Patnaik,J

The claimants in O.P. (MV) 233/83 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (for short - M.A.C.T.) Alleppey have preferred this appeal for enhancement of the compensation and to declare that the third respondent as well is liable to pay the amount of compensation. The appellants claimed a sum of Rs. 1,07,730/- as compensation for the death of the husband of the first appellant and the father of the other appellants. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 81,930/- with 6% interest from the date of the petition. The respondents 1 and 2 alone were held jointly and severally liable to pay the amount.

2. On 25.9.1980 at about 10 P.M., the deceased aged about 35 who was a toddy tapper was proceeding on a bicycle from north to south along the Shertallai Arookutty road. The motorcycle bearing No. KLR 8062 driven by the 2nd respondent with first respondent owner and a pillion rider on it came in a rash and negligent manner from the opposite side and hit the front wheel of the bicycle. The deceased was thrown off from the bicycle and sustained fatal injuries on his head. He died in the hospital at about 1 A.M. on 26.9.1980as a result of the head injury. He was then having a monthly income of Rs. 750/-. The petition was originally filed against respondents 1 and 2. But subsequently it was discovered that the third respondent was the registered owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident and as such he was impleaded later as the registered owner of the vehicle. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal absolved him from any liability on the ground that he was not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident.

3. The appellants contended that admittedly the vehicle stood registered in the name of the third respondent at the time of the accident and as such he, as the registered owner and second respondent as the driver are liable to pay the amount, the offending vehicle being not an insured one. Further, it is contended that the M.A.C.T. failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective and awarded a low amount.

4. The second respondent filed a cross-objection contending that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He was not served with any notice by the M.A.C.T. in this case and he came to know of the award only after receiving notice in the appeal. The award against him is, therefore, vitiated for want of notice.

5. The contention of the second respondent that no notice was served on him appears to be false. On a scrutiny of the record, it is found that notice was duly served on him and he did not choose to enter appearance in spite of receiving the notice. The M.A.C.T. found that it was he who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and on the facts and in the circumstances it was proved that the accident occurred due to his rash and negligent driving. We do not see any reason to differ from this finding of the M.A.C.T. The finding is supported by evidence and it is neither perverse nor unreasonable.

6. The third respondent has stated that he has transferred the vehicle to one Sheriff in the year 1979 with the understanding that Sheriff would take steps to change the name of the registered owner. He is unable to say as to how the vehicle came into the hands of the first respondent. It may be stated here that the registration was changed on transfer of the vehicle in favour of the first respondent on and with effect from 18.6.1981. The accident occurred on 25.9.1980. Learned counsel for the third respondent contends that the actual owner can be different from the registered owner. Since it is proved in this case that the registered owner transferred the ownership to a different person before the accident, he cannot be held liable as the owner despite the fact that the registration of the vehicle continued to be in his name. The evidence in this case shows that the claimants have asserted that at the time of the accident, the 1st respondent was the owner of the vehicle. It is also found that soon after the accident, the vehicle was transferred and registered in favour of the first respondent and he was in exclusive possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident. There is no evidence on record to show that the third respondent had hired the vehicle to first respondent or that he allowed the first respondent to ride the vehicle temporarily by retaining his ownership.

7. A Division Bench of this Court in Said Mohammed v. Rema (1995(2)KLT343) affirmed the three earlier decisions of this Court, namely, Kunjuraman v. Saramma (1986 KLT 742), Swaminathan v. Jayalakshmi Amma (1981 (2) KLT 292) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi (1991 (1) KLT 832) and held as follows:

"The liability to pay compensation in accident cases is that of the transferee owner of the vehicle if the registered owner had transferred its ownership before the accident. The actual owner can be different from the registered owner and if it is proved that the registered owner has transferred the ownership to a different person the tortuous liability will have to be borne by the transferee despite non-transfer of the registration. S.2 of the, which contains various definitions starts with a preface that every definition is subject to alteration or change in accordance with the context. This is evident from employment of the words "unless the context otherwise requires" in the prefatory portion of the section. The definition is therefore, not exhaustive in regard to every context. If a particular context warrants departure from the contours of a definition, legislature permitted such departure to be made. The context here is such that mulcting the registered owner with the pecuniary liability of the tortuous act of somebody elses servant or employee would result in manifest injustice to him. When a registered owner is not the real owner of the vehicle on the date of accident that registered owner has no vicarious liability for paying compensation, for, the driver of toe vehicle would then have been acting in the course of the employment of the actual owner".

Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajamani (1992 (1) ACJ 354) and a Single Bench of the Orissa High Court in A.N. Choudhry v. Debahuti Pattanaik and Ors. (1979 ACJ 455 [LQ/OriHC/1978/90] ) while considering the scope of S.31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended by relying on a Division Bench decision of this court in S. Sudhakaran and Ors v. A.K. Francis and Ors. 1996 (2) KLT 507 =1996 (2) KLJ 39 [LQ/KerHC/1996/302] , and Sanjay Singh Thakurv. Sultan Ahmed and Ors. (1996 ACJ 261 [LQ/MPHC/1995/370] ) of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Shiv Nath v. Nand Kishore and Ors. (1995 (1) ACJ 362) of Punjab and Haryana High Court and Dr. Gop Ramchandani v. Onkar Singh and Ors. (1993 (1) ACJ 577) of Rajasthan High Court that the ownership of the vehicles continues to be that of the person in whose favour it stands registered until the change of ownership is effected in the registration certificate according to law.

9. In Sudhakaran s case 1996 (2) KLT 507 =1996 (2) KLJ 39 [LQ/KerHC/1996/302] , the Court found on facts that the registered owner of the vehicle retained its ownership despite the fact that the vehicle was in the possession of the transferee. In the agreement for sale a condition was stipulated that until and unless he repaid the entire purchase price, the transferee would not claim its ownership. In these circumstances it was held that though the transferee was in possession of the vehicle yet, the person in whose favour the registration of the vehicle stood continued to be the owner in terms of the deed of agreement between them. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the aforesaid case.

It is true that in the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants it has been held that until the change in the registration is effected in favour of the transferee, the transferor or the person in whose name the registration stands continues to be owner of the vehicle. This proposition of law is contrary to the law laid down by this court. If the sale of the vehicle is complete according to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, notwithstanding the fact that there is no mutation in the registration certificate in favour of the transferee the transferee becomes its owner. This has been the consistent view of this court as pointed out in Said Mohammeds case with which we agree.

10. The Tribunal on proper appreciation of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the first respondent was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Since this finding is based on unimpeachable evidence of exclusive possession of the vehicle by the first respondent at the time of accident, the change of registration in his favour soon after the accident and statement of the witnesses that he was the owner of the vehicle, we do not find any reason to differ from it. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the third "respondent should also be held liable as the registered owner of the vehicle cannot be accepted.

11. As regards the question of adequacy of compensation, we also find that the tribunal has considered all the material facts on record properly and came to the right conclusion. Nothing has been pointed out to u s to show that the compensation awarded is too low.

12. For the reasons stated above, we find that there is no merit in the appeal or in the cross objection. Hence both the appeal and the cross objection are dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.