U.N.Sinha, J.

(1) This case has come before the Full Bench because of an order passed in it by R. K. Choudhary and G. N. Prasad, JJ., on the 8th April, 1965, to the effect that they were not in agreement with an order passed by another Division Bench of this Court on the 11th March, 1965, in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 (Pat). The question for decision arises thus : This First Appeal (First Appeal No. 509 of 1964) was filed on the 9th November, 1964, along with First Appeal No. 510 of 1964 and was registered on the same day. The two appeals had been tiled along with one certified copy of the decree, but without any copy of the judgment, on a nominal court-fee. A certified copy of the judgment was filed on the 30th November, 1964. On the 11th December, 1964, a stamp report was made, stating that the judgment was filed on the 30th November, when the period of limitation for filing the appeal had expired. It also stated that the court-fee stamp was short by Rs. 1446.25 paise according to valuation. This slump report did not, in so many words, mention the date on which the limitation was taken to have expired, but it appears from a calculation made on the memorandum of appeal, that 12th November, 1984 was taken to be the date on which the limitation for filing the appeal had expired. Counsel for the parties in this case have proceeded on that interpretation of the stamp report. On the 17th December, 1944, the stamp report regarding shortage of court-fee stamp was listed before the Registrar of this Court, and, on the learned advocates acceptance of the stamp report, one months time was allowed to pay the deficit court-fee. The deficit court-fee not having been paid within the time granted by the Registrar, the matter was put up before the Court on the 25th January, 1965, when two weeks peremptory time was granted. It appears that the deficit court-fee was deposited on the 27th January, 1965. Thereafter, the case was listed before the Registrar on the 8th February, 1965, upon an office note to the effect that the stamp report dated the 11th December, 1964 had mentioned that the appeal had become barred by limitation. On the same day, 14 days time was allowed to the appellant to file an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. This application was filed on the llth February, 1965, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, praying that the delay in filing the certified copy of the judgment with the prescribed period may be condoned by the Court. This application was admitted on the 16th February, 1965, and this is the matter which had gone before R. K. Choudhary and G. N. Prasad, JJ., on the 8th April, 1985, and which had come for final orders before us now.

(2) It appears that the learned Additional Standing Counsel, appearing for the appellant, had argued before the Division Bench, that, in view of the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 on the 11th March, 1985, (Pat.), the limitation for filing this first appeal (First Appeal No. 509 of 1964) had not expired on the 12th November, 1964, and that the certified copy of the judgment required in this appeal had been filed within time, on the 30th November, 1964. The question that had fallen for decision in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 (Pat.) was the interpretation of the Explanation added to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 38 of 1963). It is contended by the learned Standing Counsel before us that upon a correct interpretation of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (to be referred to henceforth as the New Act), including the Explanation added to it, the limitation for filing this appeal expired sometime in December 1964, if the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree is rightly calculated.

(3) Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act 9 of 1908) and Section 12 of the New Act are quoted below for comparison:-- Old Act New Act.

"12 (1) In computing the period of limitation pre-scribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. "12 (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation pre-scribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation pre-scribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation. In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy o a decree or an order, any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded."

It will appear that over and above some additions made in two of the sub-sections, an Explanation has been added in the New Act for the first time.

(4) For a consideration of the question that has arisen, the following dates are necessary:-- 31st July, 1964 .... the date when the judgment was pronounced; 25th August, 1964 .... the date when applications were made for copies of the judgment and the decree; 28th August, 1964 .... the date when the decree was prepared and the date when folios were notified for both; 2nd September, 1964 .... the date when folios were filed for both; 10th September, 1964 .... the date when the copy of the judgment was ready; 11th September, 1964 .... the date when the copy of the decree was ready.

(5) According to the learned Additional Standing Counsel, the entire time taken by the Court between the 31st July, 1964 and the 28th August, 1984, should be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from and should be excluded, over and above the time between the 2nd September and the 11th September. It is argued that the Explanation to Section 12 of the New Act cannot be interpreted to mean, that the time between the date when the judgment was pronounced and the date when the application for a copy of the decree was made was not requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. Shri A. K. Choudhury, appearing for the respondents, has argued, on the other hand, that when the Explanation to Section 12 of the New Act states that, "any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded", the time between the 31st July, 1964 and the 25th August, 1964, should not be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. It appears to me that the substance of the controversy regarding the Explanation, is, whether the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree, before application for copy thereof had been made, should be excluded in favour of the appellant as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, or whether, the time should be excluded from consideration as time not requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. I am of the opinion that the second interpretation should now be accepted. That is to say, the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before an application for copy thereof is made shall not be excluded in favour of the appellant as time requisite. It has been urged by the learned Additional Standing Counsel that the Explanation should mean that the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy thereof is made "shall be included" as time requisite, as the Explanation states that it "shall not be excluded." I am not in a position to accept this contention, as Section 12 is not concerned with any inclusion of time at all. The section is concerned with exclusion of time, and, therefore, it is not possible to interpret the Explanation by holding that the expression, "shall not be excluded" means "shall be included" as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. Our attention has been drawn to some anomalous situation that would arise if Sri A. K. Choudhurys contention is accepted. For instance, if a person applies for a copy of the decree before it is prepared, it is said that the time elapsing after the application for copy and before the decree is prepared will be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or part of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, whereas if an application is filed after the decree is prepared, the time between the pronouncement of the judgment and the preparation of the decree will not be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. But, we are not concerned with anomalies when the words of the Explanation appear to be clear. It may even be, that a litigant who is awake to the situation and who applies for a copy of the decree, even before it is prepared, will have some advantage, although in most cases, the decree has to be prepared by the Court as a matter of course. But I think all speculative considerations must be left out of view. The simplest construction of the Explanation should be that when a party applies for a copy of the decree, the time elapsing between the pronouncement of the judgment and the application made for a copy of the decree shall not he taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. Therefore, in this case, the time between the 31st July, 1984 and the 28th August, 1964, was not spent by the appellant in obtaining a copy of the decree, and it should not be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, in view of the Explanation added to section of the New Act.

(6) For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the stamp report is correct as to the date of limitation for filing this appeal. It is, however, clear that the appellant-petitioner has made out a sufficient case for condoning the delay in filing the certified copy of the judgment on the 30th November, 1964. Apart from the fact that the Explanation in question has not been as clearly worded as it might have been, it appears that there is a substantial difference of opinion as to its interpretation. Order No. 6, D/- 22-9-1964, passed by a Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 309 of 1964 (Pat), indicates that in a case where an application for a copy of the decree was filed after the decree was signed, it was conceded at the bar that under the new Explanation, the appellant "cannot take advantage of the period during which the decree is not in existence." Thereafter, it was held by another Division Bench of this Court, by order No. 18, dated the 11th March 1965, passed in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 (Pat) and analogous, that, the period that the Court takes from the date of the judgment to prepare and sign the decree must be included in the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. In this case, the application for a copy of the decree had been made before the decree had been signed. It was stated in that order that if the application for a copy of the decree is made some days after the decree is prepared and signed, the period that will be included in the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, will be the period between the date of the judgment and the date of signing of the decree. I have already referred to the circumstances under which this matter has come before the Full Bench. Under the circumstances, it appears to me that it is a fit case in which the delay in filing a certified copy of the judgment should be condoned and the appeal should be allowed to proceed in the regular course. Mahapatra, J.

(7) The point for decision is, what is the proper meaning of the Explanation given in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963). The old Act of 1908 was recast and some of the provisions were streamlined in the New Act. The four sub-sections of Section 12 have been retained in the new Act with certain additions. In Sub-section (2) it is provided that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal.... the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree .... appealed from .. . shall be excluded. The explanation which has been added for the first time in the new Act is in respect of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree and is in the following language :

"Explanation.--In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded."

How the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree is to be computed has been indicated in this Explanation. Part III of the Act deals with computation of the period of limitation and begins with Section 12. All the four sub-sections prescribe the exclusion from the computation of the period of limitation certain days and periods specified in them. In Sub-section (2) the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed have been asked to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Before the new Act was enacted, different High Courts in India had taken different views about the computation of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree. Patna, Calcutta and Bombay High Courts decided in their Full Benches that the entire period taken by the Court for preparing the decree after the pronouncement of the judgment should be included in computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, if an application for such a copy is made either before or after the decree is prepared. Other High Courts like Nagpur took a different view and held that if an application for a copy is not made before the decree is prepared by the Court, the period between the date of the judgment and the date of preparation of the decree should not be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, and as such, should not be excluded in computing the period of limitation. In the case of Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lat Bhargava, AIR 1961 S C 832 their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt with and discussed the provisions under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the old Act. They observed :

"Where a decree is not drawn up immediately or soon after a judgment is pronounced, two types of cases may arise. A litigant feeling aggrieved by the decision may apply for the certified copy of the judgment and decree before the decree is drawn up, or he may apply for the said decree after it is drawn up. In the former case, where the litigant, has done alt that he could and has made a proper application for obtaining the necessary copies, the time requisite for obtaining the copies must necessarily include not only the time taken for the actual supply of the certified copy of the decree but also for the drawing up of the decree itself."..........

"There is, however, a sharp difference of opinion in regard to cises where an application for a certified copy o the decree is made after the said decree is drawn up. In dealing with such cases Courts have differed as to what would be the period requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the decree. The Bombay, Calcutta and Patna High Courts appear to have held that the period taken in drawing up of the decree would be part of the requisite period, while other High Courts have taken a contrary view. It is significant that though the High Courts have thus differed on this point, in every case an attempt is judicially made to do justice between the parties."...

"Then it was argued that the respondents should have moved the trial Court for the drawing up of a decree as soon as they found that no decree had been drawn up. It may be assumed that the respondent might have adopted this course ; but where the dual system does not exist it would be idle to contend that it is a part of the duty of a litigant to remind the Court or its office about its obligation to draw up a decree after the judgment is pronounced in any suit. It may be that decrees when drawn up are shown to the lawyers of the parties, but essentially drawing up of the decree is the function of the Court and its office, and it would be unreasonable to penalise a party for the default of the office by suggesting that it was necessary that the party should have moved the Court for the drawing up of the decree."

This decision was pronounced on the 5th December 1960. The view of this Court as to how the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree shall be computed irrespective of the application for such a decree being made before or after the decree is prepared, was elaborately given in a case decided by seven learned Judges in Gabrial Christian v. Chandra Mohan, I L R 15 Pat 284 : A I R 1936 Pat 45. That view was clearly approved by the Supreme Court.

(8) The explanation given in Section 12 appears to have settled the difference in view between some of the High Courts in this country, about the inclusion or otherwise of the period of time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy thereof is made when such application is filed after the preparation of the decree. The Supreme Court did not resolve that difference in the decision cited above, as that point was not necessary to be decided. In that case (as in the instant case before us) the application for copy of the decree was made before the decree was actually prepared by the Court, and in that event, most of the High Courts were agreed and the Supreme Court also similarly held, that the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree will include the period taken by the Court after the pronouncement of judgment and before the application was made for preparing the decree.

(9) The language of the explanation is clear. A cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is that when the language and grammatical construction of particular provision in the statute are without any ambiguity, they should receive the plain and natural meaning. In that case, no aid is to be sought from the marginal or head notes or the statement of aims and objects. The Parliament expressed its intention through the language of its enactment.

(10) Explanation or proviso is added to a section, generally, by way of exception to what is stated in the main section. Sometimes an explanation is appended to stress upon a particular thing which, ordinarily, would not appear clearly from the provision in the section. This artifice seems to have been adopted in drafting the explanation to Section 12. The time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and the judgment on which the decree is founded are required in Sub-sections (2) and (3), to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review, which means, that time will be counted to the benefit of the appellant or the applicant and will be available to him besides the prescribed period of limitation for filing an appeal or an application of the nature stated in the two sub-sections. In other words, that time shall not be included in or be a part of the period of limitation. The draftsman having used the word "excluded" at the end of each of the four sub-sections, appears to have thought fanciful to use the same word at the end of the explanation, to have as it were, a rhythmical effect. To counteract the natural meaning of "excluded", he used another negative form in the same expression so that the real meaning will not be lost. The expression "shall not be excluded" means undoubtedly "shall be included." What is provided in the explanation "not to be excluded" (meaning to be included) is "any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made." If the application is made alter the decree or order is prepared, then, the time taken by the Court for preparation of such decree or order cannot be more than what was actually taken for that purpose, irrespective of the date of application for copy. If the application is made before the decree or order is prepared, in that case, the time spoken of will be me period from the date of the judgment to the date of the application. The rest of the period taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order after the application will necessarily come within the time requisite for obtaining the copy. It is only about the period preceding the application for copy filed before the preparation of the decree, there was some doubt, according to some High Courts, if that period can be said reasonably to be requisite for obtaining a copy. To remove all those doubts, the explanation has now, clearly and in simple language, provided that while computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order, that period shall not be excluded; in other words, that period will be included within the time requisite for obtaining a copy. If we read "shall be included" for "shall not be excluded" in the explanation, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the thing in which the inclusion is meant is the time requisite for obtaining a copy. If the opening words of the explanation would have been "in computing the period of limitation" as it is in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4), the meaning would have been certainly different. But the language was purposefully different and the whole explanation is about the computation of "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order." I cannot, therefore, see how learned Counsel can successfully contend, on the language of the explanation, that the period, preceding an application for a copy of a decree or an order, shall not be excluded from or shall be included in the period of limitation. The only meaning, in my view, that flows from the explanation is that, for purposes of exclusion from the prescribed period of limitation, while computing the extent of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or an order appealed from, in all cases, the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before the application for copy thereof is made, shall be taken as a part of the time requisite for obtaining the copy. Besides that, the period otherwise taken for supply of the copy shall also be included in "the time requisite", and that will also be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Both on an analysis of the section and the explanation and on the construction of the sentence in the explanation, this conclusion is inescapable,

(11) The same view of the explanation in section 12 was taken by a Bench of this Court in order No. 18 passed on the 11th of March 1965 in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 (Pat). A different view was assumed by another Bench, as expressed in order No. 6 on the 22nd of September 1984 in First Appeal No. 309 of 1964 (Pat), but, as it appears from the same order, that view was conceded to by the learned Advocate appearing in that case for the parties, who pressed against the question of limitation on another line. Without any discussion and not giving any reason another Bench, in the present case, stated their difference with the view expressed by this Court on the 11th of March 1965 in First Appeal No. 325 of 1964 (Pat), as a result of which this matter has come before us now. I should like to point out here that a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Subramania Vishwanath Pillai v. Indo-World Trading Co., Ltd. AIR 1965 Cal 217 [LQ/CalHC/1964/199] , in considering the explanation given in Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1963, observed that the period taken by the Court in drawing up the decree ought not to be charged against a litigant.

(12) I am aware that the Law Commission, while recommending the recast of the old Limitation Act, stated that in their view, the period taken by the Court for preparing the decree before an application for a copy is made, should not be counted in favour of the appellant. One of the objects and reasons given in the bill was that any delay in the office of the Court in drawing up a decree or order before the application for a copy thereof is made, shall not be excluded. The recommendation of the Law Commission or the objects and reasons stated in the bill cannot alter the clear and unambiguous meaning of the actual enactment that the Parliament passed.

(13) I have stated how the Supreme Court and almost all the High Courts had interpreted Sub-section (2) of section 12 of the old Act, which remains the same in the new Act (only with addition of Civil Revision to which that provision will also extend). If the explanation is taken to mean that the period taken by the Court to prepare the decree before the application for the copy is made, is not to be excluded from the computation of the limitation period, then, that will be directly opposite to the view of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Parliament is always aware of the judicial interpretations of a particular expression used in a particular statutory provision, and particularly that of the highest Court of Law in the country. If the Parliament really wanted at the final stage of the enactment to legislate in a manner directly opposite to the judicial interpretation, they would have done so emphatically and in unmistakable language. On the other hand, a judicial interpretation which is advantageous to the subject and which held the field for very long time, should be assumed ordinarily to have maintained in a subsequently recast enactment. It is the usual practice with the legislature to resolve the difference in judicial opinions on particular matters in an amending or replacing statute, so that the public will have a guide of certainty. The law of limitation is an artificial mode to terminate the justiciable disputes and it is construed strictly, always leaning on benefits to the suitor. One cannot conceive of any justification for the legislature to depart from the judicial interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the expression "time requisite for obtaining the copy" of the decree or order in Sub-section (2), which did not put the laches or delay suffered by the Court in doing its legitimate duty to the detriment of an aggrieved appellant. As the Supreme Court pointed the difference between the High Courts about the cases where application for the copy is filed after the preparation of the decree and indicated that, in spite of such difference in opinion, substantial justice was always done to individual cases on their own facts, the legislature, while undertaking subsequently a replacing enactment, can naturally be taken to have put that matter beyond doubt and difference and adopted the indication of the Supreme Court in providing an explanation to the section in the language in which it has been done.

(14) For the reasons given above, the meaning that should be given to the explanation in Section 12 is that the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before the application for its copy is made, shall be included in "the time requisite for obtaining the copy".

(15) In the present case the judgment was pronounced on the 31st July 1964. The decree was prepared on the 28th August 1964. Before that an application for copy of the judgment and decree was made on the 25th August 1964. The period between the 31st July and the 25th August shall be taken as included in the time requisite for obtaining the copy, and, therefore, it should he excluded in computing the period of limitation under Sub-section (2). Viewed in that light, the appeal was presented to this Court within the time and shall, therefore, proceed in the usual way.

(16) I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared separately by my learned brothers U. N. Sinha and Mahapatra, JJ. I have considered the question at issue very carefully, and I find myself in lull agreement with the view which has commended itself to my learned Brother Mahapatra, J. In my opinion, upon the very terms of the Explanation to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time taken by the Court to prepare a decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made has to be included in the time requisite for obtaining a copy of that decree or order.

(17) The Explanation, which has been added to section 12 under the new Limitation Act of 1963, reads as under :

"Explanation--In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded".

The plain meaning of the Explanation to my mind is that in calculating "time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order" any time that may have been taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order in question before an application for a copy thereof has been made has not to be excluded, that is, has to be included. All the four sub-sections of Section 12 as also Sections 13, 14 and 15 deal with exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation, whereas the Explanation deals with connotation or meaning of the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order". There appears to be no justification for reading the words "shall not be excluded" as equivalent to saying "shall not be included". The legislature, in my view has by inserting the Explanation sought to expand the meaning of the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order"; and it is well settled that when any word, phrase or expression in any enactment is explained by the legislature, the Act has to be applied with the authoritative explanation of that expression, phrase or word, as the case may be for the very object of the authoritative explanation is to enable the Court to understand the Act in the light of the Explanation, and the construction of the Explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory or hypothesis as to its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. Minus the Explanation, the meaning of the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order" appears to be, in my opinion, to be circumscribed by two words therein, namely, the words "requisite" and "obtaining". "Requisite" means something much more than required. It means "properly required", and the word "obtaining" connotes an element of effort on the part of the suitor or the applicant, but it appears to me that this restricted or circumscribed meaning of the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order" has been extended by insertion of the Explanation to include the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before an application for the copy of the decree is made. It may be that the legislature felt that when a party is not allowed to put in a requisition himself for the drawing up of the decree or the order, the time taken for the drawing up the same cannot be justly taken in account against him and he cannot be expected to put in an effort in a vacuum. Whatever may have been the motive or the logic which persuaded the legislature to insert the Explanation in question, the language of the Explanation itself is clear and that must prevail.

(18) In my opinion, for the reasons briefly set forth above, apart from the several other considerations to which elaborate reference has been made in the judgment of my learned Brother Mahapatra, J., I am of the view that in the instant ease the period between the 31st July, 1984, the date on which the judgment was pronounced, and the 25th August, 1964, the date on which the applications were made for the copies of the judgment and decree shall be taken as included in the time requisite for obtaining the copies and therefore, all that time together with the actual time taken in obtaining the copies applied for should be excluded in computing the period of limitation under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in that view of the matter it must be held that this appeal was presented to this Court within time, and no question of condoning any delay in filing the appeal, therefore, arises. The appeal shall, therefore, proceed in the usual way.