R.L. Gupta, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated. 4.6.1988 of the learned Addl. District Judge, Delhi by which she dismissed a petition under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the appellant along with her divorce petition. The divorce, however was granted.

2. By this application the appellant stated that her parents/other relations had presented to her the following articles at the time of her marriage.

(i) One golden set (Jaru) comprising of gulubind for neck, two Karas, ear rings,

(ii) One another golden set called Makhi set comprising of neckless, two ponches, ear rings and three rings.

(iii) One golden set of small weight consisting of Kanti for the neck, karas for hand and three rings.

(iv) Golden churies 20.

(v) One Nath golden, one tika, one sangarpari nath.

(vi) 31 utensils of silver consisting of thals, katcoas etc.

(vii) Utensils of brass (make Muradabadi) comprised in one bucket.

3. Learned ADJ held that since there was no averment in the applica­tion that the property was jointly presented to the appellant as well as her husband at the time of the marriage so it was not maintainable under Section 27 of the.

4. I have heard arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the appellant drew my attention to some authorities. The first case is that of Anju Bhargava v. Rajesh Bhargava Volume II (1986) DMC 467. A perusal of this authority shows that both the parties came to a settlement in that case. The husband agreed to pay Rs. 20,000 in instalments of Rs. 2,000 to the wife. The agreement was accepted by this Court and the case disposed off. I am of the view that the other observations made in this aut­hority holding that the words, “May belong jointly” may also mean, “may not belong jointly” in Section 27 of theare in the nature of obiter and cannot be called ratio decebendi. This Court held in the case of Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar AIR 1982 Delhi 223,

“Section 27, Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is a substantive provision empowering the Court in any proceeding under the said Act make a just and proper order regarding property presented at or about the time of the marriage of the parties and belonging jointly to both of them. The Court exercising the jurisdiction under the is powerless to deal with properties exclusively belong­ing to one or the other spouse”. In the above case the wife who pleaded that the properties were presented to her and, therefore, belonged to her was held not entitled to the relief of their recovery under Section 27 of the. Her remedy lay before the Civil Courts. Neither could such an order be based on Order 7 Rule 7 read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code.” The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in Ashok Kumar Kad v. Usha Rani Kad FAO No. 111 of 1983 reported in 1985 M.L.R. 21. The Court said,

“It is no doubt true that the operation of the provision embodied in Section 27 of theis confined only to property presented to the parties at or about the time of the marriage which belongs jointly to both of them.”

Therefore, in matters which were contested by the parties before this Court, the consistent view is that Section 27 of theis attracted when the property presented at or about the time of the marriage is alleged to belong jointly to both the spouses. In the present case, the allegation is that all the aforesaid articles were presented to her at the time of marriage by her parents/ other relations, meaning thereby that the same belonged to her. Learned Counsel for the appellant also drew my attention to the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another AIR 1985 SC 628 [LQ/SC/1985/88] . After going through the aforesaid authority, I am of the view that the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case the wife had filed a criminal complaint against the husband alleging misappropriation of the property absolutely owned by her. The Court of first, instance summoned the husband as an accused. But the High Court quashed the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the wife to file a civil suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in para 15,

“We are of the opinion that this view of the High Court is not legally sustainable because neither of the two Acts, (Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act), referred to above, go to the extent of providing that the claim of a woman on the basis of stridhan is completely abolished. All that the two Sections, mentioned above, provide is that if the husband refuses to return the stridhan property of his wife, it will be open to the wife to recover the same by a properly constituted suit. The Sections nowhere provide that the concept of stridhan is abolished or that a remedy under the criminal law for breach of trust is taken away.”

5. Therefore, I am of the view that the appellant does not seem to derive any strength for her case from the aforesaid ruling. I am, therefore, of the view that the conclusion of the learned Add. District Judge is correct. This appeal has no merit and the same is hereby dismissed.