1. This is an appeal from a decision of the SubordinateJudge of Jessore, dated the 2nd of June 1898.

2. The suit is one for ejectment of a tenant, or rather thetransferees of a former tenant, who has abandoned the land, and is no longer inpossession of it.

3. The Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit, holdingthat notice to quit has not been served upon the defendants Nos. 1 to 3, andfurther that the notice that was served upon the defendants was not properlyserved under the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hehas also held that the notice was insufficient, as the plaintiff did not givethe defendants 15 clear days notice to quit. It is to be observed that theSubordinate Judge has found that the defendants tenancy is one of a monthlynature and that it can be put an end to by 15 days notice. There is nocross-appeal against this finding.

4. We think that in some respects the Subordinate Judge iswrong. In the first place, he says that service by registered letter throughthe post office is not a proper service of the notice to quit under Section 106of the Transfer of Property Act. We are unable to concur with him in this view.It is true that the second Clause of Section 106 says that the notice underthis section must be "tendered or delivered either personally to the partywho is intended to be bound by it, or to one of his family or servants at hisresidence or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to aconspicuous part of the property." Now, service of notice by a registeredletter through the post office is not necessarily bad, and is not necessarily anon-compliance with the provisions of the second Clause of the section. Ifthere were evidence in this case that the dak peon tendered or delivered thenotice either personally to the party, or to one of his family, or to hisservant, then we do not see that the service through the post office would not bea sufficient compliance with the provisions of the section, and in support ofthis view we would cite the case of Rajoni Bibi v. Hafisonnissa Bibi 4 C.W.N.572 in which a similar view has been taken by another Division Bench of thisCourt. In the present case the notice has evidently been served on thedefendants Nos. 1 to 3, inasmuch as the receipts for the registered lettershave been produced, signed by each of them, and although the dak peon has notbeen examined, still there Would seem no reason to doubt that the notices wereduly served under the provisions of the. But it is not necessary for us tocome to any finding on this point. It is sufficient for us to say that we donot think that the Subordinate Judge is correct in holding that service ofnotice to quit by registered letter cannot be a sufficient compliance with theprovisions of Section 106.

5. Then, the Subordinate Judge has said that there is notlegal evidence that the three copies of the notice served on the threedefendants were true copies of the notice filed on the record. We do not knowwhy the Subordinate Judge has come to this conclusion: because there isevidence on the record in the deposition of the Am-Mookhtar of the plaintiffthat the copy produced is the notice that was served on the defendants; bywhich he undoubtedly means that the notices served on them were in the sameterms as the document found on the record.

6. A third point is whether the defendants had 15 daysclear notice to quit. The pleader for the appellant maintains that underSection 106, the defendants were entitled to 15 days notice but not to 15clear days notice; and in support of this view he cites the following threeEnglish cases: Glassington v. Raulins (1803) 3 East. 406 Castle v. Burditt(1790) D. & E. 628 and Migotti v. Colvill (1879) L.R. 4 C.P.D. 233. Thelast of these is the case of a prisoner who was held entitled to be released onthe 14th day of the period of 14 days imprisonment to which he had beensentenced. The same rule is observed in this country; but we do not think thatthe case of a prisoner can throw any light on the provisions of Section 106 ofthe Transfer to Property Act. Nor do we think that the English oases cited bythe learned pleader for the appellant can assist us in any way in interpretingthe provisions of that section. In the absence of any Indian authorities to thecontrary, we must hold that the 15 days notice referred to in the sectionmeans 15 clear days, and we do not think that the terms of this section havebeen complied with by the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff served hisnotices on the defendants on the 16th Falgoon, and required them to quit theland on the 30th of the same month, so the defendants had only 14 clear daysnotice and the notice to quit is bad.

7. On this ground then we must affirm the decree of theLower Appellate Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

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Subadini vs. DurgaCharan Law and Ors. (05.06.1900 - CALHC)