JUDGMENT

Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.

1. This reference has come up before this Court for taking proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act on the basis of a report dated 27.10.1998 of Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah. The District Judge, Etawah forwarded the said report to this Court on 28.10.1998. The letter of Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah reads as follows :

(Kindly email us at info@legitquest.com for this matter)

2. On the basis of the aforesaid report, Joint Registrar (C & L) submitted a note which reads as under:

REGISTRAR

Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. Chief Judicial magistrate, Etawah has made this reference for initiating contempt proceedings Under Section 15 of Contempt of Court Act 1971 against Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi, Advocate of Collectorate, Etawah.

Reference has been made on two grounds.

First it is said that on 22.8.98 Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi, Advocate on behalf of accused person was arguing in Criminal Case No. 991/94 State v. Ram Naresh Under Section 323/325/352/504 I.P.C. before the said court. During the course of cross examination Sri Raghuvanshi asked the questions in a loud voice by threatening the witness. He was asked to cross examine witness politely, but instead of following the advice of the court Sri Raghuvanshi reached on the dias of the court and attempted to snatch papers of statement from the Presiding Officer and uttered abusive language as mentioned at portion marked A in the office note dated 19.11.98. These words were recorded in the order sheet as well as in the statement. Show cause notice was issued to him under the provision of contempt of Court. But he did not submit any explanation despite the opportunity was granted to him.

The reference has been moved on the second ground with regard to Criminal case No. 204/91 State v. Asharfi Lal and Ors. Under Section 452/342/504/506 I.P.C., P.S. Bidhuna. Sri Raghuvanshi was the advocate on behalf of the accused person in that case also and was having well acquaintances with them (accused persons) as he appeared in the court of different dates on behalf of accused person. On 25.7.98 one Om Prakash S/o Sri Krishna Jatav in the fake name of Sri Ram Krishna S/o Asharfi Lal was got surrendered in the aforesand case and sent to jail as Sri Ram Krishna was wanted in that case. On information of misdeed, an enquiry was made and it came to the knowledge of the court that the surrendered accused person was Sri Om Prakash instead of Sri Ram Krishna. Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi was the advocate of accused Ram Krishna in the said case. The Presiding Officer has mentioned that Sri Raghuvanshi was the master brain for constructing fake process. On enquiry Sri Raghuvanshi has refuted about aforesaid fact while other circumstances indicated his involvement in the matter. Presiding Officer passed an order on 28.9.98 to take action against sri Raghuvanshi by referring the matter to the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council.

Sri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate has reported that committing fraud in the court came under the purview of criminal contempt on the light of decision given by Honble Supreme Court in various cases which are mentioned at portion marked B in the office note dated 19.11.98. He had further mentioned the decision of Honble Supreme Court namely Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India : [1998]2SCR795 in which Honble Supreme Court has held that the proceedings under contempt of court and proceeding before Bar Council against professional misconduct of advocates are separate. Hence Sri Jain has also referred this matter for taking action against the advocate under provisions of Contempt of Court Act. In this context Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act which defines criminal contempt is relevant to mention here.

"2 (c)" Criminal Contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which -

i) Scandalises or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or

ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.

The act and conduct of Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi which he committed on 22.8.98 and 25.7.98 have not only scandalized the court but also caused interference in the administration of justice and act committed on 22.8.98 further lowered down the authority of the court as he uttered abusive language against the court. Prima facie a case of criminal contempt is made out against Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi, Advocate.

May kindly lay the file before the Honble Acting Chief Justice for his lordships kind perusal and orders.

Sd/- Illegible (D.N. Agarwal) Joint Registrar (C & L)

3. A perusal of the above shows that the allegations are that on 22.8.1998 the contemnor Sri Vishram Singh Raghuvanshi, Advocate, was arguing in Criminal case No. 991 of 1994 (State v. Ram Naresh) and during the course of cross-examination he asked the questions in a loud voice by threatening the witness. He was asked to cross-examine the witness politely but instead of following the advice of the court Sri Raghuvanshi, the contemnor, reached at the dais of the court and attempted to snatch the papers of statements from the Presiding Officer and uttered abusive language that "Madarchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko contempt refer Kara Tatha Isi Tarah Ki Asabhya Gatiyan Dete Hue Nyayalaya Kachh Se Bahar Nikal Gaye." These words were recorded in the ordersheet as well as in the statement, A show cause notice under the Contempt of Courts Act was issued to him but he did not submit any explanation despite having been given 3 days time in this regard.

4. The second allegation against the contemnor is that he was appearing on behalf of accused persons in Crl. Case No. 204/91 (State v. Asharfi Lal and Ors.) under Sections 452/342/504/506 I.P.C., P.S. Bidhuna. He was well acquainted with the accused persons as he appeared in the court on different dates on behalf of the accused. On 25.7.98 one Om Prakash son of Sri Krishna Jatav in the fake name of Sri Ram Krishna son of Asharfi Lal was got surrendered in the aforesaid case and sent to jail as Shri Krishna was wanted in that case. An enquiry was made and it came to the knowledge of the court that surrendered person was Om Prakash and not Shri Krishna. On enquiry Sri Raghuvanshi, contemnor, has refuted about aforesaid facts while the circumstances indicated his involvement in the matter. The Presiding Officer passed an order dated 28.9.98 to take action against Sri Raghuvanshi, contemnor. This Court had framed following charges against the contemnor on 27.9.2004 :

(1) On 22.8.98 you appeared on behalf of the accused in Criminal Case No. 991 of 1994 State v. Ram Naresh under Sections 323/325/352/504 I.P.C. before the Court of Sri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. C.J.M., Etawah. During (he course of cross-examination you asked questions in a loud voice threatening the witness. When you were asked to cross-examine the witness politely you reached to the dais of the court and attempted to snatch the papers of statement from the President Officer and uttered abusive language e.g. Madarchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko contempt refer Kar. These words were recorded in the order-sheet as well as in the judgment.

(2) That on 25.7.98 you got surrendered one Om Prakash s/o Sri Krishna Jatav in the fake name of Sri Ram Krishna s/o Asharfi Lal and the said Om Prakash was sent to jail instead of Sri Ram Krishna who was really to be surrendered. In this connection an inquiry was held and the Presiding Officer has mentioned that you were the master-brain for constructing the fake process. The Presiding Officer has passed an order on 28,9.98 to take action against you and has referred the matter to the U.P. Bar Council.

5. Thereafter the case was adjourned on several dales either on the request of the counsel for the contemnor or on account of his illness or the case could not be taken up due to paucity of time. An affidavit dated 18.10.05 was filed in reply to the charges framed and in paragraph 11 it was stated that "in view of the facts and circumstances stated above, the charge No. 1 is categorically denied as based on incorrect facts. The deponent did not use any abusive language as stated in the charge. The deponent would require copies of the order-sheet as well as records for a detail reply to the said charges especially in order to enable the deponent to get Ram Naresh accused in criminal case No. 991 of 1994 summoned for establishing as to whether narration in the order-sheet/judgment regarding the deponent having used abusive language and having snatched the papers is correct or false. It was further mentioned in paragraph 12 that " charge No. 1 is based on incorrect report which has been given in retaliation to the complaint made by the deponent against Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, ACJM, IInd which fact is further fortified by the averments made in the preceding paragraph." In paragraph 13 of the affidavit charge was categorically denied and it was also stated that the "the enquiry referred to in charge No. 2 was unilateral and ex-parte enquiry, copy of which has not been given to the deponent till date and thus the deponent is not in a position to make statement regarding the said enquiry report".

6. Another affidavit dated 24.11.05 was filed by the contemnor. In paragraphs of this affidavit it was stated that the "deponent expresses his unqualified remorse for the incident giving rise to the present contempt application. The deponent tenders his unconditional apology to this Hon ble Court and to Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, the then A.C.J.M.-2, Etawah for the entire incident without any qualification or precondition. The deponent gives a solemn undertaking that no such incident would occur in future. The deponent has immense respect for this Honble Court and all other courts of law in the land." In paragraph 4 it was stated that "deponent also expresses bona fide, genuine and heartfelt regret for the occurrence which the deponent considers a blot on his professionalism."

7. We have heard Shri Bhagwati Prasad, Advocate, and the learned A.G.A. For the State.

8. We see no reason to disbelieve the facts stated by Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, II Addl. C.J.M. Etawah against the contemnor and we arc of the opinion that the facts reported are correct. These facts clearly prove that the contemnor V.S. Rabhubansh is guilty of gross criminal contempt.

9. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana : AIR1988SC1395 the Supreme Court observed that"

10. Under the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.

11. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that the power of the High Court of superintendence and control over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution includes within its ambit the duty to protect members of the subordinate judiciary.

12. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat reported in : AIR1991SC2150 the Apex Court had held The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage." (Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S.) The object and purpose of punishing contempt for interference with the administration of justice is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of the Judge or the Magistrate, but the purpose is to preserve the authority of the courts to ensure an ordered life in society.".

13. If the judiciary has to perform its function in a fair and free manner the dignity and authority of the court has to be respected by all concerned. Failing that, the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost. Since the contemnor is also an Advocate the matter has to be considered with little more seriousness. An Advocate is not merely an agent or servant of his client, he is the officer of the court. He owes a duty towards the court. There can be nothing more serious than an act of an Advocate if it tends to obstruct or prevent the administration of law or destroys the confidence of the people in such administration. In the case of N.B. Sanghvi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported in : 1991CriLJ2648a the Apex Court observed The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalize which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution. The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the presiding judicial officers with impunity. It is high time that we realize that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society. Judicial independence was not achieved overnight. Since we have inherited this concept from the British, it would not be out of place to mention the struggle strong-willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and many others had to put up with the Crown as well as the Parliament at considerable personal risk. And when a member of the profession like the appellant who should know better so lightly trifles with the much endeared concept of judicial independence to secure small gains it only betrays a lack of respect for the martyrs of judicial independence and for the institution itself. Their sacrifice would go waste if we are not jealous to protect the fair name of the judiciary from unwarranted attacks on its independence."

14. As we said, there is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the facts stated by the Presiding Officer of the court concerned against the contemnor. The same are found to be correct. Both the charges related to criminal contempt framed against him are fully established. We should say a few words more in respect of each of the charges.

15. So far as the first charge related to what he did on 22.8.1998 during the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 991 of 1994 (State v. Ram Naresh ) in the court of the presiding officer is concerned, he (contemnor) committed the grossest criminal contempt unimaginable of an Advocate. A Judge has a duty to discharge and he passes order in the manner as he thinks fit to the best of his capability under the facts and circumstances of the case before him. No litigant, far less an advocate, has any right to take the law in his own hands. The contemnor before us abused the Judge in filthymost words unworthy of mouthing by an ordinary person, what to say of a lawyer belonging to intelligentsia class. There was hardly any justification for his ascending the dais during the course of the proceedings in the manner he did and then abusing him in these words: "Maaderchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko Contempt Refer Kar." The presiding officer had simply asked him to cross-examine the witness in the witness box politely instead of asking questions in a loud and threatening voice. The presiding officer was duty-bound to ensure that the witness was not coerced resulting the truth becoming a casualty under the threat of the contemnor. Law does not permit a lawyer the liberty of causing disrespect to the court or in any manner lowering its dignity. The courts cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. He intimidated the presiding officer of the court hurling filthiest abuses and lowered the authority of his court amounting to interference with the due course of judicial proceedings, which were being conducted by him (presiding officer). By his act, he also obstructed the administration of justice. The first charge stands fully established against him.

16. The act of the contemnor to which the second charge relates, also amounts to grave criminal contempt. He got surrendered one Om Prakash son of Sri Krishna Jatav in the fake name of Ram Krishna son of Asharfl Lal on 25.7.1998 in the court of the presiding officer concerned. The said fake person Om Prakash was sent to jail instead of Ram Krishan, who in fact, was to surrender. In this connection, even an inquiry was held and it came to surface that the contemnor was the master brain for this fake process. The contemnor was conducting the case of the accused persons right from the beginning in criminal case in question. Criminal Case No. 204 of 1991 (State v. Asharfi Lal and Ors.) menaing thereby that he was well acquainted with them as he appeared in his court on their behalf on different dates. It was he who had initially got the accused persons bailed out. Subsequently because of non appearance of the accused Ram Krishna in the court, non-bailable warrant was issued against him. It was in this background that the contemnor got surrendered a fake person. By his this act, the contemnor blackened the nobility of the profession of advocacy and interfered and obstructed the administration of justice by polluting the courts proceedings. Thus, the second charge is also clinchingly proved against him.

17. While concluding, we should say that the charges of criminal contempt like the present one established against a practicing lawyer cannot be taken lightly. No system of justice can tolerate such ignoble act and conduct of a practicing lawyer. The pertinent question would be as to what punishment we should award to the contemnor Vishram Singh Raghubansi, Advocate. In the case of Preetam Pal v. High Court M.P. (1993) 1 SCC 529, the Supreme Court ruled as under:

To punish an advocate for contempt of court, no doubt must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the courts from being deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the court, though painful to punish the contemnor in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt if his act or conduct in relation to court or court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice.

18. In the present case, we are of the firm opinion that the apology tendered by the contemnor is not at all bona fide or genuine. The charges were framed against him as back as on 27th September, 2004. In his first affidavit dated 18th October, 2005 he denied the allegations. In the second affidavit dated 24th November, 2005 he has made a show of tendering apology. This apology is coming forth after he scented that his adventure has turned to be misadventure. It is well settled principle that apology is not a weapon to purge the guilt of a contemnor. The apology must be sought at the earliest opportunity. The apology tendered by the contemnor is at a very belated stage to escape the punishment for the grossest criminal contempt committed by him. The apology so offered by him cannot be allowed to be employed as a device to escape the rigour of law. Therefore, we do not accept the apology of the contemnor. Instead, we allow the reference and find the contemnor Vishram Singh Raghubansi, Advocate to be guilty of criminal contempt on both the charges. We convict him accordingly under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentence him to suffer simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-. In default of payment of fine, he shall suffer further simple imprisonment of one month. However, the punishment so imposed shall be kept in abeyance for a period of sixty days to enable him to approach the Supreme Court, if so advised.

19. The contemnor Vishram Singh Raghubansi, Advocate, Collectorate, Etawah shall be taken into custody to serve out the sentence immediately after the expiry of sixty days if no stay order is passed by the Supreme court in the meantime.

20. Let the matter come up before this Court on 2nd August, 2006 for ensuring compliance.