BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J.

(1) THIS is an application at the instance of State of West Bengal represented by the Collector, Howrah, under section 5 of the limitation Act for condonation of delay of 1927 days in filing a first appeal against the order dated 23rd February, 1998 passed by the Land Acquisition tribunal, Howrah in L. A. Misc. Case No. 33 of 1987 thereby enhancing the valuation of the acquired land from Rs. 2287/- to Rs. 10,000/- per cottah.

(2) THE appellant has given the following reasons in support of the prayer for condonation of delay:

(a) The judgment impugned having been passed on 23rd February, 1998 the Government Pleader, Howrah sent the copy of the judgment without any authentication to the department of L. A. Collector on 10th March, 1998.

(b) On 7th January, 2001 on receiving the authenticated copy, a proposalwas sent for getting the certified copy from the office of the Collector,howrah to the office of the Govt. Pleader.

(c) As the concerned L. A. case was not traced out and misplaced due to shifting of office from the previous place to the present place, after thorough searching, some portion of records were ultimately traced out on 7th January, 1999 and on 27th January, 1999 order was passed for examining the L. A. case records.

(d) On 15th February, 1999 the examination report was submitted and after scrutiny, the Special Land Acquisition Officer forwarded the report for preferring the appeal to the Collector, Howrah.

(e) On 24th February, 1999 the Additional District Magistrate in charge of land acquisition passed order for sending proposal for opinion of the learned Government Pleader, Howrah,

(f) On 24th January, 2002 the learned Government Pleader, Howrah gave opinion and returned the file along with the L. A. proceedings in original which was lying in the office of G. P. , Howrah and for the above reason delay for another 760 days had taken place.

(g) On 31st January, 2001 the Additional District Magistrate (L. A.)enquired about the total financial involvement in the said L. A. proceedings.

(h) On 9th February, 2001 the total involvement of financial liability wascalculated and informed. (i) The Collector, Howrah recommended filing of appeal and on 14th february, 2001 L. A. Collector passed order to process for filing appeal.

(j) On March 1, 2001 the proforma report for appeal was prepared and sent to the Collector for approval.

(k) On 14th March, 2001 the said proforma report was approved. On 2nd april, 2001 the certified copy of the judgment of the concerned L. A. Misc. Case was made ready. On 19th April, 2001, after preparation of the brief history the proposal was put up to the Special Land Acquisition officer for approval.

(L) On 2nd April, 2001, the proposal for appeal was sent to Government of west Bengal and for this reason there was further delay of 30 days.

(m) On 24th December, 2002 the department obtained approval for preferring appeal from the higher authority and name of learned State advocate and in the process there was delay of 595 days and had refused to take up the case on personal ground.

(n) On 26th February, 2003 Land Acquisition Department again proposed to the Land Reforms Department, Govt. of West Bengal to appoint another learned State Advocate. On 30th September, 2003 Land acquisition Department obtained the learned Advocate again on 10th july, 2003 the draft memo of appeal and application of stay was prepared as per advise of learned Advocate Mr. Sridhar Panja and put up to Special Land Acquisition Officer.

(o) On 30th September, 2003 the draft was approved and made ready for typing. Ultimately, the appeal was filed on 11th November, 2003.

(3) THIS application has been seriously opposed by the claimant contending that no sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay of such a long period.

(4) MR. Sridhar Panja, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal has contended that the appeal having been preferred by the state of West Bengal, the same should be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented manner and certain amount of latitutde should be given having regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set-up involving red-tapism. In support of such contention Mr. Panja has relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme court: 1. Special Teshildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma, reported in 1996 (10) SCC 634 [LQ/SC/1996/1124] . 2. State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and Ors. , reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] ">1996 (3) SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] . 3. Radha Krishna Rai vs. Allahabad Bank and Ors. , reported in 2000 (9)SCC 733. 4. M. K. Prasad vs. P. Arumugam, reported in 2001 (6) SCC 176 [LQ/SC/2001/1555] .

(5) COLLECTOR, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji and Ors. , reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 [LQ/SC/1987/214] . 5. The aforesaid contentions of Mr. Panja have been seriously disputed by mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant and according to him the State cannot be treated as a favourite litigant. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in this case a meagre amount of three and half cottahs of lands have been acquired from his client in the year 1984 and the learned Tribunal on consideration of the various deeds involving transactions of the similar nature of land of the same locality filed before it held that at the relevant point of time the valuation of the land was Rs. 10,000/- per cottah and as such, for enhancement of a paltry amount of about Rs. 7,000/- per cottah in respect of three and half cottahs of land, there is no justification of unnecessarily harassing his clients after the lapse of six years. Mr. Bhattacharya contends that the sole object of the State is to delay the actual payment after getting the possession of the lands. In support of such contention, Mr. Bhattacharya relies upon the following decisions : 1. State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors. , reported in 1972 (1) SCC 366 [LQ/SC/1971/659] . 2. State Bank of India vs. Balito Engineering Corporation and Ors. , reported in AIR 1988 Cal 246 [LQ/CalHC/1987/238] . 3. P. K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr. , reported in AIR 1998 sc 2276 [LQ/SC/1997/1286] . 4. Vedabai Alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil vs. Shantaram Baburao patil and Ors. , reported in 2001 (9) SCC 106 [LQ/SC/2001/1449] .

(6) AFTER hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the material on records, we are of the view that in this case there was gross inaction and negligence on the part of the State respondent in preferring the present appeal. It appears from the reasons assigned by the petitioner that there was no bona fide approach in the matter of preferring appeal. No reason has been explained why the learned Government Pleader did not give his opinion in course of more than three years, and why the State has not taken early steps for expediting the opinion. Similarly, at every step huge time has been taken. Moreover, it appears from the explanation given in this application that although the Additional District Magistrate in charge of land acquisition passed order for opinion of the learned G. P. on 24th February, 1999 and according to the explanation, the learned G. P. gave opinion on 24th January, 2002, about three years thereafter, such delay was described as "more than 760 days" in the application and at the same time several other steps were taken which are irreconcilable with the statements of the application.

(7) BE that as it may, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate appearing for the claimant, the State cannot be treated as a favourite litigant. The petitioner should also bear in mind that the period of limitation prescribed by law is made for all litigants including the State of West Bengal. In this case, we are unable to find sufficient reason for condonation of such a long delay of 1927 days for a case of this nature.

(8) WE now propose to consider the cases cited by Mr. Panja.

(9) IN the case of Radha Krishna Rai vs. Allahabad Bank and Ors. (supra), the supreme Court was dealing with a case for condonation of delay in filing appeal beyond 1418 days after the expiry of period of limitation. In the said case, the appellant prayed for condonation of delay on the ground that he acted under a wrong impression given by his Counsel that the appeal was pending before the high Court whereas such no such appeal had been filed by the said Counsel. Under such circumstances, though the delay was unduly long, the cause shown by the petitioner was held to be sufficient justifying the condonation of delay. The facts of the present case are entirely different. In this case, the appellant all along was aware of the fact that the order impugned had been passed and in spite of such knowledge, took long six years in preferring the appeal. Thus, the principles laid down in the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case.

(10) IN the case of M. K. Prasad vs. P. Arumugam (supra), the Apex Court was considering a case for condonation of delay in filing application for setting aside exparte decree. In that case, the delay was of 554 days where the Advocate for the defendant had withdrawn from the case after framing of issues owing to death of his son and the applicant had no information of such fact till he received notice regarding execution proceedings. In our view, the principle adopted by the Supreme Court in the said case cannot have any application to the fact of the present case where at every stage there was inaction, gross negligence and long delay in the matter of taking steps for preferring the appeal.

(11) IN the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a case of condonation of delay at the instance of State Government. While deciding such a case, the supreme Court specifically held that the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as litigant should be accorded the same treatment and the law should be administered in an even-handed manner. There was no warrant for adopting a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In that case, the delay was only for four days and as such the Supreme Court was of the view that Court should adopt a liberal approach.

(12) IN the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Muni and Ors. (supra), the supreme Court was considering a case where there was delay of 109 days for filing a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court at the instance of State. While dealing with such a case, the Supreme Court was of the view that Court should consider the case with pragmatism injustice-oriented manner and certain amount of latitude within reasonable limits is permissible having regard to impersonal bureaucratic set-up involving red-tapism. In the case before us, the delay is of six years and as such even if we give reasonable latitude to the State appellant, such gross inaction and negligence as have been found in this case cannot be condoned.

(13) IN the case of Special Teshildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a case of condonation of delay where delay was of about two years. In such a case, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the government, it was very difficult to explain day to day delay as the transaction of business of the Government are done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. In that case, the Supreme Court, however, clearly observed that section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in the matter of limitation, the makes no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless, according to the Supreme Court, adoption of strict standard of proof in such a case leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. In our view, by taking aid of the said decision, the delay of six years without any sufficient reason cannot be condoned.

(14) WE, consequently, find that the decisions cited by Mr. Panja are of no avail to his client.

(15) WE, therefore, hold that no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay of six years in preferring the appeal. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. The appeal also stands dismissed on the ground of limitation. Both the appeal and application are, thus, disposed of.

(16) IN the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs. Joytosh Banerjee, J. : I agree. Later:

(17) LET xerox certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties within a week on compliance with requisite formalities. Appeal and application dismissed.