1. Can an adoption duly recognised by decree of a Civil Court can be ignored by the Revenue Authorities. This is the question posed in this Letters Patent Appeal preferred under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

2. One Sampuran Singh was an allottee of evacuees land. This land came to be allotted to him under Cabinet Order No. 578 C of 1954. The appellant Tejinder Singh came forward with a plea that he is adopted son of Sampuran Singh and therefore, he is entitled to succeed to his rights. This plea of his found favour with the Divisional Commissioner. Jammu exercising the powers of Dy Custodian General. This officer observed that the question of adoption having been decided by the civil court cannot be over looked by the departmental authorities. Harnam Singh respondent, who was all along challenging the status of Tejinder Singh as the adopted son preferred a revision before the J and K Special Tribunal, Jammu. The Special Tribunal remanded the matter back. An observation was made that the factum of adoption has to be established by evidence and a decree obtained by the appellant declaring him to be the adopted son can always be re examined by the departmental authorities. This view expressed by the Special Tribunal was challenged in this court in writ petition. The writ petition stands dismissed. It is in these circumstances, an appeal has been preferred.

3. It is not in dispute that there exist a decree and the validity of this decree was challenged by Harnam Singh. He filed a civil suit. The suit came to be dismissed on 12101998. The appellant who figures as defendant in the suit urged that he is to be treated as adopted son of Sampuran Singh and his wife Mooli. It was urged that the factum of adoption was not denied by plaintiff Harnam Singh. Therefore, the decree establishing his right as adopted son could not be challenged. With regard to the rights of respondent Harnam Singh, the observations made by the civil court while dismissing the suit on 121088 are as under:

"Under Section 3A of Agrarian Reforms Act displaced person allotted evacuee land shall be deemed as occupancy tenants thereof, and shall be so recorded. Deceased Mooli and her husband Sampuran Singh being displaced person and the land under consideration being evacuee is not denied. Mst. Mooli had died on 471985 as has been recorded in the death register, a copy whereof is on record of this case. As Mooli, therefore had become the occupancy tenant of the land allotted to her in her life time by operation of the law itself. Now as the deceased had become occupancy tenant in her life time so after her death the right of occupancy had to devolve in terms of Section 67 Tenancy Act. Such being the position of law the plaintiff herein would not have inherited the land alloted to Mst. Mooli and got possession thereof even if there had been no adoption made by her".

4. With regard to factum of adoption the claim of Harnam Singh was again negatived. What was said in this regard is reproduced below :

"Now coming to the next argument of the learned counsel, perusal of the plaint shows that it has not at all been alleged by the plaintiff that the defendent No.1 was never adopted by Mst Mooli. The mere fact that the decree was collusive and was granted by the court in shortest possible time is no ground for declaring the same as null and void being fraudulent. On that score also the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable".

5. If above is the situation then so far as Harnam Singh is concerned he is bound by the result of the civil suit initiated by him. He did not challenge the view expressed by the trial court in any appellate forum. The decree by which the suit of Harnam Singh was dismissed, having attained finality has put an end to this controversy so far as Harnam Singh is concerned. This however, did not happen. As indicated above the Deputy Custodian General placed reliance on the decree recognizing the factum of adoption of appellant Tajinder Singh and the question arises whether this can be brushed aside.

6. We are of the opinion that the personal rights of the parties stood determined by the law of adoption. The fact that there was a decree recognizing the fact that the appellant Tejinder Singh was an adopted son of Sampuran Singh had not been challenged so far. Harnam Singh made a futile attempt. The suit filed by him in this regard was dismissed He was satisfied with that. Under these circumstances the determination of the rights of Tejinder Singh visavis his having been adopted attained finality. It would be against all cannons of judicial interpretation to let the revenue authorities to again reexamine the validity of the decree. If any authority for this proposition is required then a reference can be made to the decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as State of Haryana vs. Karnal Coop Society, AIR 1974SC 1.

7. The counsel appearing for Harnam Singh submitted that the appellant had challenged the proceedings in a civil court. He sought an injunction also. He was un successful in this regard. It is also urged that the writ petition was filed belatedly. It be seen that these questions were not raised before the learned Single Judge, therefor they are not being take into consideration. We are accordingly of the opinion that the appeal must succeed on the short ground that the decree passed by the civil court recognizing the appellant as the adopted son of Sampuran Singh must be shown full respect. Subordinate Revenue hierarchy cannot be allowed to rejudge the validity of this decree. This is more so when Harnam Singh respondent made a futile attempt to challenge the same in a suit filed by him.

8. It be seen that a judgment in rem binds everyone. A Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in case State of Haryana vs. Vinod Kumar (AIR 1986 PandH 407 has observed as under)

"Broadly speaking there are two types of judgments/orders, namely judgments in rem and judgments in personam. The former binds the whole word whereas the latter binds only the parties. The judgments/order in rem are the ones passed by the authorities or the courts and matrimonial. The jurisdiction exercised by the authorities under the Punjab Act is not of such a nature that the orders passed under it would bind the public at large. Obviously they are the judgments/orders in is that they only bind the partise to it or the persons named therein. So far as the person who is neither a party nor named in such an order is concerned, the order in the eye of law is ineffective and non est and as such set aside. Strictly speaking the terms "void1 or "voidable" when used qua a judgment or an order would be relevant when a person is a party or named in the judgment or the order because it is only such a person who can take proceedings to get it declared void or set aside as the case may be. On the other hand, a person who is not a party would have no right to get the order set aside or declare it void as the order would be binding on the persons who are party or named therein and his remedy would be only to get a declaration that the order was ineffective and nonest so far as he is concerned".

9. Judgment in rem is an adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular subject matter by a Tribunal having competent jurisdiction and including all persons, not merely the parties to the proceedings, from saying that the status of the thing adjudicated upon was not such as declared by the adjudication. The factum of adoption determine the status of the man. He is planted in a new family. He loosed his right in the family in which he is born. A declaration made regarding this status would be binding on all. This would be more so qua Harnam Singh respondent who had challenged the status of appellant and was unsuccessful.

In view of the above the order passed by the J and K Special Tribunal is set aside and that of the Divisional Commissioner with powers of Dy. Custodian General is restored.

Appeal allowed in the manner indicated above.