V. P. TIPNIS, J.

(1) THE petitioner is the wife of one Virendra Omprakash Sood who has been detained by order dated 26th May, 1995 passed by the Principal Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Preventive Detention) and Detaining Authority under the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Prevention of illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the TAct ).

( 2 ) THE petition raises as many as about 15 grounds challenging the order of detention. However, we find it unnecessary to deal with all the grounds inasmuch as the first two grounds of the challenge have great merit.

( 3 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the facts of the case show involvement of the detenu on a large scale in manufacturing mandrax tablets. On 13. 11. 1994 the police officers of Narcotics Cell, Andheri Unit, Bombay, received information that one Shivkumar Sood was likely to come near hotel President in a car to give delivery of mandrax tablets between 01. 30 and 02. 00 hrs on 14. 11. 1994. A watch was kept and the said Shivkumar Sood was apprehended. Two small packets containing tablet were found in shirt pocket and three bags were found in the dashboard of the car. Each bag was 500 gms. in weight. All the material when tested showed that it contained methaqualone. Shivkumar Sood stated that he had a factory at Mohili village, Saki Naka Pipe Line, Bombay, for manufacturing mandrax tablets and the present detenu does the manufacturing work for him. On 14. 11. 1994 at 22. 20 hrs, a search in the factory was conducted and the detenu was found taking out a tray from dryer. 200 bags of methaqualone powder, machine, dryer and dyes were seized from the factory. The son of the said Shivkumar Sood by name Deepak Sood and his wife Mrs. Brijmohini Sood were also arrested. Subsequently, the statements of all these persons including that of the detenu were recorded between 14. 11. 1994 and 29. 11. 1994. Certain searches were also conducted and, ultimately, the order of detention was passed on 26th May, 1995.

( 4 ) THOUGH the order was passed on 26th May, 1995, there was a further communication dated 29th May, 1995 purporting to amend the original order of detention and this subsequent communication was served on the petitioner on 12th June, 1995.

( 5 ) AS stated earlier, Mr. Kannali has raised many points. His first ground of challenge is that there was no material to issue the impugned order with a view to preventing the detenu from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugst and that it was issued on the basis of non-existent and illusory facts and material. It is further stated that remising that the order suffered from such fatal infirmity, the detaining authority issued a communication dated 29th May, 1995, but it was served on the detenu on 12. 6. 1995, whereby the detaining authority attempted to modify the said order by stating that instead of narcotic drugs read psychotropic substances. It is contended that the detaining authority could not have modified the order in the manner done. The submission is that the original order of detention clearly shows that the detenu was detained with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and all the grounds supplied along with the said original order show that the detenu was indulging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances". It is contended that the impugned order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. It is issued absent-mindedly and in a casual and cavalier manner. It displays slipshod exercise of the statutory power. It is further contended that realizing that the impugned order as issued suffers from total infirmity, the detaining authority issued a sort of a corrigendum on 29th May, 1995 which reads as under:1. Please refer to my letter No. SPL 3 (A)! PND. 0195/43 dated the 26th May, 1995 communicating the grounds of detention on the basis of which a detention order was issued against you. 2. In the detention order, following modification is made in para 2 of the last line. In Paragraph 2, instead of word Narcotic Drugs please read as Psychotropic Substances. 3. The detention order may be read after making the above modification. It is contended that the satisfaction recorded in the original order is regarding the necessity to prevent the detenu from engaging in illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs, and the correction suggested was that the detaining authoritys satisfaction regarding the necessity to detain the detenu was with a view to preventing the detenu from engaging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances. It is submitted that the detaining authority could not have modified or substituted the original or initial satisfaction as has been attempted to be done by the detaining authority.

( 6 ) THE detaining authority has filed affidavit-in-reply. In para 5 of the affidavit, the detaining authority has stated that it is true that in the order of detention dated 26th May, 1995 inadvertently he has stated that the detenu be detained with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs". The said inadvertent error, however, was corrected by the detaining authority by communication dated 29th May, 1995 and the detenu was informed that he was being detained with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances. Referring to paras 28, 29 and 30 of the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has asserted in the affidavit, that he has noted that the samples of the seized contraband were sent to the Chemical Analysed who reported the presence of methaqualone, a constituent of mandrax tablet and that it was necessary to detain the detenu under the provisions of the Act to prevent him from engaging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances. On these basis, the detaining authority has asserted that the words narcotic drugs have crept in the order of detention inadvertent and the said inadvertent error was immediately corrected within four days i. e. , on 29th May, 1995. The detaining authority on these grounds has stated that therefore he denies that there is any non application of mind or that the order is issued absent-mindedly or in a casual or cavalier manner. Regarding the modification, the detaining authority in para 6 of the affidavit-in-reply has stated that the reiterates that the detention order was issued by the authority only when he was satisfied that the detenu was indulging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances and by the subsequent communication, only the inadvertent error was sought to be corrected.

( 7 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Karmali relied on the decision of the apex Court in Vijay Kumar Dharma v. Union of India. In the said case before the apex Court, in the Gurmukhi version of the detention order, it was stated that the detention order had become necessary with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods and from abetting the smuggling goods. However, in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority recorded his satisfaction as under: i am satisfied it is necessary to detain you under COFEPOSA Act, 1974 with a view to preventing you from concerning, transporting smuggled goods as well as dealing in smuggled goods. The apex Court observed that the above satisfaction does not speak of smuggling of goods or abetting the smuggling of goods which are the grounds found in the Gurmukhi version of the detention order. The apex court observed that, therefore, there is considerable force in the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that on account of the variance the detenu was not able to effectively represent his case before the carried authorities. In fact, the appellant was confused whether he should represent against his detention for smuggling of goods and/or abetting the smuggling of goods or for engaging in transporting and concealing smuggled goods ant/or dealing in smuggled goods. Besides, the English version of the detention order was only fat abetting the smuggling of goods. The satisfaction recorded in the Gurmukhi version of the grounds for detention is not count with the purpose for detention found in the detention order. It left the detenu confused whether he should represent against the grounds in the detention order at the satisfaction recorded in the grounds of detention. The apex Court held that in the circumstances, the detenu was unable to make an effective representation against his detention and was thereby denied his right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution.

( 8 ) MR. Karmali also relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (S. W. Puranik and M. F. Saldanha, JJ.) dated 19. 2. 1991 in Fakkihussain Fakkihasan Qureshi v. L. Hmingliana and Ors. . In the said case, in the order of detention, the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to pass the order for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from engaging in export from India of narcotic drugs. The grounds of detention therein showed that the contraband material which was seized from the detenu was a batch of mandrax tablets. It was submitted that mandrax tablet is not a narcotic drug but a psychotropic substance and, as such, there is a misreading on the part of the detaining authority. In the case before the Division Bench, the detaining authority tried to justify that mandrax is a manufactured drug falling under the definition of narcotic drug as defined under section 2 (xiv) of the Act. Referring to the definition of narcotic drug as found in the Act, the Division Bench observed that apart from the specific items like coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium, etc. , even the manufactured drugs are included in the definition a of narcotic drug". However, the contention of the detaining authority that mandrax table amounts to a manufactured drug is not substantiated. For the simple reason that manufactured drug has necessarily to be declared so by notification in the Official Gazette and the learned Public Prosecutor despite time being granted could not produce some notification showing that mandrax or methaqualone is listed in the list of manufactured drugs. The Division Bench, accordingly; held in the said case that it was satisfied that the detaining authority has mis-applied himself to the distinction between psychotropic substance and a manufactured drug and the order of detention passed by the detaining authority in order to prevent the detenu from indulging in export of narcotic drugs is vitiated by the vice of non-application of mind.

( 9 ) MRS. Desai, learned Public Prosecutor, referred to the grounds of detention and especially para 10 wherein the statement of the detenu is extracted showing the detenu was dealing and manufacturing mandrax tablets and that it was the brain of the detenu who studied the chemistry of manufacturing mandrax tablets and purchased the machinery and was manufacturing mandrax tablets. Mrs. Desai also referred to paras 28, 29 and 30 of the grounds emphasising that it was clear that the satisfaction was in respect of illicit traffic in psychotropic substances. Mrs. Desai also referred to the statement of the wife of Shivkumar Sood and the application for bail preferred by the detenu and submitted that everywhere the words narcotic drug or drug is mentioned She submitted that as such when the original order of detention used words narcotic drugs the detenu could have understood it as psychotropic substances and the words narcotic drugs used in the original order will not show non-application of mind and/or casual manner inasmuch as in the facts and circumstances of the case, the detenu would clearly understand and must have understood that though the words narcotic drugst are used in the original order, what was meant was psychotropic substances.

( 10 ) MRS. Desai in support of her submission, also relied upon several authorities. She first relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Kamarannissa v. Union of India, and para 9 thereof in particular which is as under:"it is indeed true that in paragraph 15 of the grounds of detention the detaining authority has averred that the detenu are charged with a bailable offence. After setting out the fact that two of the detenus had made an application for bail in the Bombay Court and their oc- accused Kasim had made a similar application in the Madras Court, the authority proceeds to state as under: though you are in judicial custody but can be released on bail any time as the offence with which you have been charged is bailablet in which case you may indulge in similar prejudicial activities. It is necessary to bear in mind the context in which the expression bailable is used. In the counter filed by the Joint Secretary who passed the detention orders and prepared the grounds for detention it is stated that his past experience in such cases was that normally and almost as a matter of rule courts grant bail after the investigation is completed. It was in this background, says the officer, that he used the expression bailable'. We may reproduce his exact words from the counter. It is also submitted that the word bailable which has not been used in the legal sense, it was intended to convey that normally in such cases one gets bail and in that context, the word bailable was used. Proceeding further it is averred in the counter that even in non-bailable offences the Sessions Court and the High Court are empowered to grant bail. He was, therefore, of the view that in such cases courts normally grant bail. It was in this background that he used the word bailable in the grounds of detention. "

( 11 ) MRS. Desai further submitted that, in any case, the mention of narcotic drugs in the original order of detention was a mere mistake committed through inadvertence which was inconsequential and was, in fact, corrected by communication dated 29th May, 1995 by intimating the detenu that in the original order of detention, in para 2, instead of the words narcotic drugs it be read as psychotropic substances. Mrs. Desai submitted that unless some prejudice is proved, mere mistake of such a nature could not be sufficient to quash the detention order. In that behalf; she brought to our notice the decision of the apex Court in Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M. L. Wadhawan. Para 25 of the aforesaid authority is as under we do not see any mistake of fact in Item B which relates to purchase of a IV 27 and a VCR There is an entry at p. 338 of SG 6 showing that the detenus account was debited with these items although the detenu in his statement asserted that they were gifted by his broilers. That takes us to the effect of the mistake occurring in Item Cat p. 215 of the seized documents that there is an entry showing that the detenu had a fixed deposit of US $ 2lakhs. The entry reads: ML 2 Lakhs NS 11. 75 dated June 2, 1983. Even assuming that it was a mistake to have introduced the words also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars) in paragraph 44 of the grounds that would not by itself without more vitiate the impugned order of detention or necessarily show non-application of mind. Even so, the detaining authority was entitled to act upon the entry relating to US $ 2 lakhs for the formation of his subjective satisfaction. Significance of these entries shows that the detenu was maintaining the secret account and had large sums of money in fixed deposits abroad the detaining authority has charged the detenu with keeping U$ $ 2 lakhs in fixed deposit in Kamal Account which is the capital account of the detenu and his brothers in Messrs Greenland Corporation, Japan. The words also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars) are no doubt not there in the backs of accounts but they crept in the proposal and have been reproduced in paragraph 44 of the grounds. It is somewhat strange that these words should be introduced when they were not there in the books of accounts but the fact remains that there is a typographical error. 'the High Court rightly observes that a single typographical mistake about making a reference to US $ 20 lakhs would not necessarily show the non-application of mind when the entry of US $ 2lakhs (dollars) is reflected in various places in the amount such as MLJI Khata P175 and Kamal Accountp226, copies of which were furnished to the detenu. Even assuming that the words also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars) were introduced in paragraph 44 of the grounds that would not be a factor vitiating the impugned order of detention. The detaining authority was still entitled to act upon the entry relating to fixed deposit of US $ 2lakhs (dollars) for the formation of his subjective satisfaction.

( 12 ) MRS. Desai also relied upon the decision of the apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Sunil. Para 7 of the aforesaid judgment on which reliance is placed is asunder:the stand of the State that the petition dated 3. 10. 1984 was considered by the detaining authority appears to be right. The original me dealing with the de detenus case was produced in Court for our perusal, and we found that the Home Minister, State of Gujarat, while passing the order for detention made a detailed note running in several paragraphs and in paragraph 2,he pointedly mentioned both the bail application dated 2. 10. 1984 and the petition dated 3. 10. 1984. The notes also-show that he (detaining authority) correctly appreciated the nature and purport of the 3rd October document but was of the view that not much credence could be in the circumstances given to it. The first point urged on behalf of the respondent must, therefore, be rejected. The error in the description of the document in the grounds cannot in the situation be said to have vitiated the order.

( 13 ) MRS. Desai also relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Tejpal v. Asstt. Secretary, Gout. of Maharashtra. Para 5 of the aforesaid judgment on which reliance is placed is as under: as regards point No. 1, the grievance is that while referring to the number of calls from the residential telephone No. 265707 of Hanif it is mentioned that in all four calls were made though in fact the statement says that few calls were made. Now, it does appear that this mistake has crept in the detention order. But from this, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that there has been non-application of mind Every mistake or error is not necessarily demonstrative of non-application of mind. Emphasis has always to be not so much on accuracy or on the nature or incident of error but on the state of mind of the detaining authority. The test has to be whether casual approach demonstrating want of care and caution has been made.

( 14 ) MRS. Desai also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Sattar v. Union of India. Para 12 of the aforesaid judgment on which reliance is placed is as under: in the instant case the grounds were served on the detenu in time along with the documents relied upon. In addition the copies of the complaints and details of crimes were also mentioned in the annexures. That apart as mentioned in the reply of the government the detenu was also furnished the copies of the Fills. The Arrest Register also inter-alia showed that the petitioner was released on bail in respect of criminal cases mentioned in this extract. In fact the bail applications were filed by the detenu himself and he was very much aware of the contents of those bail applications and the orders made thereon. These documents were not relied upon by the detaining authority. When a request is made by the detenu for supply of these bail applications and orders refusing thereon are made, the court inter-alia has to look into the question whether the detenu is in any way handicapped in making an effective representation by such refusal. No authority has been placed before us which goes to the extent of holding that a mere non-supply of any document whatever its nature may be, to the detenu per se amounts to the denial of an opportunity under Article 22 (5 ). The detenu, as a matter of fact, made his representation. What is more, he filed a habeas corpus petition earlier in this Court and no grievance has been made about the non-supply of those bail applications or other documents for which he made a request later, in his special leave petition. In fact he has referred to the details of the crimes, their numbers registered against him. Further the nature of the crime also is referred to by him therein and he has also referred to the fact that bail applications were filed on his behalf and he was released on bail. We may also point out that though the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata cannot be made applicable, to a case of detention yet there should be some finality. The petitioner having failed in his earlier attempts has now again come forward with the present petition with a highly balated plea that some documents, though he made a request, have not been supplied. This request, as we find from the records, was made after this Court dismissed the Habeas Corpus Petition No. 302 of 1989. He, however, justifies the filing of the present petition on a plea that he was unaware of the existence of these documents. But as noted above his petition itself shows that he was aware of an these documents. Therefore, we do not see any bona fides in this plea of his. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the refusal to supply the documents requested by him amounts to violation of Article 22 (5 ). Mrs. Desai also relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India. Para 26 of the aforesaid judgment on which reliance is placed is as under: as regards C. R. No. 306 of 1986, the detaining authority has in paragraph 28 of the grounds of detention referred to the shifting of the factory premises by M/s. Expo International somewhere in Mohali, but no specific address of the factory was declared by the firm either to the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports or to any other authority. Mentioning of that fact in the grounds of detention does not, in our opinion, necessarily require the detaining authority to supply a copy of the Civil Revision Petition in C. R No. 306 of 1986. At the same time, it has to be presumed that the petition in the said civil revision case was before the detaining authority and he had to go through it otherwise could not mention in the grounds of detention the fact of the shifting of the factory premises without disclosing any specific address of the same. In the circumstances we are of the view that the detenu was not prejudiced for the non-supply to him of the copies of the documents mentioned above and, accordingly, there is no substance in the contention of that there was non-application of-mind by the detaining authority.

( 15 ) LASTLY, Mrs. Desai relied upon the decision of the apex court in Prakash Chandra v. Commr. and Secy. Govt. of Kerala. Para 62 of the said judgment shows that the apex Court considered the issue as to whether the grounds should have been communicated in the language understood by the detenu. The apex Court, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case before it, found that the detenu states that he does not understand English or Hindi or Malayalam and understands only Gujarati language. On the basis of material on record which has been discussed in the said para, the apex Court held that the detaining authority came to the conclusion that the detenu knew both Hindi and English and the apex Court recorded its opinion that the detenu was merely feigning ignorance of English language. Mrs. Desai also brought to our notice parasi of the aforesaid judgment in which the apex Court has observed that the society must be protected from the social menace by immobilizing the persons by detention of the persons engaged in those operations and to disrupt the machinery established for furthering smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations.

( 16 ) ON consideration of the aforesaid authorities cited by Mrs. Desai, we are of the opinion that none of these authorities helps her submission.

( 17 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Kannali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu, cited several authorities. He relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Kamlesh kumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. , and especially para 49 thereof which is as under; at this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General that some of the detenus have been indulging in illicit smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances on a large scale and are involved in other anti-national activities which are very harmful to the national economy. He has urged that having regard to the nature of the activities of the detenus the Cases do not justify interference with the orders of detention made against them We are not unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities in which the detenus are alleged to be involved. But while discharging our constitutional obligation to enforce the fundamental rights of the people, more especially the right to personal liberty, we cannot allow ourselves to be influenced by these considerations. It has been said that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safe guards are required to be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. We would, in this context, reiterate what was said earlier by this Court while rejecting a similar submission: may be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the Laws of Preventive Detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic setup, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not dewed to the detenus. T (See Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1981 (4) SCC 481 [LQ/SC/1981/410] at p. 488 ). Mr. Karmali also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Icchu Devi v. Union of India, para 3 wherein the Supreme Court expressed that it is not at all happy at the thought that its order may have resulted in setting free a possible smuggler. The Supreme Court observed that it is quite possible that the effect of the order may be to let loose on the society, a smuggler who might in all probability, resume his nefarious activities causing incalculable mischief and harm to the economy of the nation. The apex Court further observed that at the same time we cannot forget that the power of preventive detention is a draconian power justified only in the interest of public security and order and it is tolerated in a free society only as a necessary evil. The apex Court further observed that the law cannot be subverted, particularly in the area of personal liberty in order to prevent a smuggler from securing his release from delention, because whatever is the law laid down by the Courts in the case of a smuggler would be equally applicable in the case of preventive detention under any other law.

( 18 ) MR. Karmali next relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Prabhu Dayal v. Dist. Magistrate Kamrun12, and especially para 67 thereof which is as under: the facts of the cases might induce mournful reflection how an honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty of taking pro-phylactic measure to secure the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community has been frustrated by what is popularly called a technical error. We say and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. And observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community cannot be over-emphasized There will be no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community. But social security is not the only goal of a good society. There are other values in a society. Our country is taking singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its constitution and the most cherished of these ideals is personal liberty. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of social security, we would sanction the subversion of this liberty. We do not pause to consider whether social security is more precious than personal liberty in the scale of values, for, any judgment as regards that would be but a value judgment on which opinions might differ. But whatever be the impact on the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. When a contain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, we think it our duty to see that procedure is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears. 20. Mr. Karmali also relied upon para 12 of the decision of the apex Court reported in AIR 1987 s. C. 1192, para 6 of the decision of the apex Court reported in AIR 1988 S. C. 109 AIR 1949 bom. 75, AIR 1952 S. C. 106, (para 9 thereof in particular) and AIR 1966 S. C. 1925, (para 21 in particular ).

( 19 ) ON consideration of the rival submissions in the light of the authorities cited before us and on the basis of material on record, undoubtedly, the detenu is involved very substantially in manufacturing of mandrax tablets on a large scale. However, that by itself cannot condone any abridgement of the constitutional protection guaranteed to the detenu or that will not condone if the order is passed mechanically without application of mind or in a-slip-shod manner. If the seriousness of the activities of the detenu should weigh with the Court, it should weigh equally, if not more, with the detaining authority and the detaining authority in such a serious case must be all the more particular to be meticulous, deligent, accurate and take every possible care to see that the order is not exposed to valid challenges.

( 20 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, the detaining authority, in fact, has admitted that the words narcotic drugst in the original order were used inadvertently. We find it difficult to appreciate, much less accept this explanation. It is extremely relevant to notice that the detaining authority is a high responsible authority and such an authority cannot afford to ignore the difference between psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs especially when the Act specifically defines narcotic drugt and psychotropic substance separately under section 3 of the Act. The subsequent corrigendum issued by the detaining authority clearly shows that the original order of detention was signed carelessly, casually or even without properly reading the same. Such inadvertence cannot be condoned as mere mistake.

( 21 ) WE are also not impressed by the submission made on behalf of the detaining authority that, ultimately, the detaining authority has corrected the mistake by communicating to the detenu that instead of narcotic drugs the detenu should read it psychotropic substances in the original order of detention. When the original order of detention specifically records the satisfaction of the detaining authority that he is satisfied that the detenu be detained with a view to preventing him engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, we are at a loss to know how such subjective satisfaction can be later on corrected or modified. If he was originally satisfied that the detenu is required to be detained with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in psychotropic substances and still mentions narcotic drugst in the original order, no further proof of non-application of mind or casualness or carelessness is needed. If on the other hand, the original satisfaction was regarding necessity of the detenu being prevented from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, then that also is a clear indication of his total non-application of mind because the entire material shows that the detenu was dealing in psychotropic substances. Taking into consideration the involvement of the detenu on a large scale in manufacture of the psychotropic substances, we have given our serious thought, but we find it impossible to condone the lapse as a mere inadvertence. The authorities quoted above clearly show that in matters of preventive detention, the constitutional safeguards have to be meticulously observed by the detaining authority and zealously guarded by the Courts.

( 22 ) IT is also to be appreciated that even if the purported modification is held permissible, still the right of the detenu to have an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India is clearly Violated. The original order of detention was passed on 26th May, 1995 and a copy of the same was served on the detenu on the very day. The letter containing modification was issued on 29th May, 1995. However, it is an agreed position before us that the said letter was served on the detenu as late as 12th June, 1995. Thus very clearly, not only the communication of the correct satisfaction was delayed by about 17 days but also the detenu was clearly deprived of his constitutional right of getting the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the said order.

( 23 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances, the order of detention must be quashed on the ground that it is passed casually, carelessly and without due application of mind by the detaining authority. The subsequent purported correction, in our opinion, is not only impermissible but even if held to be permissible, would result into denial to the detenu of his constitutional right under Article 22 (5) affording earliest opportunity to make a representation against the said order.

( 24 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and the order of detention dated 26th May, 1995 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is also detained by virtue of the criminal prosecution launched against him and his bail application having been rejected. Under the circumstances, we direct that the detenu Virendra Omprakash Sood shall not be continued in detention any further only so far as his detention is under the aforesaid order of detention dated 26th May, 1995. The rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Petition allowed.