Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot And Ors

Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot And Ors

(High Court Of Judicature At Calcutta)

| 16-06-1893

William Comer Petheram, C.J.

1. My answer to the question referred to the Full Bench isthat, when an application is made to a Court for filing a private award, andobjections to the validity of the award are raised in a verified writtenstatement, and the objections are such as fall within Section 521 of the Codeof Civil Procedure, the Court is not bound to hold its hand and reject theapplication, but must inquire into the validity of the objections raised, andthereupon determine whether the award shall be filed or not.

2. Before examining the cases on the subject, it will bewell to see what are the provisions of the Code, by which the rights andliabilities, whatever they may be, are created.

3. Sections 506 to 522 create a system of procedure by whichthe matters in issue in a suit may, if the parties wish it, be tried byarbitration, and by which the judgment and decree in the suit must be inaccordance with the award, unless it has been set aside in consequence of themisconduct of the arbitrators, the fraud of either of the parties, or becauseit was made after the submission had been superseded, the only ground of appealfrom such a judgment being that the decree is in excess of, or not inaccordance with, the award.

4. Sections 525 and 526 create a procedure by which, when noaction is pending, matters in dispute may be referred to arbitration, and amode by which, in my opinion, the award, when made, is to be enforced.

5. Section 525 provides that, when an award has been madeunder a submission by agreement, any person interested in it may make a writtenapplication to a Court to file it, which application is to be numbered andregistered as a suit, and notice of it requiring them to show cause is to begiven to all the other parties to the arbitration, any of whom may show causeon any or either of the following grounds:

A--(a) Where the award has left undetermined any of thematters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referredto arbitration.

(b) Where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable ofexecution-

(c) Where an objection to the legality of the award isapparent upon the face of it.

B--(a) Corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator or umpire.

(b) Either party having been guilty of fraudulentconcealment of any matter which he ought to have disclosed, or of wilfully misleadingor deceiving the arbitrator or umpire.

(c) The award having been made after the issue of an orderby the Court superseding the arbitration and restoring the suit.

6. If no such cause is shown against the award, it is to befiled and shall then take effect as an award under the provisions of ChapterXXXVII of the Code, that is to say, it takes effect as an award upon whichjudgment must be given, and upon which judgment a decree must follow in thesuit which was, I think, for reasons which I will presently mention, commencedby the petition to file the award, which petition, by virtue of Section 525,takes the position of the plaint by which a suit is to be commenced.

7. The question upon which there are conflicting decisionsin this Court is whether the provision in Section 526, that the award is to befiled unless cause is shown, means that it is to be filed unless some legalcause is proved to exist, why it should not be filed, or whether it means thatit is not to be filed if it is merely asserted, by a verified statement oraffidavit made by some person interested, that some such cause exists.

8. I now proceed to examine the cases to which we have beenreferred. They are : Sree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhry I.L.R. Cal. 490Pontifex and Field, JJ. there held that no appeal lay from an order of aSubordinate Judge refusing to file an award under Section 525. Both the learnedJudges expressed the opinion that the words "The application shall be inwriting and shall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant asplaintiff and the other parties as defendants" in Section 525 did not havethe effect of converting the application into a suit for all purposes, butmerely meant that for the purposes of the entry in the register of civil suits,and of the classification of the business of the Courts, and for these purposesonly, the application is to be regarded as a suit; and Pontifex, J., in thecourse of his judgment said, "I think it world be the duty of the Courtwithout inquiring into the validity of the cause so shown to refuse theapplication to file the award, and to leave the applicant to his remedy bysuit." If this view is correct, and if Section 525 does not have theeffect of converting the application into a suit, then it seems to me that, ifan objection is made by any one, the award ought not to be filed; but thedecision of the question on which the opinion is expressed was not necessaryfor the decision of the case, and I am unable to agree in that opinion. If the applicationto file the award is not converted into a suit for all purposes, it is notconverted into one at all, for any but an administrative one, as defined byField, J., and it must follow that the award cannot be enforced under theprovisions of those sections, as there is no suit pending in which a decree canbe made, and filing the award has no effect whatever, as even after it isfiled, it can only be enforced by a regular suit, to be commenced by a plaintin the ordinary way, which could be done as well before it is filed as it couldafterwards; and this is to hold that these two sections, 525 and 526, have nopractical effect whatever. I understand that from the passing of the Act downto the present time, proceedings under these sections have been treated assuits, in this way, that when the award has been filed, judgment and decreehave in all cases followed upon such filing without any question, and I thinkit would be impossible to hold now that all such decrees have been waste paperbecause they were not made in any suit.

9. The next case is that of Ichamoyee Chowdhranee v.Prosunno Nath Chowdhry I.L.R. Cal. 557, where Wilson, J. held that, when it isshown, by written statement or affidavit or other verified statement, that theaward is impugned as invalid, for any of the reasons contained in Sections 520and 521, the Court is then bound to hold its hand and leave the parties totheir remedy by suit. MACPHERSON J. agreed in setting aside the order in thatcase, but added that he would hesitate to say that when such grounds ofobjections are set forth in a verified petition or affidavit, the Court is tomake no enquiry.

10. In Dutto Singh v. Dosad Bahadur Singh I.L.R. Cal. 575,Mitter and Okinealy, JJ. dissented from the opinion of Wilson and MacphersonJJ., and adopted that of Melville, and Pinhey, JJ., of the Bombay High Court,in the case of Dandekar v. Dandekars I.L.R. 6 Bom. 663, who had held that theterm to "show cause" is a technical term having a well-understoodmeaning; that it does not mean merely to allege cause, nor even to make outthat there is room for argument, but both to allege cause and prove it to thesatisfaction of the Court. In Hurronath Chowdhry v. Nistarini Chowdhrani I.L.R.Cal. 74, (Garth, C.J., and Macpherson J)., the Chief Justice in the course ofthe judgment said: "We are disposed to think that when an application ismade to the Court to file an award, and an objection is made to the filing ofit upon any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 520 or 521, the proper coursefor the Court to pursue is to dismiss the application and to leave theapplicant to bring a regular suit to enforce the award, in which all theobjections to its validity may be properly tried and decided." Jones v.Ledgard I.L.R. All. 340; Straight J., after considering all the authoritiessaid: "What I consider is required is that such party should by argument,or evidence, or both, show substantial materials to warrant the Court inarriving at a conclusion that the reasons referred to in Section 520 andSection 521 exist in the particular case." Bindessuri Pershad Singh v.Jankee Pershad Singh I.L.R. Cal. 482; the question is referred to in thejudgment of Mitter and Beverley, JJ., but is not decided.

11. In the cases in this Court, in which it has been heldthat, when an objection is taken, the Court should refuse to file the award,the reason which induced the Judges to take that view seems to have been thatin an action to enforce the award, all the objections to its validity could bemore conveniently considered than in a proceeding to file it, but except in thecase of Sree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhry I.L.R. Cal. 490, the Judgesdo not appear to have expressly considered the effect of the provision inSection 525, that the petition is to be registered as a suit, and thateverything which could be pleaded as an answer to an action to enforce theaward could be pleaded as an answer to the petition to file the award; so that,as far as I can see, the proceeding to enforce the award by petition isidentical with a proceeding to enforce it by suit, except that in a proceedingby petition no appeal lies against the judgment, except on one of the groundsmentioned in Section 522, whilst in an action an appeal would lie against thejudgment on those mentioned in Sections 520 and 521 as well. When it is bornein mind that the proceeding to tile the award is a mode of enforcing it 1 thinkthat the words "show cause" must have the meaning which wasattributed to them by MELVILL, J. in the case which I have already quoted, asthe cause to be shown is cause to be shown against a proceeding which is by thelaw converted into a suit, and I do not think it could be the intention of theLegislature that such a proceeding could be defeated by a mere assertion, thetruth or sufficiency of which was not admitted, and which had not beenestablished.

12. For these reasons my answer to the first part of thequestion referred to us is in the negative, to the latter part in theaffirmative. The result is that the rule will be made absolute. We make noorder as to costs.

Henry Thoby Princep, J.

13. The question raised in this matter is whether, in anaward made without the intervention of a Court, and presented to a competentCivil Court to be filed, if one of the parties to the arbitration, on beingcalled upon under Section 526 to show cause, takes an objection falling withinSection 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, the Court is bound to decideon such objection or should stay its hand and refer the parties to a suit.

14. Section 525 directs that such an application should benumbered and registered as a suit between the parties to the arbitration, andit further directs that notice should be given to such parties, other than theapplicant, to show cause why the award should not be filed. Section 526declares that if no ground, such as is mentioned or referred to in Section 520or Section 521, is shown against the award, the Court shall order it to befiled, and such an award shall then take effect as an award under theprovisions of Chapter XXXVII of the Code, that is, it shall take effect as adecree. It has been contended, under the authority of some cases of this Court,that if such an objection be raised, the Court should stay its hand, and referthe parties to a suit. By this I understand that it should dismiss theapplication which is declared by the law to be numbered and registered as asuit. These, however, are points which must necessarily arise on such anapplication, and form the subject-matter of issues to be decided, unless it iscontemplated that the matter should become a decree only by consent of theparties. I do not agree in the view of the law which would place it in thehands of any party to an arbitration to defeat the object of the arbitrationand the law by merely making an objection falling within Section 520 or Section521, however groundless or dishonest that objection may be if subjected toinvestigation. As remarked in Dandekar v. Dandekars I.L.R. 6 Bom. 663, "Itwould be unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended that a mereallegation of the existence of cause without any inquiry whatever into thevalidity of the cause alleged would be sufficient to prevent the filing of anaward." Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chowdhry Murtaza Hossem v.Bechunniasa L.R. 3 IndAp 209 : 26 W.R. 10 considered objections of this naturein a case under the Code of 1859, which, however, was not dissimilar to thepresent case. The objection taken in this case was not taken before theirLordships, but we cannot hold that it was not present to their minds. It washeld that any ground which would be fatal to an award on an application to theCourts of England could in India be taken under the Code of 1859, and theobjections taken were duly considered in deciding that case. It seems to methat the slight alteration of the law made by Section 526 of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1882, was, as was held by Straight, J., in Jones v. Ledgard I.L.R. 8All. 340, especially designed to give full effect to that judgment. I observethat the case in the Privy Council was not cited in any of the cases on thissubject, except in that of the Allahabad Court.

15. So far, therefore, I think that on cause shown on any ofthe grounds mentioned in Section 520 or Section 521, the Court is bound todetermine the objections raised. But we have been also required to considerwhat course should be followed if the objection is taken that the matters indispute were never submitted to arbitration, whether it is open to the Court toconsider such an objection, or whether it should rather refer the parties to aregular suit. It is unfortunate that the Code should be obscure on such apoint. But the fact that it refers only to objections taken on the groundsmentioned in Section 520 or Section 521, seems to me to show that it proceedson the assumption that a submission to arbitration has been made so as toenable the Court to deal with it under Sections 525 and 526. It requires theCourt to deal with objections only to the conduct of the arbitrators, theconduct of the parties while the matter was under arbitration, and the awarditself; and it therefore seems to contemplate that in a proceeding of thisdescription the Court should confine itself to these matters; an objection thatthere was no submission to arbitration seems to deprive the Court ofjurisdiction to proceed under Sections 525 and 526, and to require that thematters in dispute should be adjudicated in a suit.

James Quain Pigot, J.

16. The question referred in this case is no doubt Limitedto one point which arises under Section 526 of the Code; namely, whether, whenan application is made to file a private award, and objections are raised tothe filing of the award, which objections are such as fall within Section 521of the Code, the Court is bound to hold its hand and reject the application,the rulings to that effect--Hurronath Chowdhry v. Nistarini Chowdhrani I.L.R.Cal. 74, Ichamoyee Chowdhranee v. Prosunno Nath Chowdhri I.L.R.Cal. 557, andSree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhury I.L.R. Cal. 490--being thus in thisquestion referred to the Full Bench.

17. Although, according to the terms of the rules regulatingreferences to a Full Bench, this question alone can be authoritativelyanswered, I think it would be unsatisfactory (as it might lead tomisapprehension) to abstain in answering this question from all reference tothe wider question how far, in the case of proceedings under Sections 525, 526,the Court ought to stay its hand upon objection made to the filing of theaward. The decisions above mentioned are founded chiefly on the ground thatproceedings under these sections as they have the character given toproceedings under the earlier sections of Chapter XXXVII, of absolute finalitywithout appeal, cannot have been intended to involve the final determination ofquestions of such difficulty as may arise under Sections 525, 526. That Iunderstand to have been the principal, though not the only, reason of thosedecisions. Having regard to the decisions which have been cited, and to thegeneral scope of the sections of this chapter, I agree in the opinion that, sofar as relates to questions of the kind which fall within Section 531, theCourt, under Sections 525, 526, was intended to deal with them, and to do sofinally, and that the argument founded upon the denial of any right of appealhas been carried too far when invoked as a reason why the Court should not,under Sections 525, 526, deal with questions arising under Section 521. But Ithink it would be unsatisfactory in saying this to leave without any notice thequestion how far the argument founded on the denial of appeal is applicable toproceedings under Sections 525, 526; since, if this were done, it mightpossibly be supposed that all questions of every kind relating to a privateaward are, in our opinion, such as must be dealt with under these sections; andthis, I think, ought to be guarded against.

18. The circumstances under which the provisions of Section526 become applicable, are stated in Section 525. They are--

First.--That a matter has been referred to arbitrationwithout the intervention of a Court of Justice.

Second.- That an award has been made.

Third.--That an application has been made that the award betiled in Court.

fourth.-- -That notice to show cause has thereupon beengiven to the parties to the application other than the applicant.

19. These conditions having been fulfilled, the case standsupon the same footing as one in which, under the earlier sections, the fact ofthe submission and of the making of the award being beyond question, the onlymatters of dispute that can arise are those contemplated by Sections 520 and521.

20. Under such circumstances, the Court is in nearly thesame position, in respect of its power to do justice between the parties, asthough the arbitration had been had upon a reference made by order of Courtunder Section 508, or upon an agreement to refer filed in Court and an orderthereon under Section 523.

21. There are, no doubt, differences between the provisionsrelating to an arbitration held under an order of Court, and those on a privatereference, and notably that Section 513 does not apply to the latter class ofcases. But I think that upon the true construction of Section 526, it must beheld that the Legislature intended to give to awards made in privatearbitration the same degree of finality as is given to awards made in pursuanceof an order of reference provided, first, there be no question of the fact ofthe reference, having been really made, second, and none that an award has beenmade under it.

22. These two last conditions seem do me to be essentialpreliminaries necessary before Section 526 can apply. I do not see that theSections 525, 526, provided for cases in which the factum of the reference orof the award under it is challenged, and in the absence of express provision tothat effect in the Code, I do not think it can be held that these questions canbe determined by the Court acting under these sections.

23. I do not think that the fact that an application to filean award alleged to have been made upon an alleged reference is to be filed andnumbered as a suit, does, by implication making the proceeding a suit for allpurposes, give the Court power to determine, without appeal, whether thealleged reference has been actually made, and the alleged award has beenactually made under it.

24. I think that as to both these matters, and those whichmay arise in reference to them, the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in thecase of Samal Nathu v. Jai Shankur Dalsukram I.L.R. 9 Bom. 254 may be applied :and that if either the reference or the award is challenged, the parties mustbe left to a regular suit, which I think will certainly well lie on the award,if actually and duly made; Palaniappa Chetti v. Rayappa Chetti 4 Mad. H.C. 119and Kota Seetamma v. Kollipurla Soobbiah 8 Mad. H.C. 81.

25. I think that, if no question arises as to the fact ofthe reference, or as to the fact of the award, and the questions raised areonly those which fall within Section 521 of the Code, it is the duty of theCourt to inquire into and determine the validity of such objections. But Ithink that, if either the fact of alleged reference, or the fact of the allegedaward, or both, be denied, then the Court has not, under Sections 525, 526, thepower of deciding upon the dispute between the parties: it should reject theapplication to file the award and leave the applicant to his remedy by suit.

26. The question referred to us must, I think, be answeredas to the first part of it in the negative, and as to the second part of it inthe affirmative.

Macpherson, J.

27. I agree with Mr. Justice Pigot, and would only add a fewwords. The direction that the application "shall be numbered and registeredas a suit between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties asdefendants" does not, I think, in itself indicate that the application isto be treated as a suit in which all the questions which might arise on theapplication are to be tried and determined. Section 931 and 529 of the Codecontain a similar direction, but there is a further provision that the casesreferred to in each of those sections should be tried as if a suit had beeninstituted. From the absence of any such provision in connection with Sections525 and 526, and from the specification of the particular grounds on whichcause may be shown, and which are obviously not exhaustive, it may be inferredthat the power of the Court in dealing with the application is limited, andlimited to the grounds referred to in Section 526. In this view an objectionthat there was no submission, or that the award was not the award ofarbitrators, would, I think, be fatal to the application, and the Court wouldhave no power to inquire into it. But if the objection taken is such as isreferred to in Section 520 or 521 it seems to be intended that it should beinquired into and determined in the same way as if it had been taken to awardmade under a reference by the Court and filed under Section 216. Otherwisethere is no apparent reason for limiting the grounds on which cause may beshown to the grounds specified in Section 526.

Chunder Madhab Ghose, J.

28. I agree with the Chief Justice in the answers heproposes to give to the questions referred to the Full Bench.

29. As to what may be the true import of the expression"if no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in Section 520 or 521 beshown against the award," as occurring in Section 526 of the Code, thereis considerable divergence of opinion, as set out in the order of reference.

30. Section 526 of the Code provides that when any personinterested in a private award is desirous of enforcing it, he may apply to theCourt of the lowest grade having jurisdiction over the matter to which theaward relates, that the award be filed in Court. The application when presentedshall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant as plaintiffand the other parties as defendants; and the Court shall then call upon theopposite party to show cause why the award should not be filed. Section 526provides that if no ground such as is mentioned in Section 520 or 521 be shownagainst the award, the Court shall order it to be filed; and such award shallthen take effect as an award made under the provisions of the Chapter XXXVII,i.e. an award made through the intervention of the Court. On turning to Section522, which relates to such an award, we find it laid down that if the award isaccepted, judgment shall be given in accordance therewith, and upon thejudgment so given a decree shall follow.

31. When therefore Section 526 provides that the award shalltake effect as a decree, 1 take it that judgment shall be passed by the Court,and a decree shall follow as in Section 522. When such a decree is made, thesame limitation as to appeal, as applies to decrees made upon awards throughthe intervention of Court, equally applies to it. In this view of the matterthe proceedings taken upon the application, which is registered as a suit, mayrightly be regarded as proceedings taken in the suit. When, however, the Courtrefuses to file the award, such order of refusal is not a decree, and is notopen to appeal. In this event, it may well be doubted whether the proceedingscould be regarded as proceedings in a suit, properly so called.

32. But however that may be, the Legislature, by providingthat the application shall be registered as a suit between the applicant asplaintiff and the other parties as defendants, and that the award, when orderedto be filed, shall take effect as a decree, has, I think, clearly indicatedthat the proceedings taken upon the application should take the form of a suit,and should be of the same character as in a suit properly so called; and thequestion thereupon arises, what is the duty of the Court when the defendantsappear and allege certain grounds against the award : whether it should inquireinto and determine the validity of the grounds, or whether it should at onceput an end to the proceedings by declining to proceed any further with thematter. In the case of Sashti Charan Chatterjee v. Tarak Chandra Chatterjee 8B.L.R. 315 decided by a Full Bench of this Court, Norman, Chief Justice, withreference to private awards, observed as follows: "I am disposed to thinkthat an award filed under the provisions of Section 327 stands in precisely thesame position as an award submitted to the Court under Section 320. In bothcases before passing final judgment the Court is empowered by Section 322 tomodify or correct the award; by Section 323 to remit the award forreconsideration, first, if the award has left undetermined some of the mattersreferred to arbitration or determined matters not referred to arbitration;secondly, if it is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; thirdly, ifan objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of the award:and lastly, by Section 324 the Court is empowered to set the award aside incertain cases."

33. Whether these observations could be altogether supportedis open to doubt, having regard especially to the decision of the Privy Councilin the subsequent case of Chowdhry Murtaza Hossein v. Bechunnissa L.R. 3 IndAp209 : 26 W.R. 10 to he hereafter referred to. But that is the view which wasexpressed in the case of Sashti Charan Chatterjee v. Tarak Chandra Chatterjee 8B.L.R. 315.

34. When an objection is raised to the legality of an awardmade through the intervention of the Court, the Court, I take it, is bound toinvestigate into the truth or otherwise of the objection under Sections 520 and521 of the Code,--and the question is whether the same rule ought not to applyin the case of a private award, when a like objection is raised before theCourt.

35. If the question bad arisen with reference to the old ProcedureCode (Act VIII of 1859), I apprehend that there would be no difficulty upon theauthorities in answering the question. In Section 327 of the old Code, thewords were "if no sufficient cause be shown against the award, the awardshall be filed, and may be enforced as an award made under the provision ofthis chapter." The observations of Norman, Chief Justice, in the FullBench case of Sashti Charan Chatterjee v. Tarak Chandra Chatterjee 8 B.L.R. 315already referred to, and the judgment of the Privy Council in the case ofChowdhry Murtaza Hossein v. Bechunnissa L.R. 3 IndAp 209 : 26 W.R. 10; are, Ithink, conclusive to show that under the old Procedure Code, the Court would bebound to investigate the question raised by the petition of the defendant, andthereupon to determine whether the award should be filed or not. In the case ofChowdhry Murtaza Hossein v. Bechunnissa, which was a case of a private award,the Judicial Committee, although they were of opinion that the earlier sectionsof Chapter VI of the old Code, relating to awards made through the interventionof the Court, were not incorporated into Section 327, still, in construing thewords "sufficient cause" as occurring in the said Section 327, heldthat those words "should be taken to comprehend any substantial objectionwhich appears upon the face of the award, or is founded on the misconduct ofthe arbitrators, or on any miscarriage in the course of the proceedings, orupon any other ground which would be considered fatal to an award on anapplication to the Courts in this country;" and the Judicial Committee,treating the proceedings as if they were in a suit, examined fully into theobjections raised by the defendant.

36. It seems to be probable that the Legislature, having inview the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Chowdhry MurtazaHossein v. Bechunnisa, expressly incorporated (as I understand it didincorporate) the earlier Sections 520 and 521 of the present Code into Section526, and when this section says: "if no ground such as is mentioned inSections 520 or 521 be shown against the award," I think that theLegislature meant to lay down that if no such ground is established, the Courtshall order the award to be filed. I cannot lead myself to believe that the Legislature,while they incorporated Sections 520 and 521 into Section 526, and while theyprovided that the application is to be registered as a suit between theapplicant as plaintiff and the opposite party as defendant, meant to alter thewhole scope of Section 327 of the old Code and to limit the functions of theCourt under Sections 525 and 526 of the present Code in such a way that theCourt should have no authority to inquire into and determine the validity ofthe objections raised by the defendant.

37. I agree in the view expressed by the Bombay High Courtin the case of Dandekar v. Dandehars I.L.R. 6 Bom. 663. Melville, J., in thecourse of his judgment in that case observed: "Moreover, it would beunreasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended that the mere allegationof the existence of cause without any inquiry whatever into the validity of thecause alleged should be sufficient to prevent the filing of an award. Thiswould be to render the filing of the award impossible in almost any case;"and later on "The term to show cause is a technical term having awell-understood meaning. It does not mean merely to allege cause, nor even tomake out that there is room for argument, but both to allege cause and to proveit to the satisfaction of the Court. We think we may safely say that the termis used in this sense in every other part of the Code in which it occurs (e.g.,in Sections 479 and 485), and we do not see how we should be justified inputting a different construction upon it in Sections 525 and 526." Ientirely agree in these observations. This case was followed in this Court intwo cases in Dutto Singh v. Dosad Bahadur Singh I.L.R. Cal. 575 and Rung Lallv. Hem Narain Gir I.L.R. Cal. 166 and in the Allahabad Court in Jones v. LedgardI.L.R. All. 340.

38. It has been said that a suit upon the award is the rightform of action in which objections as to the validity of the award may properlyand effectually be gone into, and that when any objection is raised underSection 526, the Court should refer the parties to a regular suit. I doubt, inthe first place, whether a separate suit would lie to enforce an award if theapplication to file it can be dealt with under Section 526, and if it has beenrefused, though no doubt a suit being brought upon the original right the awardmay be referred to as evidence in support of that right. But however that maybe (and it is perhaps unnecessary to express any opinion upon that question inthis case), I do not see why, if the Legislature has provided a procedure underSections 525 and 526 to enforce an award, the parties should be driven toanother suit.

39. Whether, if an objection is raised upon the score thatthere was no submission to arbitration, or that there was no award at all, theCourt would have jurisdiction to deal with the mutter, is a question which doesnot arise in this reference, and I therefore refrain from expressing anyopinion upon it. I confine myself to the question as referred.

.

Surjan Raot vs.Bhikari Raot and Ors. (16.06.1893 -CALHC)



Advocate List
Bench
  • William Comer Petheram, C.J., Henry Thoby Princep, JamesQuain Pigot, Macpherson
  • Chunder Madhab Ghose, JJ.
Eq Citations
  • (1893) ILR 21 CAL 213
  • LQ/CalHC/1893/55
Head Note

- Whether the Revenue is entitled to recover duty on foreign salary payment as a component of the total salary paid to an expatriate working in India, in Eli Lilly case, (2009) 15 SCC 1 — Held, yes. - Question whether orders under Ss. 201(1) & (1-A) were beyond limitation purely academic in these circumstances as question would still be whether assessee could be declared as assessee in default under S. 192 — Question of limitation left open, since assessees had paid differential tax and interest thereon and undertaken not to seek refund thereof — Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss. 192, 201(1) and 201(1-A). (Paras 3 and 5)