(Prayer: Appeals (disposed of on 5-4-1948) under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and orders of Horwill J. dated 9-2-1948 in A.A.O. Nos. 603 and 602 of 1947 respectively preferred to the High Court against the orders of the District Court of Madura dated 10-12-1947 in I.A. No. 533 of 1947 in A.S. No. 136 of 1947 and I.A. No. 532 of 1947 in A.S. No. 134 of 1947 respectively (O.S. No. 15 of 1944 Subordinate Judges Court, Madura.)

Rajamannar, Offg. Chief Justice:

These are appeals under the Letters Patent against the judgment of Horwill J. dismissing two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals, Nos. 602 and 603 of 1947.( Since reported in 61 L.W. 358) The two civil miscellaneous appeals were filed against two orders of the learned District Judge of Madura dismissing two applications for the issue of an interim injunction restraining the respondent from executing the decree for possession obtained by him in O.S. No. 15 of 1944 on the file of the Subordinate Judges Court of Madura pending two appeals before him. That suit, namely, O.S. No. 15 of 1944 was a suit for partition to which the husband of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 14 who was the managing member of the joint family at the time and the father of the minor appellants in L.P.A. No. 13, a coparcener of the family, were parties. The suit ended in a compromise decree.

The applications were made under O. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Obviously, O. 39, R. 1 has no application to the facts of this case, nor was it contended before us that it had any application. Before the learned District Judge, apparently R. 2 of O. 39 was also relied on, but he held it would not apply in terms. In the appeals to this Court, the learned Judge held that from a perusal of O. 39, R. 1 the case would not come within that rule. But evidently it was not argued before him that O. 39, R. 2 would apply. Before us, it was contended that the case might be brought within O. 39, R. 2 and reliance was placed on the words restraining the defendant from committingother injury of any kind. No authority has been cited to us that proceedings in execution of a compromise decree which had not been set aside would amount to committing an injury. It was said that the decree was not binding on the appellants before us, because they were not parties. We are not impressed with this argument. We hold that the respondent cannot be held to be committing any legal injury by executing the decree in O.S. No. 15 of 1944.

It was then contended that even if O. 39, Rs. 1 and 2 did not apply there was inherent power in the Court to issue an injunction in a proper case. It is true that it has been ruled in some decisions that apart from the powers under O. 39, Rs. 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code the High Court has powers inherited from the Supreme Court which would enable it to issue an injunction in circumstances not covered by O. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. But surely that power cannot be invoked by the appellants in this case and all that we have to determine is the power of the lower Court to grant an injunction. None of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants in Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Balasubramania Mudaliar (224 L.W. 421), Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar (227 L.W. 418), and Govindarajulu Naidu v. Imperial Bank of India, Vellore (935 L.W. 168), has any application to the facts of this case. In the first of the three cases, the learned Judge held that the facts would justify the issue of an injunction under O. 39, R.

2. In the other two cases, it was clearly laid down that the extraordinary jurisdiction possessed by the High Court is not possessed by any of the subordinate Courts. We agree with the learned Judge that the lower Court and this Court sitting as an appellate Court no against the orders of the lower Court have inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction apart from the provisions of O. 39 Civil Procedure Code.

The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.