Shearer, J.This application in revision is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of Muzafferpur, setting aside a decree passed by a panchayat in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 78, Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act (Act in [3] of 1922). It is contended on behalf of the opposite party that the application is not maintainable and that this Court, purporting to act in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, has no power to set aside the order made by the learned District Judge. The question that primarily arises is whether a panchayat is a Court and more particularly, whether it is a Court "subordinate to the High Court" within the meaning of these words as they occur in Section 115, Civil P.C.

2. Section 3 of the Code states that:

For the purposes of this Code, the District Court of subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.

The Courts herein referred to are the Courts constituted u/s 8, Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Section 9 states that:

The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

By reason of this provision and of the provisions contained in Sections 67 and 58, Village Administration Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain and try certain suits has been taken away by the legislature, and that jurisdiction has been conferred on panchayats which are Courts but not civil Courts or Courts within the meaning of these words as they are used in the Code of Civil Procedure. It would not, of course, necessarily follow from this and this alone that the High Court has no jurisdiction to revise their decrees and orders. But the extent of the civil appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, which must be taken to include also its civil revisional jurisdiction, is defined in Clause 11 of the Letters Patent, which states that the High Court

Shall be a Court of appeal from the civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence.

As I have just said, panchayats are not civil Courts. Are they, then, Courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court It is quite clear that they are not. The legislature has conferred the power of superintendence over panchayats not on the High Court but on the Provincial Government. In view of the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 224, Government of India Act, it seems to me open to doubt whether, if panchayats were subject to superintendence by the High Court, the High Court would ipso facto still be entitled to revise their decrees and orders as the Act which constitutes these Courts does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to question their decisions. On the contrary, it impliedly, if not expressly, ousts its jurisdiction. It provides that there shall be no right of appeal and that the only authority competent to set aside their decrees and orders shall be the District Judge. It seems to me impossible to say that a Court is subordinate to the High Court, when the High Court has no powers of superintendence over it and when the statute creating the Court does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain appeals or applications in revision against its orders. Now, if the High Court has no power to revise an order made by a panchayat, it is difficult to understand on what principle it can be said that it has jurisdiction to revise an order made by a District Judge in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 78 of the Act. It is contended by Mr. S.C. Mukherji, for the petitioner, that the Court of the District Judge is a subordinate Court, and that, on a strict interpretation of the language used in Section 115 of the Code, the High Court necessarily has jurisdiction. Mr. Mukherji strongly relied on the observations made by Chatterji and Meredith JJ., in Abdul Razak Vs. Kuldip Narain, . There an order made by a District Judge, sitting as Election Commissioner under the Bihar District Board Election Petitions Rules, 1939, was set aside on an application in revision. The ratio decidendi, as I understand it, was that the order, although it purported to have been made by an Election Commissioner, was really made by the District Judge presiding over the District Court, the jurisdiction of that Court having been enlarged to enable it to deal with the particular matter in controversy between the parties. One of the decisions cited by Meredith J., was the National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. His Majestys Postmaster-General (No. 2) (1913) A.C. 546. Lord Atkinson there said:

t is simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing Court of law, with all its incidents including a right of appeal, to a new matter closely resembling in character those matters over which it has a. ready jurisdiction as a Court of law.

Lord Parker similarly said;

Where by statute matters are referred to the deter ruination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.

With the greatest respect, I think myself that the decision in Abdul Razak Vs. Kuldip Narain, is open to criticism. In any case, it is clear that the District Judge was there sitting as a Court of original jurisdiction and that he was bound by the ordinary law of procedure and evidence applicable to the civil Courts. In the case with which we are now concerned, the District Judge was exercising a revisional jurisdiction and the District Court, as such, has no revisional jurisdiction.

3. Moreover, the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by Section 96(1) of the Act has made the following rule:

In proceedings under B. 78 of the Bihar and Orissa village Administration Act, 1922, the District Judge

(1) may, if he thinks fit, hear any party or their agents as defined in Section 86 of the Act, and

(2) shall be bound by no laws of evidence or procedure other than that herein prescribed.

Section 86 of the Act provides that:

While parties to suits triable by a panchayat may appear by agent, no advocate or legal practitioner shall be permitted to appear as an agent.

Section 87 provides:

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, advocates or legal practitioners shall not be permitted to appear before a panchayat.

When the District Judge, when exercising his. jurisdiction u/s 78 of the Act, is debarred from permitting any legal practitioner to appear on behalf of either of the parties and when ha is not bound by the ordinary laws of evidence or procedure, it cannot, I think, be said, for a. moment, that he is sitting as the president of the District Court and that the jurisdiction of the District Court has been enlarged to enable it to deal with some new matter which would not otherwise come before it. On the contrary, the District Judge is, in my opinion, exercising a jurisdiction of a highly anomalous and novel kind, in fact, the same arbitrary jurisdiction as the legislature has seen fit to confer on panchayats.

4. Mr. S.C. Mukherji, for the petitioner, was at pains to collect a number of decisions which he frankly admitted, were not directly, or even very indirectly, in point, but on which he relied by way of analogy. It is not, I think, necessary to refer to these decisions except, perhaps, to Goni Mahton and Others Vs. Emperor, in which Agarwala J., as he then was, decided that this Court could interfere in revision with an order made by a panchayat sitting as a criminal Court. Mr. Mukherji strongly relied on this decision and on the decisions of the Allahabad High Court which were cited there. It appears to have been contended before Agarwala J., as he then was, that a panchayat was not a Court at all and to have been conceded that, if it was a Court it was necessarily an inferior criminal Court. I am inclined myself to think that the expression "inferior criminal Court" does not connote a Court of lower status than the High Court, as, the High Court alone being a Court of record, and all other Courts being Courts not of record, the word "inferior" would, in such a case, be redundant and unnecessary, but connotes rather a Court which is subordinate to, or subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Even, however, if there is an ambiguity in the language used in Section 436, Criminal P.C., there is no such ambiguity in the language used in Section 115, Civil P.C. In my opinion, the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the opposite party must prevail and the application must accordingly be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee one gold mohur. At the same time, I consider, that the case ought to be brought to the notice of the Provincial Government, which has superintendence over panchayats, in order that it may consider whether the members of this panchayat, or some of them, should not be removed. The surpanch apparently reported to the District Judge that the suit was instituted on llth August 1946. The other members of the panchayat reported that, although the suit had been entered in the suit-register on llth August 1946, the plaint had in fact been presented on 28th April 1946, and had, for some reason or other, been left lying about in the office of the panchayat and not entered in the register. If the surpanch was correct, the suit was barred by limitation; if the other members of the panchayat were correct, it was not. It is perfectly clear that either the surpanch or the other members of the panchayat have told a deliberate untruth and have done so in order to procure a miscarriage of justice.

Reuben J.

5. For the reasons given by my learned brother, I agree that a civil revision petition will not lie, and that this petition must be dismissed with costs.