Reginald Roe, J.

1. The point for decision in this case is, has the District Judge power to grant sanction to prosecute under section 209 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of a case instituted in the Small Cause Court and with regard to which sanction has already been refused by the Small Cause Court Judge The question has been answered in the negative in Ambica Tewari v. Emperor 34 Ind. Cas. 320 : 1 P.L.J. 206: 17 Cr.L.J. 208 and Ajodhia Parshad v. Ram Lal 13 Ind. Cas. 284 : 34 A. 197 : 9 A.L.J. 121 : 13 Cr.L.J. 44. But in Ram Prosad Malla v. Raghubar Mall 4 Ind. Cas. 6 : 37 C. 13 : 10 Cr.L.J. 454 : 13 C.W.N. 1038it is quite clear that their Lordships of the Calcutta Court saw no reason to consider that the Court of the District Judge was not the principal Court of original jurisdiction in such a case within the meaning of clause 7(c) of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

2. I have been asked by the learned Deputy Government Advocate, in view of this difference of opinion, to refer this matter to a Full Bench. I am not prepared to do so, for it seems to me clear that the view taken in Allahabad and already followed in this Court is the correct view. Moreover it is to be noted that in Ram Prosad's case  4 Ind. Cas. 6 : 37 C. 13 : 10 Cr.L.J. 454 : 13 C.W.N. 1038, there is no definite finding that a District Judge has jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of a Small Cause Court in these matters. The question was not raised and cannot, therefore, be said to have been decided. Section 195(7)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code runs: "For the purposes of this section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals From the former Court ordinarily lie, that is to say, where no appeal lies, such Court shall be deemed to he subordinate to the principal Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such first mentioned Court is situate."

3. I would attach importance to the words "that is to say." They indicate not that a supplementary provision is to be found in clause (c), but merely an explanation of the words "to which appeals ordinarily lie."

4. It is contended by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the reasoning, upon which the case of Wazir Muhammad v. Hub Lal 2 Ind. Cas. 182 : 31 A. 313 : 6 A.L.J. 231 : 9 Cr.L.J. 504 and Ajodhia Parshad v. Ram Lal 13 Ind. Cas. 284 : 34 A. 197 : 9 A.L.J. 121 : 13 Cr.L.J. 44 were decided, is an erroneous reasoning, for the words of section 195, clause (7)(a) and (b), clearly refer to classes of Courts and not merely to classes of cases. Even granting this for the sake of argument, it still seems to me that we have to consider the actual meaning of the words the principal Court of original jurisdiction." It would be idle to say that a District Court has jurisdiction to grant sanction in cases coming before the Collector in his capacity as a Revenue Court. The words "original jurisdiction" must clearly mean original jurisdiction over the class to which the case in question belongs. A District Judge could not possibly be asked to interfere with orders granting sanction for perjury, for instance, in cases tried under the Land Registration Act or the Partition Act. In considering to what class a case belongs we have to consider not only the three main classifications, civil, revenue or criminal, but also to consider the nab divisions of those civil, revenue and criminal classes. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code runs: "The Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred," and section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act runs: "Save as expressly provided by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit cognizable by a Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court having jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes by which the suit is triable." By these sections the jurisdiction of the District Court has been expressly barred in all cases of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court. It cannot be said that in cases of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court the District Court is the principal Court of original jurisdiction. Nor in my view is there anything anomalous in saying that a Small Cause Court is itself a principal Court of original jurisdiction with regard to suits cognizable only by a Small Cause Court. Small Cause Courts have been given very wide powers indeed with regard to decisions on questions of fact. A District Judge has no kind of authority to interfere with the proceedings of a Small Cause Court. It does not seem to me to be logical to suggest that the discretion of the Small Cause Court on the question whether a suit is of such a nature that the plaintiff in that suit should be made liable to prosecution under the Indian Penal Code, should be fettered by interference by the District Court.

5. I am of opinion that the District Judge had no power to entertain the applications made to him in this case. I, therefore, set aside, as without jurisdiction, the order made by the District Judge granting the sanction.