1. The question that arises in these two references by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Ernakulam to quash the committal in sessions cases 1 and 2 of 1964 are the same and so a common order is passed.

2. In sessions case 1 of 1964 the accused is one Kanda. On 28-3-62 at about 3 p.m. while Head Constable No 163 of the Pothanicad police station was patrolling with a police party he saw the accused armed with a loaded single-barrel country-gun without a licence. The accused was arrested and produced at the station and after due investigation he was prosecuted for an offence under S.19(f) read with S.12 and 14 of the Arms Act 11 of 1878. In sessions case 2 of 1964 the accused is one Sankaran. The same Head Constable while patrolling detected the accused with an unlicensed country gun and he was also prosecuted under S.19(f) read with S.12 and 14 of Act 11 of 1878.

3. The case came up before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Moovattupuzha for trial. The prosecutor who appeared for the prosecution presented a petition that as the Arms Act 11 of 1878 had been repealed by the new Arms Act 54 of 1959 the offence would fall under S.3, 25[1][a] and 27 of the new Act and that as the offence under S.27 was one punishable with imprisonment for 7 years, it is an offence triable exclusively by the sessions court and that committal proceedings may be taken under S.207-A, Crl. P.C. The learned Magistrate allowed the petition and after recording the evidence of two witnesses committed the accused in both the cases to stand their trial in the sessions court. The case was made over to the Assistant Sessions Judge. When the case came up for hearing preliminary arguments were heard and the learned judge has sent up these reports under S.438 Crl. P.C. (not S.215 Cr. P.C.) for quashing the commitments.

4. The offence in both the cases had been committed on 28-3-62. The new Act has come into force only on 1-10-1962 and so the accused could have been prosecuted only for the violation of the law in force on the date of the commission of the offence and not under the new Act.

5. A similar question arose in the case in State of Kerala v. Ramakrishnan (1963 KLT. 478), where the matter had been considered by me and 1 have held that whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S.4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, would follow unless as the section itself says a different intention appears. In S.4 there is a specific saving of penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of offences committed against any enactment so repealed and a scrutiny of the various sections would show that the new Act nowhere evinces an intention which is inconsistent with the continuance of the rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the repealed Act and S.4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act would apply and the accused could be prosecuted under S.27 of the repealed Act.

6. The same is the case here. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge is, therefore, right in holding that the accused cannot be prosecuted under the new Act and have to be tried only under S.19(f) of Act 11 of 1878. It is under S.27 of the new Act that the offence has become triable exclusively by the sessions court. If the new Act is not applicable it is only an offence triable by the First Class Magistrate.

7. The commitments made in these cases are, therefore, quashed. The learned First Class Magistrate, Moovattupuzha, will take the cases on file, frame charge under S.19(f) of Act 11 of 1878 and dispose of the case in accordance with law.

8. I wish to record my appreciation of the help rendered by Sri M.C. Sen who appeared as amicus curiae for the accused.