Bhattacharjee, J.

1. An award made on 28-11-77 was presented for registration to the Sub-Registrar on 25-11-83 and was admitted to registration on the same day. Could that be done after such a long lapse of time That is the question that has come up for our consideration in this case arising out of a petition filed under Art. 227.

2. Under S.23 of the Registration Act, an award, like any other non-testamentary instrument, is to be presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar within 4 months from the date of its execution. If, however, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, an award or other non-testamentary instrument is not presented for registration within 4 months of its execution, the Registrar, but not the Sub-Registrar, may direct that such document shall be accepted for registration on payment of fine provided the delay in presentation beyond the period of 4 months as aforesaid, does not exceed 4 months more. In other words, while ordinarily the period within which a document is to be presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar is 4 months from the date of its execution, in some extraordinary cases as envisaged in S.25 the Registrar may allow a further period of 4 months. A total period of 8 months, is, therefore, the limit for presenting a document for registration under the provisions of S.25 read with S.23 of the Registration Act. In this case, the award has been admitted to registration by the Sub-Registrar without any direction from the Registrar as to extension of time from 4 months to 8 months under S.25 and the award having been registered almost 6 years after its execution, was registered palpably beyond time, unless time could be extended, the delay could be condoned or any period could be ex-eluded from consideration.

3. Mr. Banerjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner has very strongly urged that no registration is permissible beyond the period fixed under S.25 read with S.23 of the Registration Act and any registration beyond such period is void. Mr. Banerjee has, in support of his contention, relied on a Division Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Daw Nyi Ma v. Ma E Tim AIR 1938 Rang 53 and also a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Ram Singh v. Jasmer Singh AIR 1963 Punj 100. In the Rangoon decision it has been stated (supra, at 55) (of AIR 1938 Rang 53) that a Sub-Registrar has "no jurisdiction" to proceed with registration of a document which was already 4 months old and any such registration would be bad. In the Punjab decision it has been held (supra, at 102) that a document presented for registration after the period of 8 months as provided in S.25 of the Registration Act "could not, under any circumstances beregistered".

4. If the matter rested there then we would have, with respect, dissented from the Rangoon and the Punjab view and would have held that there can be circumstances when a Registration Officer would have jurisdiction to admit a document to registration, even though presented after the period fixed under S.23 or S.25. But the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Banerjee, would apparently stand in the way and these decisions are Motahar Ali v. Abdul Malek AIR 1957 Cal 324 [LQ/CalHC/1956/163] and Aditya Kumar v. Narayandas (1971) 75 Cal WN 439 : (AIR 1971 Cal 65) [LQ/CalHC/1970/100] .

5. In Motahar Ali (supra) it has been held (at 326) by the Division Bench that the period of 30 days fixed by S.75(2) of the Registration Act for the presentation of a document for registration cannot be extended and the observations of a learned single-Judge in Mafisur Rahaman v. Jamila Khatun (1938) 42 Cal WN 1174, to the effect that the provisions of the Registration Act regarding the time within which certain acts are to be done are peremptory in character and are not capable of being extended in the absence of express provisions in that behalf, have been referred to with approval. In Aditya Kumar (AIR 1971 Cal 65) [LQ/CalHC/1970/100] (supra at 446) (of Cal WN) : (at Pp. 6970 of AIR) the Division Bench has refused to direct return of the award to the Arbitrator to present it for registration as the period provided in S.25 had already elapsed and "the provisions in S.25 of the Registration Act are imperative and that time cannot be extended by Court".

6. It appears that in this case, after the award was made and signed by the Arbitrators on 28-11-77, the present petitioner initiated a proceeding under the Arbitration Act in the Munsiff Court at Arambag on 1-12-77 and it was registered as Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977 and it appears further that in that Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977 an order was passed by the learned Munsiff of 26-7-78 directing the parties, including the Arbitrators, to maintain status quo. Even though it is not quite clear to us as to how the aforesaid order directing maintenance of status quo could prevent or restrain the Arbitrators or the parties from taking back the award filed in court and to present the same for registration, we must take the matter to have been clinched by the order of the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980 (Tarapada Dey v. Rajkumar Dey - decided on 6-3-81). That Civil Rule was directed against an earlier order dated 16-1-80 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Nooghly in Misc. Case No. 28 of 1977 which arose out of an application filed by some of the opposite parties for direction upon the Arbitrators to file the award in court. After the award was filed in court in that Misc. Case on 28-1-78, the Arbitrators, having realised that the award required registration, filed an application on 14-8-1978 for return of the award to them to enable them to present the same for registration and the application was granted by the Subordinate Judge by his order dated 16-1-80. This order of the Subordinate Judge was, however, struck down by the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980 as according to the Division Bench, "to allow the Arbitrators to take back the award for the purpose of presenting the same for registration would really constitute a breach of the said interim order" passed by the Munsiff in Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977 directing maintenance of status quo. It must now, therefore, be accepted that from 26-7-78 when the order directing maintenance of status quo was passed in the Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977, till 20-12-82 when the said order Lapsed with the dismissal of the Misc. Case the parties and the Arbitrators were restrained by a prohibitory order of a competent court from presenting the award for registration. Should not then this period be excluded from computing the period of 4 months or 8 months within which the award as to be presented for registration under S.23 or S.25 of the Registration Act We unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative.

7. Because of the provisions of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. 1963, the provisions of S.5 thereof authorising extension of the prescribed period and of S.15 thereof providing for exclusion of time in certain cases are available to matters governed by the special Law of Limitation. But even if those provisions are so available, those would apply to matters in orbefore Courts. Aspointed out by the Supreme Court in Nityananda Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation A1R 1970 SC 209, [LQ/SC/1969/190] "the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with application to courts. Even though the powers under S.5 or S.15 of the Limitation Act are to be read in a special or local law of Limitation by reasons of the provisions of S.29 (2) of the Limitation Act, that power is exercisable by Courts only. A Registration Officer acting under S.23 or S.25 is obviously not a Court and if any authority is necessary for such an obvious proposition, reference may be made to the two old Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court and the Madras High Court in Udit Upadhia v. Imam Bandi (1902) ILR 24 All 402 at 404 and in Krishnamal v. Krishnaiyangar (1912) 15 Ind Cas 652 at 653.It may also be noted that S.15, where it is applicable, would apply on its terms only to suits and applications for execution of decree and the case at hand relates neither to a suit nor to any such application.

8. But the general principles of law as enunciated in the Maxims "Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia", that is the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and " Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", that is, an act of the court shall prejudice none, are of universal application and must always be applied for the prevention of miscarriage of justice unless application thereof is clearly barred by express declaration or irresistible implication. We find no such declaration or implication in S.23 or S.25 or anywhere else in the Registration Act. In this case if, as held by the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980, the parties and the Arbitrators were restrained by the interim order passed in Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977 from proceeding with the registration of the award, it would be blatant injustice to deprive them of the right to get the award registered now after the Misc. Case is dismissed solely on the round that the period prescribed therefor has expired as a result of running of. time during the operation of the said interim order. As observed by the Supreme Court in, Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall, AIR 1975 SC 67 [LQ/SC/1974/284] at p. 71, "it is a well established principle of judicial procedure thatwhere any proceeding are stayed by an order of a court or by an injunction issued by any Court, that period should be excluded in computing any period of limitation laid down by law". Therefore, if, as held by the Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 621 of 1980 proceeding with the registration of the award was stayed by the interim order in Misc. Case No. 74 of 1977, then, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall (AIR 1975 SC 67 [LQ/SC/1974/284] ) (supra),according to the well established principle of judicial procedure the entire period during which the matter was so stayed as a result of the operation of the interim order should be excluded in computing the period of 4 months or 8 months as prescribed under S.23 or 25 of the Registration Act. This aspect was not considered in the two Bench decisions of this High Court in Motahar Ali (AIR 1957 Cal 324) (supra) and in Aditya Kumar (AIR 1971 Cal 65) (supra) and the observations in these two Bench decisions to the effect that the periods fixed by the different provisions of the Registration Act cannot in any circumstances be enlarged, whether by extension or exclusion of time or otherwise, cannot be regarded to have laid down good law in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall (supra).

9. But even if we exclude the entire period during which the interim order was in operation preventing the registration of the award, we would thereby exclude the period from 26-7-78 till 20-12-82 only. But even after such exclusion, the award which was made on 28-11-77 and was presented for registration on 25-11-83 cannot be said to have been presented within 4 months as provided in S.23 or even 8 months as provided in S.25 of the Registration Act. We must, therefore, hold that the Registration Officer could not admit and was wrong in admitting the award to registration and the registration was therefore invalid and ineffective. We accordingly allow the petition, quash the impugned registration, but make no order as to costs.

10. Chakravarty, J.

I agree.

Petition allowed.