1. Heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. L. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

2. This application is filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, praying for invoking the inherent jurisdiction in quashing and setting aside the proceedings of Itanagar Women Police Station Case No.28/2020, registered under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, corresponding to POCSO Case No.09/2022, which is pending before the Court of learned Special Judge (POCSO Act) at Yupia, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh.

3. The brief facts leading to filing of the present petition, is stated as under:-

“On 20.03.2020, a missing complaint was lodged before the Officer-inCharge, Naharlagun, Police Station by petitioner No.1, Shri Tame Talling to the effect that his sister- Miss Tame Yatang (petitioner No.2) is missing since 18.03.2020, after appearing her Class-X CBSE examination. Later on, the said complaint was forwarded to the Itanagar Women Police Station, which was registered as WPS Case No.28/2020, under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. It is further stated that the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were in love relationship for 4(four) years prior to the filing of the said FIR/missing report. The petitioner No. 3 (alleged accused) used to work as a gardener at the flower Nursery of victim’s aunt house. After knowing the relationship between the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, her aunt terminated the petitioner No.3 from his job. Thereafter, the petitioner No.3 went to Mumbai (Maharashtra) and worked there in a factory, namely, Max Spare Company located at Paliphata, Khopoli. However, the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 were in constant touch through facebook and over phone. On dated 18.03.2020, the petitioner No.2, after completion of her Class-X CBSE examination, went to Mumbai of her own to meet her boyfriend (petitioner No.3) without informing her family members and reached Mumbai on 21.03.2020. The petitioner No.2 stayed with the petitioner No.3 at his room allotted by the Company. During her stay with the petitioner No.3, they had entered into sexual intercourse many times, which was consensual. Later, after filing of the FIR, the Arunachal Police track down her location and in coordination with the Maharashtra Police, brought back both of them to Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh. During the course of investigation, the age of the petitioner No.2/victim was found to be about 16 years. After the completion of the investigation the case was chargesheeted, vide charge-sheet No.12/21 dated 05.02.2021, under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, before the Court of learned Special Judge, POCSO Act, Yupia, which is now at the stage of appearance. It is further stated that the FIR was lodged by the petitioner No.1 in order to trace his missing sister, and when she was brought back here in Itanagar, the family members from both the parties discussed the matter with the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, who were in love relationship and they came to know that the petitioner No.2 was already pregnant from their relationship and they were ready to marry each other. Hence on 26.09.2020, the parties entered into a Marriage Agreement in presence of family members from both the sides and the said Marriage Agreement was also produce before the Investigating Officer of the case during the investigation stage. On dated 27.01.2021, the petitioner No.2 delivered a baby girl, who is still with the petitioner No.2.

The petitioner No.1 is the informant of this case, and he does not want to pursue the matter further, since the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 were now staying together as a husband & wife and living peacefully with their minor daughter. However, the Section under which the petitioner No.3 is charge-sheeted is non-compoundable offence and thus, the matter could not be compounded before the learned Trial Court. During the investigation of the case also the petitioner No.2, while recording her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., had categorically stated that she was in relationship with the petitioner No.3 since last 4(four) years, when the petitioner No.3 used to work in Nursery of her aunt and also stated that she went to Mumbai of her own after completion of her Class-X CBSE examination. The petitioner No.2 also admitted that during her stay with the petitioner No.3, they had sexual intercourse many times out of love and the petitioner No.3 never forced her to come to Mumbai nor did he force for sexual intercourse. After sexual relationship, she got pregnant and was brought back to home by the Arunachal Police. She also admitted in her statement that she was in love affairs with the accused/petitioner No.3 and even after termination of his job, they were still in contact and used to meet whenever they got chance and after completion of her Class-X CBSE examination she went to Mumbai to stay with him. The petitioner No.2 has become adult and attained the age of marriage and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 have already registered their marriage before the Additional District Registrar of Marriage Office, Yupia, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh. The petitioner No.3 married the petitioner No.2 and they are staying together as a husband and wife along with their minor daughter. The petitioner No.3 is of 24 years of age having his bright future ahead. The petitioner No.2/victim is only 18 years of age and she completely dependent upon the petitioner No.3. More so, the parents of both the parties have accepted their marriage, and they are residing happily. Both the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 were of very young age during the time of alleged offence and ignorant of law in this regard had cohabited together as a husband and wife and as a result, the petitioner No. 2 got pregnant. At present the petitioner No.3 is the bread earner of the family, and thus, the petitioner No.2 will face great hardship, if the case against the petitioner No.3 proceeds further.”

4. Mr. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, [LQ/SC/2012/838 ;] wherein, in paragraphs 55 and 56, it has been observed as under:-

‘‘55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorized, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorized in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.’’

5. Mr. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioners further relied on the decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court passed in Crl.M.C.27/2022 dated 21.02.2022 (Kundan & Anr. Vs. State & Ors.) wherein, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court quashed the FIR against the petitioner No.1 on humanitarian ground and also considering the fact that both the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are already married and their relationship are also accepted by their parents and more so, both the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have a child out of their wedlock.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that though Section under which the accused/petitioner No. 3 is charge-sheeted is not compoundable, yet considering the future of both the petitioner Nos.2 & 3 and also considering the fact that the incident took place out of their love affairs at a very young age, more so, the fact that both the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 got married and also have a minor daughter, prays for quashing the FIR and the criminal proceeding in WPS Case No. 28/2020, under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, corresponding to POCSO Case No.09/2022, which is pending before the Court of learned Special Judge (POCSO Act) at Yupia, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh.

7. In this context, Ms. L. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State respondent submits that this is a case under Special Act, i.e. POCSO Act, apart from the fact that the case was registered under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, the Court should not entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR or any criminal proceeding where a life of the minor is involved.

8. Ms. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor further relied on the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh passed in CRM-2270-2020 dated 07.09.2022, (Nardeep Singh Cheema Vs. State of Punjab and ors.), wherein, it has been observe as under:-

’’Subsequent marriage of the accused with the prosecutrix would not dilute the offence under POCSO Act or under Section 376, IPC. POCSO Act has been incorporated with the objective of protecting children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, pornography. If an accused is absolved of committing sexual excesses with a minor on the basis of settlement with victim on her attaining majority, this would encourage an unhealthy trend and defeat the objective and spirit behind the legislation of POCSO Act.’’

9. Now, the only issue to be decided here in this case is as to “whether this is a fit case wherein this Court can exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioner No.3 in WPS Case No. 28/2020, under Section 363/376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, corresponding to POCSO Case No.09/2022, pending before the learned Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act) at Yupia, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh”

10. In the present case, it is seen that there was a Marriage Agreement and Settlement Agreement on 26.09.2020 and 10.05.2021, respectively, between the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 and subsequently their marriage was also registered on 15.07.2022. From the statement made by the petitioner No.2/victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and also from the other relevant documents, it is seen that the victim was a minor at the relevant time of incident and due to physical relationship with the petitioner No.3, she got pregnant and both were brought back to Itanagar and there was an agreement between them.

11. It is the admitted fact that at the time of the incident the petitioner No.2/victim was minor and she just appeared the of Class-X CBSE Board examination and due to sexual intercourse with the petitioner No.3 on many occasions, she got pregnant and thereafter, several months later, there was a Marriage Agreement between the parties, even when the petitioner was a minor.

12. In the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners in paragraph 55, it was observed that “the power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection” and in para 56, it is emphasized that “it needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” And it is also observed that it is neither permissible nor proper for the Court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482.

13. It is also to be noted here that in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan & ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, [LQ/SC/2019/430 ;] the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that in respect of the non-compoundable offences, the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked if the case is private in nature and if the same do not have a serious impact on the society and also if there is any settlement or compromise between the victim and the offender.

14. For ready reference, paragraph No. 13 of the Laxmi Narayan (Supra) is extracted herein below:-

’’13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

v) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.

For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.’’

15. In the present case, it is seen that at the relevant time of incident the petitioner No.2/victim was a minor girl, hardly of 15 or 16 years of age, who just appeared her Class-X CBSE Board examination, and she had sexual intercourse with the accused/petitioner No.3 repeatedly when she was in Mumbai and got pregnant and delivered a baby girl, when she was only 15/16 years of age. Having no other alternative, subsequently there was a Marriage Agreement between the parties on 26.09.2022, while the petitioner No.2 was still minor girl.

16. So, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as considering the gravity of the offence and also considering the view expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmi Narayan (supra), I find that subsequent Marriage Agreement or marriage between the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 cannot dilute the offences under the POCSO Act. The POCSO Act is considered to be a special Act, which is incorporated with the only objective to protect the children from the offence of sexual assault or sexual harassment etc. Such kind of offence is considered as heinous offence and also has a serious impact in society.

17. Thus, this case is serious in nature, and if the accused/petitioner No.3 is not allowed to proceed the criminal proceedings or if, the FIR is quashed, invoking power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this would encourage the unhealthy trend and will also send a message to the society which will affect the objective and spirit beyond the legislation of POCSO Act. The POCSO Act being a Special statute cannot be quashed only on the basis of compromise or subsequent marriage between the accused and the prosecutrix.

18. In the result, I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed.