1. The review petitions being Civil Review No. 11 of 2021, 46 of 2021, 49 of 2021, 50 of 2021 and 51 of 2021 are against the common order dated 20.01.2020 passed in letters patent appeal being L.P.A. No.733 of 2018 & analogous cases and further the review petitions being Civil Review No 44 of 2021 and 47 of 2021 are against the common order dated 30.06.2020 passed in letters patent appeals being L.P.A. No.423 of 2018 & 478 of 2018 respectively, whereby and whereunder, the Division Bench of this Court has disposed of the appeals in terms of the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017).

2. Further, the Civil Review being Civil Review No. 62 of 2021 is directed against the order dated 18.12.2019 passed in L.P.A. No. 431 of 2018 wherein the issue involved in this review petition is similar to that of the aforesaid Civil Review Petitions.

3. The instant review petitions, therefore, were directed to be listed together for analogous hearing.

4. Learned counsel for the parties have argued the matter by taking common point and is now being decided by the common order.

5. The ground for review in all the review petitions is that subsequent to the order passed by the letters patent appeal court, the Hon’ble Apex Court has come out with the view in the case of M/S Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vrs. Raghbendra Singh & Ors. passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).11025/2020, and has been pleased to hold that the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) is not a judgment and the reliance placed in the impugned judgment on the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vrs. Bokaro Steel Plant [Civil Appeal No.4740/2007] dated 31.03.2017 is misplaced.

Facts

6. Before considering the issue of review, it needs to refer herein the factual aspects, as per the pleading made on behalf of the appellants, before the letters patent appeal court, which reads as under: -

7. It is the case of the review petitioners that the SAIL/Bokaro Steel Management did not withhold any gratuity of its employees. The amount equivalent to gratuity was deposited as security money in lieu of retention of company's quarter beyond grace period, i.e., 2 months with normal rent in normal case and 4 months in death cases. The security amount is refunded only on vacation of retained quarter after deducting all necessary dues like penal rent, damage charges, electricity bill etc.

8. It is the further case of the review petitioners/appellants state that according to company's retention policy, the grace period of 2 months to 10 months of authorized retention rent decided by the company and beyond retention period, penal rent is charged as the occupation of quarter becomes unauthorized.

9. The respondents had given the consent for retaining security deposit (equivalent to their gratuity money) on their own will through a declaration and no unauthorized act has been committed by the appellants/the review petitioners.

10. It is the further case that the security deposit is refundable only, after vacation of retained quarter in question. As per companies' retention policy, all the dues, including penal rent, damage charges, electricity and water charges etc. are deducted from the security money deposited to the company. The Management has right to gainful utilization of the company's idle assets and all the respondents know that penal rent will be charged if quarter is not vacated beyond the period as mentioned in their respective orders.

11. The security deposit can only be refunded after vacation of the retained quarter by the respondents after deduction of dues against them i.e. penal rent and other charges too. Therefore, there is no violation of Article 14, 19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

12. The Management does not retain a gratuity of its retired employees and it was released along with all other retiral benefits. Those employees, who retain company's quarter after retirement, deposit security money to the Management on their own will and no interest is paid on the security deposit. Thereafter, the Management of appellants issued retention order as per Rules of the Company regarding retention of quarter.

13. As per retention policy, security deposit only can be refunded after deducting penal rent, electricity charges and water charges etc. after vacation of retained quarter by the respondents. The security deposit is given by retiring employees on their own will in lieu of not vacating company's quarter after operation.

14. It is the further case of the review petitioners/appellants that all the respondents have also crossed their authorized retention period for the company's quarter. They are occupying the company's quarter illegally and without any entitlement.

15. It is the further case that the Management does not withhold any gratuity amount. The superannuating employees deposit security money in lieu of quarter retention and if the respondents retained respective quarters beyond authorized retention period (mentioned in their respective retention order), they were liable to pay penal rent according to retention policy of the appellant company.

16. All the writ petitioners, thereafter, retired from the services of the appellant company. Upon application of the petitioners and their written declaration to retain the security deposit "amount equal to gratuity", the petitioners were allowed to retain quarter up to 30.11.2010 and beyond this date the petitioners have become unauthorized occupant of the company's house and are staying there without any entitlement. A notice was served to vacate the quarter, as they were occupying the quarter without any authorization. The security deposit can be released only after vacation of the retained quarter by the respondents herein/writ petitioners. After deduction of dues against them (penal rent + other charges etc.), penal rent is being recovered from the petitioners because they were occupying the house without any authorization.

The company allots quarters to the serving employees of the company and to non- BSL Agencies that are essential for the social and civil needs of the employees. The status of the respondents herein/writ petitioners are of unauthorized occupant and cannot be compared with authorized allottee.

17. The appeals have been filed both by the writ petitioners and the respondents being aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Single Judge.

18. The appeals being LPA. Nos.733 of 2018, 159 of 2018, 708 of 2018 and 490 of 2017 have been preferred by the Steel Authority of India Limited and Bokaro Steel Limited, the review petitioners herein against the respective decisions of the learned Single Judge disposing of the writ petitions on the ground that the issues now stand settled by an order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017).

19. The rest of the appeals, have been preferred by the ex- employees of the Steel Authority of India Limited/Bokaro Steel Plant against the order of dismissal of their respective writ petitions on the ground that this Court in L.P.A. No.15 of 2013 (Bokaro Steel Limited Vrs. Ram Naresh Singh & Ors.) has reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge and it was held that in view of the undertaking, the gratuity amount which was adjusted, was not required to be paid back as they did not vacate the quarters.

20. The argument had been advanced that the aforesaid issue has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others which was disposed of directing the respondents to release the gratuity amount along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of retention of the amount till the date of actual payment. But, at the same time, it has also been stated in the order that it will be open for the respondents to charge normal rent at the rate of Rs.88/- per month for the quarter/premises in question for the period for which the appellant was in occupation after his superannuation.

21. The Division Bench of this Court by taking into consideration the fact that the writ petitions of the appellants in L.P.A. Nos.271 of 2014, 417 of 2016, 427 of 2016, 428 of 2016, 429 of 2016, 430 of 2016, 432 of 2016, 561 of 2017 and 495 of 2017 were dismissed in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No.15 of 2013 and in the appeal arising out of aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given the aforesaid order, the appeals have been preferred by them.

22. Learned counsel for the Steel Authority of India Limited before the letters patent appeal court, has vehemently argued that they are not liable to pay the gratuity amount along with interest in view of the undertaking given by the concerned employees and they are also liable to recover the electricity and water usage charges but without any penal charges.

23. It is also contended that the said judgment would not be a binding precedent because the case has not been decided.

However, when learned counsel was asked to make a distinction between the cases of the appellant Steel Authority of India Limited and the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra), then it was contended that there is no distinction at all save and except that in case of Ram Naresh Singh, at the time of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the quarter was already vacated but in the present case quarters have not been vacated as yet.

24. The Division Bench of this Court, while considering the rival submission has come to the conclusion to follow the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court as given in the identical matter without any deviation.

25. Accordingly, the appeals had been disposed of in terms of the direction contained in Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as was decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

26. The Coordinate Division Bench, in consequence thereof, had directed all the private parties/employees to vacate the quarters within a period of eight weeks and they shall appear before the competent authority, i.e., Chief General Manager (Town & Administration) on 20.03.2020 and handover the keys of the vacated quarters and at the same time, the authority of the SAIL will hand- over the cheques of gratuity amount along with interest.

27. However, the authority of the SAIL would deduct the normal rent for the quarters/premises in question from the said amount for the period for which private parties/employees had remained in occupation after their respective dates of superannuation.

28. So far as the electricity charges are concerned, the authority of the SAIL would also be at liberty to deduct the same from the said amount in the same manner at the same rate in which they had deducted it in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (supra).

29. The authority of the SAIL was further directed to provide a detailed statement of interest given on the gratuity amount and deductions made, to the employees concerned at the time of handing over the cheques. Resultantly, all the appeals had been disposed of.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioners

30. The aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench of this Court is the subject matter of the present review petitions, on the following grounds:-

"(i) The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghbendra Singh has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Secretary, ONGC Limited & Anr. Vrs. V.U. Warrier, reported in (2005) SCC 245 and accordingly, the reliance as was placed in the impugned order on the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) has been held to be misplaced as it is not even a judgment but an order in the given facts of the case, therefore, the argument has been advanced that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the different appeals is fit to be reviewed.

(ii) The ground has been taken that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in letters patent appeal is contrary to the law after the order having been passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghbendra Singh, (supra) hence, the same is the fittest ground to review the order passed by the Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid appeals.

(iii) The order further needs to be reviewed, since, before the letters patent appeal court, the stand of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. was that the said judgment would not be a binding precedent because the case has not been decided but without answering the said issue of applicability of the order/judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra), the order has been passed by the Division Bench in the aforesaid appeals, subsequent thereof, when the Hon’ble Apex Court in the subsequent order rendered in the case of Raghbendra Singh(supra) has also been pleased to hold that the judgment passed in the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra) is not even a judgment but an order in the given facts of the case as such, the same is the ground for review, therefore, the present review petitions have been filed."

31. Learned counsel for the review petitioners, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the present review petitions are fit to be allowed by recalling the order passed by the Coordinate Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 18.12.2019, 20.01.2020 and 30.06.2020.

32. To buttress his argument, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the review petitioners has relied upon the following judgments: -

"(i) State of Punjab & Ors. Vrs. Surinder Kumar Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 489.

(ii) Divisional Controller, KSRTC Vrs. Mahadeva Shetty & Anr, (2003) 7 SCC 197.

(iii) Secretary, ONGC Limited & Anr. Vrs. V.U. Warrier, (2005) SCC 245.

(iv) U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. Vrs. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479.

(v) Union of India Vrs. Namit Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 359."

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondents

33. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has taken the following grounds based upon the said ground, the submission has been made that the present review petitions are fit to be dismissed.

"(i) The order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghbendra Singh(supra), is subsequent to the order/judgment passed by this Court in the letters patent appeals since the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in letters patent appeals dated 20.01.2020 which is based upon the order/judgment passed in the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra) which is dated 31.03.2017 hence, on the date when the letters patent appeal court has disposed of the appeals, the order/judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh was in a existence and that time its application was not in question.

Therefore, if the letters patent appeals have been decided directing the respondent to make payment of the gratuity after deducting the normal rent at the rate of Rs.88/- based upon the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (supra) the same cannot be fit to be reviewed merely on the ground that subsequent thereto, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the said issue by putting reliance upon the order passed in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (supra) for the reason that the subsequent order/judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court will not have any adverse effect upon the right of the parties having been adjudicated by the court of law, based upon the law as on the day, when the adjudication has been made.

(ii) So far as the power to be exercised for review by the High Court, the specific rule has been framed under the Jharkhand High Court Rules, as contained under Rule 203, whereby and whereunder, the statutory provision has been made, the parameter is to be followed in exercising the power of review."

The said rule is based upon the principle of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein, the requirement to exercise the power of review is only on the limited ground, i.e., if there is any error apparent on the face of order or the fact could not be brought on record in spite of due diligence but no such grounds have been taken by the learned counsel for the review petitioners.

34. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the reliance which has been placed on behalf of the learned counsel for the review petitioners in the judgments as referred hereinabove, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

35. In addition to the aforesaid, the respondents have also taken the plea that the case of Secretary, ONGC Limited & Anr. Vrs. V.U. Warrier (supra), is altogether on different facts, wherein, the employee in the said case was holding the post of Additional Director (Finance & Accounts) prior to his retirement and when he has retired, he was to vacate the residential quarter so as to give it to the other incumbents but due to his non-vacation, the ONGC was to make payment of house rent allowance to the extent of 30 per cent of basic pay and that was the reason for making deduction from the amount.

36. In addition to the said argument, reliance has been placed upon the learned counsel for the respondents in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362, wherein, the principle has been laid down in the matter of review.

37. On the basis of aforesaid grounds the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the grounds as raised by the review petitioners for the review of the order, cannot be said to be ground of review, rather, at best, the same will be a ground to file an appeal before the appropriate forum and as such, all these grounds as taken by the review petitioners is not fit to be considered.

Analysis

38. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and appreciated the argument advanced on their behalf.

39. The undisputed fact herein is that the ex-employees who have retired way back are claiming their amount of gratuity. All the ex- employees are retired from service and due to want of their residential accommodation has sought for permission to retain the quarter upon which the respondents, however, have agreed but by imposing condition, i.e., by retaining the amount of gratuity as also if the residential accommodation will not be vacated on or after 30.09.2010 then the penal rent will be deducted. One or the other ex-employees have not vacated the residential accommodation.

40. It is also undisputed fact that in most of the cases even though, the review petitioners have not taken recourse of the vacation of the residential accommodation by initiating the proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958.

41. The writ petitioners had filed writ petitions for issuance of direction upon the Steel Authority of India Ltd. for payment of gratuity with 18 per cent interest.

42. The learned Single Judge of this Court, after putting reliance upon the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017), has disposed of the writ petitions with a direction upon the respondent no.2, Chief General Manager (Finance & Accounts) to ensure the payment of gratuity with 6 per cent interest as ordered in the case of Ram Naresh Singh, for ready reference, the order passed by the learned Single Judge needs to be referred, which reads as under:-

“This writ petition was filed for a direction upon the respondent-Steel Authority of India Limited for payment of gratuity with 18 % interest. Another prayer in the writ petition is for quashing letter dated 01.06.2011 in respect of Qr. No.89 Sec-3B. In so far as, vacation of company’s quarter is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent-SAIL, on instruction, states that the petitioner has now vacated the aforesaid quarter. Moreover, the learned counsel for the petitioner states that he is not pressing prayer no. ii which is in relation to the company’s quarter.

In so far as, payment of gratuity to the petitioner is concerned, the issue is now settled by an order passed by the Supreme Court in “Ram Naresh Singh vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Ors.” (Civil Appeal No.4740 of 2017). In the said case the Supreme Court has ordered payment of gratuity payable to the employee, with 6 % interest from the date it became due till it was actually paid. In view of the aforesaid order passed in “Ram Naresh Singh”, the respondent no. 2-the General Manager (Finance & Accounts), Steel Authority of India Limited/Bokaro Steel Plant shall ensure payment of gratuity with 6% interest as ordered in the “Ram Naresh Singh” to the petitioner, if already not paid, within six weeks.

The writ petition stands disposed of, in the aforesaid terms.”

43. The Steel Authority of India Ltd., the review petitioners herein as also the ex-employees being aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Single Judge had preferred appeals.

44. The letters patent appeal court by taking into consideration the view taken by the learned Single Judge, wherein, after having placing the reliance of the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra), has disposed of the writ petition, hence, declined to interfere with the same by disposing of the letters patent appeals way back in the year 2020.

45. These review petitions have been filed sometime in the year, 2021 seeking review of the order passed in letters patent appeals disposed of vide order dated 18.12.2019, 20.01.2020 and 30.06.2020.

46. The reason for filing the review petitions as has been taken that the judgment since has been passed by the learned Single Judge based upon the order passed in the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra), has been held to be passed in the facts of the said case, in the case of Raghbendra Singh(supra) in the very basis of the order passed either by the learned Single Judge under writ jurisdiction or by the letters patent appeal court will be said to be non-existent and as such, the order is to be reviewed and the matter is to be heard afresh on merit.

47. On the basis of the arguments as made by learned counsel for parties, it is evident that in the instant review petitions, the core issue is that:

“Whether the subsequent judgment rendered in the case of Raghbendra Singh (supra) holding the case of Ram Naresh Singh as a judgment which has been passed on the facts of the said case, can be said a ground for review”.

48. This Court, before appreciating the aforesaid issue, is of the considered view that the scope of review is required to be considered as per the position of law, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., [AIR 1954 SC 526], particularly at paragraph-32 which reads as hereunder: -

“32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely

(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.”

49. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India (1980) Supp. SCC 562, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:

“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed:

‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.”

50. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under:

“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki17, and approved

by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:—

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

51. However, the ground has been taken that the order passed by the letters patent appeal court, has been sought to be reviewed on the basis of the subsequent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghbendra Singh (supra). However, we have already dealt with the power of review that in which case the power of review is to be exercised as per the judgment referred hereinabove but so far as the ground that as to what would be given effect of subsequent judgment in the order already been passed by the concerned Court.

52. The reference in this regard is required to be made with respect to the provision of review, as provided under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules, are required to be referred, which read as under: -

Order 47 Rule 1

“1. Application for review of judgment. — (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.”

“Explanation. —The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules

“203. Every application for review made upon the ground of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence within the meaning of Order XLVII, Rule

1 shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant or his pleader, stating in clear terms, what such new and important matter or evidence is, the effect or purport thereof and that the same, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, the order was made or the judgment was delivered.

The document, if any, relied upon shall be annexed to the application.”

53. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of the due diligence, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra).

54. It has been argued on behalf of the review petitioners that in the case of Ram Naresh Singh, the law has not been decided which is one of the grounds taken for review.

55. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the said ground can only be said to be a ground to file an appeal not a review.

56. This Court, on consideration of the provision, as made under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules, wherefrom, it is evident that the power of review is only to be exercised if there is any error apparent on the face of the order or the fact could not have been brought to the notice even in spite of the due diligence.

57. It has further been evident from Order 47 Rule 1 as has been taken note in the Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules that the ground for review would be the error apparent on the face of the order and due diligence is required to be shown.

58. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made.

59. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review.

60. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

61. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.

62. Before proceeding further, we consider it proper to mention that there was divergence of opinion among the High Courts on the question whether the subsequent contra judgment by the same or a superior court on a point of law can be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of review of an earlier judgment. In Lachhmi Narain Balu Vrs. Ghisa Bihari, [AIR 1960 Punjab 43] the learned Single Judge of the then Punjab High Court held that the court cannot review its judgment merely because in a subsequent judgment different view was expressed on the same subject-matter. In Patel Naranbhai Jinabhai v. Patel Gopaldas Venidas, [AIR 1972 Gujarat 229] the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court considered the question whether the Court can revise its view on the question of pecuniary jurisdiction simply because the same has been rendered doubtful in the light of subsequent decision of the High Court and answered the same in the negative. However, a contrary view was expressed in Pathrose Vrs. Kuttan, [AIR 1969 Ker. 186]. In that case, the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court opined that a subsequent decision authoritatively declaring the law can be made the basis for reviewing an earlier judgment.

63. The Law Commission took cognizance of these divergent opinions and suggested amendment of Order 47 and that led to insertion of the Explanation below Rule 2 of Order 47 by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976.

64. This Explanation was added on the recommendation of the Law Commission to put an end to the controversy which had arisen as regards whether a judgment could be reviewed merely on the ground that the decision on a question of law on which the same was founded has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court.

65. In Haridas Das Vrs. Usha Rani Banik , (2006) 4 SCC 78] , the Hon’ble Apex Court made a reference to the Explanation added to Order 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and has further observed that it is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.

66. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vrs. Mohd. Nayyar Khalil, (2000) 9 SCC 252, has observed that if an order following a three-Judge Bench decision is passed and at that time the three-Judge Bench decision had not been upset, even in the future or later if the Constitution Bench takes a contrary view, it would be a subsequent judgment which cannot be a ground for review in view of the Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1CPC.

67. Further, the constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J.), (2021) 3 SCC 1 has observed as under:

"2. The present review petitions have been filed against the final judgment and order dated 26-9-2018 [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar- 5 J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1] . We have perused the review petitions as well as the grounds in support thereof. In our opinion, no case for review of judgment and order dated 26-9- 2018 [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5 J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1] is made out. We hasten to add that change in the law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed."

68. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. which is pari materia to Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules, wherein, the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph-

16.1 to 16.8 which reads as under:-

“16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".

16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.”

69. Thus, the ground which is being taken that in the case of Ram Naresh Singh the fact has not been decided, the same in view of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, cannot be a ground to review, rather, the same can be a ground to prefer an appeal.

70. So far as the ground/issue of subsequent judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghewandra Singh(supra), the same can also not be a ground to review the order already passed by the letters patent appeal court, based upon the order/judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh(supra), reason being that the subsequent judgment cannot be held to be a ground to review the decision already taken by the court of law as per the judgment rendered the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal(supra) and as per the explanation under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Rule 203 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules, the relevant paragraph of this judgment has already been quoted herein above.

71. Particularly, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the said judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra) has concluded by way of gist at paragraph-16 making out parameters to exercise the power of review, as has been quoted and referred hereinabove.

72. In the aforesaid parameters, as per paragraph-16.8 of the said judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra), there is no reference to entertain the review petitions on the basis of the subsequent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

73. This Court, after taking into consideration the law laid down to exercise the power of review is of the view that the issue is to be answered against the review petitioners, accordingly, the issue is answered against the review petitioners.

74. The another ground has been taken on behalf of the review petitioners that the issue of non-applicability of the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (Supra) was also agitated before the Division Bench in L.P.A. No.733 of 2018 & analogous cases, the relevant part of the said order needs to be referred as under:-

“… …It is also contended that the said judgment would not be a binding precedent because the case has not been decided. However, when learned counsel was asked to make a distinction between the cases of the appellant Steel Authority of India Limited and the case of Ram Naresh Singh, then it was contended that there is no distinction at all save and except that in case of Ram Naresh Singh, at the time of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the quarter was already vacated but in the present case quarters have not been vacated as yet.

Thus, in our opinion, in the present appeals also this Court would be required to follow the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given in the identical matter without any deviation.

In the result, these appeals are also disposed of in terms of the direction contained in Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Bokaro Steel Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court… …”

75. The aforesaid ground of applicability or non-applicability of the order/judgment passed in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (Supra) cannot be said to be a ground for review, rather, at best the same can be a ground to prefer an appeal before the Higher Forum, reason being that once the Court has taken decision discarding the contention of the appellant before the letters patent appeal court and holding the applicability of the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (Supra), is applicable, hence, the only remedy available to the review petitioners is to prefer an appeal because the consideration of the judgment is there, but, as the ground is being taken that the said consideration is not proper, the same cannot be a ground for review, rather, it will be said to be a ground for appeal.

76. The law is well settled that a review petition, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715,. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under:

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.”

(Emphasis supplied)

77. Similarly, in S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai Kannan and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:

"15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which the controversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under:

“(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions.

(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.

(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate.

(v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.”

78. Further, in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer, (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court at para 16.5 has observed that a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

79. It is thus, evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that the review cannot be filed in disguise of an appeal.

80. If the contention of the review petitioners will be accepted, wherein, the ground has been taken as has been referred in the order sought to be reviewed that the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh (Supra) is not applicable and as per the petitioners, the same has not been decided even accepting the same, it can said to be ground to prefer an appeal and not the review.

81. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances, as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the instant review petitions lack merit.

82. In the result, the instant review petitions fail and accordingly, dismissed.

83. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.