(1) THIS appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) C. P. C. has been preferred by defendant No. 1 against the order dated 17-1-1992 of Ist Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad by which the application 5-C filed by the plaintiff was allowed and the defendants, their dealers, stockists and distributors were restrained from infringing the plaintiffs copyright existing in art work, label and wrapper by using these as wrappers for Maingis Todha. They were further restrained from passing off their goods as goods of plaintiff under trade mark Maingis Todha.

(2) M/s. Dodha, House, Kot Ka pura, through its partner Subhash Chandra Vig filed O. S. No. 22 of 1990 against Surendra Kumar Maingi, Proprietor of M/s. V. R. K. Todha Sweet House, Kot Ka Pura and Pallu Ram for permanent injunction restraining them from infringing plaintiffs copyright existing in the art work, label and wrapper duly registered under the Indian Copyright Act by using these in the art work involved in defendants label and wrappers titled Maingis Todha Sweet, from infringing the trade name Dodha House of the plaintiff by using the word Todha as part of defendant trade name and also from passing off their goods as goods of the plaintiff under the trade mark Todha.

(3) THE case set up by the plaintiff in the plaint is as follows. The plaintiff is a firm which was registerd under the Indian Partnership Act and Subhash Chandra Vig is one of its partners. The plaintiff is engaged in the business of manufacturing confectionary sweet-meats under the trade mark Dodha and has been carrying on his business under the trade name Dodha House, which trade mark was adopted in the Year 1912 and is being used continuously since then. The plaintiffs registered office is at Kot Ka Pura in District Faridkot and the branches are in Ludhiana, Delhi and Ghaziabad. The plaintiffs trade name Dodha House was duly registered on 15-1-1972 under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The plaintiff is also owner of Royal Dodha Sweets and art work/label and wrapper of the same were registered under the copy right Act. Thus the plaintiff has acquired exclusive right to use the trade name Dodha House and also the aforesaid art work/labels/wrappers. The plaintiff has extensive business. The details of sales from 1947 onwards have been given in para 9 of the plaint which rose to Rs. 14,14,145. 00 in 1989-90. The defendant No. 1 adopted trade name Todha with the word Maingis as its prefix and is selling the aforesaid goods duly packed in Maingis Todha label/wrapper in Kot Ka Pura since second week of September, 1990. The trade mark/trade name/label/wrapper and art work chosen by the defendant No. 1 is similar to that of the plaintiff in its composition colour, scheme and get-up etc. and it is a deliberate imitation. This is bound to cause deception and confusion in normal course of business activities of the parties. The defendants are passing off their goods and business as that of the plaintiff. The suit was accordingly filed for the reliefs mentioned above. The plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C. P. C. praying that during the pendency of the suit the defendants be restrained from infringing the plaintiffs copyright existing in the art work/label and wrapper, from infringing the trade name Dodha House and from passing off their goods and business as goods of the plaintiff.

(4) THE defendants filed written statement and their case is as follows. The trade mark of defendant No. 1 is Maingis Todha Sweet and not Maingis Todha. The defendant No. 1 started his business under the aforesaid trade mark about 20 years back and his trade mark was very different from the plaintiffs trade mark "v. R. K. Dodha Sweet House, Kot Ka Pura". The word Todha is a description of sweet meat which cannot be property of an individual. The defendants product is not in the market at Ghaziabad. It is denied that the trade mark/trade name/label/ wrapper of the defendant is same as that of the plaintiff and there is any imitation of any kind. It is not likely to cause any deception or confusion in the normal course of business activity. There is no infringement of the plaintiffs trade mark or of the alleged art work, label or wrapper under thecopyright Act. The plaintiffs business is in no way affected by the sale of product made by the defendant. It is further pleaded that no part of cause of action had accrued at Ghaziabad and the Court at Ghaziabad had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The defendants also filed objection to the injunction application filed by the plaintiff on the same grounds which are set up in the written statement.

(5) THE parties filed affidavits in support of their respective cases and also some documents. The learned Addl. District Judge accepted the version of the plaintiff and passed an injunction order in his favour on 17-1-1992 in the terms mentioned earlier.

6) SRI Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has urged that the wrappers of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in which sweet is sold are entirely different and as such there is neither any infringement of the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act or of the Copyright Act nor there is any chance of deception upon the customers and therefore the trial court erred in passing the impugned injunction order. The learned counsel has referred to the wrappers of the product of the plaintiff and defendant on which the following is written :plaintiffs PRODUCTROYAL Estd. 1912dhodhasweetmanufactured bydodha House (Regd.) Gold Medalist. Regd. T. M. No. 277714on one side of the wrapper following is written : Super Bazar, Place New Delhi Ph. 2518759railway Road, Ghazia- bad, U. P. DHODHA HOUSE Ph : 85-3636railway Road, Kot Ka Pura, pb. Ph : 132, 237, 444ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhianaph : 26979there is a round seal towards the left side of the words "estd. 1912". A crown is shown in black colour over letter r in the word Royal. The word Royal has been printed in red colour and in big letters. On the back side of the wrapper a closed packet of Royal DHODHA Sweets has been printed in blus colour and on the right side there is a picture of eagle inside a circle which is made with bold red dots. DEFENDANTS PRODUCTMAINGIs TODHASweetprop : Surendra Kumar Maingi VRK TODHA SWEET HOUSE KOTKAPURA. On the back side a closed packet of Maingis Todha Sweet is shown in blue colour and towards the right side there is a circle in which the words VRK are written in red colour and the outer side of the circle is in black colour where the words TODHA Sweet House, Kotkapura are written in white colour. It may be pointed out that the word royal is written with red colour in bold letters over the word DODHA Sweet in the plaintiffs product while the words MAINGIs is written in big block letters and in red colour in the defendants product. There is neither any seal nor the words "estd. 1912" are mentioned in the defendants product. On the back side of the wrapper the closed packet no doubt looks similar from a distance but there is a mark difference in the middle with an eagle in the plaintiffs product and a round circul with a writing "vrk Todha Sweet House" in the defendants product.

(7) I am in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the similarity in the wrappers of the defendants with that of plaintiff is not such which may cause deception to customers. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has drawn the attention of the court to certain similarities in the two wrappers and has urged on its basis that a confusion is bound to arise in the mind of a customer. It is true that a circle has been shown with red colour towards the left side where the following is written- "forget to eat but not Todha sweet. " Similar language is written in the plaintiffs wrapper but the colour of the inner circle in the two wrappers is entirely different. In the plaintiffs wrapper it is of blue colour while in the defendantswrapper it is of red colour. It may also be noticed that the plaintiffs product is Dodha and the defendant product is Todha. Phonetically they may sound some what similar but there is difference in their spelling. In the defendants wrapper these words have been written in very bold print in black colour which are more than one inch long. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance on K. R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri Ambal and Co. , AIR 1970 SC 146 [LQ/SC/1969/167] wherein it has been held that the resemblance between the two marks must be considered with reference to the ear as well as the eye and ocular comparison is not always the decisive test. Even if there is no visual resemblance between the two marks, that does not matter when there is a close affinity of sound between the words which are distinctive features of the two marks. He has also placed reliance upon Ruston and Hornby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co. , AIR 1970 SC 1649 [LQ/SC/1969/330] and has urged that the customers are likely to be misled. In view of the features which distinguish wrappers of the plaintiff and defendants, which have been noticed earlier, I am of the opinion that the wrappers of the defendants product do not resemble that of the plaintiff and there is no such similarity between the two which may cause confusion or deception with regard to the goods and it is not likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other, if offered to him.

(8) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff has urged that many customers are not familiar with English language and they are likely to be misled as appearance of the two wrappers is similar. I am unable to accept the submission made by the learned counsel. Many items are sold in the market whose wrappers or covers look alike but they are distinguished by their names even though the same may be printed in English. Shaving blade is a most common item of use and it is sold in packets of exactly same size and dimension. They are distinguished only by their name which is printed in English. Similar is a case of tooth paste which is sold in tubes of standard size and in wrappers made of hard papers which are also exactly similar and often having the same colour. Some of the well known brands of biscuits like Britannia or Parle are sold in packets of same size and colour which look exactly identical and they are distinguished by their names which are written in English language. Therefore the fact that the customers may not be knowing English language is not enough to hold that they are likely to be misled and or that they would buy defendants product under a mistaken belief that it is that of the plaintiff.

(9) LEARNED counsel for the defendant-appellant has next submitted that Dodha is a name of particular variety of sweet and it cannot be property of an individual and therefore the defendant has infringed no law by marketing the sweet in the name and style of Maingis Todha Sweet. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has however urged that dhodha is a special item which is made only by the plaintiff and it is not name of a sweet. In my opinion this question requires oral evidence and no finding can be recorded in favour of plaintiff at this stage. The defendant has no doubt filed wrappers which show that some others are also manufacturing and selling the same product Dodha. One wrapper is that of Ramsonss dodha Sweet, manufactured by Hafiz Abadian Dihatti, Ram Chand Madan Lal, Bus Stand, Nawan Shahar and the other is Special Dodha manufactured by Har Har Mahadev Misthan Bhandar, Model Town, Yamuna Nagar 135 001. This documentary evidence prima facie supports the defendants contention that Dodha is a name of a variety of sweet and it is not a special product which is manufactured by the plaintiff alone.

(10) SRI Yatindra Singh has next submitted that according to the para 3 of the plaint, registered head office of the plaintiff is at Kot Ka Pura in District Faridkot but the plaintiff also carries on business at Ghaziabad and Delhi. As per para 10 of the plaint, the defendant No. 1 carries on his business in Kot Ka pura and not at Ghaziabad. It is thus urged that the Court at Ghaziabad has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act lays down that a suit for infringment or relief to any right in registered trade mark or for passing off the same shall be instituted in District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit and in view of Section 20 C. PC. such a suit can be filed where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Therefore on the allegations made in the plaint the present suit for injunction for restraining the defendant from infringing the plaintiffs registered trade mark orfor passng of his goods as that of the plaintiff was maintainable only at Faridkot and not at Ghaziabad. Section 62 of the Copyright Act no doubt provides that a suit in respect of infringement of copyright in any work or infringement of any other right conferred by the Act shall be instituted in the District Court within whose jurisdiction the person instituting the suit voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Since the plaintiff claims that he is carrying on business at Ghaziabad a suit for infringement of copyright Act would be maintainable there.

(11) IT is urged that the trial court has completely ignored to consider the provisions of Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act and in view of the aforesaid provisions the court at Ghaziabad had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit with respect to matters enumerated therein. In support of this proposition, learned counsel has placed reliance on H. P. Marketing and Processing Corpn. v. M. M. Breweries, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 117 wherein it was held that in a suit for passing off or injunction on account of infringement of trade mark, the cause of action partly or wholly can arise in a given jurisdiction only if the defendant is proved to have directly made sale of goods under the impugned trade mark, within that jurisdiction, not to an individual consumer but to a distributor, whole-saler or retailer and that such a sale is on a commercial scale. Reliance is also placed on C. B. Dembla Trading v. Bharat Sewing Machine Co. , AIR 1982 Delhi 230 (para 5). It is also urged that unless the court has jurisdiction to try all the causes of action, such different causes of action cannot be joined together in one suit. In support of this proposition, reliance is placed on AIR 1942 Allahabad 387, AIR 1954 Mad. Bharat 156, AIR 1955 Mad. 595 [LQ/MadHC/1954/168] and 1983 AWC 986. It is thus urged that the court at Ghaziabad has no jurisdiction to try the suit. In the suit as framed cause of action arising under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act has also been joined for which the court has no territorial jurisdiction. Sri Sahini learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has submitted that the Court at Ghaziabad has jurisdiction to try the suit and in support of this proposition, he has placed reliance on Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals, AIR 1984 Delhi 265 and 1992 patent and Trade Marks Cases 94. Reliance is also placed on Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Reward Soap works AIR 1983 Delhi 286. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents do not relate to such cases where the courts had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of section 105 of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. In the present case a bare perusal of the plaint would show that the suit is based upon alleged infringement of registered trade mark or relating to any right in a registered trade mark or for passing off by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plainiffs trade mark. Such a suit cannot be entertained by the court at Ghaziabad in view of section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The mere fact that the court may have jurisdiction to entertain the suit with respect to a cause of action under the Copyright Act under Section 62 of the Act can be of no avail. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the court at Ghaziabad has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.

(12) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has lastly urged that the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the plaintiff. It is submitted that as the injunction order was granted in 1992, the defendant has not been able to carry on any business. Had there been no injunction, the defendants business would have multiplied and in the event of the dismissal of the suit the loss suffered by the defendant cannot be ascertained. On the contrary if no injunction is granted and the suit is ultimately decreed the loss suffered by the plaintiff can be ascertained and he can be adequately compensated. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that principle for grant of injunction in cases based upon infringement of registered trade mark are different and even if there is small chance of success of the suit, an injunction order should by passed. In support of this proposition, he has placed reliance on Century Trader v. Roshan Lal, AIR 1978 Delhi 250 and AIR 1990 Kerala 119. In my opinion, the principle urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff can have application where the equity is confined to the question whether the infringement is such which is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In cases where it is prima facie shown that the courthas no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, this principle will have no application as question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter.

(13) IN the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am clearly of the opinion that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the defendant and not in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore the impugned injunction order passed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be sustained and has to be set aside.

(14) IN the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dt. 17-1-1992 passed by the Ist Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad is set aside.

(15) IT is made clear that the trial court will decide the suit on the basis of evidence adduced before it, without being influenced in any manner with any observatins made in this order and in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.