1. In the wake of instant surge in COVID – 19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in the Court, for the safety of all concerned.

2. This criminal revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:

“It is therefore, prayed that the misc. petition may kindly be allowed and the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Cases) Udaipur dated 25.06.2014 in Criminal Regular Case No. 37/2011 may kindly be set aside and the petitioner may kindly be discharged from the offence under Section 120B IPC read with Section 13(1) (d) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.”

3. The facts of the case as placed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that one Mr. Naru Lal, filed an F.I.R. bearing C.R. No. 314/2008 before the ACB Chowki, Udaipur, stating that when he sought to collect pending payments, for works already completed by him, from the Panchayat Samiti, Kumbalgarh, and that during his meetings with the concerned B.D.O. and the Pradhan of the said Panchayat Samiti for the same, an illegal demand of a bribe for Rs.22,000/- was made from him. And that, after filing of the F.I.R., the concerned Deputy Superintendent of Police arranged trap proceedings, wherein on audio tapes it was ascertained that the B.D.O. was in fact demanding and taking bribes in connection with release of the pending payments of the complainant Mr. Naru Lal. And that, subsequently, the A.C.B. submitted a charge sheet against the said B.D.O. and the petitioner, who is a Junior Engineer (under suspension).

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner submitted an application before the Additional Sessions Judge, Udaipur seeking to be discharged from any liability, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 37/2011, arising out of the F.I.R.No. 314/2008 stating that there was not an iota of evidence against the petitioner. and that the Additional Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Cases), Udaipur passed an order, dated 25.06.2014, wherein a prima facie case against the petitioner under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B IPC was found to be made out, and accordingly, the said application was rejected.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments;

(a) 2012 (9) SCC 257 [LQ/SC/2012/690] Subramanian Swamy Vs. A. Raja;

(b) Govind Singh Shekhawat Vs. State of Rajasthan (Cri. Misc. Petition No.989/2017, decided by this Hon’ble Court on 11.05.2017);

(c) Ms. Shreya Jha Vs. CBI, (S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 584/2006 decided by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 28.05.2007;

(d) State of Raj. Vs. Keshav Dev & Anr., RLR 1999(2) 414; (Raj.) and

(e) 2009 (1) Cr. L.R. (Raj.) 778 State of Rajasthan Vs. Narayan Lal & Anr.

6. Learned Public Prosecutor however, submits that the impugned order, dated 25.06.2014, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Cases), Udaipur has been passed after rightly appreciating the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the finding that the petitioner was working closely with the concerned B.D.O. and was in charge of handling of the day to day affairs regarding construction matters of the Panchayat Samiti, and that prima facie a case against the petitioner under the aforementioned provisions of law was rightly made out by the learned Court below.

7. Heard learned counsel for both parties as well as perused the record of the case and judgments cited at the Bar.

8. This Court observes that the impugned order, dated 25.06.2014, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Cases), Udaipur is a well reasoned and speaking order, which has been passed after taking into due consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order lays out clear and cogent reasoning in arriving at the conclusion that a prima facie case, under the aforementioned provisions of law against the petitioner is made out, and that the petitioner, while holding the post of Junior Engineer at the Panchayat Samiti, Kumbalgarh, District Rajsamand, although was not directly involved in taking bribes, nor mentioned in the incriminating audio evidence obtained by the complainant, but he worked in close proximity with the concerned B.D.O. and was directly tasked with supervision and management of the construction activities for which the concerned B.D.O. would take bribes, and that the petitioner if not directly involved in the act would have knowledge and involvement, and that there was sufficient evidence on the record to make out a charge under the aforementioned provisions of law against the petitioner.

9. This Court also takes note of the judgments cited at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner and observes that the case laws do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Subramanian (supra), the Court observed that mere suspicion cannot replace the place of evidences and proof, as is not the case in the present petition. In Govind Singh (supra), the trap proceedings laid down by the A.C.B failed and the quality of the audio was clear enough to prosecute the petitioner. In Shreya (supra), the Court observed that merely opening bank accounts in the name of the father would not make the petitioner daughter liable under 120-B IPC. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Keshav Dev (supra), the Court observed that if the Trial Court is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time, it would be advisable to truncate or nip the proceedings at the stage of charge itself, however that is clearly not the case in the present petition. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Narayan Lal (supra), the Court dismissed the criminal revision petition on the finding that on the basis of witness testimony, no prima facie case was made out against the petitioner, which does not apply to the present case at hand.

10. This Court, in light of the above made observations, and taking into due consideration the multitude of judgments cited at the Bar, finds that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity and therefore, does not warrant any interference by this Court.

11. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.