1. The appellant was a Sub-Inspector in the police force of the North-West Frontier Province. On the 25th April, 1938, he was dismissed from service on certain charges by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The appellant appealed to the Inspector-General of Police and to the Provincial Government, and, failing to get any relief, instituted a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as being unsustainable, on the 3rd March, 1940. This decision was upheld by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the 19th September, 1940, but the Court granted, on the 15th October, 1940, a certificate under s. 205(1) of the Constitution Act. On the 11th November, 1940, the appellant applied to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner praying that he may be excused from compliance with the provisions of O. XLV, r. 7, of the Civil Procedure Code, but the Court dismissed the application on the 3rd March, 1941, on the ground that the appellant had not complied with the provisions of the Code relating to the deposit of security for the costs of the respondent and the amount required for printing the record.

2.The appellant originally began proceedings in this Court in forma pauperis, but withdrew his application in the course of a preliminary hearing on 22nd April, 1941. The appellant then filed an application under O. XXXVII, r. 1, of the Federal Court Rules for exemption from compliance with the provisions of O. X., rr. 1, 2 & 3 of the Rules. Notice was given to the Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the application was heard by the Court on the 7th October, 1941. The applicant appeared in person. The respondent Province was represented by the Advocate-General of the North-West Frontier Province. The Court made the following order:

“In the course of discussion it has become clear and it is agreed both by the appellant and by the Advocate-General for the respondents that the only questions in issue in the proposed appeal are constitutional questions and the petitioner has informed us that he is going to confine himself when the appeal heard to constitutional questions only. In these circumstances, the question of granting the appeallant exemption from giving security for costs will not arise and it is therefore not necessary to go into the question whether any rules are ultra vires or not. So far as the question of printing is concerned, the Court is of opinion that the appellant ought to be excused from compliance with so much of Order X, rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Federal Court Rules, as requires him to have the record printed in the Judicial Commissioner's Court and to lodge his petition of appeal in this Court within sixty days of the admission of the appeal by the Judicial Commissioner's Court. Accordingly, the appellant will be at liberty to lodge his petition of appeal in this Court within twenty-eight days from the date of this order.”

3. The appeal was filed on the 11th October, 1941. The original record of the case was transmitted to the Federal Court by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province.

4. The Appellant in person.—The Courts below were wrong in holding that they had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, They ignored altogether that the pleasure of the Crown could be expressed only in a certain way. If it is expressed in a way inconsistent with the provisions of a statute, then a dismissal consequent on such an expression will be illegal and civil courts in such cases have jurisdiction. The Courts below erred in applying to this case the ruling in Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India(1936) 64 Ind. Ap. 55. what they should have followed was the decision of the Privy Council in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for lndia, in which the contravention of a proviso in s. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, was alleged. This proviso corresponds to s. 240(2) of the present Government of India Act. The appellant was appointed by the Inspector-General of Police, N.W.F.P., and his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was in contravention of this provision in the Constitution Act. It is not correct to hold that s. 243 of the Act deprived him of the benefit of s. 240(2). Even if it were so, there was nothing in the Indian Police Act, 1861, or the rules made thereunder, which authorised the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to dismiss him. Alternatively, the appellant was entitled to the protection afforded by s. 96-B of the old Act, since he was appointed in 1928. In support of this contention, he invited a reference to s. 84 of the 1919 Act, Art. 15(2) of the Government of India (Commencement and Transitory Provisions) Order, 1936, and s. 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889. The order of dismissal passed against him was therefore void and inoperative.

5. Sardar Bahadur Raja Singh, A.-G. of the North-West Frontier Province, and Kanwal Kishore Raizada for the respondent.—The appellant held his post at the pleasure of the Crown and not by any statutory right: see s. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919; s. 240(1) of the Constitution Act, and Shenton v. Smith. While in service the appellant was subject to the statute and the rules applicable to the service to which he belonged as amended and modified from time to time, and this was one of the conditions of his service. The argument that the appellant had any vested right under any statutory rule prevailing at the time of his appointment cannot prevail, since otherwise it would be impossible for the Government to maintain the organisation and discipline of the Police Force in the Province. Under s. 243 of the Constitution Act and s. 7 of the Indian Police Act, the dismissal, etc., of police officers is clearly governed by rules made from time to time. The rule under which the appellant was dismissed was valid law at the time. Any inconsistency that that rule may have with s. 240(2) of the Constitution Act was cured by s. 243 of the Act. So much of s. 240 of the Act as is in conflict with the procedure prescribed in the Police Rules is not applicable to the subordinate ranks of the police force in the Province. The appellant exercised his rights of appeal under the Police Rules and his appeals were iustly heard and determined by proper authorities. But it is also submitted that even non-observance of these Rules or of the provisions of s. 240(3) of the Constitution Act does not give the appellant any right of redress by civil action. The following cases were also referred to: Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India; Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India.

6. The true meaning of ss. 240 and 243 will become clear, if reference is made to the reasons given in their Report for the special recommendations of the Joint Select Committee with reference to the Police in India, following upon the transfer of law and order to the new Provincial Governments, and to the discussions in Parliament on the same subject. A reference for this purpose to the Report of the Joint Select Committee is permissible: see the observations made by His Lordship the Chief Justice in the Central Provinces Petrol Taw Case.

7. Gwyer, C.J.:— It is time that this misapprehension was removed once and for all. It is true that in the passage which has just been cited I observed that it was permissible to refer to the so-called White Paper and the Report of the Joint Select Committee upon it as historical facts, that is, as part of that series of events which culminated in the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935. I should not have supposed that this proposition was open to doubt, and there are Judgments of the Judicial Committee in recent years in which the Quebec Resolutions of 1864, on which the British North America Act was founded, and the well-known Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 are referred to. But in that same passage I pointed out that this Court “is only concerned with what Parliament has in fact said”, that is to say, when it is endeavouring to ascertain the meaning of any part of the Act. I should have thought it was clear beyond any doubt that in saying this I was emphasizing the long established rule of construction that for the purpose of interpreting an Act of Parliament a Court is not entitled to go outside the language which Parliament has thought fit to use in the statute itself. I am aware that what I said in the Central Provinces Case has been the subject of comment and misinterpretation, and T take this opportunity therefore of putting the matter straight for the future.]

8. Sir Brojendra Mitter, A.-G. of India, (Asadullah Khan with him) was heard by the leave of the Court.—So much of the provisions of ss. 240 to 242 of the Constitution Act as relate to conditions of service, do not, apply to the subordinate Police forces. “Conditions of service” means from the beginning to the end of service, and, necessarily, includes the manner in which the service terminates, whether by effluxion of time, dismissal or otherwise. Under s. 243, conditions of service which include dismissal are regulated by the Indian Police Act, 1861 and the rules made thereunder. The rule under which the appellant was dismissed was passed in 1934. i.e., before the new Government of India Act came into operation. By virtue of s. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919. that rule, which empowers the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to dismiss sub-inspectors, was inapplicable to sub-inspectors appointed by the Inspector-General but was otherwise applicable to sub-inspectors appointed by the Deputy Inspector-General himself or officers subordinate to him. The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1919, and the exclusion of s. 240(2) from application to the subordinate Police forces have the effect of extending, the oepration of that rule to all sub-inspectors irrespective of the appointing authority. It is significant that in the adaptation of s. 7 of the Police Act by the Adaptation Order, all mention of appointment has been omitted. That rule was not hit by s. 84 of the Act of 1919. It was simply inapplicable to a certain class of cases. There was no repugnancy to the Government of India Act or the Police Act. Section 292 of the Act of 1935 kept the rule alive: s. 243 extended its scope.

9. The contract of service included the implied term that the Crown had the right to dismiss at will: Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India, Shenton v. Smith, Reilly v. The King and Fletcher v. Nott. The sub-inspeetor also had rights, but these rights were always subject to rules made under the Police Act, and for the time being in force. Under rule 16(1), the Deputy Inspector-General could dismiss sub-inspectors. The appellant was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General and the dismissal was therefore valid.

10. It is not at all certain that, under the N.-W.F. Police Rules which were in force in 1928, the Inspector-General appointed sub-inspectors. Appointing authorities for different classes of officers and men are specifically mentioned; but in the case of sub-inspectors no authority is mentioned. All that the rules provide is that applications are to be made to the Inspector-General and the certificate of appointment is signed by him. It may be admitted that on the pleadings this point is not open, but it should nevertheless be noticed.

Cur. adv. vult.

11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

12. Varadachariar, J.:— This is an appeal by a plaintiff whose suit against the North-West Frontier Province Government has been dismissed by the Courts below on a preliminary finding that the suit was not maintainable. The only point for determination by this Court is whether this finding is consistent with the true interpretation and effect of ss. 240 and 243 of the Constitution Act.

13.The facts relevant at this stage may be briefly stated. The petitioner was appointed a Sub-Inspector in the police force of the North-West Frontier Province in March, 1928, and in April, 1938, he was dismissed on certain charges by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police of that Province. His appeals to the Inspector-General of Police and to the Provincial Government failed and he instituted this suit praying for a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal and void and that he ought still to be regarded as continuing in office. He also claimed arrears of pay and, in the alternative, damages for wrongful dismissal. The plaint impugned the validity of the order of dismissal on various grounds; but, in the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to refer to all of them. It is sufficient to state that one of the grounds urged was that as the plaintiff had been appointed by the Inspector-General of Police, the Deputy Inspector-General, who was only a subordinate authority, was not competent to dismiss him. Though the papers relating to the appointment are not on the record (as the suit has been disposed of on a preliminary point), it may be pointed out that the plaint alleged that the plaintiff had been appointed by the Inspector-General of Police and the written statement admitted the correctness of this allegation. It is common ground that the order of dismissal dated April 25, 1938, was passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The Provincial Government contested the suit, maintaining that the dismissal was valid and proper and that in any event the plaintiff had no remedy by way of suit. They asked for and obtained a preliminary decision on the question of the maintainability of the suit.

14. Founding himself on the declaration in s. 240(1) of the Constitution Act and the decision of the Judicial Committee in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for Indiain and Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India, that every person who holds any civil post under the crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure, the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded to hold that there was nothing in s. 243 of the Constitution Act, or in the provisions of the Indian Police Act (Central Act V of 1861) or the rules framed thereunder to restrict the Crown's unrestricted power of dismissal, so as to give the aggrieved officer a remedy by civil action. The appellate Court confirmed this decision, with the following observation: “Our interpretation of s. 243 of the Government of India Act is that if anything were contained in the Indian Police Act, then s. 240 of the Government of India Act would not apply to that extent. There is however nothing in the Indian Police Act which restricts the power of the Government to dismiss a police officer at its pleasure”. It is apparent that the bearing of ss. (2) of s. .240 of the Constitution Act on the case was not sufficiently realised in the Courts below, though the plaint and the grounds of appeal laid stress on the circumstance that the plaintiff had been dismissed not by the authority that appointed him, but by a subordinate authority. The argument before this Court mainly rested on this ground.

15. It may be convenient to mention at this stage how the order of dismissal came to be passed by the Deputy Inspector-General. Under s. 7 of the Indian Police Act (Central Act V of 1861), as it stood before its adaptation by the Adaptation of Indian Laws Order, 1937, the appointments of all police officers below a certain grade were (under such rules as the Local Government should from time to time sanction) made to rest with the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of Police; and the section further provided that these officers “may, under such rules as aforesaid, at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer”. Though a number of superior officers are specified in the section, the intention apparently was that the rules should provide for different grades of officers in the subordinate police service being appointed and dismissed by specified grades of officers in the superior ranks of the service and not that the power should be exercised by any of them indiscriminately. The rules in force in the North-West Frontier Province at the time of the plaintiff's appointment provided that a Sub-Inspector of Police could be dismissed by the Inspector-General of Police, and, as already stated, the appointment of the plaintiff was also made by the Inspector-General of Police. It is only as regards officers below a Sub-Inspector in rank that the rules provided for appointment and dismissal by officers subordinate in rank to the Inspector-General of Police. In 1934 however the Provincial Government modified these rules and provided that a Sub-Inspector could be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General. The rule did not differentiate between Sub-Inspectors appointed before the date of this modification and those who might be appointed later. We do not know whether at the same time a change was made to the effect that even the appointment of Sub-Inspectors could be made by the Deputy Inspector-General, though we have been told that some such rule is now in force in that Province. We presume that it was on the strength of the modified rule that the order dismissing the plaintiff was passed by the Deputy Inspector-General.

16. Sub-section (2) of s. 240 of the Constitution Act contains a statutory prohibition to the effect that no office-holder shall be dismissed from service by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Referring to the corresponding provision in s. 96-B of the Government of India Act. 1919, Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed in Rangachari's Case that the protection thus afforded to the office-holder could not be permitted to be destroyed by a delegation purporting to be made under the rules. Emphasizing the distinction between a safeguard enacted in the section itself and one merely contained in the rules, Their Lordships expressed it as their clear opinion that the dismissal by an authority subordinate in rank to the officer who made the appointment “was by reason of its origin bad and inoperative”. In this respect, the position under s. 240 of the Act of 1935 is, if anything, stronger than it was under the Act of 1919. In the latter, s. 96-B opened with the words “Subject to the provisions of ……… rules made thereunder” and this afforded some room for the argument [accepted by the High Court at Madras in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India that the declaration contained in the section could be qualified by the rules to be made under the Act. In the Act of 1935, ss. (2) of s. 240 has been enacted in unqualified terms, and there is accordingly no scope for the contention that this provision can be qualified or taken away by statutory rules. Unless the plaintiff is for any reason precluded from relying on this declaration, his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police must, on the authority of the decision in Rangachari's Case, be held to be inoperative as one “made by an official who is prohibited by statute from making it”.

17. It was accordingly contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the terms of s. 243 of the Constitution Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to rely upon s. 240. Section 243 provides that the “conditions of service” of the subordinate ranks of the police forces in India shall be determined by or under the Acts relating to those forces respectively, and the section opens with the words “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter”. The plaintiff's office admittedly fell under the category of subordinate ranks of the police force, and the rule authorising the dismissal of Sub-Inspectors by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police must-have been made either under the Indian Police Act of 1861 or under the Devolution Rules (as appears from the High Court's Judgment in Rangachari's Case). We are however unable to hold that s. 243 of the Constitution Act has the effect of depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of ss. (2) of s. 240. It was argued that the expression “conditions of service” in s. 243 was wide enough to comprehend a provision as to the authority competent to terminate an officer's tenure of office and that it was clearly the intention of the section that even this should be provided for by Indian legislation or rules made thereunder. It was also urged that the opening words “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter” had the effect of totally excluding the application of ss. 240 and 241 to the subordinate ranks of the police force in India. These contentions do not seem to us warranted by the context.

18. The extent to which the opening words of s. 243 will exclude or modify the general words contained in the preceding section or sections in the chapter will depend upon the nature of the positive provision which follows, and it is only to the extent to which that positive provision is inconsistent with the preceding general provision that the operation of the general provision will be excluded. The real question therefore is whether the provision relating to “conditions of service” in s. 243 should be understood to include a rule relating to the authority by whom the Oown's pleasure to terminate an officer's tenure of his office is to be signified. It may be that as a matter of etymology, the expression “conditions of service” can be given a very comprehensive meaning; but, reading the four sections of the chapter together, it seems to us that the Act clearly intended to draw a distinction between the tenure on which an office is held on the one hand and the incidents relating to service in the office on the other and that the duration of the office as well as the authority by which the Crown's pleasure to terminate it is to be signified were treated as fundamental matters standing on a different footing from the incidents of service. The former were, in our opinion, regarded as of such importance as to justify a declaration by the Act itself, while the latter were considered to be a proper subject for the rules. This interpretation will be consistent with the grounds of the decision in Rangachari's Case. It seems to us clear that in ss. 241 and 242, the “conditions of service” left to be provided for by rules could not have been intended to comprise the matters dealt with in ss. (1) and (2) of s. 240. It seems to us reasonable to hold that the same restricted meaning should have been intended when the same expression was used in s. 243.

19. We may also point out that the respondent's reading of s. 243 would also exclude the declaration in ss. (1) of s. 240 as to these offices being held during His Majesty's pleasure. It may be that the Government will not be prejudiced thereby, because even without the statutory declaration contained in ss. (1), they may fall back on the common law rule [as stated in Shenton v. Smith and Gould v. Stuart that all public servants hold office only during His Majesty's pleasure. But it does not seem to us reasonable to assume that when passing the Act of 1935 Parliament intended to place this principle on a statutory basis as regards some offices, but allowed it to remain on a common law or implied contract basis as regards the rest. It will be more reasonable to hold that the statutory declaration as to the nature of the tenure contained in ss. (1) of s. 240 was intended to apply as much to the offices referred to in s. 243 as to the offices referred to in ss. 241 and 242; and for the same reason the protection afforded by ss. (2) must equally be held to have been intended for the benefit of both. We see no justification in the reason of the thing for drawing a distinction for this purpose between one set of public officers and another.

20. The Advocate-General of India, to whom we had directed that notice of the proceedings should be given and to whose argument we are indebted, invited our attention to a decision of the High Court of Australia [Fletcher v. Nott in what he described as a similar case. That case no doubt bears some resemblance in its facts to the present case, but the Judgment affords little guidance on the point now under consideration. The main attempt of the appellant there was to bring his case under the exception recognised in Gould v. Stuart, but in this e did not succeed. The argument based upon the rank of the dismissing authority in that case was different from that arising here. There was an order of dismissal by the Commissioner of Police on the 2nd of December, 1936, and an order of dismissal by the executive government of the State on the 5th of February, 1937. Under the law of the State, the Commissioner (who had been substituted by an Act of the Legislature for the Inspector-General) was competent to dismiss the plaintiff. If the matter had rested with the dismissal by the Commissioner, the plaintiff would have had a right to appeal to a Board with a District Court Judge sitting on it. But the supervening dismissal by the executive government deprived him of this right of appeal, because no appeal was provided against a dismissal by the executive government. The plaintiff's complaint in the case therefore was against the dismissal by a higher authority and not against a dismissal by an authority subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. The Judges who dealt with this argument answered it by holding that the executive government had a power of dismissal independently of the provisions of the statute.

21. It was next contended on behalf of the respondent that as the plaintiff in the present case had appealed to the Inspector-General of Police against the Deputy Inspector-General's order dismissing him, the rejection of that appeal was equivalent to a dismissal from office by the Inspector-General himself and as such sufficient to satisfy ss. (2) of s. 240 of the Act. We cannot accede to this contention. In theory as well as in practice, there is a well-marked difference between a decision given by an officer who acts in the consciousness that he is primarily responsible for the investigation and decision of the case and the act of one who is expected only to satisfy himself that another officer who had the primary responsibility has properly dealt with the case. The distinction seems to us one of substance and is not merely formal or technical. The pre-existing rules provided, and s. 241 of the Act of 1935 also contemplates, that appeals may be preferred by the dismissed officer, and it is common knowledge that in most cases such appeals are in fact preferred. As these appeals would ordinarily be heard and decided by an authority superior in rank to the dismissing officer, the protection intended to be afforded by ss. (2) of s. 240 would have been almost illusory if it were sufficient that, no matter by what authority the order of dismissal was made, tne appellate authority was not subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. We are accordingly of opinion tnat the plaintiff is entitled to invoke the aid of ss. (2) of s. 240 of the Constitution Act.

22. There is an alternative aspect of the case which also requires consideration, though, in the view we have above taken, we do not propose to deal with it at length. The plaintiff was appointed at a time when the Government of India Act of 1919 was in force. The provision in s. 96-B of that statute was not qualified by anything corresponding to s. 243 of the Act of 1935; nor was there anything in the police rules in force at the time authorizing his dismissal by an officer subordinate in rank to the Inspector-General. The change made in 1934 in the rules cannot prevail against section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919. Under s. 84 of that Act, any law made by any authority in British India would be void so far as it was repugnant to this provision of the statute. What then was the effect of the passing of the Act of 1935 on the plaintiff's position, even if it should be assumed that s. 243 of the new Act should be construed as excluding the application of ss. (2) of s. 240 to the subordinate ranks of the Indian police If the police rule of 1934 was void at its inception, so far as it authorized or could be construed as authorizing the dismissal of existing sub-inspectors of police by an officer lower in rank than the Inspector-General, could it be said that that rule became valid and operative as against them merely by reason of the enactment of s. 243 of the new Act Article 15(2) of the Government of India (Commencement and Transitory Provisions) Order, 1936, dated 3rd July, 1936, provided as follows:—“Until other provision is made under the new Act, the conditions of service applicable to any person or any class of persons appointed, or to be appointed, to serve His Majesty in a civil capacity in India shall be the same as were applicable to that person or, as the case may be, to persons of that class immediately before the commencement of Part III of the new Act”. Even if the expression “conditions of service” should be understood in the comprehensive sense contended for on behalf of the respondent, the plaintiff was, on April 1, 1937, entitled to the benefit of s. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, notwithstanding the change made in the Police Rules in 1934, so far as the same was inconsistent with the provision in the Act, and nothing has since happened to deprive him of that benefit. Further, it may reasonably be contended that the benefit of s. 96-B of the Act of 1919 is a right or privilege which has been saved to the plaintiff by s. 38 of the Interpretation Act (52 and 53 Vict., ch. 63), because there is nothing in the language of s. 243 of the Act of 1935 indicating an intention to deprive officers already in service of their existing rights and privileges. The Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, dated March 18, 1937, slightly recast the language of s. 7 of the Indian Police Act, 1861, but it does not seem to us to have affected the substance of the section. Even if it did, the argument based on “pre-existing” rights and privileges will still remain unaffected, because art. 11 of that Order saved them in terms almost identical with s. 38 of the Interpretation Act. In this connection, the Advocate-General of India drew our attention to the Judgment in Reilly v. The King; we find nothing in it adverse to the plaintiff's contention. Their Lordships only observed that, on the facts of that case, there was nothing to be saved by this principle of interpretation, because the pre-existing right itself was one “subject to be determined by the office being abolished by statute”, and that was what actually happened.

23. It remains to consider what relief the plaintiff is entitled to, on the footing that the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Inspector-General in April, 1938, was void and inoperative. The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to a declaration to that effect. The decision in Rangachari's Case seems to us to support this contention, though a declaration was in fact refused in that case on other grounds. The plaintiff is obviously not entitled to any relief by way of damages for wrongful dismissal. As the case has been disposed of by the Courts below on the preliminary issue, we are not in a position to say what other questions remain to be tried before the nature of the reliefs to be awarded to the plaintiff can be finally determined. It seems to us best in the circumstances to say that the plaintiff was at least entitled to a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him was void and inoperative, and that the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the suit as wholly unsustainable.

24. We accordingly set aside the decree of the Judicial Commissioner's Court and remit the case with a declaration that there shall be substituted for the decree appealed against a declaration in the terms above stated, with such further directions as the circumstances of the case may require in the light of the observations in this Judgment. The plaintiff will be entitled to the costs of this appeal. The Judicial Commissioner's Court will deal with the costs of the proceedings in the Courts below.