Kapur, J.

1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Harnam Singh J., affirming an order passed by the Additional Custodian affirming a lease in favour of Govind Ram Jaggi and cancelling the order of allotment passed in favour of Firm Thakar Dass Piyare Lall.

2. On 10-9-1947, Mohammad Nawab, Proprietor of Messrs. Ahmed Bux and Sons, granted a lease for eleven months from 10-9-1047 to 10-8-1948, of the premises in dispute, Nos. 5565 and 5565/1, situate in Sadar Bazar, Ambala Cantonment, consisting of a house and shop, to Govind Ram Jaggi, who on 10-2-1948, applied for confirmation of the lease. On 15-11-1948, by an order purporting to have been passed by the Financial Commissioner Mr. Thapar, the pro-porty in dispute was allotted to firm Thakar Dass Piyare Lal. The order was signed by one Mr. Balwant Singh, Under-Secretary to Government, and says that the Financial Commissioner has allotted the whole of the premises (now) in dispute to Messrs. Thakar Dass Piyaro Lal, who were already in possession of No. 5565.

3. On 11-8-1040, the Additional Custodian Mr. Parshotam Lal passed an order confirming the lease which had been granted in favour of Govind Ram Jaggi and also by the same order cancelled the allotment which had been made in favour of Messrs. Thakar Dass Piyare Lal on two grounds: (1) that the allotment was made in ignorance of the proceedings which were pending before -the Custodian for eonfirmation of the lease and (2) as the lease was being eonfirmed the allotment would stand cancelled." Against this order an appeal was brought to this Court and was decided by Harnam Singh J., who, as I have said before, affirmned the order of Mr. Parshotam Lal, and against this judgment an appeal under Clause 10, Letters Patent, is filed.

4. The first point taken by the learned advocate for the Appellant is that the finding of the learned Judge that he had no right of appeal is erroneous. His submission is that as a consequence of the confirmation of the lease he would be losing the rights that he has got under the allotment, which is thereby being cancelled, and he contended that he as a person aggrieved within the meaning of the term as used in Section 30 of Ordinarice-IX [9] of 1949. Relying on Ex parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 : (49 L.J. Bk. 41), and other rulings the learned Judge has held that ho was not a person aggrieved. James L.J. has in that case observed:

The words person aggrieyed do not really mean a man who is disappointed of benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A. person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.

The learned advocates submission is that this is too restricted a meaning to be given to the words "person aggrieved" and he has relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in Narasimham v. Ramayya : A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 492 [LQ/MadHC/1949/292] : (1950-1 M.L.J. 484 F.B.), where an insolvent as an "aggrieved person" was allowed to appeal against an order under Section 68, Insolvency, questioning the acts of the Official Receiver. In that case Viswanatha Sastri J. observed at p. 501:

If there is a flagrant case of a sale by the receiver for a gross under-value, if a sale or lease is granted secretly and without public notice.... if the property sold is so incorrectly described as to mislead purchasers into thinking that its value is negligible when in fact it is valuable, in cases like these the insolvent is an aggrieved person and would, in our opinion, have a remedy by way of an application to the Court under Section 68 and an appeal under Section 75, Provincial Insolvency Act. In such cases the insolvents rights to the surplus estate or the proceeds of the state after paying off the debts and to obtain an annulment of the adjudication or an absolute discharge under Sections 41 and 42 of Act V. [5] of 1920 by payment of eight annas in the rupee, is prejudiced and the insolvent is an aggrieved person. The extreme contention of the Respondent that even in such cases the insolvent his no legal grievance and has no right to complain to the Court against the act of the official rcceiver would, if accepted, reduce him to the position of a poison who is a civilitur morthus. Such, however, is not his position in the eye of law.

5. No doubt this case and some others which wore cited before us may lead one to the conclusion that in India the words "person aggrieved" have been given a wider significance than in England But the question still remains whether the Appellant Firm Thakar Dass Piyara Lal are a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of the words used in the section. The question is not free from difficulty. In the present case persons whose rights are adjudicated upon under Section. 25 of the Ordinance must-necessarily be parties to the transactions which are to be confirmed and the Appellants certainly are not one of those, but cases can be conceived where as a result of some order passed a person may have a grievance in regard to his legal rights. The Appellants were allottees and under Section 2(h), East Punjab Evacuee Property Administration Act, 1947, allotment has been defined to mean.

the grant by the Custodian or a Rehabilitation Authority or any other person authorised by The Custodian in this behalf for a temporary right of use and occupation of an evacuee property to any person other wise than by way of lease.

The rights of the Appellants were, therefore, those of a mere licensee, which rights could has been extinguished both under Section 60, Easements Act, and if not under that section than there is an express provision in the East Punjab Evacuee Property Administration Ordinance, 1949, in Section 10 by which the Custodian has been given the power to cancel leases or allotments of evacuee property; and if the Custodian does cancel any allotment the allottee has no remedy; and merely because the Custodian passes a composite order whereby he confirms a transaction made by an evacuee in favour of one person, a third person whose allotment is also cancelled by the same order even though it may be consequent upon the order of even though cannot make him a party aggrieved as the allottee has a more licence which can be revoked at any time. The point of a right of appeal under Section 30, as I have said before, is not free from difficulty, but in the circumstances of this case I agree with the judgment of Harnam Singh J., that the Appellants would have no right of appeal though for different reasons.

6. But even if the Appellant had a right to come up in appeal, I do not think there are any merits in his appeal. There was a lease for eleven months in favour of the Respondent Govind Ram Jaggi for the confirmation of which he had applied in February 1948 and in my opinion, it is open to the Custodian to confirmation can be ex post facto. But even if that were not possible the Custodian has to power under Section 9(j) of the Ordinance to give fresh lease. This power again is not open to one to challenge and the reasons given by he Custodian seem to me. even if the rights could be challenged, to be adequate for the grant of such a licence.

7. In my opinion, therefore, there are no merits in this appeal, and I would dismiss the appeal and the Respondents will have their costs of all the proceedings.

Weston, C.J.

8. I agree.