the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act must give way before the provisions of the Banking Companies Act Again, while S. 4(1) of the provincial Insolvency Act is limited to questions which may 'arise in' any case of insolvency, S. 45-B(1) is wider and refers to questions which may 'relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company.'

The question as to whether a debtor of a banking company under liquidation should be adjudged an insolvent and should get the protection of the insolvency court is a matter relating to the winding up of the banking company and consequently the High Court alone has exclusive Jurisdiction under Ss. 45-A and 45-B(1) to decide this question and all other questions arising out of the same.

Sections 45A and 45-B were inserted by the Amending Act of 1950 with the main object of conferring even extra-territorial jurisdiction on a High Court so that all claims by a banking company against its debtors may be realised as soon as possible. For that purpose exclusive jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court and on no other court in respect of any matter relating to the realisation of the assets of the banking company. It will not only be opposed to the scheme of the amending Act but it will also materially affect speedy realisation of the assets of a banking company under liquidation if the various debtors of that company are given leave by the High Court to prosecute their petitions for insolvency in the various district courts.

In Discount Bank of India Ltd., Delhi Vs. Triloki Nath and Others, it was held:

Sections 45-A and 45-B, Banking Companies, Act, cover cases which relate to the winding up of a Banking company - instituting of a suit or carrying on a suit already instituted are matters which relate to the winding up of the company. Under S. 45-A of the Act only the High Court in which the winding up is pending has jurisdiction to try such suits and it applies to suits pending before or instituted after the winding up. S. 11 of the Amending Act has to be read with S. 10 of that Act and a combined effect of these two sections is that such suits if brought in any other court shall stand transferred to the High Court mentioned in S. 45-A of the Banking Companies Act.

In Discount Bank of India Ltd. Vs. A.N. Misra, ), it was held:

The meaning of the words 'relating to or arising out of cannot be extended to mean any matter in which a banking company is a party and the company goes into liquidation on its being wound up. There must be some intimate connection between the proceedings or claim and the winding up of a company.

In Dhirendra Chandra Pal Vs. Associated Bank of Tripura Ltd. (In Liquidation), it was held:

When in 1949 special legislation in respect of Banking companies was taken up, it was one of the main stated objects to provide a machinery by which proceedings in liquidation of banking companies could be expedited and speedily terminated. It was found, however, that the Act of 1949, as originally enacted, was inadequate to achieve the purpose. It is in this situation that that Amending Act of 1950 introduced into Act of 1949 an entire chapter, Part III-A consisting of Ss. 45-A to 45-H under the heading 'special provisions for speedy disposal of winding up proceedings.

Consistently with this policy and with the scheme of the Amending Act, where the liquidator has to approach the court under S. 45-B for relief in respect of matters legitimately falling within the scope thereof, elaborate proceedings by way of a suit involving time and expense, to the detriment of the ultimate interests of the company under liquidation, were not contemplated. In the absence of any rules framed by the High Court concerned under S. 45-G the procedure mast be taken to be one left to the judgment and discretion of the court, having regard to the nature of the claim and of the questions therein involved. The normal proceeding that S. 45-B contemplated must be taken to be a summary proceeding by way of application.

In Shri Ram Narain Vs. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Limited, it was held, that the provisions of the Banking Companies Act as amended by Act LII of 1953, S. 45-B had an overriding effect and exclusive jurisdiction was thereby vested in the appropriate High Court notwithstanding anything in the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustments) Act, 1951.

11. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that under cover of S. 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, controversies wholly unconnected with the liquidation proceedings, like the determination of occupancy rights governed by the State Law, need not be held to be triable by the company court only.

He rests this contention upon the following grounds. The provisions of the Constitution should not be cut down by a narrow and technical construction, but should be given a large and; liberal interpretation so that the Union Parliament or the State Legislature may be mistress within its own prescribed sphere of legislative activity: In the matter of C. P. and AIR 1939 1 (Federal Court)

There is always a presumption that a legislature, be it central or provincial, never intended to exceed its legislative ambit so as to conflict with the jurisdiction of another legislature. The words "notwithstanding anything" in the beginning of Cls. (1) and (2) and the words "subject to Cls. (1) and (2)" at the beginning of Cl. (3) of Art. 246 of the Constitution, secure the predominance or supremacy of the Union legislature in case of overlapping as between Lists I. II and III.

To be more particular in the language of Sri N. Rajagopala Ayyangar (now Justice), Government of India Act, 1935, page 125.

(i) if there is overlapping between a matter falling within the Federal List and the Provincial List, the subject to the extent of the overlapping is one exclusively Federal on which the Province cannot legislate; (ii) if there is any overlapping between the Federal list and the Concurrent list it is again similarly treated as being exclusively Federal, so as to shut out Provincial legislation on the subject; and (iii) if there is overlapping between the Concurrent and the Provincial List, the subject is treated as within the Concurrent list thus giving the Federal Legislature to legislate over the matter with the attendant consequences.

The principle underlying the non-obstante clause may be invoked only in the case of "irreconcilable conflict." But in this case the learned Advocate General points out that there is no such overlapping or conflict, winding up of banking business, and jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to the same are in the Central List, Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, etc., and the jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to the same are in the State List, It would be too much to say that every law which in its operation might affect the property or interest of a bank would come within items 43 and 45 of List I.

They must be limited to laws which affect amounts to be recovered from or recoverable by banks in their winding up proceedings. These two Central and State entities can peacefully coexist and there is no necessity to invoke the non-obstante clause and the predominance or supremacy of the Union Legislature if the "claims by or against" are properly construed.

12. This construction, according to the learned Advocate General, is brought out by S. 2 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 and the use of the word "claim" in S. 45-B. Section 2 lays down:

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not, save as hereinafter expressly provided, in derogation of, the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (Act VII of 1913), and any other law for the time being in force.

The scheme which the legislature has kept in view in enacting the Banking Companies Act is that except in matters pertaining to banking, the Indian Companies Act should continue to apply to banking companies. The Banking Companies Act contains only additional provisions, and except in so far as this Act expressly provides, the provisions of the Indian Companies Act are applicable. The application of other laws for the time being in force is also not excluded, even though the Banking Companies Act purports to be a consolidating Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act, for example, is another law which affects banking companies. Therefore, we have to look to the definition of the term "claim" used in S. 45-B, in Ss. 191 and 228 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Section 191 lays down:

The Court may fix a time or times within which creditors are to prove their debts or claims, or to be excluded from the benefit of any distribution made before those debts are proved.

Section 228 states:

In every winding up... all debts payable on a contingency, and all claims against the company present or future, certain or contingent, shall be admissible to proof against the company, a just estimate being made, so far as possible, of the value of such debts or claims as may be subject to any contingency or for some other reason do not bear a certain value.

13. In fact the Banking Companies Act itself makes only two more changes to the Indian Companies Act, viz., firstly regarding the money claims by the company (S. 45-D) and secondly, secured creditors both for and against are brought in. Therefore, the learned Advocate General contends that what the liquidator is concerned with in winding up the affairs of the company is to collect the assets and distribute such assets and is not concerned in that winding up with the enforcing of rights and obligations like the determination of occupancy rights. In other words, there is no intimate connection between the proceeding or claim & the winding up of a company in the context in which these appeals have arisen.

14. On the other hand where the legislature has used similar language as in S. 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act it has been laid down repeatedly that only those orders can be made under S. 7 which are necessary for facilitating the distribution of the assets among the creditors. In re In Re: Igustins Rohdirick, . The insolvency court it has been held exists to distribute the assets between the creditors and not for deciding partition suits or other questions between the insolvent and the rest of the world : M. R. M. S. Chettyar Firm v. Official Assignee, Rangoon, AIR 1937 Rang 214 : ILR 14 Rang 652 (K).

15. The learned Advocate General also seeks to derive support for his argument from the phrase "entertain and decide" used in Section 45-B as connoting the seizure of a matter required for the winding up or liquidation and not a fugitive seisin of a controversy outside the ambit of the winding up and constituting the subject-matter of day to day administration under State Acts, of the relationship of landlord and tenant, for which special tribunals specially equipped and located have been installed by State Governments having jurisdiction and powers relating thereto.

In this connection it is pointed out by the learned Advocate General that in the Rules which have been made by this Court under the Banking Companies Act, no provision has been made regarding the procedure to be adopted to the disposal of these controversies. So far as the Banking Companies Act is concerned, the procedure appears to be nothing more than the summary proceedings under S. 45-B to settle the list of debtors.

The undesirability, from the point of view of creditor and debtors, of determination of complicated questions of land tenure in the shape of settlement of debtors and the burden which may be thrown on the company court by multifarious day to day matters in regard to disputes for which specially competent and equipped local courts exist coming up there and the resulting clogging instead of facilitation of winding up proceedings, are stressed to show that the legislature would not have intended that the term "claim" should be so widely construed as to take in disputes regarding occupancy rights and the phrase "entertain and decide must be restricted to claims as contemplated by Ss. 191 and 228 of the Indian Companies Act.

16. These are grave and weighty reasons deserving of the closest consideration. But the connotation of claims in the context of this case is much wider than what the learned Advocate General would like to restrict it and secondly the weight of authority is definitely against the contention of the learned Advocate General.

17. The term "claim" is a word of very extensive signification embracing every species of legal demand. It is one of the largest words of law & includes "demand" and "debt". The word "claim" has been considered a word of art; and long since was defined by Chief Justice Dyer to be a challenge, by a man, of the property or ownership of a thing which he has not in possession but which is wrongfully detained from him.

The term also signifies a demand made of a right or supposed right; a calling of another to pay something due or supposed to be due. as a claim for wages or services. "Claim" is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace actions founded on torts as well as actions founded on contract. S. 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, gives exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court to entertain and decide (i) any claim made by a banking company which is being wound up; (ii) any claim made against a banking company which is being wound up (iii) any question of priorities arising in the course of the winding up of a banking company and (iv) any other question whatsoever of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company. The expression "relating to winding up" is also wide and does not admit of any narrowing down; The Fortune Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Vidyagauri J. Metha and Others, ; it is wider and more extensive than the expression "arising out of winding up." Matter relating to winding up includes an application for winding up itself.

There is no contextual reason at all to restrict the meaning of the words. Therefore, the term "claim" relating to or arising in the case of winding up of a banking company is sufficiently wider enough to take in decisions of questions like the determination of occupancy rights claimed and denied.

18. This wide interpretation has been favoured by the Supreme Court. In ( Shri Ram Narain Vs. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Limited, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court state,

In our opinion this contention (i.e., the questions that arise in execution in this case and particularly the question relating to attachment which has been effected by the Bombay High Court, are not questions which fall within the scope of S. 45-B) is so obviously untenable, in View of the very wide and comprehensive language of the section that, it requires no more than to be mentioned and rejected.

Again at pp. 585-586 (of SCJ) : (at p. 622 of AIR) :

Now so far as the Banking Companies Act is concerned its purpose is clearly, as stated" in the heading of part III-A for speedy disposal of winding up proceedings. It is a permanent statutory measure which is meant to impart speedy stability to the financial credit structure in the country in so far as it may be effected by banks under liquidation.

It was pointed out in ((S) Dhirendra Chandra Pal Vs. Associated Bank of Tripura Ltd. (In Liquidation), that the pre-existing law relating to the winding up of a company involved considerable delay and expense. This was sought to be obviated so far as banks are concerned by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the appropriate High Court in respect of all matters arising in relation to or in the course of winding up of the company and by investing the provisions of the Banking Companies Act with an overriding effect. This result was brought about by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950 and later by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953.

Sections 45-A and 45-B of the Part III-A brought in by the 1950 Act vested exclusive jurisdiction in the appropriate High Court to decide all claims by or against a Banking company relating to or arising in the course of winding up. But Ss. 45-A and 45-B of the Part III-A substituted by 1953 Act are far more comprehensive and vest not merely exclusive jurisdiction but specifically provide for the overriding effect of other provisions also.

In (S) Dhirendra Chandra Pal Vs. Associated Bank of Tripura Ltd. (In Liquidation), , it is explicitly stated:

It is to be remembered that S. 45-B is not confined to claims for recovery of money or recovery of property, moveable or immovable , but comprehends all sorts of claims which relate to or arise in the course of winding up. Obviously the normal proceeding that the section contemplated must be taken to be a summary proceeding by way of application.

On this conclusion it follows that notwithstanding the fact that normally the determination of such questions, as the decision relating to occupancy rights, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State and the Tribunals established by it, by reason of the non-obstante clause the supremacy of Parliamentary legislation clothes the High Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to determine such questions notwithstanding this being in the exclusive sphere of the State legislation. Besides, there is really no irreconcilable conflict also because here the principle of pith and substance comes into play.

The Indian Legislature has not purported to legislate in regard to the subject covered by item 18 of List II, in enacting S. 45-B of the Banking Companies Act. The decision regarding the tenability of the claim for occupancy right or not is only incidental to the decision of a claim by or against the Banking Company for the settlement of debtors under the Banking Companies Act. Though the claim by a Banking company in regard to a property liable to satisfy the debt due to it involves the question whether it is private land or ryoti land or occupancy or non-occupancy holding, that question will have to be incidentally determined as otherwise it will have only a speculative value and nobody would buy, because as the English Lombard street phrase goes "they would be buying a pig in a poke. That is why both as regards item 95 of the Union List and item 65 of the State List, the phrase "with respect to" has been used. As the Federal Court observed in interpreting the same expression in the Government of India Act, 1935:

In view of the large number of items in the legislative lists, it is almost impossible to prevent a certain amount of overlapping. Absolutely sharp and distinct lines of demarcation are not always possible... To avoid such difficulties, Parliament has thought fit to use the expression "with respect to" which obviously means that looking at the legislation as a whole, it must substantially be with respect to matters in one list or the other. A remote connection is not enough" AIR 1941 47 (Federal Court) .

19. On the other hand, the expression extends the legislative power to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic or category of legislation. In short, thus, the expression invokes the principle of "pith and substance" in the matter of interpreting the Legislative lists. Thus, either looked at as irreconcilable conflict between the lists in which case the non-obstante clause comes into play and assures the supremacy of the Parliamentary legislation, or invoking the principle of pith and substance because in the context of this case the Jurisdiction of the company court to decide the matter relating to land tenure would make it only an incidental encroachment on a State subject, there is no question of S. 45-B of the Banking Companies Act being ultra vires and the jurisdiction of the High Court thus conferred is irreproachable.

20. The argument drawn from inconvenience is undoubtedly weighty and time alone can show whether this provision will become unworkable and in which case the Legislature may be expected to step in and amend the law. Part III-A of the Banking Companies Act is itself a special provision for the speedy disposal of winding up proceedings. S. 186 of the Companies Act, 1913, provides for a short and quick method of recovering what is due from the contributories of a company in winding up proceedings.

In regard to other debts however all that the Companies Act provides is to empower the Official Liquidator to institute proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company; see S. 179(a) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. There is no provision either in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 or in the Banking Companies Act, as observed in Sree Bank Ltd. v. P.C. Mukherjee, 1952-22 Com. Cas. 73 (N) at p. 74; which enables a liquidator of a banking company to recover debts of the company by summary proceedings, such as an application to the company Judge, or in any way other than by suit.

The Banks Liquidation Proceedings Committee considered this a major evil which was one of the causes for delay and expense in liquidation proceedings. They said

Every liquidator finds it difficult to realise the assets of a banking company under his control within a reasonable time, as the ordinary legal machinery for collecting debts by filing suits is slow and subject to delaying facts on the part of debtors.

The Committee came to the conclusion that a procedure for settlement of a list of debtors on the analogy of settlement of the list of contributories under the Indian Companies Act was possible and would result in the saving of much time & costs. "Such rules are undoubtedly desirable" said their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court (N) (ibid)

because the costs incurred for filing suits in a multitude of small claims are extremely heavy and absorb all the money like to be obtained as a result of such suits.

It may be that in its practical working as envisaged by the learned Advocate General several unlocked for developments, may arise clogging rather than facilitating the speedy winding up. It is a question of balance of convenience and inconvenience. As the French proverb has it "We cannot make an omelette without breaking or scrambling a few eggs." parliament has considered that the balance of convenience lay in centralising in the company Court the disposal of all these claims by or against a Banking company, relating to winding up. It is not for us to legislate but only to declare the law. Therefore, this contention can have no bearing on the decision of these appeals.

21. In the result, the conclusions of both the courts below are correct and these second appeals have got to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with costs of the second respondent (Mr. Chary). Advocate fee Rs. 500 to be divided among the appellants. Costs of respondent 1 to come out of the estate. Leave asked and granted.