S.S. Sharma, J.

1. The Division Bench hearing this appeal felt that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ratanchand Darbarilal Firm v. Rajendra Kumar 1969 JLJ 859 required further consideration. The question formulated for opinion is as follows:--

In appeal by the Landlord against the dismissal of his suit for eviction under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act. is the Landlord entitled to succeed if the tenant commits any default in the payment or deposit of current rent during the pendency of the appeal, even though the suit was rightly dismissed, as the tenant had fully complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act upto the date of dismissal of the suit

2. The plaintiffs appellants had tiled a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, damages notice charges and ejectment from the suit premises against the respondent-defendant. This suit admittedly was on the ground provided in section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On an application of the defendant the trial Judge fixed the provisional rent as provided by section 13(2) of the Act. Later, the defendant submitted an application seeking relief under section 13(5) of the Act. The trial Court found that the required deposits of rent having been made by the defendant tenant, the condition necessary for section 13(5) of the Act arc satisfied. He, therefore, held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim ejectment in this suit on the ground of section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, he dismissed the plaintiffs suit for ejectment.

3. It would be appropriate to refer that the trial Court by its order, dated 6-1-1970 had fixed the case for issues and filing documents on 29-1-1970. But then it appears that the issues were never framed. The plaintiff had claimed Rs. 4,480/- as arrears of rent from 1-3-1967 to 30-4-1958 at the rate of Rs. 320/- p.m. Since the trial Court felt that there was a dispute about it within the meaning of section 13(2) of the Act, it had fixed the provisional rent. No doubt, the provisional rent fixed by the Court was the same i.e. Rs. 320/- p.m. as was claimed by the plaintiff but that does not make any difference so far as the requirement of deciding the question is concerned. The only effect of payment or deposit of rent by the tenant in accordance with section 13(1), is that no order or decree for eviction shall be passed against him as is contemplated by sections 12(3) and 13(5) of the Act. There may be cases where the provisional rent fixed by the Court may be in between the figures claimed as rent by the Landlord and the tenant. In such a suit there being a dispute as to the amount of rent and the Court having fixed the provisional rent, the issue in that behalf has to be decided. Either of the two i.e. the Landlord or the tenant or both of them may be aggrieved by the finding on that issue or none may be aggrieved.

4. In the present case the Division Bench has found that the suit was rightly dismissed as the tenant had fully complied with the provisions of subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act upto the date of dismissal of the suit. As stated in para 7 of the referring order the finding of the trial Court that the defendant had fully complied with the provisions of section 13(1) of the Act during the pendency of the suit was not questioned on behalf of the appellants. But there may be cases where the finding in this behalf may not be correct. Excepting for a situation like the one in hand, the questions whether the suit was rightly dismissed and whether the tenant had complied with section 13(1) of the Act till the decision of the suit, if raised, would be decided by the judgment in the appeal. The learned Judges in para 12 of their referring order have observed that "there can be no doubt that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act are applicable at least to some appeals, because sub-section (2) of section 13 provides that the provisional rent determined thereunder shall be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal."

5. The factual aspect of this case that emerges is that in this suit by the landlord on the ground provided in section 13(1)(a) of the Act the tenant disputed the amount of rent payable by him and so sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act was clearly attracted. The trial Court dismissed the landlords suit in the manner as has been stated above. The landlord preferred the present appeal against that judgment and decree. In the memo of appeal the finding of the trial Court that the tenant had complied with section 13(1) of the Act was challenged. Besides other grounds, the ground that the trial Court has erred in not deciding the other issues was also taken. The question, that has to be considered is whether in this appeal by the landlord to which sub-section (2) of section 13 applies, the tenant is required Jo deposit the rent in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 13.

6. Section 13 of the Act is as follows:--

When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction--

(1) On a suit or proceedings being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made ; and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.

(2) If, in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall fix a reasonable rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal.

(3) If in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) there is any dispute as to the person, or persons to whom the rent is payable, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same.

(4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in subsection (3) has been raised by a tenant for reason which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit.

(5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by subsection (1) or sub-section (2) no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may alto such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord.

(6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.

7. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have observed that an application by a landlord to sue in forma pauperis and an application for restoration of landlords suit dismissed in default can be treated as a "proceeding" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of S. 13 of the Act. Then it is said that the word appear having been used in sub-section (2) of section 13 is indicative of that word "proceeding" in sub-section (1) does not include an "appeal". As regards the meaning of the word "suit what is said is that it has been used in a restricted sense and would not include an "appeal", because bad it been used in its wider sense, then it would not at all have been necessary for the legislature to make a specific mention of "appeal" as distinct from suit" in sub-section (2) of the said section. While suggesting that the words "suit" and proceeding" in sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act do not include an appeal, the word "thereafter" in sub-section (1) has been construed to be wide enough to cover the period subsequent to the suit, particularly because it has not been laid down in sub-section (1) that the tenant shall deposit or pay monthly rent only during the pendency of the suit. It has been observed that "It is, therefore, clear that in case the tenant wants to derive benefit from the provisions of section 13 of the Act by filing an appeal, he must continue to pay or deposit rent up to the date of decision of the appeal." According to the Division Bench "the question of making a payment or deposit as required by sub-section (1) of section 13 for purposes of sub-section (5) of the section can arise only in an appeal preferred by the tenant and not in an appeal preferred by the landlord."

8. In Firm Ganeshram Harvilas and another v. Ram Chandrarao : 1970 JLJ 782 a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Hon. Shivdayal, J. as he then was) a Member has observed as follows:--

The words of sub-sections (1) and (2) ate clear and unambiguous. That being so according to the elementary rule of interpretation of statutes, the grammatical and natural meaning must be given to the words. Moreover the view we take also accords with the scheme and intention of section 13. The object and purpose of section 13(1) is to prevent the tenant from adopting dilatory tactics in a suit for his ejectment without paying arrears of rent and the rent falling due during the pendency of the suit. The intent and object of the second sub-section is also abundantly clear. Merely by raising a dispute as to the amount of rent, the tenant should not be allowed to circumvent the requirements of sub-section (1) Every such dispute no doubt will be determined in the final decision of the suit, but the scheme and the intention of the law is that the tenant must go on depositing or paying rent as it goes on accruing due and since the final determination will necessarily take time, a provision has been made for fixing a provisional rent.

9. In my opinion, apart from the question whether the word "proceeding" means and includes an "appeal" or not, at least in suits referred to in sub-section (1), meaning thereby the suits instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in S. 12 of the Act, where there being a dispute, sub-section (2) of S. 13 of the Act is attracted, the provisional rent has to be deposited or paid by the tenant in accordance with sub-section (1) of S. 13 till the decision of the suit or appeal. The words "in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1)" as are used in sub-section (2) of S. 13 are significant. This makes us to question as to what is "in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1)" in so far as an appeal is concerned. The provisional rent having been already fixed by the trial Court, and apart from the question as to on whose appeal the payment or deposit is to be made, it is that provisional rent which is required to be deposited. This provisional rent has to be deposited till the decision of the appeal. That the provisional rent has to be deposited during an appeal is further supported by sub-section (5) of S. 13 of the Act as this sub section specifically makes a mention of sub section (2).Even in sub-section (3) of S. 12 of the Act what is provided is that "No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 13......This also obviously includes subsection (2) of section 13.

10. The next question that arises is whether it is necessary for the tenant to deposit the provisional rent during the pendency of the appeal when the landlord prefers the appeal.

11. As stated above, the deposit or the payment of the provisional rent has to be in accordance with the, provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act. Under sub-section (1) the tenant is required within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding months a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. In this connection, the words "the service of the writ of summons", as has been held in Ratanchands case (supra) will be construed to mean notice of appeal. If the conditions regarding payment or deposit as are mentioned in section 13(1) will not apply to the deposit or payment in an appeal, the provision enacted in sub-section (5) of section 13 in so far as it relates to sub section (2) of section 13 will become nugatory. Considered in that context, the notice of appeal to the tenant would necessarily mean an appeal of the landlord. As against this, if the tenant were to prefer an appeal, then again we shall be required to look into subsection (1) of section, 13 because under sub-section (2) of section 13 the deposit or payment has to be made in accordance with sub-section (1). Considered in that light, where will be the question of notice of appeal being served on him In absence thereof, from what date would the period of one month be reckoned, and thus no question of seeking any further time would arise.

12. The matter could be looked at from yet another angle. A reading of subjection (5) of section 13 of the Act also makes it clear that the deposit or the payment is required to be made by a tenant only in case of an appeal by the landlord. Sub-section (5) of section 13 gives a protection to the tenant against eviction provided he deposits or pays the provisional rent till the decision of the suit or appeal in accordance with sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). This sub-section (5) cannot be construed to mean that on failure of the tenant to pay or deposit the provisional rent in accordance with sub-section (1) during the pendency of the suit, he can be protected by filing an appeal and then depositing the total amount of the provisional rent in appeal. A tenant has to make deposit or payment of the provisional rent in accordance with sub section (1) of section 13 not only till the decision of the suit but also of the appeal.

13. A question was also raised whether, after the disposal of the suit from the trial Court till in the event of the landlord filing an appeal and notice of that appeal being served on the tenant, it will be incumbent on the tenant to deposit the provisional rent during this intervening period. In my opinion, this presents no difficulty and the answer to this is to be found in the section itself. The payment or deposit contemplated by sub section (2) of section 13 is "till the decision of the suit or appeal". This obviously would mean that the deposit or payment of the provisional rent is to be made when there is an appeal. The tenant would come to know about the appeal when the notice of the appeal is served on him. On such service, the provisional rent is to be paid or deposited in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 13. This section nowhere provides that the tenant has to continue to deposit the rent even when there is no appeal.

14. Thus, in my opinion, in the present case, to which sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act applies, the provisional rent has to be deposited or paid by the tenant in the appeal filed by the landlord in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 13. This conclusion is without going into the question, whether the word "proceeding" as is used in sub-section (2) of section 13 means and includes an "appeal."

15. 1 may here refer to a Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Ratilal Balabhai Nagar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai Patel and others : AIR 1968 Guj. 172 . Para 4 of the report refers to those conditions under which, if fulfilled, no decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant. One of those conditions was that the tenant must continue to pay or tender in Court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided (Underlining here italics is mine). In that context, it has been observed as follows:--

Now what does the expression till the suit is finally decided mean Does it refer to the decision of the suit by the trial Court or is it intended to include the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate Court The word finally in our view suggests that what is in the contemplation of the Legislature is not the decision of the suit by the trial Court but the ultimate decision of the suit by the appellate Court. It is trite knowledge that an appeal is a continuation of a suit and when the appeal is decided, the suit is finally disposed of by the appellate Court The expression till the suit is finally decided, therefore, in our view, refers to the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate Court. Otherwise the word finally would be meaningless. When, therefore; an appeal is preferred by the landlord against a decree passed by the trial Court dismissing his suit and the question arises before the appellate Court whether the tenant is entitled to the protection of section 12(3)(b) the appellate Court would have to consider whether the tenant has, after paying or tendering in Court the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as might have been fixed by the Court, continued to pay or tender in Court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases till the decision of the appeal. If the tenant has done so, no decree for eviction can be passed by the appellate Court against the tenant. (pp. 177-8).

16. Much was sought to be made out on the basis of a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Radharani Dassi & another v. Angurbala Dassi : 67 CWN 501. In that decision a question as regards section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (XII of 1956) had arisen. Section 17 of that Act has been reproduced in another decision of this very Volume which begins from page 553. No doubt, there appears to be some similarity in section 17 (1) and (2) of that Act with section 13 (1) of the present Act, but the decision in Radharani Dassis case (supra) does not construe the meaning of the word "proceeding" as is used in section 17 (1) or (2) of that Act. In sub-section (2) of section 17 of that Act the word "appeal" is absent. Having gone through that decision. I am of the opinion that it docs not deal with any such problem as is before us.

17. Much of the arguments were also advanced on the question as to the meaning of the words suit or proceeding as have been used in section 13 of the Act. In Vidyawati v. Fattilal 1964 JLJ SN 162. Honble Shivdayal, J. (as he them was) had observed as follows:--

Much argument is advanced from both the sides on the word proceeding. There is no doubt that it is an expression of wide connotation An application to sue in forma pauperis is certainly a proceeding. But in section 13 of the Act that word is qualified by the words on any of the grounds referred to in section 12. Now an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis has nothing to do with the grounds contained in section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the word proceeding in section 13 does not include an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis The word proceeding here will include an appeal, revision, an application for execution or any other proceeding which may be based on any of the grounds referred to in section 12 of the Act.

In that decision, after referring to sub section (6) of section 13 it was further observed that until the application to sue in (sic) is allowed, the question of defence against eviction under section 12 of the Act does not arise, so that there is nothing at that stage which can be struck out. The meaning of the words suit or proceeding" has been considered by their Lordships of the Full Bench in Ratanchands case, and in the context no meaning other than that given in that case can be given to these words. This reasoning also, which I respectfully, adopt, answers the meaning sought to be suggested to the word "proceeding" by the learned Judges of the Division Bench.

18. Thus, in my opinion, in this appeal by the landlord the tenant is bound to deposit the amount of the provisional rent in accordance with subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act, 1 am further of the opinion that Ratanchands case (supra) was correctly decided.

Shivdayal C.J. (K.K. Dube & J.P. Bajpai, JJ

agreeing

19. I have the benefit of perusing the opinion of may Brother Sharma, J.

The following questions have been refereed to us for opinion:--

(i) Whether Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar 1969 M.P.L.J. 672, was correctly decided

(2) In an appeal by the Landlord against the dismissal of his suit for eviction under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, is the Landlord entitled to succeed if the tenant commits any default in the payment or deposit current rent during the pendency of the appeal, even though the suit was rightly dismissed, as the tenant had fully complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act upto the date of dismissal of the suit

20. The appellants instituted a suit against the respondent for eviction tinder section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) and for arrears of rent and damages, claiming Rs. 320/- as monthly rent. Within a month of the service of summons of the suit on him, the defendant made an application for fixation of provisional rent under section 13(2) of the Act. On that application, the defendant was directed to deposit rent at the rate of Rs. 320/- per month. The defendant deposited the arrears as directed by the Court. On his further application under section 13(5) of the Act, the trial Court dismissed the suit because the defendant had complied with the provisions of section 13(1) and (2). The suit was dismissed without framing the issues and without trying them.

21. The plaintiffs referred this appeal, at the hearing of which two questions were raised by the appellants. It was first contended that the defendant did not deposit or pay rent as required by sub-section (1) of section 13, during the course of the suit, so that he was not entitled to the protection under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act. The second contention was that even if the defendant be held to have duly paid or deposited rent as required by sub-section (1) of section 13, during the pendency of the suit, since he committed default in payment of current rent during the pendency of the appeal, he forfeited the protection under section 13(5). The Division Bench (Bhave and Rama, JJ.), which heard the appeal, dealt with the first question and observed as follows:--

The finding of the trial Court is that the defendant had fully complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 and as such the suit was liable to be dismissed on this account under subsection (5) of section 13 of the Act.

Apart from the question raised by the Learned counsel for the appellants in regard to the tenability of the application under subsection (2) of section 13, the finding of the trial Court that the defendant had fully complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 during the pendency of the suit was not questioned before us.

It was, however, vigorously argued that even though the suit may have been rightly dismissed, the dismissal must be set aside, because the defendant has failed to pay or deposit rent in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 during the pendency of this appeal.

It is thus that the Division Bench adverted to the second question. The Division Bench referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar : 1969 JLJ 859: 1969 MPJ 672: AIR 1970 MP 1 and discussed it in detail. It appears that since the Division Bench did not find itself in agreement with the view taken by that Full Bench, it referred the matter for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

22. The question before us is whether in an appeal by the Landlord from the dismissal of his suit (on any of the grounds under section 12 of the Act), section 13 requires the tenant to deposit rent in the appellate Court The question has been referred in relation to the dismissal of a suit under section 13(5) of the Act. But the answer has to be the same if the appeal is by the Landlord from the dismissal of his suit on any ground provided the suit was based on any of the grounds contained in section 12 of the Act. This is because subsection (1) of section 13 applies to such suits uniformly and the provisions of section 13 are not different for an appeal by Landlord when his suit has been dismissed under section 13(5) of the Act.

23. The Full Bench in Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar (Supra) answered this question in the affirmative by holding that the words suit or proceeding in the opening part of section 13(1) mean suit or appeal.

24. I would approach this question as follows:--

(i) Whether on its plain meaning sub-section (1) of section 13 applies to any appeal (be it by the Landlord or by the tenant)

(ii) What is the implication of the word appeal in sub-section (2) of section 13

(iii) Whether it is necessary to give an artificial meaning to the word proceeding in subsection (1) of section 13

(iv) Why the word proceeding is there in the opening part of section 13(1) of the Act.

25. A few provisions may now be reproduced for ready reference:--

12 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other Law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:--

(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the Landlord in the prescribed manner;

... ...

(g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is required bonafide by the Landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated ;

(h) that the accommodation is required bonafide by the Landlord for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or alteration cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated ;

... ...

13 (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the Landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application mace to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the Landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.

(2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in subsection (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall fix a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal.

(3) If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same.

(4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit ;

(5) If a tenant makes a deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the Landlord.

(6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section the Court may order the defence against him to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.

26. The word "appeal" is not to be seen in sub-section (1) of S. 13 of the Act. This is conspicuous and significant. It is plain enough from these provisions that the Legislature has distinctly employed in them three words, "suit", "appeal" and "proceeding". These words are very common in legal parlance. The words suit" and "appeal" are always used distinctively in Legislative enactment as distinguished from any other "proceeding". It must be presumed that they were fully known to the Legislature when this Act was drafted. It cannot, therefore, be believed that the framers of the Law used the word "proceeding" when they intended to mean "appeal". The learned counsel for the appellants could not tell us any reason whatever why the framers of the law did not employ the expression suit or appeal".

27. In Oman Bros. v. Central Bank of India, Bombay : (1976) 3 SCC 800 , their Lordships have reiterated the well settled principle in these words:

It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute that where the legislature uses an expression bearing a well-known legal connotation it must be presumed to have used the said expression in the sense in which it has been so understood..................................

Craies on Statute Law observes as follows:--

There is a well-known principle of construction, that where the legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has received judicial Interpretation, it must be assumed that the term is used in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted unless a contrary intention appears"....................... .......................

Craies further points out that the rule as to words judicially interpreted applies also to words with well-known legal meanings, though they have not been the subject of judicial interpretation............................................................................

The question before their Lordships was as to the interpretation of the word "decree". It was observed that "applying these principles in the instant case it would appear that when the Court Fees Act uses the word "decree" which had a well known legal significance or meaning, then the Legislature must be presumed to have used this term in the since in which it has been understood namely, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure even if there has been no express judicial interpretation on this point".

28. It is a cardinal rule of construction of Statutes that the intention of an enactment must be gathered from the language employed by it. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the words according to their plain meaning neither adding to nor subtracting from them. It is not permissible to travel outside the words used in a statute to discover any secret intention not expressed therein In Solomon v. A. Solomon and Co. (1897) AC 22, Lord Watson observed that the intention of the Legislature "is a common but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an commission to enact." In R. v. Wimbledon Justices (1953) 1 QB 380 Lord Goddard said:--

Although in construing an Act of Parliament the Court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there.

In R. v. Mansel Jones (1889) 23 QBD 29. Lord Coleridge said that it was the business of the Courts to see what the Legislature had said, instead of reading into an Act what ought to have been said. In Lathem v. Lafone, (1887) 2 SC 115 (131) Martin B. said:--

I think the proper rule for construing this statute is to adhere to its words strictly : and it is my strong belief that by reasoning on long drawn inference and remote consequences, the Courts have pronounced many judgments effecting debts and actions in a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the Act never dreamed of.

In State of Assam v. D.P. Barua : AIR 1969 SC 831 , their Lordships said :

According to the ordinary cannons of interpretation the words employed must be given their proper and plain meaning.

In Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Ajmer Municipality : AIR 1969 SC 227 , it was observed:

The intention of a Legislature or it delegate has to be gathered from the language of the statutory provisions and not from what it failed to say...........................................................................

29. The word "appeal" is so familiar to all concerned with law that it cannot be read so as to be included in the expression "suit or proceeding". This is mote so as in the same section, the three words are distinctly used, "suit" "appeal" and proceeding". To defend an appeal is a well recognised inherent right of the respondent, who has been successful in the lower Court. If a condition or restriction is to be imposed on that right, the language of the law must be express and unambiguous. Craies observes;--

Express and unambiguous language appears to be absolutely indispensable in statutes passed for the following purposes Imposing tax or charge; conferring or taking away legal rights, whether public or private; excepting from the operation of or altering clearly established principles of law; altering the jurisdiction of Courts of law.

30. The function of the Court is to see what the law is and not to rewrite the law in the garb of interpretation according to its whim.

31. In Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar (supra) the Full Bench considered three construction of the section. They first considered whether an appeal is included in the word "suit" on the ground that appeal is continuation of a suit. This was rejected with the observation that the legislature could not have intended to include "appeal" within the word "suit". The second construction which was considered by the Full Bench was that an appeal is neither a suit nor proceeding and is, therefore, not at all included within sub-section (1) so that a tenant is not bound to deposit any rent in appeal, whether the appeal is by the landlord or by the tenant. The Full Bench found it difficult to accept this "extreme contention" because of the word "appeal" used in sub-section (2). The Full Bench then considered the third construction that an appeal is a proceeding and found it to be "a middle course" and "most acceptable". I shall deal with this point when I shall presently consider the implications of the word "appeal" in sub-section (2).

32. Pausing here for a moment, let it be seen whether by giving an inartificial or forced interpretation to it, sub-section (1) of section 13 should be applied to appeals. The Accommodation Control Act, 1961, has for its object to regulate eviction of tenants from accommodation. Chapter III was enacted with that object of which section 12 is the pivot. A tenant is protected from eviction except on such grounds as render eviction necessary. Restrictions are imposed on the rights of the landlord to evict the tenant. Section 12 does not confer any new benefit to the landlord, nor enlarge his rights under the general law. Section 12 furnishes to the tenant a new defence. The object of section 13 is to put a cheek on the tendency of an unscrupulous tenant to protract litigation without payment of rent. The first part of sub-section (1) of this section requires the tenant to pay or deposit all arrears of rent within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him, or within such further time as the Court may on the tenants application allow him. The second part requires the tenant to go on depositing rent, month by month, by the 15th day of each succeeding month. This section does not require any deposit to be made in "appeal" or "till the decision of appeal". The word "appeal" is not to be found in this sub-section at all. Sub-section (2) envisages a case where there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant about the amount of rent payable by the latter. As soon as such a dispute is raised, the Court must fix a "reasonable provisional rent" to be deposited or paid under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) contemplates a case where the dispute is as to the person or persons to whom rent is payable In that case, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount of rent payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). But no one shall be entitled to claim the amount until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for its payment. Section 12(3) and section 13(5), each, affords protection to the tenant that no decree or order shall be made against him for ejectment on the ground of default under section 12(1)(a). Sub-section (6) of section 13 empowers the Court to strike out the defence, if the tenant does not deposit rent as required by section 13(1).

33. It must, therefore, be concluded that S. 13(1) contemplates a suit instituted in the original stage only, as is clear from the provisions of S. 12(1) of the Act. Read in this manner, there is no anomaly, no absurdity, no inequity. The whole object and purpose of section 13 is that an unwary tenant may not protract litigation without paying rent. This is because until the suit is decided, it is not known whether the plaintiff is right or the defendant is right; whether the plaintiff has brought a false suit to harass the tenant, or whether the tenant is falsely defending a suit to delay the plaintiffs claim. Therefore, as pointed out at the outset, one of the basic policy underlying this law is that the tenant should not be allowed to contest a suit without depositing rent. That object is satisfied when section 13 is read in relation to a suit,

34. The Legislature did not mean to include an "appeal", in the word "proceeding", because it was not necessary as may be explained thus. If the appeal is by the tenant, inspire of that appeal, the landlord can apply for execution of his decree for eviction and obtain possession. However, in case the tenant applies for stay of the decree for eviction, the appellate Court can put him to terms and thus require him to go on depositing rent until the decision of the appeal as a condition for the operation of the stay order. If the tenant does not fulfill that condition, the stay order gets dissolved and the landlord can obtain possession. It is now to be considered whether the object and purpose underlying section 13 apply to an appeal by landlord. The answer must be in the negative. The plaintiffs suit having been dismissed, the enquiry shifts in favour of the tenant; there is no equity in favour of the landlord. But, if the word "proceeding" in section 13(1) means an "appeal", the tenant will have to deposit rent in both these cases as well, when there is no justification for such compulsion.

35. It is quite clear from the provisions contained in section 13 that it does not provide a new machinery for recovery of rent as an alternative to the ordinary remedy, that is, a suit for recovery of rent.

36. If the framers of the 1961 Act intended to apply the provisions of section 13 (1), could they not use the word "appeal" after the word "suit" and before the words "or proceeding" Could it be presumed by any stretch of imagination that they carelessly omitted the word "appeal" in section 13(1) Will it at all be reasonable to presume that the framers of the law would mention the word "appeal" in Sub-section (2) of section 13 with the object or intention that word may, on that basis, be read as included in the word "proceeding" in sub-section (1), It is the language of the section which has to be given effect to. If is not for the Court to re-write the law according to its liking. The Court has to say what the law is, and not what the law should be. Unless a clear care or absurdity is made out, it is not permissible under the well established canons of interpretation of statutes to give a forced and unnatural meaning to the word "proceeding".

37. With due respect to the referring Judges, it must be said that they were not right in their opinion that S. 13(1) applies to an appeal by the tenant.

38. The object of sub-section (2) is abundantly clear. When there is a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, an issue will be framed and will undecided in the final judgment of the suit. But since sub-section (1) requires payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of the suit, question arises at what rate should the tenant deposit rent. Should he deposit as the rate claimed by the plaintiff or the rate as alleged by defendant. To solve this difficulty sub-section (2) was enacted. It requires the Court to fix a "reasonable provisional rent" and it is at that rate that the tenant will deposit, and go on depositing rent in compliance with the requirements of section 13, until the disposal of the suit. The rent so fixed has to be "reasonable", but at the same time it is only "provisional", It is provisional because as soon as the suit is decided the dispute as to the amount of rent "payable by the tenant" becomes finally resolved in the judgment of the suit, in several decisions of this Court, therefore, it has been held that provisional rent is to be fixed on a summary enquiry, for instance, from the receipts which the tenant may produce or from the rent note which the landlord may produce or such other documents.

39. It is obvious enough that such fixation of provisional rent is only to fulfil the above necessity and is for the period intervening the raising of the dispute and the decision of the issue in the suit. When there is such a dispute, there is bound to been issue and that issue is bound to be determined in the final judgment of the suit. Therefore, this provisional rent operates only during the pendency of the suit and until the decision of the issue. But once such decision has been rendered in the judgment in the suit and the decision is on merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties, the provisional rent is superseded. Therefore, if the law intended to provide for deposit of rent in the appellate Court, it cannot be that "provisional" rent. It is bound to be that rent which has been determined in the suit.

40. It is mark-worthy that in the opening words of sub-section (2) "appeal" being not there, in the closing part of this sub-section the word "appeal" is meaningless.

41. Clue is available how the word appeal crept into sub-section (2), Under the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (which eventually became the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955), section 4 enacted restitutions on eviction (corresponding to section 12 of the present Act). Then, section 5 of that Act read thus:--

5. Rent pending suit or appeal for eviction.--(1) On a suit being filed for eviction on any one of the grounds mentioned in section 4 or in the case of appeal, on the appeal being preferred, the Court shall, on request of the Landlord:--

(a) if the rent is already agreed upon, order the tenant to deposit in the Court the rent payable according to the terms of the agreement from the date of filing of the suit or appeal till the decision of the suit or appeal;

(b) if the rent is not already agreed upon, fix a reasonable provisional rent and order the tenant to deposit such rent every-month in the Court till the decision of the suit or appeal. The rent so fixed shall be payable from the date of filing of the suit or appeal.

(2) In the case of default on the part of the tenant the depositing the rent even after the order of the Court, the right of the tenant to defend shall be terminated: --

Provided that the Court may before making an order of terminating the right of defence, provide an opportunity to the tenant for depositing the rent within fifteen days or such Longer period as the Court may deem fit.

(3) If the Landlord intends to obtain the rent deposited by or on behalf of the tenant in accordance with the above provision, the amount shall be paid by the Court to the Landlord after deducting the proper Court fee therefrom.

It is clearly seen that section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Act, under which the tenant was required to deposit rent, had the following significant requisites:--

(i) It was when an order was passed by the Court requiring the tenant to deposit rent, that he became liable to deposit rent,

(ii) The Court could make an order on request of the Landlord.

(iii) Such request could be made by the Landlord in a suit filed on any of the grounds mentioned in section 4 or in the case of appeal, on appeal being preferred.

(iv) The Court could order to deposit rent which was payable according to the terms of the agreement; and if rent had not already been agreed upon, then, the Court had to fix a reasonable provisional rent and order the tenant to deposit such rent every month in the Court till the decision of the suit or appeal.

42. It can be clearly seen that the word appeal in the expression till the decision of the suit or appeal in section 5 of the 1955 Act has a definite meaning, because on an appeal being preferred, whether by the Landlord or by the tenant, the Court had to make an order on the request or the Landlord to fix (in the absence of an agreement) a reasonable provisional rent, and to order the tenant to deposit such rent till the decision of the suit or appeal. Now section 5 of the 1955 Act clearly contemplated such an order to be made either in the suit or in the appeal. It is evident that section 5 of the 1955 Act was necessarily before those who drafted section 13 of the present Act and it was from section 5 that the expression till the decision of the suit or appeal employed in that section crept in inadvertently in section 13(2), although the whole of section 5 was not copied out in the new Act, obviously, because the framers of the Act desired to impose a statutory liability on the tenant to deposit rent without requiring an order of the Court to be necessary. In this process they forgot that the word appeal in the existing section 13(2) would be meaningless, when the existing section was not providing for any such order to be made on the request of the Landlord on the appeal being preferred.

43. Furthermore, if the intention of sub-section (2) was that provisional rent fixed in the trial Court in the suit should continue to be paid till the decision of the appeal also, the expression would have been till the decision of the suit and appeal, not suit or appeal. The word or is disjunctive here. It was appropriately used in section 5 of the 1955 Act, but is misfit in section 13(2) of the present Act. Under the 1955 Act, the Landlord had to seek an order of the Court in the suit and also a fresh order during the appeal.

44. Now from two other angles it can be easily demonstrated that the word appeal in sub-section (2) is without meaning :--

(i) This sub-section 2 applies only when there is a dispute as to the amount of rent, but what about the cases (and they will be innumerable) in which no such dispute is raised Sub-section 2 will then not apply, for an appeal arising from a suit in which any dispute as to the amount of rent was raised and an appeal from another suit in which no such dispute was raised. This will mean that where the tenant had not raised a dispute, he is not to deposit rent in the appellate Court, but if he had raised such dispute then he has to. This position will be anomalous and cannot be accepted.

(ii) Section 13(1) applies to all suits instituted by the Landlord on any of the grounds contained in the clauses from (a) to (p) and not merely in clause (a).

If, for instance, the plaintiffs suit, on the ground contained in clause (g) or (h), is dismissed, it does not stand to reason why the tenant should be obliged to deposit rent in the appellate Court.

45. It the present context, cases may be categorised into three ; (1) When a decree for ejectment is passed against a tenant; (2) when the Landlords suit is dismissed because of the special protection contained in section 12(b) and (3) when the suit for eviction is dismissed because no ground as required in sub-sections (a) to (p) has been proved. In case (i) the Landlord can execute his decree and obtain possession. If the tenant seeks stay from the appellate Court, he can be put to terms and can thus be required to deposit rent during the pendency of the appeal. In case No. (2), the tenant is automatically required to go on paying rent directly to the Landlord He can at the most commit two consecutive defaults, but he cannot afford to commit the third default; otherwise, he can be readily evicted, inasmuch as the protection under section 12(3) wilt not then be available. It is made available only once. In case No. 3 there is no equity in favour of the Landlord, for which the tenant should be compelled to deposit rent daring the pendency of the Landlords appeal and then he is subjected to a great risk of his defence being struck out in case of a single default. He has to presume and anticipate that an appeal may be preferred against him, so that he must find out the appellate Court, where the Landlord might prefer an appeal against him and go on depositing rent from the very next month of the date of the decree, because the word till the decision of appeal connote a continuity and no break, as between the date of dismissal of suit and date of notice of appeal. If he commits a single default he loses the protection under section 12(3). [See Jagdish Kapoar v. New Education Society 1967 JLJ 859].

46. In Ganesk am v. Harvilas, : 1970 JLJ 782 , the Division Bench did not say anything different. I have again carefully gone through that decision. It is wholly in accord with what I have said just now.

47. It was faintly argued that if the tenant is required to pay rent in appeal, he does not stand to lose anything because, after all, it is his liability to pay rent every month. This argument must be rejected at least for two reasons. Firstly, as said above, section 13 is not a statutory machinery for the recovery of rent. It is a restriction which has to be strictly construed. Secondly, the restriction is stringent. A single default takes away his right under section 12(3) or 13(5) of the Act and also makes his defence liable to be struck out under section 13(6).

48. Sub-section 5--There can be no manner of doubt that sub-section (5) comes into play only at the time of the final decision of the suit in the trial Court, It is to be applied when all the issues in the suit are decided and the Court is going to pass a decree for eviction. It is only at that point of time that sub-section (5) steps in. The same is about section 12(3) of the Act. See Chitrakumar Tiwari v. Gangaram 1968 JLJ 1028. There is nothing in sub-section (5) to apply it to appeals.

49. Sub-section 6--The language of sub-section (6) also supports the conclusion that the sub-section applies only to suits. This sub-section enacts the consequences of non-compliance with the foregoing clauses of the section in which case the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out, but thereafter the Court must proceed with the hearing of the "suit". It would be stretching the language too far to say that the expression "hearing of the suit" means "hearing of the suit in the trial Court or in the appellate Court". In common legal parlance, when an appeal arising from a suit is heard, it is not said that the hearing is of the "suit".

50. The above discussion leads to the conclusion that section 13, as a whole, applies to suits only. Any cloud cast by the word "appeal" in subsection (2) vanishes, when the sub-section is closely scrutinised and analysed and also when it is examined in co-relation with other sub-sections. Clue is also available that the word "appeal" crept into sub-section (2; evidently because of careless spade work in the process of drafting the sub-section from section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (which eventually became the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955).

51. It is clear from the discussion in Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar (supra) that for including appeal within the word proceeding a great effort had to be made and the interpretation given is laboured. In common legal parlance, the word "institute" is used for a suit so also writ of summons. They had to be read as appeal preferred and notice of appeal respectively. But I do not see what hardship will be caused to the landlord for which all such efforts had to be made. A word of such common parlance as "appeal" having been omitted in section 13(1), there is no necessity to re-write the law in the garb of interpretation. A little liter, 1 shall mention how the word "proceeding" appears to have crept in.

52. With reference to the words "in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1)", as are used in sub-section (2) of section 13, a question is posed as to what it means in so far as an appeal is concerned, with due respect this would be to beg the question ; so also, when it is contemplated that section 13(5) applies to an appeal also.

53. As regards Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai : AIR 1968 Guj 172 , suffice to say that under that law the requirement is of depositing standard rent which is quite different from provisional rent under section 13(2) of our Act. Moreover, stress was laid in that decision on the word "finally". Furthermore, the reason for that decision is that an appeal is a continuation of a suit, which was rejected in Ratanchands case.

54. My learned Brother Sharma, J. makes it clear in paragraph 14 of his opinion that the view which he has formed is "without going into the question whether the word "proceeding" as used in sub-section (2) of S. 13 means and includes an "appeal". Obviously, there is unsurmountable difficulty, which may be demonstrated as below :

(a) If the word proceeding in sub section (2) means a proceeding other than a suit or appeal (which is the natural meaning), then, firstly, there being no proceeding contemplated in section 12 other than a suit, the word proceeding becomes meaningless. Secondly, in the closing word "till the decision of suit or appeal", the word proceeding does not find a place which omission reflects back on the word proceeding in the opening words of the sub-section. If the dispute is raised in a proceeding (other than a suit), then the sub section should have provided for the deposit of the rent till the decision of the proceeding, but those words are not there.

(b) If the word proceeding in sub-section (2) means appeal, then if contemplates a dispute to be raised in the appeal for the first time that is a dispute which was not raised in the suit. If the dispute had already been raised in the suit, there is no question of its being raised again in the appeal (proceeding). Therefore, if the word proceeding has to be read as meaning appeal, then the sub-section can be reconciled by contemplating a dispute which is raised for the first time in appeal. The appellate Court will then fix a reasonable rent to be deposited or paid till the decision of the appeal. But then the words in accordance with the provisions of sub section (1) become redundant. The word "appeal" is not used by the Legislature in India to mean either a "suit" or original proceedings other than a suit.

(c) If the word proceeding is redundant and it was intended (as held by Sharma. J.) that "if a dispute is raised in the suit the tenant has to go on depositing rent not only till the decision of the suit but also in an appeal arising from the suit", then the closing words would have been "suit and appeal". The existing word or in the words suit or appeal is disjunctive Furthermore, as already pointed out, this interpretation would result in two sets of rules. If a dispute is raised the tenant has to deposit rent in the suit and appeal, but if no such dispute is raised, then the tenant has not to deposit the rent in the appellate Court because then sub-section (2) does not apply and sub-sect on (1) does not provide for depositing rent in the appellate Court.

55. Thus, examined from any angle, it must be said that the words "or proceeding" in sub-section (2) are redundant and meaningless and so also the words or appeal are without meaning. From what I have already pointed out it appears to me that the word appeal in sub-section (2) has crept inadvertently in the process of drafting of these sub section, from the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955.

56. Presumably, the words suit or proceeding inadvertently crept in both in sub-section (1) and (2) from another enactment such as sections 13 and 17 of the West Bengal Act, unmindful of the fact that under those enactments, a proceeding refers to an original proceeding, which may be instituted under the Act for securing eviction of the tenant. Some of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act may be reproduced :-

CHAPTER III Suits and proceedings for eviction.

13. Protection of tenant against eviction :--

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely : --

... ... ...

(6) Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, no suit or proceeding for the recovery.

17 (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 13, the tenant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of eight and one third percent, per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.

(2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in subsection (1) there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the tenant shall within the time specified in sub-section (1), deposit in Court the amount admitted by him to be due from him together with an application to the Court for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of such application, the Court shall :--

(a) having regard to the rate at which rent was last paid, and the period for which default may have been made by the tenant, make as soon as possible within a period not exceeding one year, a preliminary order, pending final decision of the dispute, specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant shall, within one month of the date of such preliminary order, deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount so specified in the preliminary order ; and

(b) having regard to the provisions of this Act, make, as soon after the preliminary order as possible, a final order determining the rate of rent and the amount to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord and either fixing the time within which the amount shall be deposited or paid, or as the case may be directing that the amount already deposited or paid be adjusted in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the order.

(3) If a tenant fails to deposit or ply any amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.

(4) If a tenant makes a deposit or payment as required by subsection 1 or sub section 2, no decree or order for delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant shall be made by the Court but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord :

Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if he has made default in payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months.

57. Another example of such inadvertent drafting is to be found in subsection 2 of section 26 of the M.P. Act. The scheme of Chapter IV is that the tenant is required to pay rent and it is his right to get a receipt from the landlord or his authorised agent, the default of which is punishable. If a receipt is not given, a penalty is provided (section 24). If the landlord does not accept the rent tendered by the tenant, section 25 enables him to deposit it with the Rent Controlling Authority. Then comes section 26. The first sub-section fixes the time within which rent has to be deposited ; otherwise, rent is not considered to have been validly deposited under section 25. Then, subsection 2 also provides that no such deposit shall be considered to have been validly made, if the tenant wilfully makes any false statement in his application for depositing the rent, unless the landlord has withdrawn the amount deposited. But the words before the date of riling an application for the recovery of possession are inept and inapplicable. The words should have been before the date of filing of suit for possession. This mistake again has crept in while copying out the section from the Delhi Act. There, the Rent Controlling Authority has the jurisdiction to deal with the matters, but under the MP. Act the forum has been changed and jurisdiction has been given to the civil Court. Under section 14 of the Delhi Act, application has to be filed for the recovery of possession and, therefore, these words are appropriate and have a meaning in section 28 (2) of that Act; but under the M.P. Act, under section 12, a suit has to be instituted in the civil Court, so that these words in section 26 (2) are meaningless.

58. Yet another conspicuous reason why the Legislature did not apply the provisions of section 13 to an appeal is that what is to be seen in appeal is whether the decree of the trial Court was correct or erroneous. It has reference to the rights of the parties on the date of the decision appealed from. If the Legislature intentended otherwise, then an express and unambiguous Language would be required. Valuable protection earned under section 12 (3) cannot be forfeited merely by non-payment of rent in the appellate Court.

59. The above discussion may be summed up thus : --

(i) To defend the landlords appeal from the dismissal of his suit is a very valuable right. It cannot be taken away or curtailed except by law in express and unambiguous language. Requirements of sub section 1 of section 13 impose conditions or restrictions on such right.

(ii) The word appeal is not seen in section 13 (1). If the Legislature had intended to apply it to appeal it would have employed that word in the subsection. There is hardly another word in legal parlance so well known and common as appeal. It is unthinkable that the framers of the Act would use the word proceeding for appeal when they have distinctively used the word suit in subsections (1) and (2).

(iii) As only a suit is contemplated for eviction of the tenant on any of the grounds contained in section 12 (1), the word proceeding (as distinct from a suit) is without meaning in sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 13.

(iv) The reasonable rent fixed under sub-section (2) is merely provisional. It gets dissolved and merged into the decision of the relevant issue in the final decision of the suit, Thereafter the rent if it is to be paid or deposited by the tenant, would be that rent which has been finally determined in the suit. Therefore, it would have been absurd if sub-section (2) had required deposit of provisional rent (in appellate Court) after the final judgment of the trial Court. Thus the word appeal in the closing part of sub-section (2) is otiose.

(v) When in the opening words of sub-section (2) the word appeal is not there, no question arises of payment or deposit of rent until the decision of the appeal. Therefore, appeal in the closing words of subsection (2) is without meaning.

(vi) The word appeal in sub-section (2) is the sheet anchor of the appellant, but that word is misfit in the closing expression, when in the opening words, appeal is not to be seen.

(vii) The very language of sub-section (6) shows that it applies to suits only ; particularly the closing words are clinching. There is no justification for reading the words hearing of the suit in the appellate Court which expression would be unnatural in legal parlance Viewed in this light there is no consequence of non-deposit of rent in appellate Court.

(viii) Section 13 must be read as a whole. When so read it clearly applies to suits only. Any cloud cast by the word appeal in subsection (2) vanishes when it is closely scrutinised and analysed in relation to other sub-section.

(ix) In a tenants appeal, application of section 13 is unnecessary because the landlord can execute the decree and recover rent; and if stay is sought condition of payment of rent can be imposed. In case of landlords appeal against dismissal under section 13 (5) the tenant will automatically deposit, and go on depositing, rent because of the deterrent in section 12 (3). In landlords appeal from dismissal on other ground, there is no special equity in his favour. In case of non-payment of rent his ordinary remedy of a suit for recovery of rent is available to him.

(x) It is apparent that in Ratan Chand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar (supra), a great deal of effort had to be made to hold that the word proceeding in sub section (1) includes appeal (rather mean appeal inasmuch as there is no other proceeding contemplated on any of the grounds contained in section 12 In that case the expression instituted had to be read as preferred in relation to an appeal; and, the expression writ of summons, had to be read as notice of appeal, and expression hearing of suit had to be read as hearing of suit in appeal. I do not see any necessity for forcefully introducing appeal in section 13 by such process. It is wholly unnecessary to enter into a laboured interpretation because, as demonstrated above, no injustice or hardship to the landlord is made out. It is wholly unnecessary to stretch the words and, by giving them an unusual meaning, to rewrite the law according to the liking of the Court. Therefore, having regard to the common and natural use of the word appeal as used in distinction to suit or proceeding, the word proceeding cannot be read as appeal,

(xi) Section 13 is not a machinery for realisation of rent as an alternative to a suit for recovery of rent. The object of section 13 is to put a check on the unscrupulous tenant who would protract litigation without payment of rent. That purpose is served in the suit. But the equity is reversed when the suit is dismissed.

(xii) Evidently, the closing word appeal in the expression suit or appeal crept into subsection (2) from section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act (which eventually became the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955). But, in that section 5 the words or appeal after the word suit had a meaning; whereas in section 13 (2) of the present Act they have none. So also clues are available which reveal how the word proceeding appears to have inadvertently entered into subsection (1) and (2) from other enactments (For instance, section 13 and 17 of the west Bengal (Act). But, there the word proceeding has a meaning.

(xiii) If the words till the decision of the appeal in sub-section (2) are literally construed, the tenant will have to go on depositing rent even after the dismissal of the suit by speculating that the landlord may prefer an appeal. He cannot wait till service of the notice of appeal, because there has to be continuity, and any break may disentitle him to the protection under section 12(3) or 13 (5).

(xiv) Even if there be a remotest doubt, the Court should lean to a construction which will advance remedy and will not impose restriction on valuable rights of the defendant.

60. My learned brother Sharma J. has referred to Vidyawati v. Fattelal 1964 JLJ SN 162, in which the question which came up for consideration was whether an application to sue in forma pauperis is a proceeding within the meaning of section 13(1) of the Act. I held that it was not; because in section 13 of the Act that word is qualified by the word on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, and since an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis is not based on any ground contained in section 12 of the Act, the word proceeding in section 13 does not include an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. Thus the further observation that a proceeding may include appeal revision, an application for execution or any other proceeding, was obiter. No such question was involved in that revision for decision. I must now say that for the reasons I have stated in this opinion, 1 have not the slightest doubt that the obiter observation was not correct and it cannot be perpetuated.

61. In the present case the trial Court before the stage of framing of issues and recording of evidence, dismissed the suit on the application of the tenant on the ground that he had deposited all rent. Prima facie, this was premature. As said above, sub-section (5) of section 13 comes into play only at the stage of the final decision of the suit and at that point of time when the Court is about to pass a decree for eviction, as a result of the decision on all the issues arising in the suit. But the peculiarity of this case is that the trial Court had fixed the same rent as provisional rent which was claimed by the landlord, i.e. at Rs. 320/- per month. It was the tenant himself who did not want to pursue the issue when he sought dismissal of the suit just because of having deposited the rent. In other words, he abandoned the issue and, therefore, framing of issues and a trial on them became unnecessary. If that had not been the position and the trial Judge had dismissed the suit at any interlocutory state, then, on the landlords appeal, the dismissal would have been set aside on that ground (but not on the ground of non-deposit of rent). However, since we are called upon to answer only two questions which are pure questions of law, it must be left to the appropriate Bench which will decide the appeal to consider this question finally and dispose of the appeal on merits as it thinks fit.

62. In the result, I answer the questions referred to this Bench thus--

(1) Section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961, and no part of that section, applies to an appeal (whether the appeal be by the tenant or by the landlord).

(2) Ratanchand Firm v. Rajendra Kumar : 1969 JLJ 859 did not lay down correct law.

ORDER

63. According to the majority view:--

(i) Section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961 and no part of that section applies to an appeal (whether the appeal be by the tenant or by the landlord);

(ii) Ratanchand Firm v, Rajendra Kumar 1969 M.P.L.J. 672 did not lay down correct law.

2. The case shall now be laid before a Division Bench for disposal of this appeal on merits.