Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

1. The present revision is directed against an order vide which learned Special Judge, Una framed charges against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 and 509 of IPC.

2. It appears from the copy of the charge sheet annexed to the petition (Annexure P-2) that the informant made a complaint to the police that her photo was altered by Sudarshan Singh and Rakesh Soni into an indecent photo which was made viral. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The informant produced one mobile phone and three photographs containing the obscene photographs of the informant, which were seized by the police. The police found that one altered photograph of the informant and one boy namely, Sunil Kumar was sent to the mobile phone of the informant which was immediately deleted by the sender. She disclosed this fact to her sister, one or two villagers and the boy’s mother. She did not disclose this incident to any person in order to maintain her social image. She attended a meeting on 28.5.2022 in PWD Rest House, Jol. Sudershan and Rakesh Soni were also present. The informant said that she and her family members had lodged a case against her sister-in-law’s relatives, however, Sudarshan was intermeddling in the family affairs of the informant. Whenever the sister-in-law of the informant used to leave home, he would provide her shelter. This led to an altercation. The petitioner and Rakesh Soni openly stated that obscene photographs of the informant were in their mobile phone. In this manner, they tarnished the informant’s image. The police associated the petitioner and Rakesh Kumar with the investigation. The police seized their mobile phones and sent them to the FSL. As per the result of the analysis, WhatsApp chat containing the obscene photographs was recovered from the mobile phones. Some images with the same postures but different faces were found in the data extracted. The obscene image was found to be edited, however, no data related to the case was found in the mobile phone of the petitioner and Rakesh Kumar Soni. The petitioner had threatened to make the obscene photographs of the informant viral. Hence, the offences punishable under Sections 506 and 509 of IPC were found to have been committed by the petitioner.

3. The learned Special Judge found sufficient reasons to frame a charge against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 and 509 of IPC.

4. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Special Judge, the present revision petition has been filed asserting that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. The allegations are vague and they were made to harass the petitioner. Learned Special Judge framed the charge in a mechanical manner. The petitioner is a Member of the Legislative Assembly and enjoys a good reputation in the area. The FIR is an abuse of the process of the Court. The informant was an aspirant for a ticket in the Legislative Elections. She made a false allegation to eliminate the petitioner from the race. The police of Police Station Amb had no territorial jurisdiction to register the case. The incident took taken at Village Jol in the territorial jurisdiction of Police Station Bangana. The FIR does not fulfil the ingredients of Sections 506 and 509 of IPC. No obscene photographs were found in the mobile phone of the petitioner and the co-accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order framing charge be quashed.

5. I have heard Mr. N.K. Thakur learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No. 1-State and Mr K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate with Mr Karanbir Singh Kalon and Mr Amit Kumar Dhumal, Advocates for respondent No. 2.

6. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no case for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 and 509 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. Learned Special Judge erred in framing charge against the petitioner. The police of Police Station Amb had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order framing charge be set aside.

7. Ms Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No. 1-State submitted that the petitioner had intimidated the informant by threatening to make her altered picture viral and a prima-facie case for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 and 509 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. The matter is being tried by learned Special Judge, Una, who has territorial jurisdiction; therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

8. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Counsel adopted the submission of Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General and submitted that the Court has to see only the prima- facie case at the stage of framing of charge. It is not concerned with the truthfulness or otherwise of the material collected by the prosecution. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Dilip Singh Kishore Singh Rao 2023 SCC Online 1294 that at the time of framing of the charge the Court has to see the material collected by the prosecution to determine whether a case has been made out for proceeding with the trial or not. It is not necessary to examine the defence of the accused. It was observed:-

"7. It is trite law that the application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.

8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.

9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge- sheet material at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O.

10. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 [LQ/SC/2014/18] adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:

“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.”

11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 [LQ/SC/1996/793] and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 [LQ/SC/2000/1015] has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial."

11. A perusal of the charge sheet shows that on 28.5.2022 the petitioner and Rakesh Kumar Soni had an altercation with the informant over the informant’s sister-in-law and they told her that they had the obscene photographs of the petitioner in their mobile phones, which would be made viral by them. This statement was made in a public place in the presence of the public when the informant had protested about the interference of the petitioner in her family matters. The purpose of making such a statement was to dissuade the informant from pursuing her complaint. Making the obscene photographs of the informant viral would cause injury to her reputation, alarm her and prevent her from pursuing her complaint against the petitioner. Therefore, the necessary ingredients of the commission of offence defined under Sections 503 and 506 of IPC were prima facie satisfied. The words were uttered in the public in the presence of the petitioner with an intent to insult the modesty of the informant knowing fully well that these words would be heard by her. Therefore, a prima-facie offence punishable under Section 509 of IPC is made out against the petitioner.

12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilip Singh supra that the power of the Court to examine the record to satisfy itself about the legality and regularity of any proceeding is not an appellate power. It cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The Court will be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction against the order framing charge unless a clear case of interference is made out. It was observed:-

13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LQ/SC/2012/789] where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.”

14. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has also laid down principles to be considered for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397, particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P.C. is sought for as under:

“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

15. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.

13. In the present case, the order was passed by learned Special Judge, Una based on the material placed before him. Therefore, the same is not to be interfered with in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.

14. It was submitted that the police of Police Station Amb had no jurisdiction to investigate the matter at Jol, where the incident had taken place, fell within the territorial jurisdiction of Police Station Bangana. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 [LQ/SC/1999/962] that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:-

“8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that the Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that the learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable to criminal trials. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because:

(1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged.

(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction.

(3) After the investigation is over, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.

9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under:

“156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above- mentioned.”

10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub- section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After the investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which the crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.

11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. It is to be stated that under the said chapter there are various provisions which empower the court for enquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, enquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178 which are as under:

“177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.—Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of enquiry or trial.—(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for an “ordinary” place of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime.

13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC 447 [LQ/SC/1962/165] : (1963) 2 SCR 52 [LQ/SC/1962/165] ] dealt with a similar contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus:

“The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with the investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or the inherent power of the court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in regard to the statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71 IA 203, 212: AIR 1945 PC 18 [LQ/PC/1944/36] ] (IA at p. 212) observed as follows—

‘The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561- A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act.’

With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the officer in charge of the police station.”

14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit an investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 [LQ/SC/1982/36] : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 [LQ/SC/1985/88] : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180] [LQ/SC/1985/88]

15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of the investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that the SHO, Police Station PaschimVihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction."

15. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2009/1991] that once an investigation is commenced under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:-

"24. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear that a police officer in charge of a police station can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence which a court having jurisdiction over such police station can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub- section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a complaint filed before him.

26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since the alleged transactions had taken place within the territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the investigation should be transferred to the police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been entrusted with the investigation, had upon initial inquiries recommended that the investigation be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai.

27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself from holding a proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156 CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub- section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter.

29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr Syed's submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the investigating officer in the course of the investigation to decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not.

30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the stage of taking cognizance was yet to arrive. The investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the part of the investigating agency to forward its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the police station concerned in Mumbai.

31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the process should issue on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case, there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the part of the investigating agency to make an observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, which was required to be transferred to the police station having jurisdiction to do so.

32. On the materials before him the learned Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime) and to order a fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the court's powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal misappropriation or of a criminal breach of trust if the same has been committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the local jurisdiction of the said court.

33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8 SCC 728 [LQ/SC/1999/962] : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the investigating officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC, did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike as in other cases, it was for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it.”

16. Even assuming that the police had no territorial jurisdiction it will not take away the jurisdiction of the Court taking the cognisance. In R.A.H. Siguran vs. Shankare Gowda 2017 (16) SCC 126, [LQ/SC/2017/1205] the proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground that the Police Officer, who had conducted the investigation was not competent to do so under provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the investigation could not have been quashed on this ground. It was observed:

“It is well-settled law that even if the investigation is not conducted by an authorized officer, the trial is not vitiated unless prejudice is shown.

10. In H.N. Rishbud and Anr. v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 [LQ/SC/1954/179] , (1955) 1 SCR 1150 [LQ/SC/1954/179] the question considered by this Court was whether after the court takes cognizance, a trial can be held to be initiated merely on the ground that investigation was invalid. Answering in the negative, this Court held that if the plea of invalidity of investigation is raised at a sufficiently early stage, the court, instead of taking cognizance direct reinvestigation by the competent investigating officer. But, after cognizance is taken the trial cannot be quashed for invalidity of investigation.

11. The observations in the said judgment are:-

"9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by the investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in an investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings". The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is, therefore, a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case, cognizance so taken is only in the nature of the error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in the following terms is attracted:

"Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice."

If therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to the investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu v. Emperor (AIR 1944 PC 73 [LQ/PC/1944/1] ) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. King (AIR 1950 PC 26). These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of an investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both cases clearly show that the invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.

10. It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during the trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the Code as appears from Section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order an investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant case. When the attention of the Court is called to such an illegality at a very early stage it would not be fair to the accused not to obviate the prejudice that may have been caused thereby, by appropriate orders, at that stage but to leave him to the ultimate remedy of waiting till the conclusion of the trial and of discharging the somewhat difficult burden under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of making out that such an error has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice. It is relevant in this context to observe that even if the trial had proceeded to a conclusion and the accused had to make out that there was, in fact, a failure of justice as the result of such an error, an explanation to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the fact of the objection having been raised at an early stage of the proceeding is a pertinent factor. To ignore the breach in such a situation when brought to the notice of the Court would be virtually to make a dead letter of the peremptory provision which has been enacted on grounds of public policy for the benefit of such an accused. It is true that the peremptory provision itself allows an officer of a lower rank to make the investigation if permitted by the Magistrate. But this is not an indication by the Legislature that an investigation by an officer of a lower rank without such permission cannot be said to cause prejudice. When a Magistrate is approached for granting such permission he is expected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial the Court have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the. It is in the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of thehas to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined."

12. The above view has been repeatedly followed in subsequent decisions of this Court. In Union of India and Ors. represented through Superintendent of Police v. T. Nathamuni, (2014) 16 SCC 285, [LQ/SC/2014/1281] the position was discussed as follows:-

"12. It is clear that in the case of an investigation under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, an officer below the rank of Inspector cannot investigate without the order of a competent Magistrate. In the present case, the order of the Special Judge was obtained by filing an application. That order dated 24-9-2009 shows that it was passed on request and in the interest of justice, investigation pursuant to such order did not suffer from want of jurisdiction and hence, in the facts of the case, the High Court erred in law in interfering with such investigation more so when it was already completed.

13. The question raised by the respondent is well answered by this Court in a number of decisions rendered from a different perspective. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised by law has been held to be irregular. Indisputably, by the order of the Magistrate investigation was conducted by the Sub-Inspector, CBI who, after completion of an investigation, submitted the charge sheet. It was only during the trial, that an objection was raised by the respondent that the order passed by the Magistrate permitting the Sub- Inspector, CBI to investigate is without jurisdiction. Consequently, the investigation conducted by the officer is vitiated in law. Curiously enough the respondent has not made out a case that by reason of the investigation conducted by the Sub- Inspector a serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice has been caused. It is well settled that the invalidity of the investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.

14. In M.C. Sulkunte v. State of Mysore [(1970) 3 SCC 513] [LQ/SC/1970/460 ;] , the main question raised by the appellant in an appeal against the order of conviction was that the sanction to investigate the offence given by the Magistrate was not proper inasmuch as he had not recorded any reason as to why he had given permission to the Inspector of Police to investigate the offence of criminal misconduct of obtaining illegal gratification. Considering Section 5-A of the Act, Their Lordships observed: (SCC p. 517, para 15)

"15. Although laying the trap was part of the investigation and it had been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, it cannot on that ground be held that the sanction was invalid or that the conviction ought not to be maintained on that ground. It has been emphasised in a number of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation. The observations in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [1959 Supp (2) SCR 201], at pp. 210-11 to the effect that when the Magistrate without applying his mind only mechanically issues the order giving permission the investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us."

15. In Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn [(1971) 2 SCC 48] [LQ/SC/1971/222] , this Court was considering the question with regard to the irregularity in an investigation for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following earlier decisions, this Court held: (SCC p. 52, para 14)

"14. From the above proposition it follows that where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation will not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby and the accused has been prejudiced. Assuming in favour of the appellant, that there was an irregularity in the investigation and that Section 5-A of thewas not complied with in substance, the trial by the Special Judge cannot be held to be illegal unless it is shown that miscarriage of justice has been caused on account of the illegal investigation. The learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to show us how there has been any miscarriage of justice in this case and how the accused has been prejudiced by any irregular investigation."

16. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], this Court while considering Section 5-A of the Act, held as under: (SCC pp. 384-85, para 119)

"119. It has been ruled by this Court in several decisions that Section 5-A of theis mandatory and not a directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. See (1) H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196 [LQ/SC/1954/179] ], (2) Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 [LQ/SC/1961/203] ], (3) Munnalal v. State of U.P [AIR 1964 SC 28 [LQ/SC/1963/112] ], (4) Sailendranath Bose v. State of Bihar [AIR 1968 SC 1292 [LQ/SC/1968/86] ], (5) Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn. [(1971) 2 SCC 48] [LQ/SC/1971/222] and (6) Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786] [LQ/SC/1972/108] . However, in Rishbud case [AIR 1955 SC 196 [LQ/SC/1954/179] ] and Muni Lal case [(1971) 2 SCC 48] [LQ/SC/1971/222] , it has been ruled that if any breach of the said mandatory proviso relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the illegality and cure the defects in the investigation."

17. In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Admn [(1973) 1 SCC 726] [LQ/SC/1973/32] , provisions of Section 5- A were again considered by this Court and held as under (SCC p. 735, para 15)

"15. As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to the law. In this connection, it may not be out of place also to point out that the function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the offence so investigated. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196 [LQ/SC/1954/179] ], it was held that illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination of the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This decision was followed in Munnalal v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 28 [LQ/SC/1963/112] ] where the decision in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [AIR 1959 SC 707 [LQ/SC/1959/16] ], was distinguished. The same view was taken in State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal [AIR 1964 SC 33 [LQ/SC/1963/159] ] and more recently in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786] [LQ/SC/1972/108] . The decisions of the Calcutta, Punjab and Saurashtra High Courts relied upon by Mr Anthony deal with different points: in any event, to the extent, they contain any observations against the view expressed by this Court in the decisions just cited those observations cannot be considered good law."

13. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings merely on the ground that the investigation was not valid. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question raised by learned counsel for the appellants that there was no infirmity in the investigation.”

17. Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the proceedings at this stage simply on the ground that these were not conducted by an authorized officer and the accused is free to show prejudice during the trial.

18. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish any reason for interference with the order framing charge. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

19. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.