P.C. Pandit, J.

1. On 20th October, 1962, Jai Chand, by a written deed, agreed to sell agricultural land measuring 101 Kanals 7 Marias to Jiwan, minor son of Hakam Singh, for Rs. 4500-. On behalf of the minor, his father, acting as the guardian, executed the said agreement. The sale-deed had to be executed by 5th November, 1962. It appears that Jai Chand did not do so, but went on getting the date of execution of sale-deed extended. Finally, on 1st December, 1964. it was agreed that the sale-deed would be executed by 14th January, 1965. As he refused to abide by the agreement, Hakam Singh, as the next friend of his minor son Jiwan Singh, brought a suit in January 1966 against Jai Chand for the specific performance of the agreement of sale. During the pendency of the said suit. Jai Chand sold the land in dispute, on 20th May. 1966, to Sunder Singh and others. Those vendees were, subsequently, impleaded as Defendants in the suit.

2. The suit was contested mainly by the vendees on a number of pleas, but in the present appeal, we are concerned only with two of them. It was said that Jai Chand was a minor at the time of the original agre-ment of sale as well as at the time of the subsequent agreements extending the date for the execution of the sale-deed. The said agreements were, therefore, void and could not be enforced. It was further pleaded that the Plaintiff was also a minor at the time of the execution of the agreement dated 20th October, 1962, and was still a minor and that being so, he was not entitled to the specific performance of the agreement of sale made in his favour by Jai Chand.

3. The trial Judge came to the conclusion that Jai Chand was a minor at the time of the various agreements made by him with the Plaintiff and, therefore, those agreements were void and could not be enforced by the Plaintiff. He also held that the Plaintiff, being admittedly a minor, could not sue for specific performance of the contract entered into by Jai Chand with him regarding the sale of the property in question. In view of these findings, the trial Judge did not consider it necessary to decide the other issues arising in the case and dismissed the suit.

4. When the matter went in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepur, he came to the conclusion that Jai Chand had not been proved to be a minor at the time lie entered into the agreement of sale with the Plaintiff. He held that the agreement executed by a major in favour of a minor through his guardian, was not void but was voidable at the instance of the minor. He also found that the Plaintiff, who was a minor, was entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale made by Jai Chand in his favour. On these findings, he came to the conclusion that the suit could not have been dismissed. Consequently, he set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanded the case to it for deciding the other issues in the suit in the light of the findings given by him. Against this remand order, the present appeal has been filed by Sunder Singh and others, who are the vendees from Jai Chand.

5 The finding, that Jai Chand was a major on the date when he entered into the agreement of sale with the Plaintiff was not challenged before me. The only question that was agitated was whether the Plaintiff, who was admittedly a minor at. the time when the agreement of sale was made in his favour through his guardian Hakam Singh, could seek specific performance of the same or not.

6. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellants was that such an agreement was not enforceable at law, because it was not within the competence of the guardian of the minor to bind him or his estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property and as the minor was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality and, consequently, the minor could not obtain specific performance of the same. According to him, under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor had power to do acts which were necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minors estate, but he could in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. He also contended that before the contract could be specifically enforced by or against the minor, it had to be proved, firstly, that the said contract was one which it was within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it and, secondly, that it was for the benefit of the minor If either of these two conditions was wanting, the contract could not be specifically enforced at all. For this submission, he placed his reliance on the Privy Council decision in Sri Kakulam Suhrahmanyam and Anr. v. Kurra Subha Rao : A.I.R. 1948 PC 95, [LQ/PC/1948/18] According to the learned Counsel, the Additional District Judge could not hold that the Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the Contract without first giving findings on the two points envisaged in the Privy Council authority.

7. The argument of the [earned counsel for the Plaintiff, on the other hand, was that although a minor could not be a promisor under the contract, but he could always be a promisee and a contract could be made in his favour. If a minor was a promisor in a certain contract then that contract would be viod. Where a guardian of a minor made a contract, the said contract, according to the learned Counsel, was always valid, whether the same was for the benefit of the minor or not. The only condition was that if it was for his benefit, then the minors estate would be bound On the other hand, if it was not for his benefit then the guardian was personally liable for the said contract. If the minor was of the opinion that the contract made on his behalf was not for his benefit, he could avoid the contract, because such a contract was voidable at his instance. The other party, however, could not avoid it by pleading that the promisee was a minor. Learned Counsel also contended that the doctrine of mutuality had come to an end by the enforcement of Section 20 (iv) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 according to which, the Court would not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract was not enforable at the instance of the other party.

8. While dealing with a suit for specific performance by a minor of an agreement for the purchase and sale of immovable property, entered into by his guardian, it was observed by the Privy Councel in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdkuri I.L.R. 1939 Cal 232.

In a suit for specific performance by a minor of an agreement for the purchase and sale to him of certain immovable property, entered into by the manager of the minors estate and his guardian on his behalf:

Held, by the Judicial Committee, that it was not within the competence, either of the manager of the minors estate or of the guardian of the minor, to bind the minor or the minors estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property; that as the minor was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality; and that consequently the minor could not obtain specific performance of the contract.

9. According to this decision, the suit brought by the minor Plaintiff, in the instant case, would have been dismissed. Counsel for the Plaintiff, however, submitted that the doctrine of mutuality had come to an end by the enactment of Section 20(4) in the Specific Relief Act of 1963, which reads -

The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performace of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enfornceable at the instance of the other party.

10. While making this submission, learned Counsel is ignoring one important principal, namely, that before somebody can file a suit for the specific performance of a contract, it has to be established by him that it was valid and enforceable according to law. S. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, merely deals with the discretion of the Courts to decree or not the suits for specific perfomance. Section 20 (1) says that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not hound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so, but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal, Sub-section (2) of this section mentions the cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to dercee specific performance. Sub-section (3) then says that the Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the Plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a concract of specific performance. Then comes Sub-section (4) which has already been quoted above.

11. It would thus be seen that in Section 20, principles have been enunciated for the guidance of the Courts in exercising their discretion in decreeing or refusing to decree suits for specific performance. But the condition drecedent necessarily is that the contract itself must be legally valid and capable of enforcement. If that is not so, the question of the Courts discretion in granting or refusing its specific performance will not arise which agreements made by the guardians of the minors are enforceable at law This is answered by the Privy Council in Shri Kak-ulam Subrahamanyam and Anr. v. Kurra Subba Rao(1) where their Lordships approved the following passage in Pollock and Mullas Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 7th Edition. Page 71:

It is, however, different with regard to contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager of his estate. In such a case it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subsequent to the governing decision of the Privy Council, that the contract can be specifically enforced by or against the minor, if the contract is one which it is within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, and, further, if it is for the benefit of the minor. But if either of these two conditions is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all.

12. According to this ruling, therefore, such contracts can be specifically enforced by or against the minors if two conditions are satisfied- ii) if the contract is one which it is within the competence of the guard-dian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it and (ii) if it is for the benefit of the minor. It either of these two conditions is not satisfied, that contract cannot be specifically enforced at all. The powers of a natural guardian are dealt with in Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Gurdianship Act, 1956 Particular attention is invited to the provisions of Sub-section (1) of that section, according to which the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of that section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the. realisation, protection or benefit of the minors estate; but the gurdian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant.

13. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has held that the Plaintiff could enforce the agreement and ask for its specific performance merely on the basis of the provions of Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, without determining the abovementioned two conditions laid down by the Privy Council in Sri Kakulam Subrahamany-ms case, which would make that agreement valid and enforceable in law. It is only after that finding was given that the Plaintiff could seek itspecific performance. For giving a findiding on these two conditions, the learned Juage would have to bear in mind the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

14. In view of what i have said above, I would partly accept this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge only on the point that the agreement in question was enforceable at the instance of the Plaintiff The trial Court, while deciding the other issues in the case, as ordered by the lower appellate Court, will also determine the question regarding the enforceability of the agreement in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of this case, the parties will bear their own costs in this appeal. They have been directed to appear before the trial Court on 8th December, 1969.