Raghubar Dayal, J.

1. This appeal, on certificate granted by the High Court of Patna, raises the question whether S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as introduced by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act XXVII of 1950), hereinafter referred to as Bihar S. 64-A, was not applicable to proceedings for grant of permit for inter-State routes. This question, however, was decided by this Court in Shyamlal Kumar Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964, D/- 4-5-1964 (SC). It was held that it was applicable to cases of stage-carriage permits for inter-State routes.

2. The respondent prayed, in view of the observations in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey, (1963) 3 SCR 523 [LQ/SC/1962/253] : (AIR 1963 SC 64 [LQ/SC/1962/253] ), for permission to challenge the validity of the aforesaid section on the ground that Parliament, by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act No. 100 of 1956), has introduced another S. 64-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939), hereinafter referred to as Central S. 64-A and that thereby Bihar S. 64-A must be taken to have been repealed by necessary implication.

3. The question arises in this way. The appellant Tansukh Rai Jain, was one of the applicants for the stage-carriage permit for an inter-State route between Bihar and Orissa. The State Transport Authority, Bihar, granted the permit to the United Motor Works, and Co. Ltd. The appellant and respondent No. 1. Nilratan Prasad Shaw, appealed to the appellate authority, the Deputy Minister of Transport, Bihar, against the order of the State Transport authority. The appellate authority reversed the order and granted the permit to Shaw, respondent No. 1. Thereafter, the appellant went in revision to the Bihar Government, in view of Bihar S. 64-A. The Transport Minister set aside the order of the appellate authority and granted the permit to Jain, the appellant. Shaw, respondent No. 1, then filed a writ petition in the High Court and prayed for the quashing of the order of the Transport Minister and for the restoration of the order of the appellate authority granting the permit to him. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that Bihar S. 64-A did not apply to stage-carriage permits for inter-State routes and that therefore the Bihar Government was incompetent to revise the order of the appellate authority.

4. It is urged for the respondent that the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A are repugnant to those of Central S. 64-A and are therefore void in view of Cl. (1) of Art. 254. It is also urged that the Central Act has repealed Bihar S. 64-A by enacting Central S. 64-A in the exercise of the power it had under the proviso to Art. 254 (2). If the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A are repugnant to any extent with those of Central S. 64-A, Bihar S. 64-A will be void to the extent of the repugnancy in view of Cl. (1) of Art. 254 of the Constitution. As the Central Act was enacted by Parliament subsequent to the enactment of Bihar S. 64-A, the provisions of the main part of Cl. (2) of Art 254 will not apply to make Bihar S. 64-A good within the State of Bihar, even though it had received the assent of the President, as those provisions applied when the Central Act is enacted earlier than the State law. We have therefore to see whether the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A are repugnant to those of Central S. 64-A.

5. The tests for determining whether a certain provision of a State law is repugnant to the provisions of a law made by Parliament are stated thus, in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1959) Supp (2) SCR 8 at p. 43: (AIR 1959 SC 648 [LQ/SC/1959/3] at p. 655):

"Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles:

(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions;

(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and

(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field."

6. We may now refer to the two sections, Central S. 64-A and Bihar S. 64-A:

"Central S. 64-A: The State Transport Authority may, either on it motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit:

Provided that the State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order:

Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard."

Bihar S. 64-A: The State Government may, on application made to it in this behalf, within thirty days of the passing of the order in the course of any proceedings taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, call for the records of such proceedings, and after examining such records pass such order as it thinks fit."

The words subordinate to it in Bihar S. 64-A, were omitted by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1953, (Bihar Act I of 1954). This was however not noticed when Bihar S. 64-A was quoted in Pasaris Case, Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964 D/- 4-5-1964 (SC).

7. First we have to see whether there is any direct conflict between Central S. 64-A and Bihar S. 64-A. Such a conflict, to a certain extent, can arise if Bihar S. 64-A be construed literally. The language of Bihar S. 64-A is very general and empowers the State Government to revise any order made in the course of any proceedings taken under Chapter IV and pass such orders as it thinks fit. It must, however, be so construed, if possible, as not to come in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act. The power of revision vested in the State Government under its provisions is to come into play only when the Central Act does not provide any remedy against the orders proposed to be revised. Certain orders have been made appealable under S. 64 of the Act. The power of revision therefore will arise and will be exercised after the appellate power is exhausted and not when the aggrieved person has not appealed against the order. Similarly, it will be available only against non-appealable orders after the aggrieved person has taken action under Central S. 64-A. The aggrieved person cannot have recourse to action under Bihar S. 64-A without first taking action under Central S. 64-A. To the extent that the language of Bihar S. 64-A can cover the cases open to appeal and to revision under S. 64 and Central S. 64-A respectively, it will be in direct conflict with the provisions of the Central Act and Bihar S. 64-A will be void to that extent.

8. Bihar S. 64-A it is argued for the respondent, is wholly void as by Central S. 64-A Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the said subject matter of revisions. It is also urged that Bihar S. 64-A is wholly void as both that section an Central S. 64-A cover the same field. On these very grounds, it is urged that by enacting Central S. 64-A Parliament has repealed by implication Bihar S. 64-A as it was competent to do in view of the proviso to Cl. (2) of Art. 254.

9. Repeal, by implication, is not to be easily inferred. It is to be expected that when Parliament was aware of the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A and of Art. 254 of the Constitution and it intended to repeal Bihar S. 64-A, it would have expressly stated so. There is nothing in Central S. 64-A or in any other provision of the Act which expressly states that Bihar S. 64-A is repealed. We are of opinion that the mere fact that Central S. 64-A deals with revisions against non-appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority is not sufficient to conclude that Parliament intended to repeal Bihar S. 64-A.

10. The language of Bihar S. 64-A is very wide and covers all orders made by any authority or officer in the course of any proceedings taken under Chapter IV of the Act. The only limitation on the exercise of the revisional power conferred on the State by Bihar S. 64-A is that the State cannot suo motu exercise that power. It can exercise it when moved an application by some person aggrieved with the order he seeks to be revised. Such orders can be orders of the State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority or any other authority or officer. Central S. 64-A provides for revisions against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and does not provide for revisions against the orders of the prescribed authority to whom appeals could be preferred under S. 64. Central S. 64-A can therefore preclude the State Government from entertaining revisions against non-appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority, but cannot preclude the operation of Bihar S. 64-A in regard to other orders. It is not provide in the Act that the order passed by the State Transport Authority in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Central S. 64-A would be final. If such a provision had been made it might have been possible to urge that Parliament intended that the order of the State Transport Authority in revision was not to be interfered with by any authority. The absence of such an expression therefore leads to the inference that Parliament did not intend that there be no interference with such orders of revision. Further it may be noticed that S. 64 does not exhaust the list of all appealable orders. Its Cl. (I) provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed. Prescribed means prescribed by rules made under the Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 68 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV which consists of Ss. 42 to 68. Sub-section (2) specifies certain matters with respect to which rules be made. Its clause (za) mentions any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. It follows that the State Government can make rules providing for certain order to be appealable under S. 64 and thus reduce the orders which otherwise would come within the ambit of Central S. 64-A. The orders made appealable under the rules framed by a State would not be open to revision under S. 64-A as it provides for revisions against non-appealable orders only. It is clear therefore that Parliament cannot be imputed the intention to make the provisions of S. 64-A to be so exhaustive and complete as to lead to the necessary conclusion that thereby it intended to repeal the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A which gave power to the State of Bihar to revise orders made by authorities or officers in proceedings under Chapter IV.

11. The provisions of Bihar S. 64-A and Central S. 64-A are not such that they cannot be complied with simultaneously, except for the contingency already mentioned, i.e., when an application is made to the State Government by a person aggrieved by such and order of the Regional Transport Authority which is not appealable under S. 64. In such a case, the State Government cannot exercise its power under Bihar S. 64-A against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, though it would be free to exercise that power at a later stage after the State Transport Authority had disposed of the revision, if any, made to it. Revision, in the first instance, against non-appealable orders passed under Chapter IV, must go to the State Transport Authority as in respect of such orders Parliament must be taken to have varied the provisions of Bihar S. 64-A.

12. We therefore hold that Bihar S. 64-A is neither void nor has been repealed by Central S. 64-A and that its scope has been limited only to this extent that revisions against such orders of the Regional Transport Authority which are not appealable have to be preferred to the State Transport Authority.

13. In the present case the State Government of Bihar revised the order made by the appellate authority. It was competent to do so. The High Court was in error in holding otherwise

14. We therefore allow the appeal with costs, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the State of Bihar granting permit to the appellant Jain.

15. Appeal allowed.