C.T. DIGHE, J.

These two Revision Applications have been preferred by the State of Maharashtra, against the Order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 17th Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, discharging the accused. A common judgment has been written by the learned Magistrate, and the Revision Applications can also be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The respondents in both the Revision Applications are the same. The 8th respondent is a firm of Messrs. Jethalal Nemchand and the other seven respondents the partners of that firm. Food Inspector Bhojraj visited this firm on 9-1-1973 at about 3 p.m. and purchased four samples of chilly seeds of different varieties. The two Revision Applications arise out of two samples : one of chilly seeds (Ghati) and the other chilly seeds (Punjab), collected for the purpose of analysis. The report of the Public Analyst, Exhibit F in the Court below, shows that on visual examination, living weevils and living larvae were present in the samples, and as such the Public Analyst expressed opinion that the samples were adulterated under section 2(i)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution the respondents were proceeded against. Before framing of the charge, Food Inspector Rajbhoj examined himself and produced the documents on record. At that stage, Assistant Police Prosecutor closed his evidence before the charge. Subsequently, the matter were kept for arguing whether the charge be framed and the learned Magistrate by writing the impugned judgment, came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient material to frame a charge. Consequently, the accused came to be discharged.

3. Aggrieved by that decision, the State has come in revision. According to Mr. Deshmukh for the revision petitioner, the learned Magistrate has assumed a proposition that a charge ought not to be framed unless there is certainly of conviction. There is an error in that reasoning and since there was some prima facie material, the charge ought to have been framed although after the fuller trial, the accused may come to be acquitted. A reading of the judgment would show that the learned Magistrate was influenced by the argument that the accused were not dealing in chilly seeds as such, and hence no prosecution could have been filed against them for sale of the chilly seeds. He also approved the argument that if living weevils and living larvae were visually seen, they ought to have been seen by the Food Inspector at the time the sample was collected, and, in much as no such reference is made by the Food Inspector either in his deposition or in any of the documents prepared by him that cannot be taken as satisfactory evidence to prove the guilt. The learned Magistrate has also approved the argument that Rules 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, were not complied with.

4. Apart from the certificate of the Public Analyst, we have on record Exh. B. receipt in Form No. 6 showing that the Food Inspector took the samples for analysis. Exh. X are the copies of Form No. 7 prescribed under Rule 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules calculated to show that the samples collected were sent to the public Analyst. Behind these forms there appears a signature of a person connected with the Municipal Laboratory. Exh. C. are two cash Memos given in favour of the Food Inspector, showing that 600 grams of each sample was sold by the firm of the 8th respondent to the Food Inspector at a price noted therein. There is also Exh. I on record, a document which seems to have been prepared by a partner of the 8th respondent in the presence of a third party showing that the two samples were given over to the Food Inspector at his demand and request, and that the shop-keeper was asked to empty the bags of chilly and after emptying them, lose seeds alone came to be collected for the purpose of sampling. Food Inspector Rajbhoj has also signed this document.

5. In addition to the documents referred to above and the complaint filed by the Food Inspector, we have the, evidence of Food Inspector Rajbhoj given on oath. He speaks of his visit to the shop and his collecting the samples of 600 grams of each variety of chilly seeds. He has also spoken of his dividing the samples and observing the necessary requirements of packing, labelling and sealing etc. In his cross-examination, it is taken out that in the complaint he has referred only to the presence of accused No. 1 in the shop at the time of his visit and that in the diary he is required to maintain, there is no reference to other partners having been present, although he so stated in his Examination-in-Chief. It is also elicited in cross-examination that the firm deals in whole chillies in packed bags whole-sale. He denies the contents of Exh. I as being true and adds that Exh. I was given after the sampling was over. The cross-examination reveals that entries were made in the register showing the collection of samples. But there is no entry showing the date of despatch of the samples. It is the case of the Food Inspector that he had personally gone to the Public Analyst for delivering the sample copy of Form No. 7. He denies the suggestion that the samples produced in the Court and samples sent to the Public Analyst are not the samples taken from the accused.

6. This was all the evidence before the learned Magistrate while passing the order of discharge. Since the prosecution had closed its case, it could not now lie in the mouth of the prosecution to suggest that some other evidence was available which would show that the framing of the charge was essential. That has to be appreciated only on the evidence that was led before the learned Magistrate. Mr. Deshmukh for the State contended that it is not necessary for the prosecution to show at the stage of framing a charge that there is certainty of conviction. That contention is valid, but we must also discuss the question whether the framing of a charge is proper if there is certainty of acquittal. The answer would be in the negative.

7. This was a warrant case, and the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate falls under section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Upon taking of the evidence i.e. the evidence so far referred to, if the Magistrate, considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. In other words, if the evidence led, points out a possibility of conviction, there should be no discharged. Section 245(2) empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.

8. Mr. Ganatra, the learned Counsel for the respondents, invited my attention to the ruling reported in (Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545 where, in connection with section 251(2), i.e., in relation to a summons case, some useful observations regarding the stage of discharge have been made. In paragraph 16, there are the following observations :---

"The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does not substantially affect the persons liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge, merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charge is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."

9. These principles will have to be born in mind for finding out whether the order of discharge was properly passed by the learned trial Magistrate.

10. Mr. Ganatra, while supporting the Order passed by the learned Magistrate, makes out almost the same grounds. According to him, since his clients were not storing chilly seeds for sale, the Food Inspector had no power to collect the sample of chilly seeds. Giving of the samples does not amount to a sale, so that the prosecution should not at all have been launched. He contends that if it was permissible for him to come to the Court even before the trial opened in the Court of the magistrate asking for quashing of the proceedings, abortion the order of discharge is justified. He further contends that the article collected from the respondents is not an Article of food, and therefore not covered by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Even otherwise, he has a case that the prosecution has not made out any prima facie case, and hence, the learned Magistrate was right in discharging the accused. For this purpose, he relies upon the absence of any reference to the living weevils and living larvae at the time of collection of the samples and he also addressed the Court on the alleged defective certificate of the Public Analyst, upon which, according to him, no conviction could have been based. In fact, he further says that, the Food Inspector has intentionally and maliciously collected the samples and he is guilty of the offence laid down under section 10(9)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, so that it would be necessary to sanction a prosecution against him.

11. Adverting to the question whether collection of the samples of chilly seeds from the shop of the respondents was a proper exercise of the powers conferred on the Food Inspector, we must bear in mind the cross-examination of the Food Inspector Rajbhoj, which shows that the present respondents are whole sale dealers in chillies and they are sold in packed bags. The inference which is sought to be drawn is that the chilly seeds as such are neither stocked nor sold in any quantity. It is said that it was only at the instance of the Food Inspector Rajbhoj and fearing that in case the samples were not supplied as asked by him, the respondents would be exposed to a criminal action, that the chilly seeds were given over to the Food Inspector. According to the defence, chilly seeds as such, were not collected in any one place. The packed bags were emptied as per the directions of the Food Inspector and the chilly seeds which probably had gone to the bottom of the bag, came to the top of the heap when it was stored on the floor. 600 grams from among those seeds were given over to the Food Inspector.

12. The witness Rajbhoj, in his Examination-in-Chief does not speak of this method or manner of collecting the chilly seeds. May be, he would like to deny that the sample was collected in this manner. But there are two documents, which the Court, even at the stage of passing the order for framing charge would necessarily have to take into account, and those are the cash memo Exh. "C" and writing Exh. "I". Although the Food Inspector is interested in denying the manner in which the seeds came to be possessed, the two cash memos in respect of the two samples in question unmistakably show that a packed bag of chilly whose was made up side down and chilly seeds were picked up. The Food Inspector has supplied this cash memo. Mr. Deshmukh for the State commented that he has never come across such cash memos. The normal function of a cash memo is to show that articles sold and the price paid. He may be right. The other writing describing the method of collection may not strictly be a part of the cash memo but the importance of it lies in the marker doing that writing just at the time the seed was collected. It is a writing contemporaneous to the transaction and is a highly useful statement, which cannot be brushed aside unless something was coming against it on oath from the Food Inspector Rajbhoj. When he produced the same, he has observed complete silence regarding the truthfulness of the contents. Had he said something about this writing having been made against his wish or contended it as not being truthful, the Court could have been concerned to weigh the merits of the claim of the prosecution and the defence. Here, not only that no such case was made by the Food Inspector at the time he produced the cash memo, but we find that the cash memos are authenticated by the Food Inspector by putting his signature on it, suggestion thereby that at the time he received these memos, he was aware of the writing made. The obvious purpose of that writing could not have been missed by him, and therefore, if the writing was untruthful, he could have, and ought to have made efforts to impress the Court of the facility of the contents.

13. In addition, we also find the document Exh. "I" something like a letter-written to the Food Inspector, showing that the chilly seeds, were given to the Food Inspector making the bags upside down for the purpose of collecting the chilly seeds as directed by the Food Inspector. It is a writing signed by a third person and it also bears the signature of the Food Inspector. In other words, on behalf of the respondents consistent efforts were made to show that, as a matter of fact, selling of chilly seeds was unknown to them, but they were driven to it in the circumstances appearing in the cash memos as well as in Exh. "I". If the learned Magistrate had learned over these documents in arriving at his conclusion, I do not think any fault could be found with him.

14. On the basis of these facts, we can usefully go to the judgment, reported in (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon etc.)2, A.I.R. 1876 S.C. 621 where it is laid down that the expression "store" in section 7 means "storing or sale", and consequently storing of an adulterated Article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Observations in paragraph 14 of the judgment are relevant, which are as follows :---

"From a conjoint reading of the above referred provisions, it will be clear that the broad scheme of the Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale, or import, manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated Article of food. The terms "store" and "distribute" take their colour from the context and the collection of words in which they occur in sections 7 and 16. "Storage" or "distribution" of an adulterated Article of food for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within the mischief of this section. That this is the right construction of the terms "store" and "distribute" in section 16(1) will be further clear from a reference to section 10. Under that section, the Food Inspector, whom the act assigns a pivotal position for the enforcement of its provisions, is authorised to take samples of an Article of food only from particular persons indulging in a specified course of business activity. The immediate or ultimate end of such activity is the sale of an Article of food. The section does not give a blanket power to the Food Inspector to take sample of an Article of food from a person who is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of sub-section (1)(a) or sub-section (2). The three sub-clauses of sub-section (1)(a) apply only to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential, of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed for sale. It follows that if an article of food is not intended for sale and is in the possession of a person who does not fulfil the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or store for sale such as in referred in sub-sections (1)(a) and (2) of the section, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In short, the expression "store" in section 7 means "storing for sale", and consequently storing of an adulterated Article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16(1)(a).

All these observations would show that mere existence of the impugned Article could not be taken as storing for sale. If that is so, the Food Inspector is not empowered to take samples of such an Article and consequently although the receipt etc. may have been passed, it does not amount to any transaction of sale.

15. I have occasion to consider this judgment of the Supreme Court in relation to the previous judgment of the Supreme Court, (The Food Inspector, Calcicut Corporation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and another)3, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1925 while deciding (Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 1976 on 27th of June, 1977)4. Observations therein that the sale of a sample of a food Article to Food Inspector for analysis amounts to a sale within the meaning of the Act, would have to be understood on the background of a valid and taking of the samples, so that where the Food Inspector is not empowered to exercise his powers, the ratio of Calicut Corporations judgment would not apply.

16. On the evidence discussed, it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate was wrong in coming to the conclusion that chilly seeds as such were not stored by the respondents. In fact, there is nothing on record to show that any such quantity of seeds alone was kept apart. When the Food Inspector insisted upon having a sample of chilly seeds alone that was given by separating them from whole chillies stored in a bag. It can legitimately be said therefore, that chilly seeds was not an article stored for sale. The Food Inspectors was not authorised to take a sample of the same and that the transaction does not amount to sale. This out at the very root of the prosecution and if considering the impact of this deduction, the order of discharge is passed, it cannot be said that it is passed in improper exercise of the power vested in the learned Magistrate.

17. When the Order of discharge can there by substantiated, really we need not go to the other points. Since, however, elaborate arguments have been made, I would like to indicate my views on those points also.

18. It was said by Mr. Ganatra for the respondents that chilly seeds was not an article of food and the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are, therefore, not attracted. For this purpose, he invited my attention to some of the provisions in Annexure B of Food Adulteration Rules and the normal practice of traders. According to him, no merchant keeps chilly seeds as such for sale for human consumption and that the case of selling chilly seeds for the purposes of agricultural operations is a different transaction covered by a different Act. Rightly, we will not be concerned with such a transaction. We are, however, to examine the argument whether chilly seeds as such are outside the scope of the Act.

19. My attention was invited to Rule A-05 in Appendix B which speaks of the standards necessary in the commodities listed under the title "Spices and Condiments", Sub-Item A.05.05 of the Rule A.05 refers to chillies specifying the ingredients thereof. Item A.05.05.01 refers to chillies power. Now, these Items are contrasted with Item A.05.03, which relates to Cardamom whole, Item A.05.03.01 which refers to Cardamom seeds, and Item A.05.03.02 which refers to Cardamom powder. The argument of Mr. Ganatra is that whenever the legislature wanted the seeds also to be looked upon as a particular food item as in the case of Cardamom, it has been separately referred to. But the same is not the case with chilly seeds, and, therefore, it is not an Article of food. Now it can be said with some force, that although chilly seeds has no standard laid down, for that reason alone it could not be looked upon as an Article of food. Otherwise it becomes an Article which by its very nature and existence is unfit for human consumption.

20. Much will therefore, depend upon understanding the exact meaning of the word "Food", as defined in section 2(v), which definition includes any Article for human consumption ordinarily entering into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food, including even any flavouring matter or condiment. Simply because chilly seeds alone are not sold by merchants for human consumption, it cannot be said that it is not an Article of food. More so, when chilly seeds in one form or the other are used in preparation of food. Without, therefore, giving a finding, I would like to indicate my declaration in accepting the case made out by Mr. Ganatra on his aspect.

21. Mr. Ganatra has an alternative case that even on the evidence led there was no prima facie case for framing a charge. He has a two fold argument (1) attacking the contents of the report of the Public Analyst on the basis of the circumstances and (2) attacking the certificate which is said to be defective and hence not sufficient for pronouncing a conviction.

22. To refer to the first limb of this argument, the Certificate Exh. F in respect of both the samples with which we are concerned, showed that on visual examination, living weevils and living larvae were present. The sample was collected on 9-1-1973. The report was made on 21-2-73 i.e. one month twelve days thereafter. Mr. Ganatra rightly urges that there must be evidence to show that these insects were present on the date the sample was taken. He contents that if living weevils and living larvae were visible to the naked eye of the analyst, the Food Inspector who collected the sample on 9-1-1973, ought to have also seen them and inasmuch as he has made no such note, the report would be insufficient to hold that such insects were present when the sample was collected. He invited my attention to section 9, speaking of the qualifications of the Food Inspector, and Rule 8 speaking of the training of such Inspector. According to him, therefore, such a trained person could not have failed to note that on visual examination there were insects. Now, the argument proceeds ignoring the change that could have taken place during the time the sample was collected, and it was examined. When the sample was taken no preservatives were added. The contention of the learned Government Pleader that the insects may have been there on 9-1-1973 and may have grown up and become visually detectable on 21-2-1973, could therefore, be understood. However, the point could not be concluded on such an assumption. It would be the duty of the prosecution to show that as a matter of fact on 9-1-73 also the said insects were present in some form but the report of the Public Analyst is silent on that aspect. If that is so, and if the learned Magistrate has come to the conclusion that on this ground, no prima facie case is made out, it is difficult to say that he has made an error.

23. As regards the second limb of argument, Mr. Ganatra also invited my attention to section 2(i)(f). It is true that the certificate does not mention in so many words that the Article was found unfit for human consumption. In the opinion given by the Public Analyst, he says that the Article was found adulterated under section 2(i)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. We, are therefore, required to assume that the Analyst implies that the article was unfit for human consumption. On authority however, we can say that the mere presence of some insects may not render the article unfit for human consumption. In other words, the certificate as it stands, does not indicate the nature and extent of the insect found and its connection with the unfitness for human consumption. It appears a stereo typed way in which the Analyst has certified the adulteration under section 2(i)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

24. A glance at the ruling reported in (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal)5, would show that the words insect infested has to be understood as showing that the insects were found in a swarm or were in very large quantity. The relevant observations would be found at page 396, which are as follows :---

"The expression insect-infested is to be construed in the context of an article of food meant for human consumption. It takes its hue from the phrase unfit for human consumption occurring at the end of the sub-clause. Thus construed, it means that the article so abounds in insects, dead or living, that it is rendered unfit for human consumption. We need not labour the point further. It has been lucidly brought out by Jagjit Singh, J. who spoke for the Bench of the high Court in Dhanrais case (supra) at page 668 of the Report I.L.R. 1970(2) Delhi 68 : 1973 Cri.L.J. 433 at p. 437. We fully approve that reasoning and would extract it here :

The expression insect-infested was not defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and has, therefore, to be given its ordinary meaning. The word infest appears to have been derived from the Latin word infestate which meant to assail or molest. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Volume V at page 259) the word infest means To attack, assail, annony, or trouble (a person or thing) in a persistent manner, "to visit persistently or in large number for purpose of restriction or plunder", "to swarm in or about, so as to be trouble-some". In the same Dictionary the word "infestation" is stated to mean" : "The action of infesting, assailing, harassing, or persistentantly molesting". It is also mentioned that the word is now used especially for insects which attack plants, grain etc. in large swarms. "Thus an article of food would be" insect-infested", if it has been attacked by insects in swarms or numbers. It however, seems to us that there is no instification for the view that insect-infestation would only continue so long as the insects continue to be alive. If an article of food is attached by insects in large swarms or numbers and for some reason these insects die, the mere fact that the article of food has no longer living insects but has dead insects will not change its character of being insect-infected."

25. If that is so, the certificate in our case not indicating anything about the number of insects could be looked upon as defective.

26. Mr. Deshmukh for the State argued that this aspect could very well be decided at the final stage and when the charge is to be framed, it would not be relevant to consider this point. The matter has to be appreciated for deciding whether the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate is wrong. On this background, the impact of the above cited decision, in my opinion, would be necessary to be considered so that in case ultimately there is no likelihood of conviction, there would be no necessity to set aside the order of discharge.

27. One more point urged by Mr. Ganatra in this Revision Application is the non-compliance of Rules 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The learned Magistrate has accepted the contention. To speak shortly, a glance at Exhibit X would show that the samples appear to have reached the laboratory. On the back side of Form 7, there is the signature of the person receiving it. The Food Inspector on oath says that he had personally taken the samples. Reasonably construing therefore, that the signature on the reverse is in taken of acceptance of what is mentioned on the other side of Form No. 7. We can conclude that the sample reached the laboratory. If this is so Rule 17 seems to have been complied with. The question raised however, is that Rule 18 is not complied with. Rule 18 relates to sending of the copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet to the Public Analyst, and its importance can be judged by looking to Rule 7, where a duly is cast on the Public Analyst to compare the seal. It is not disputed that Rule 18 and Rule 7 are also mandatory like Rule 17. Now, prima facie, there is no evidence showing complain with Rule 17. The learned Government Pleader says that the case is different because the Food Inspector personally took the samples to the Analyst and as such there need not be specific compliance with Rule 18. For this purpose, he relied upon the judgment in (Criminal Revision Application No. 685 of 1974 with Criminal Revision Application No. 685 of 1974, decided on 8th April, 1975, by Justice Chandurkar)6. In that case a sample was taken personally by the Food Inspector to the Analyst. Page 14 of this judgment contains observation supporting the stand taken by Mr. Deshmukh for the State. The relevant extract is as follows :---

"There is nothing in Rule 17 or Rule 18 to prevent the Food Inspector from himself taking the sample to the Public Analyst along with the specimen seal. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the conviction is vitiated because of non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Rule 18."

Mr. Ganatra, however, distinguishes this case. He says that the learned Judge has observed in the case cited that there was no suggestion of tampering at the hands of the Food Inspector. But in this case, he had put a question in cross-examination, suggesting that the samples taken to the Analyst were not the samples collected from the shop of the respondents, and therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to speak about the identity. Again, it is said that although, as in that case, the Food Inspector speaks of his observing Rule 18 while giving statement on oath, he has not produced the office copy of correspondence showing he observance of Rule 18. Apart from that, he also reliefs upon the mandatory character of Rule 7 and argues that in the absence of evidence showing that the document referred to in Rule 18 were sent to the Public Analyst, inspite of the Food Inspector personally taking the samples to the Laboratory, that would not be considered satisfactory compliance with Rule 7. There is much substance in these contentions. When the learned Magistrate, on the evidence, has observed that the Rules were not complied with, atleast so far as Rule 18 is concerned, his finding does not look erroneous.

28. That being my finding, I feel, the two Revision Application preferred by the State cannot be allowed. There is, however, a further point pressed for decision, by Mr. Ganatra, he prays to proceed against the Food Inspector Rajbhoj for filing such a compliant. According to the submission of Mr. Ganatra, firstly, the Food Inspector ought to have known that he could not collect the sample of articles which were not stored for sale, and secondly, certain statements made by him reveal his real desire to speak against the respondents even at the cost of truth.

29. Now, the section applicable would be section 10, and the provision for proceeding against the Food Inspector is seen in sub-section 9 of that section. Together with the (proviso) (a) and (b), sub-section (9) of section 10, runs as follows :

"10(9) Any Food Inspector exercising powers under this Act or under the Rules made thereunder who--

(a) Vexatiously an without any reasonable grounds of suspicion seize any article of food; or

(b) commits any other Act to the injury of any person without having reason to believe that such Act is necessary for the execution of his duty :

shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be punishable for such offence with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees."

30. Surely, sub-section (a) cannot apply, because it speaks of seizing of an article, as contemplated by sub-section (4) and it would be unconnected with collecting the samples as provided in sub-section (2) of section 10. Proviso (b) of sub-section (9) relates to the injury done to any person by the commission of any Act of the Food Inspector other than the seizure of the article. It will, be, therefore, necessary to find out, what is the injury don to the present respondents. It is said in this connection that although according to the diary notes and the complaint, accused Nos. 2 to 7 were not present at the shop, and therefore, normally not answerable to the charge under the Act, the Food Inspector has intentionally involved them showing his bias against the respondents. It is also said that he has intentionally given false evidence denying that the samples were collected after emptying the bags. These are actions done merely for fortifying the case filed and the evidence given, and do not, in my opinion, necessarily indicate the making of deliberate and dishonest statements with the vindictive object of convicting the respondents. In a similar manner, it could be said that the Food Inspector may not have fully realised the implications of the ruling, showing that if an Article is not kept for sale, he has no powers to collect samples. Since the article in this case viz. chilly seeds was a part of the Article kept for sale, it is possible to say that the Food Inspector may have bona fide entertained the belief of his power or authority to take sample of chilly seeds. I am not therefore, satisfied that this is a case where the Food Inspector ought to be proceeded against.

31. I pass the following orders :---

32. The Revision Applications are dismissed. Rules are discharged.