1. This application is filed by the applicants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone delay of 4 years 7 months and 11 days in filing the Review petition seeking review of the judgment dt. 30.10.2018 in LPA no.70 of 2013.

2. In the application filed to condone the said period of delay, it is contended that the judgment in the LPA was pronounced on 30.10.2018 and the certified copy of the judgment was delivered to the office of Advocate General on 19.11.2018; it was then forwarded by the said office to applicant no.2 on 28.12.2018 and it was received in the office of applicant no.2 on 01.01.2019.

3. It is contended that the matter was then examined by applicant no.2 and then he took it up with the office of applicant no.1 through letters dt. 17.12.2018 & 29.01.2019.

4. Thereafter, matter was considered again at Government level and it was decided to take over the service of the respondent on notional basis without any arrears of pay as per Government approval on 30.07.2019, and accordingly, the pay of the respondent was also fixed through an order dt. 19.08.2019.

5. It is stated by applicants that feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid pay fixation order, the respondent again represented his case. Matter was then referred to the Government on 06.01.2020 & 17.06.2020 for further consideration.

6. It is stated that the respondent then filed an Execution Petition no.193 of 2022 before this Court for implementation of the Court order in his favour and requested to grant consequential benefits of higher Pay Scales, i.e. Pay Band II, III & IV; that the High Court then passed an order on 13.03.2023 in the said Execution petition, granting two weeks’ time to file compliance, failing which, the erring Officer was to remain present in the Court in person; and pursuant to the said order, the Additional Director (Colleges), was present in the Court and assured compliance of the judgment passed by the Court.

7. Thereafter, matter was taken up with the Government on 05.04.2023, and on 10.04.2023, Pay Bands II & III had been granted to the respondent through a letter dt. 18.04.2023, subject to the condition that the High Court orders would be assailed further.

8. Matter was then taken to the Government, and the Government through a letter dt. 12.05.2023 granted permission to file Review or SLP on 01.06.2023.

9. The facts set-out above indicate that between 30.10.2018 ( the date when the judgment in the LPA was pronounced) and 03.08.2023 (when the Review petition was filed), the judgment in the LPA had even been substantially implemented by the applicants.

10. When the applicants were aware that the period of limitation either to file a Review or to file an Appeal is only 30 days, and their conduct shows that they have substantially implemented the judgment in the LPA, it appears that the Review petition has been filed after thought.

11. Also the delay in filing the Review petition has not been properly explained, and by no means, can it be said that a delay of 4 years 7 months & 11 days in filing the Review petition is liable to be condoned in the facts & circumstances of the case.

12. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court held: -

“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11.09.2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 08.01.2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11.09.2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 08.01.2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

13. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 3 SCC 159, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 327; Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & others (2021) 11 SCC 557; Union of India & others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another (2022) 9 SCC 263; and State of Uttar Pradesh & others vs. Sabha Narain & others (2022) 9 SCC 266.

14. Learned Additional Advocate General relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs & others Vs. Union of India & another, Civil Appeal no. 5867 of 2015 dt. 09.10.2023.

In Sheo Raj Singh, the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing a Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour with the Supreme Court.

In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an application for condonation of delay, but was sitting in appeal over discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; that in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; and the law was well settled that a Court of Appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise by the Courts below; and that the appellate power should be exercised only when the order of appeal is clearly wrong and not when it is merely not right.

15. The said decision, therefore, cannot help the applicants since in the instant application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the said period of delay in filing the Review petition. It is not considering whether a Tribunal/Court subordinate to it was right in condoning or refusing to condone the delay.

16. Learned Additional Advocate General also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Manipur and Ors. vs. Koting Lamkang (2019) 10 SCC 408.

That was a case where the State had preferred an RFA against an order of a Single Judge of the High Court, declining to condone delay of 312 days in filing a Regular First Appeal. The State had contended that being under a bonafide mistake, it had wrongly filed an appeal before the District Judge instead of the High Court and the said Court had dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court observing that regard should be had to the impersonal nature of the Government’s functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly, resulting in injustice to institutional interest of the State.

This case is distinguishable in the sense that there was an appeal filed within limitation in that case, but in a wrong forum. It was not a case like the instant case where no review at all was filed within limitation.

Also in this judgment, the attention of the Court was not drawn to the judgment in Post Master General (supra-1) and other cases following it, referred to in Para 12 above.

17. Having regard to the above facts & circumstances and the legal position set-out above, we find no merit in the application and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the unregistered Review petition is also dismissed.

18. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.