(1.) The petitioners herein are the Srikrishnapuri Boring Road Vyapari Sangh and its Secretary, who is aggrieved by the action of the respondents alleging that the respondents have without any warrant or justification demolished and is demolishing large number of structures on the Boring Road, Boring Canal Road and Srikrishnapuri, which were occupied by the members of the petitioner-Sangh who are shopkeepers, traders and businessmen occupying those structures as tenants. They have, therefore, prayed that the respondents be restrained from demolishing any structure, either temporary or permanent, even if those structures have been raised without a sanctioned plan or in violation of a sanctioned plan, unless a proceeding is initiated under the provision of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981. The writ petition has been filed as a public interest litigation.

(2.) The case of the petitioners is that the Boring Road has a width of 54(feet), and this is obvious from the fact that a strip of land having breadth of 54(feet) was acquired in or about the year 1920 for the purpose of construction of the said road. In a writ petition filed in public interest by one Nand Kishore Roy and another, being C.W.J.C. No. 8175 of 1992 this Court had directed the authorities to take necessary steps for removal of illegal occupants, trespassers, encroachers and squatters from public land, particularly those who had erected hutments etc. whether temporary or permanent on the flanks of roads, streets, lanes etc. That order was passed by this Court in the context of large scale encroachments is over the roads, streets and lands in the city of Patna. The order of this Court however authorised the respondents only to remove such encroachments from the road and, therefore, did not justify removal of structures which were not in the nature of encroachment on public land or roads : The petitioners submit that they are not aggrieved by the order passed by this Court, and their grievances arise on account of the fact that the respondents have acted beyond the authority conferred by the order of this Court for removal of encroachments from the public land, particularly, roads, lanes, by-lanes etc., which was primarily aimed to achieve free flow of traffic. The respondents have acted illegally in removing structures on one pretext or the other. According to the petitioners, a distinction must be made between an encroachment on public land and a construction made either without a sanctioned plan or in violation of a sanctioned plan on private land. If a construction is made without a sanctioned plan or in violation of a sanctioned plan, it cannot be said to be an encroachment, though under the provisions of the relevant Act, action may be taken for the demolition of such structures. The petitioners claim that, on protest by the persons affected, they were told by the Magistrate and the authorities accompanying the demolition squad that although the present width of the Boring Road was only 54 (feet), the Master Plan envisaged the Boring Road with a width of 90 (feet) and, therefore, any structure raised within the aforesaid 90 (feet) was illegal and liable to be demolished. The petitioners submit that even if in the Master Plan the width of the road has been shown to be 90(feet), the said Master Plan has not been finally approved or published and, therefore, unless the lands are acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, they cannot be said to be public land. It is further alleged by the petitioners that the demolitions have taken place also on the plea that the constructions were without sanctioned plan or in deviation of the sanctioned plan. It is submitted that such an action could not be taken without initiating proceedings against the owners, occupiers and/or occupants of those premises.

(3.) The respondents have filed counter-affidavits and have submitted that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the instant writ petition. The instant petition is not in public interest and, therefore, cannot be treated as a public interest litigation. It is submitted that only the owners or builders of the structures can make a grievance, if at all, against the action of the respondents. No grievance has been made by any of the owners or builders of the structures, as they themselves realise that the structures are illegal. The existence of such illegal structures has an adverse effect on the free movement of traffic on the road, because the road is not suited to bear the burden of such heavy traffic generated the existence of shops located on either side of the road is unauthorised constructions. It was stated that no construction or structure which has been raised after getting a plan sanctioned by the competent authority has been touched. The structures, which have been demolished, are illegal structures and, therefore, this Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to grant relief to the petitioners, because the same would amount to perpetuating an illegality, and encouraging illegal constructions in the city of patna.

(4.) So far as the order of this Court is concerned, it is quite apparent that this Court was concerned primarily with the removal of encroachments on the roads, streets and by-lanes which hamper free flow of traffic, and it was in that context that the authorities were commanded to take necessary steps under the Act and to perform the duties enjoined on them by the relevant law, which authorised removal of such encroachments. The question still remains whether the action taken by the authorities can be assailed by the petitioners.

(5.) The petitioners do not claim to be the owners or builders of the structures, which have been demolished. They claim to be tenants of the premises who are carrying on their business in those structures. It is not their case that the structures have been erected in accordance with sanctioned plan. In fact, from the pleadings it appears, and this was not controverted by counsel appearing on their behalf, that the structures which have been removed by demolition are structures which have been raised unauthorisedly without a sanctioned plan. There is considerable force in the submission urged on behalf of the respondents that it can never be said to be in public interest to protect illegal constructions which cause inconveniences to the public at large. We are also of the view that the instant writ petition cannot be regarded as a public interest litigation, though it is certainly a writ petition filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the shop-keepers, traders, etc., who are in occupation of unauthorised structures which are sought to be removed.

(6.) The next question, which arises for consideration, is whether at the instance of the petitioners, this Court should entertain this writ petition and exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, and grant relief to the petitioners. It is well settled and, therefore, it is unnecessary to cite authorities, for the proposition that a writ court will not exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief, if that amounts to perpetuating an illegality. The intervener, however, brought to our notice a Full Bench decision of this Court in Amarendra Pratap Singh v. Lalit Narain Mithila University, 1987 Pat LJR (HC) 591 in support of the said proposition. The Courts have very often refused to exercise their writ jurisdiction to quash an order which may be defectiveve for one or other reason, if the effect thereof was to revive another order which was patently illegal. It was, therefore, submitted before us that if this Court were to exercise its writ jurisdiction, and grant relief to the petitioners, the effect would be that illegal structures which have been admittedly raised contrary to the Master Plan and without any sanctioned plan in teeth of the provisions of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981, shall be granted protection by this Court. This would encourage illegal constructions all over the city. Counsel for one of the interveners vehemently urged that the respondents have been aroused from their deep slumber after a considerably long period, and if they have realised their duties under the law and are doing good work in the interest of public at large, this Court should not interfere with the good work being carried out by the authorities. The City of Patna must be kept clean, and must be rid of illegal constructions and encroachments, because the city exists not only for the traders and shop-keepers, but also for the ordinary residents of the city, who have been facing grave inconveniences on account of the mushroom growth of illegal structures all over the city. For once the authorities are doing the right thing, and this Court should not prevent them from doing so, particularly at the instance of those who are wrong doers and who claim the privilege of carrying on their activities in premises illegally constructed. In fact the aforesaid intervener has given up a part of his holding for widening the road.

(7.) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners did not assert even at the Bar, that the structures which have been demolished or are sought to be demolished have been raised pursuant to a sanctioned plan. None of the owners or builders of the structures has made any grievance before this Court against the demolition of such illegal structures. It was submitted that there are large number of structures in the area, including thousand of houses, which have been constructed without a sanctioned plan. Having regard to the facts not disputed, particularly having regard to the fact that all the structures are unauthorised and have been raised without a sanctioned plan, we are not persuaded to exercise our writ jurisdiction to protect such illegal structures, particularly at the instance of the petitioners, who have no right whatsoever under the law even to object to the demolition of such structures. This by itself furnishes a good ground for dismissing this writ petition.

(8.) Even the other grounds urged in support of the writ petition are untenable. The petitioners have themselves stated in the writ petition that two grounds were disclosed to them for demolition of the structures. Firstly, that the structures were within the range of 90 (feet), which is the proposed width of the road in the Master Plan, and secondly that the structures were raised without a sanctioned plan. Since the structures which have been demolished are located in the heart of the city in the posh locality of Boring Road, we can take judicial notice of the fact that most of the structures which have been removed are in the nature of temporary or semi permanent structures which have been raised by the side of the existing road. The contention of the petitioners that the proposal contained in the Master Plan can have no effect on the building activities to be carried on the lands in question has no substance. The relevant provision of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 is S.23 which provides as follows :

"23. Restriction on change of use of development thereof.- (1) No person shall on or after the publication of a draft plan institute, or change the use of any land covered by the plan for any purpose other than agriculture, or carry out any development in respect of any such land without the previous permission in writing of the authority. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time bring in force, the permission referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall not be granted otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of the plan."

The aforesaid section makes it quite clear that the prohibitions contained therein apply as soon as the draft plan is published. The petitioners contended that the plan has not been approved, but that does not make any difference to the operation of S. 23 of the Act, since it is not disputed that the Draft Plan has been published and is presently under consideration of the State authorities. Section 23 of the Act is in the nature of a restriction not only on the right of the owner, but also on the power of the Authority to sanction a plan not in conformity with the Master Plan, meaning thereby, for purposes contrary to the purpose for which the land is earmarked in the Draft Master Plan. It is in the nature of preventive action, so that the proposal in the Draft Master Plan is not defeated even before it is approved and implemented. The provision enables the Authority to take action under S. 54 of the Act even if a building plan is illegally sanctioned, if the same is not in conformity with the Draft Master Plan.

(9.) The second submission, namely, that even if there was no sanctioned plan, or even if the constructions were raised in violation of the sanctioned plan, the action was not justified, unless action was first taken under the relevant provision of the Act is of no help to the petitioners. We may notice some of the relevant provisions of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981. Section 35 of the Act provides :

"35. Prohibition to building without sanction.- No person shall erect or commence to erect any building, or make any addition or alteration to any building except with the previous sanction of the Vice-Chairman, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and the regulations made under this Act : Provided that the Authority may make separate set of Regulations for different areas or different kinds of areas."

Section 36(1) provides as follows :

"36. Erection of buildings etc.- (1) Every person, including local authority, body corporate constituted under any law and a department of Central or State Government, who intends - (a) to carry out a development plan or any other development work; (b) to make any addition or alteration thereto, shall apply for sanction by giving notice in writing of his intention to the Vice-Chairman in such form and containing such information as may be prescribed by regulations made in this behalf : Provided that no such sanction need be sought if the alteration is to be done internally in a building without affecting the position of bath-room, kitchen and drainage arrangements and further that the proposed internal alteration does not violate the provisions of the building regulations or planning standards then in force."

Section 54, which is most significant provides as follows :

"54. Order of demolition of building.-(1) Where any development or erection of building has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the Regional Plan, Master Plan or Zonal Development Plan or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Ss. 35, 36, 37 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted, any officer of the Authority empowered by it in this behalf may, in addition to prosecution that may be instituted under this Act, make an order briefly stating the reasons therefor directing that such erection or development work shall be removed by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner thereof or by the person at whose instance the erection or development work has been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed within a period of thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order of removal has been delivered to the owner or that person, as may be specified in the order, and on his failure to comply with the order, any officer of the Authority may remove or cause to be removed the erection or development work and the expenses of such removal shall be recovered from the owner or the person at whose instance the erection or development was commenced or was being carried out or was composed, as arrears of land revenue : Provided that no such order shall be made unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-see. (1) may appeal to a Tribunal constituted under this Act against that order within thirty days from the date thereof; and the Tribunal may after hearing the parties to the appeal either allow or dismiss the appeal or reverse or vary the order or any part thereof. (3) The decision of the Tribunal on the appeal and subject only such decision the order under sub-sec. (1) shall be final and conclusive. (4) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other provisions relating to demolition of buildings contained in any other law for the time being in force."

9A. The provisions of the Act, therefore, make it abundantly clear that no person is authorised to erect or commence to erect any building or make any addition or alteration to any building except with the previous sanction of the Vice-Chairman of the Authority, and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the regulations made therein. Section 54 provides the consequence if any development or erection of building has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the Regional Plan, Master Plan or Zonal Development Plan or without the permission, approval or sanction of the concerned authority under the Act, or in contravention of any condition subject to which such permission, approval or sanction had been granted. If it is so done, the Authority is empowered to make an order briefly stating the reasons therefor directing that such erection or development work shall be removed by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner thereof or by the person at those instance the erection or development work has been completed. If the aforesaid order is not carried out by the owner or that person, as may be specified in the order, the Authority may remove or cause to be removed the erection or development work at the expense of the owner or the person at whose instance the erection or development took place. The proviso provides that no order shall be made unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that under the proviso the tenant of the premises in question is required to be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made. On the other hand, the respondents contend that notice, if any, has to be given to the owner or the person at whose instance the erection or development work has been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed. The Act does not envisage issuance of notice to the tenants, because the offending act is the act of erection of structure contrary to the Regional Plan, Master Plan or Zonal Plan or without the permission, approval or sanction of the concerned authority. An opportunity, therefore, if any, has to be given to such owner or person concerned, and not to the occupants of the premises or tenants who have no role to play in the erection of the structures and who do not own the structure. If the structures have been illegally constructed, and an order under S.54 is justified, it will make no difference whether the premises are self-occupied or are tenanted premises. The mere fact, that the premises are tenanted will not protect them from the consequence that flows from S. 54 of the Act. What attracts the provision of S. 54 is the erection of illegal structures and not letting out of such structures. In an action for removal of such structures, its owner or the builder of the structures may be prosecuted in addition to being required to remove the structures. A tenant of the illegally raised structure does not come into the picture, because it can be no defence in an action under S. 54 of the Act that the premises is tenanted. Therefore, having regard to the nature of the offending action, a mere tenant can have no say in the matter.

(10.) Even well settled principles of interpretation of statutes justify this conclusion. It is well settled that the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which, but for the proviso, would be within the purview of the enactment. The proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment. It qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out, as it were, from the main enactment, portion which, but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. It is cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as proviso and to no other. The proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso.

(11.) Adverting to the provision of S. 54 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act,- 1981, the proviso is to sub-sec. (1) of S. 54. It, therefore, carves out an exception to the rule enshrined in sub-section (1), of S. 54. Sub-section (1) authorises an officer of the Authority empowered by it in this behalf to make an order for the removal by demolition of the offensive erection or development work by the owner thereof or by the person at whose instance the erection or development work has been commenced or is being carried out. Sub-section (1), therefore, envisages a direction to be issued to only those two categories of persons, namely, the owners and builders under whose direction the offending construction has been raised or is being raised. This power is to be exercised subject to the proviso, which provides that the owner or the person concerned must be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be given. Obviously, therefore, the owner or the person concerned are the same persons to whom reference has been made in sub-sec. (1) of S. 54. A tenant or occupier does not come within the purview of sub-sec. (1) of S. 54 and, therefore, without violating the well-settled principles of interpretation of statutes, it cannot be held that the proviso includes within its sweep occupants and tenants also, apart from the owner or the builder of the offending structure referred to in the main sub-section. We must, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioners that they were entitled to notice under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 54 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981. Only the owner or the builder has the right to object under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 54. None of the owners or builders has made a grievance against the authorities and, therefore, it would not be permissible to entertain this writ petition at the instance of the tenants or occupiers of the unauthorised structures. In fact, they have no right to maintain this writ petition, because if action was taken under sub-sec. (1) of S. 54 of the Act after complying with all the requirements of the section, it would have made no difference whether the premises were tenanted premises or self-occupied premises. The objection is not to the creation of a tenancy, but to the erection of the structure itself. The erection, if it is found to be illegal, may be demolished in exercise of the power vested in the Authority under S. 54 of the Act. It is in pursuance of statutory authority that such structures may be demolished, and obviously, therefore, a private contract of tenancy cannot override the statutory provision, or render it ineffective. If we accept the submission urged on behalf of the petitioners, with a view to avoid the consequence of S. 54 of the Act, every owner or builder may plead that the premises are tenanted and, therefore, should not be demolished under S. 54 of the Act.

(12.) We may now consider the authorities cited at the Bar by counsel for the petitioners.

(13.) Counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 . In that case the Court was considering the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905, and the Court came to the conclusion that the summary remedy provided under S. 7 thereof was not adequate, because complicated questions of title arose for decision. It was in that context that the Court held that having regard to the facts of the case and the complicated questions of title that arose for consideration, the parties must be relegated to a suit and that the summary proceeding under the Act was not suited for an adjudication of complicated questions of title. In our view, this judgment is of no assistance to the petitioners, because no proceeding has been challenged before this Court. Counsel then relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 , and in particular he drew our notice to paragraph No. 45 of the judgment. The Court observed in the aforesaid decision that while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. The principles of natural justice were excluded by way of exception and not as general rule. So far as the instant case is concerned, we have already held that the petitioners have no right to represent against the action of the respondents because they are mere tenants of the illegal structures, and are not either owner or builder, who have a right to object under S. 54 of the Act. Counsel next referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , and in particular referred to paragraph No. 101 of the judgment. The observation in the aforesaid paragraph of the judgment in fact supports the view that we have taken. The right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion. In the instant case, apart from the fact that Sec. 54 of the Act does not confer on the petitioners a right to raise objection against the action taken under that section, the purpose for which the action is taken under Sec. 54 is also relevant. As observed earlier, the offending act is the act of erecting an illegal structure, which is done either by the owner or by the builder. Even if the demolition of such illegal structures has some effect on the interest of the tenants, having regard to the mischief sought to be remedied, they can have no say in the matter, and only the owner and the builder may raise objection, and plead such defences as may be available to them in law. Learned counsel then referred to two decisions, reported in 1985 (Volume 1) The All England Law Reports and 1983 (Volume 2) All England Law Reports. Counsel submitted that on the basis of the doctrine of reasonable expectation, the petitioners could claim a right of hearing. Though the doctrine of reasonable expectation has found acceptance by the courts in this country including the Supreme Court, we fail to understand how this doctrine will. come to the aid of the petitioners. If the petitioners occupied illegal structures which did not have any legal sanctity can it be said that they could reasonably expect to continue in those illegal structures for all times to come Such an expectation could not be entertained by them reasonably, particularly having regard to the provisions of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981. Counsel then relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 . The ratio of that decision can be of no aid to the petitioners, because in that case the buildings and the land attached to the buildings belonged to the landlord, who under an agreement authorised defendants Nos. 2 to 4 to demolish the buildings for consideration. In that context the tenants raised an objection. In principle it will make a world of difference between the action taken by the landlord to demolish his building and an action taken by the authorities under a statute to demolish a building constructed without a sanctioned plan. While in the one case it is on account of the volition of the landlord that the building is demolished, in the other it is the compulsion of law which compels the authorities to demolish the building concerned. The case in hand stands on different facts, and as we have already observed earlier in this judgment, the private contract between the landlord and the tenant cannot override the statutory provisions which justify demolition in certain cases. The judgment of this Court in Bishwanath Prasad v. The Municipal Board, Chapra, AIR 1976 Patna 226, is also of no help to the petitioners. Paragraph No. 6 of the judgment on which reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners only lays down the principle that once a notice is issued to a party to show cause, and the party concerned files his show cause, that should be considered along with the materials produced on behalf of the party concerned. The principle laid down therein is of no assistance to the petitioners. Similarly, is the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Haji Wali Mohammed, AIR 1972 SC 2538 , the question which was canvassed and decided in paragraph No. 12 of the judgment was with regard to the inadequacy of the notice to the person concerned. No such question arises for consideration in the instant case. Counsel then referred to the case in Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 2 SCC 604. In that case an order earlier passed under the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, was subsequently sought to be modified to the detriment of the petitioners. While issuing the notification on the earlier occasion, objections had been invited and considered. While modifying the same later, that procedure was not followed. The court held, relying upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which is in pari materia with Section 10 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, that the power should have been exercised in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any - to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued. Since the same was not followed while modifying the earlier notification, the Court held that action was not in accordance with law. No such question arises for consideration in the instant case. Lastly, in Rabindranath Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1984 BBCH (HC) 321, the Court was considering a case under the Bihar Land Ceiling Act. Under Section 45-B of the said Act the Collector proceeded to reopen a concluded proceeding and this Court considered the principles which justified reopening of such concluded proceeding. No such question arises for consideration in the instant case.

(14.) We are, therefore, of the view that none of the authorities cited at the Bar helps the petitioners.

(15.) Having considered all aspects of the matter, we have no hesitation in dismissing this writ petition. We hold that this writ petition is not in the nature of public interest litigation, but has been filed to espouse the cause of shopkeepers and traders, who are occupants of unauthorised constructions. This Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction will not issue a writ which has the effect of perpetuating an illegality by protecting illegal structures raised by owners and builders even without a sanctioned plan and in contravention of the Draft Master Plan. It would not be either in public interest or in the interest of justice to grant protection to such illegal activities. We are, therefore, not persuaded to exercise our writ jurisdiction and consequently this writ petition must be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed.

(16.) We may, however, record the statement of the learned Additional Advocate General that the authorities will not touch any building or structure which is being erected or has been erected pursuant to a sanction plan. Secondly, no building or structure will be demolished if there be an order of a court of law preventing or restraining the respondents from demolishing a structure or building. Court orders binding upon the respondents shall be respected in all events. Thirdly, the removal of unauthorised constructions will be confined to the area earmarked for the expansion of the road in the Draft Master Plan, and if any structure is removed, it would be strictly in accordance with the Master Plan. Lastly, no boundary wall shall be demolished if it is not an encroachment on the Boring Road which has presently a width of 548 (feet). The owners are entitled to enclose their holdings by erecting boundary walls without encroaching on the road, even if it is within 90(feet) width of the road envisaged under the Master Plan, but they shall not erect any structure thereon.

(17.) Before parting with this case we are compelled to make a few observations. In the city of Patna, as also in other cities of this State, building laws and bye-laws have been observed in their breach. Their existence is completely ignored by those who raise structures within the Municipal area or the area covered by the provisions of the Regional Development Authority Act, The authorities, who are enjoined to enforce the provisions of the law have been equally indifferent to the violations of the laws, otherwise the problem presently faced by the citizens of Patna and other cities of this State would not have acquired such alarming proportion. One has to see to believe with what impunity the laws have been ignored, and illegal structures have been raised all over the City. The result is that the City of Patna is a veritable slum, and it will require a serious effort on the part of all concerned to make it a city worth living. Not only building laws, but even traffic laws and other such laws, which are intimately connected with the enjoyment of civic amenities and otherwise intended to make city life worthwhile, are also observed in their breach. This provides encouragement to the violators of the law. The impunity and obstinacy of the law breakers is only matched by the apathy and indolence of those responsible for enforcement of the laws. This has resulted in immense misery to the only sufferers, namely, the ordinary citizens of Patna, and other cities of the State, who have virtually raised their hands in despair. We can say from our judicial experience that even in ordinary routine matters, where actions must be taken in a normal way, without requiring any intervention by a court of law, large number of petitions in public interest are filed before this Court, and it is only under threat of court orders that the authorities are activated into action. This is a sorry state of affairs and has cast a heavy burden on the High Court with numerous writ petitions being filed in public interest for the purpose of enforcing the performance of normal statutory duties by the concerned authorities. We do hope that the respondents will not sleep over this matter after the disposal of this writ petition. They must take prompt steps to prevent illegal constructions from converting the city into a virtual slum. If preventive action is not taken immediately, perhaps, later it will be too late. The Patna Regional Development Authority will be well advised to carry out a survey of all constructions made in the recent past and those in the process of construction, and verify whether those constructions are legal and in accordance with the sanctioned plans. If it is found that illegal structures have been raised or are being raised without a sanctioned Plan, coercive machinery provided under the Act should be activated, and further constructions must be stopped forthwith. The Patna Regional Development Authority is under a statutory obligation to perform these functions and must do so with promptitude in the larger public interest. Similarly, the district authorities must vigorously remove the encroachments which they are enjoined to do under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. Some encroachments have been removed, but that was only pursuant to several orders passed by this Court from time to time. The citizens of the State are justified in their expectation that the authorities must act on their own and discharge the duties cast on them by the laws, and that in the discharge of their normal duties under the statute, there should be no necessity for judicial intervention.

(18.) After the judgment was pronounced counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if the constructions have to be demolished, some reasonable time must be given to the shopkeepers to remove their belongings. We consider the request to be reasonable and we direct the authorities to give at least seventy-two hours to the shopkeepers to remove their belongings before any structure is demolished, so that within three days at their disposal they may remove their belongings to a suitable place.

(19.) This application stands dismissed. Application dismissed.