Special leave granted.
This is an appeal by the State of Punjab against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 12-8-1999 passed in RSA No. 3454 of 1998 affirming the judgment of the District Judge dated 6-8-1998. The learned District Judge reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit filed by the respondent seeking to set aside the order of discharge dated 4-9-1992 passed by the competent authority and directed the reinstatement with all benefits. The question is whether the impugned order of discharge dated 4-9-1992 is bad in law.
The impugned order dated 4-9-1992 was passed by the competent authority. It reads as follows :
"It has been reported to me by In-charge of PTC, Ladha Kofthi, Sangrur, Inspector Joginder Singh, RI Police Lines, Faridkot and Inspector Sadhu Ram, PS City Kot Kapura that the act and conduct of Const. Bhagwan Singh, No. 1819/Fdkt. on the whole is not satisfactory and he is unlikely to become a good police officer. I am also satisfied with their reports. I, Jasminder Singh, IPS, SSP/Faridkot being competent authority do hereby discharge Const. Bhagwan Singh, No. 1819/Fdk. from service w.e.f. today i.e. 4-9-1992 A.N. under PPR 12.21 as he is found to be unlikely to prove a good police officer." *
This aforesaid order to the extent it stated that the officer was unlikely to prove a good police officer, was in terms of the relevant Rule 12.21 applicable to the respondent. In our view, when a probationer is discharged during the period of probation and if for the purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work is to be made, and the authorities referred to such an assessment of his work, while passing the order of discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma.
The other sentence in the impugned order is, that the performance of the officer on the whole was "not satisfactory". Even that does not amount to any stigma.
Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the reference in the impugned order to the reports of the Inspectors on the basis of which the above assessment was made, would itself amount to stigma. This again cannot be accepted. The said reference has also become necessary because the respondent was working under the said officers and it was their assessment that was referred to and that was the source for the opinion expressed by the competent authority to discharge the respondent. The learned District Judge and the High Court were, therefore in error in treating that the removal order caused stigma.
It was further contended that the reporting officers when examined in court, denied having given such reports. By the date of evidence, they had retired. The learned District Judge acted in a perverse manner in relying upon the evidence of such witnesses who while they were in service reported as mentioned in the impugned order but who after retirement, denied having given such reports.
For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the High Court and of the District Judge are set aside and the order of the trial court is restored and the order of discharge is held valid.
The appeal stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.