1. In this appeal, the State of Punjab has questioned judgment dated 25.05.2001 of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby he dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of Additional District Judge, Patiala (hereinafter referred to as the lower appellate Court) confirming the decree passed by Subordinate Judge, Class-III, Patiala (hereinafter described as, `the trial Court) in a suit for declaration and possession filed by the respondent.

2. By Notification dated 30.09.1955 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, `the Act), the Government of Punjab proposed the acquisition of 33 bighas and 8 biswas land comprised in Khasra Nos.17, 20, 42, 146 and 147 situated in village Lehal, Tehsil and District Patiala, Punjab for construction of Teachers Training Institute (for short, `the Institute). Declaration under Section 6 was issued on 30.11.1955. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officers passed two awards dated 06.10.1956 and 22.08.1960. The State Government took possession of the acquired land from its owner Sunder Singh son of Fatta in October, 1956 and constructed the building of the Institute.

3. After almost 13 years of the issue of notification under Section 4 and over 12 years and 6 months of the issue of notification under Section 6, respondent Amarjit Singh filed suit for declaration and possession by asserting that by virtue of Will Exhibit P1 executed by Sunder Singh, he had become owner of the land. He pleaded that the acquisition was made without following the procedure prescribed under the Act and the awards were passed by an officer who was not authorised to do so.

4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant, the following preliminary objections were taken:

1. That the suit is not within time.

2. That the proceedings had already been taken under the Land Acquisition Act and the award given and payments also made, hence, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Land Acquisition Act.

3. That the matter in dispute is not justiciable.

4. That the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit.

5. That no notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was served on the defendant.

6. That the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit.

5. In the replication filed by him, the respondent averred that the suit is within limitation because the same was filed within 12 years from the date of taking possession.

6. In the light of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:

"1. Whether the suit is within time

2. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file this suit

3. Whether the valid notice u/s 80 C.P.C. was served upon the defendant

4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from bringing this suit

5. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try this suit

6. Whether the matter involved in the suit is not justiciable

7. Whether the acquisition proceedings regarding the suit land are invalid, illegal, if so, what is its effect

8. Relief."

7. After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the trial Court held that Notifications dated 30.09.1955 and 30.11.1955 were legal and did not suffer from any infirmity. The trial Court rejected the appellants objection to the locus of the respondent by observing that he had acquired right in the property by virtue of the Will executed by Sunder Singh. The trial Court also held that the plaintiff cannot be non suited on the ground of having accepted the compensation by observing that he had done so under protest.

8. While examining the respondents challenge to the legality of the awards, the trial Court referred to notification dated 14.6.1957 issued by the State Government under Section 3(c) of the Act whereby Shri Mohan Lal Dewan was authorised to exercise the power of the Collector and held that the said notification cannot be relied upon for justifying the making of award dated 6.10.1956 by the officer. The trial Court further held that the second award dated 22.8.1960 passed by Shri M.L.Mongia was not valid because he had not been vested with power of the Collector under Section 3(c). The appellants plea that the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit was rejected by the trial Court by observing that when the awards have been passed in violation of the statutory provisions, the acquisition proceedings will be deemed to be illegal and void and the Civil Court is competent to grant a declaration to that effect. The issue of limitation was decided by the trial Court in favour of the respondent by relying upon Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

9. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the lower appellate Court, which agreed with the trial Court that the Land Acquisition Officers, who passed the award were not authorised to do so. The lower appellate Court also relied upon Article 65 of the Limitation Act and held that the suit was within limitation. The second appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, who also agreed with the trial Court that the suit filed by the respondent was within limitation and that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain challenge to the acquisition proceedings and the awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officers.

10. The appellant unsuccessfully sought review of the judgment of the learned Single Judge inasmuch as the application filed by it under Order 47 Rule 1 was dismissed as barred by limitation because explanation given in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay was not found satisfactory.

11. Initially, the special leave petition was filed only against order dated 07.07.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge in Review Application No.31-C/2003, but having realised that without challenging dismissal of Regular Second Appeal No. 1989 of 1980, it will not be in a position to persuade this Court to set aside the decree passed by the trial Court, the appellant applied for amendment of the special leave petition and prayed for setting aside judgement dated 25.5.2001 vide which the learned Single Judge dismissed the second appeal. By an order dated 07.11.2005, the Court condoned the delay and granted leave for amendment of the memo of special leave petition.

12. We have heard Shri J.L. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned counsel for the respondent and carefully perused the record.

13. The question whether the Civil Court can entertain a suit involving challenge to the acquisition of land under the Act is no longer res integra and must be answered in favour of the appellant.

14. In State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229 [LQ/SC/1995/585] , the two-Judge Bench, which was perhaps not sure whether it should make a declaration that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in such matters, proceeded to observe:

"The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive.

Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11A now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable."

(emphasis supplied)

15. However, the legal position was made crystal clear in Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia (1996) 7 SCC 218 [LQ/SC/1995/1082] . In that case, the appellant challenged the legality of the acquisition proceedings and the award by filing a civil suit. The trial Court upheld the objection raised by the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court approved the same. Before this Court, it was argued that the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. While rejecting the argument, this Court observed:

".......It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure contemplated under the Act is a special procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act are required to be published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the land mentioned therein. The award should be made under Section 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the Act. If the Government intends to withdraw from the acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to. If possession is taken, it stands vested under Section 16 in the State with absolute title free from all encumbrances and the Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition.

It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts viz. the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power.Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court."

(emphasis supplied)

16. The same question was again considered in Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 SCC 336 [LQ/SC/2006/925] . The facts of that case were that the respondent had filed suit in the Court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and from demolishing the existing structure. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the High Court remitted the matter to the trial Court with liberty to the plaintiff-respondent to apply for amendment of the plaint. After remand, the respondent amended the plaint and prayed that he may be declared as owner of the suit property and a decree for possession be passed in his favour. The trial Court granted leave to the respondent to amend the plaint. The parties did not adduce any further evidence. The trial Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia (supra) and held that validity or otherwise of the acquisition proceedings cannot be questioned before the Civil Court. The High Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and ruled that the acquisition proceedings were invalid. This Court referred to the two earlier judgments and held that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

"It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the plaint scheduled property is not covered by the notification issued under Section 17 of the Act. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute that the land regarding which the suits have been filed is covered by the notification. The main ground on which the suits have been filed is that the notice as required by sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are claiming title to the property and are seeking the relief of possession on the ground that the notification has been rendered invalid on account of non-service of notice upon them under sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act. The plaintiffs are clearly assailing the validity of the acquisition proceedings. It is not their case that the plaint scheduled property is outside the purview of the land regarding which the notification under Section 17 had been issued. The ground for assailing the notification, namely, that notice under sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs and its effect could only be examined in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and not by the civil court. The judgments and decrees passed by the High Court are, therefore, clearly illegal and have to be set aside."

17. In view of the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, we hold that the trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the lower appellate Court and the High Court committed serious error by confirming the decree passed in favour of the respondent.

18. We are also convinced that the suit filed by the respondent on 25.06.1968 was barred by time and all the Courts committed a serious error by relying upon Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for recording a contrary finding. That article is applicable only to the suits for possession of immovable property or any interest based on title and not to a case where legality of the acquisition proceedings is challenged.

19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment as also the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court are set aside and the suit filed by the respondent is dismissed. The order passed in the review petition is also set aside. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

20. While disposing of the appeal in the manner indicated above, we make it clear that if the respondent had deposited the amount of compensation, the competent authority shall repay the amount to him within a period of three months.