1. Both these petitions are filed by petitioner-accused No.2 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing First Information Report filed by the respondent bearing No.RC 7(E)/2017 dated 05.05.2017 for the offence punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'PC Act') and also the charge sheet in Spl. C.C. No.231/2018 pending on the file of XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI cases, Bengaluru.

2. Heard learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Special Counsel for the respondent CBI.

3. The case of the prosecution is that one Smt. Pooja Tiku, the Deputy General Manager of the Industrial Finance Corporation Limited (IFCI) lodged a written complaint dated 03.05.2017 against the petitioner and others to the CBI at Bengaluru alleging that the company VNR Infrastructures Ltd. (Accused No.1) and the petitioner-accused No.2 being the Managing Director along with accused Nos.3 to 9 said to have committed fraud on the complainant IFCI Ltd. to the tune of Rs.205.02 crores as on 15.03.2016 by way of misappropriation, cheating and criminal misconduct. It is further alleged that accused Nos.1 and 2 had availed corporate loan from the complainant bank IFCI to the tune of Rs.190 crores in two cheques, that is, Rs.90 crores on 15.09.2014 and Rs.100 crores on 05.05.2015. The said loan amounts were secured by immovable properties. It is further alleged that the first loan of Rs.90 crores was secured by mortgaging 29 acres 23 guntas of Non-agricultural land situated at Panjeerala Village of Mahbubnagar District of Telangana State, 5 acres 27 guntas of Non-agricultural land situated at Nandigama Village of Mahbubnagar District of Telangana State, 20 acres 10 guntas of Non-agricultural land situated at Raikal Village of Mahbubnagar District of Telangana State, 20 acres 18 guntas Non-agricultural land situated at Immulnarva Village of Mahbubnagar District of Telangana State along with personal guarantee of Accused No.2 and Corporate Gurantee of the Mortgagers. It is also alleged that the said complainant IFCI Ltd. appointed Accused Nos.4 and 5 as valuators in order to evaluate the mortgaged properties. The valuation was effected by the Accused No.4 along with K. Chandrasekhkar (official of the company) on 11.09.2014, and as per the valuation report, the fair value of the mortgaged properties situated at Mahbubnagar was estimated to be Rs.257.59 crores as against Distress Sale Value at Rs.231.54 crores. The 2nd valuation regarding the mortgaged properties situated at Mahbubnagar was effected by the Accused No.5 along with K. Chandrasekhar (official of the company) on 12.09.2014 and estimated the fair market value at Rs.282.80 crores as against distress sale value at Rs.226.24 crores. Based on the two valuation reports of Accused No.4 and Accused No.5, the corporate loan for an amount of Rs.90 Crores was executed between the Company (Accused No.1) and the Complainant IFCI Ltd. on 15.09.2014.

4. It is further alleged by the complainant that in the month of April 2015, accused Nos.2 and 3 acting on behalf of the company approached the Complainant for another Rs.100 crore corporate loan to meet and fulfill the company and IPO objectives. The Complainant agreed in principle for the said loan considering the accused furnishing securities and personal and corporate guarantees for the said loan amount. In view of the same, the properties measuring 24 acres 21 guntas of Non- Agricultural Land situated at Rajabollaram village of Medachalmangal, Rangareddy District, Telangana State were mortgaged as security for the Second Loan of Rs.100 Crores along with the personal Guarantee of the Accused No.2 and Corporate Guarantee. The complainant company entrusted accused Nos.4 and 5 for valuation of the mortgaged properties measuring 24 acres 21 guntas at Rajabollaram Village. The first valuation was carried out on 02.05.2015 by the Accused No.4 and the fair value of the mortgaged property was estimated to be Rs.320.94 crores as against distress sale value of Rs.256.39 crores. The second valuation was carried out by the Accused No.5 on 07.05.2015 and as per the valuation report the fair market value of the mortgaged property was estimated to be Rs.325.83 crores as against the distress sale value of Rs.260.66 crores. Based on both the valuations, the Second Corporate Loan amount of Rs.100 Crores was sanctioned by the complainant Bank in favour of the Accused on 15.05.2015 and the deed of personal guarantee was executed on the same date. The said first and second loans were supposed to be repaid on quarterly installment basis.

5. It is also alleged that, subsequently on 15.09.2015, the accused No.2 started defaulting on repayment of the loan amount. On 15.03.2016, the loan account of Accused No.1 was classified as Non-Performing Asset as the total loan amount including interest stood at Rs.205 crores (Rs.205,02,734,44.02/-). In furtherance to that, on 01.04.2016, proceedings were initiated under Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short SARFAESI Act) for the recovery of the said loan amount by issuing notice under Section 13(2) of the said Act. The services of the BKC Advisors Pvt. Ltd. Consultants and Valuators were engaged for carrying out the valuation of the mortgaged properties in order to take recourse under the provisions of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. As per the valuation report dated 27.06.2016 submitted by BKC Advisors Pvt. Ltd. Consultants and Valuators, the distress sale value of all the properties situated at Mahbubnagar was estimated to be Rs.23.84 crores and the distress sale value of the properties situated at Rangareddy District was estimated to be Rs.6.04 crores. In view of the massive discrepancies regarding valuation of the mortgaged properties carried out by the valuators (Accused No.4 and Accused No.5), it was found that accused Nos.1 to 3 had inflated the fair value and distress value of the mortgaged properties. Therefore, the complaint came to be filed against the accused persons. After investigation, CBI also filed challan and the trial Court took cognizance against the accused persons, which is under challenge.

6. Previously, the petitioner filed the first petition in Crl.P. No.9445/2018 and there was interim order passed by this Court. Subsequently, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Fertico Marketing And Investment Private Limited And Others Vs. Central Bureau Of Investigation And Another reported in (2021)2 SCC 525, the trial Court separated proceedings of the trial. Therefore, the subsequent petition in Crl.P. No.2185/2021 was filed and further stay was granted by this Court. In fact, both the petitions are arising out of the same case with the same prayer for quashing of criminal proceedings against the petitioner- accused No.2.

7. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the complainant IFCI does not make out the commission of various offences much less cognizance of offence against the petitioner. Perusal of the charge sheet reveals the inflation of the valuation of the lands offered as security for the loans availed by the accused company from the complainant i.e., IFCI Ltd. In view of the massive discrepancies regarding valuation of the mortgaged properties carried out by the valuators (Accused No.4 and Accused No.5) who were appointed by the complainant bank before sanctioning of Corporate loan to Accused No.1, with that of the valuation being carried out by BKC Advisors Pvt. Ltd. and ITCOT during the course of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, led to the complainant bank assuming and alleging that the accused No.4 and Accused No.5 in connivance with Accused No.1 to 3 had inflated the fair value and distress value of the mortgaged properties. It is further contended that by no stretch of imagination can such alleged discrepancy in the valuation be a criteria for alleging any of the offences punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 of IPC and Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner.

8. The learned Senior counsel further contended that the first two valuators were appointed by the complainant - bank itself. If that were to be so and merely because the third valuator quixotically gives his own fanciful valuation at a diminished rate, blissfully ignoring of ground reality inasmuch as no lands in and around Hyderabad City, would be certainly having a market value much more than Rs.25.00 lakhs, it cannot be said that on the basis of such quixotic valuation, the petitioner is guilty of any of offences alleged. Evidently, the dispute between the complainant and the accused NO.1 - company and the petitioner is purely civil in nature and it was converted into a criminal proceedings, which is baseless allegation against the petitioner. It is further contended that the trial Court has mechanically without proper application of mind either in the charge sheet or in the FIR filed by the police did not in any manner even remotely indicate the consent having been given by the Government of the State of Karnataka for the respondent CBI under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the investigation conducted by the CBI is wholly without jurisdiction and null and void abinitio. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that to the knowledge of the petitioner, the general consent as was given by the State of Karnataka was withdrawn in the year 1988 and therefore, the CBI did not have any general consent. Therefore, without obtaining any special permission from the State of Karnataka for registering FIR, filed charge sheet, which goes to the root of the matter.

9. The learned Senior counsel contended that the proceeding is also pending before the National Company Law Tribunal. It is an admitted fact that the company is presently under liquidation and the respondent has suppressed the fact that there is a specific order passed by the NCLT, Hyderabad against the company in No.12/10/HBD/2017 in the matter of VNR Infrastructures Ltd. i.e. Annexure-D whereby the NCLT declared a moratorium by prohibiting the institution of suits or continuation of pending suit or proceedings against the Corporate Debtor (VNR Infrastructures), including the execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, Tribunal Arbitration Panel or other Authority. When once there is a moratorium passed, then in terms of Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy code, the institution of suits or "proceedings" against the company is prohibited. Therefore, the CBI has no authority or jurisdiction to have registered the FIR and investigate and file the impugned charge sheet. The trial Court has strangely ignored these aspects and has taken cognizance and the same is liable to be quashed.

10. The learned Senior counsel has also contended that in terms of the order dated 20.07.2018 passed by this Court in Criminal Petition No.155/2018 and connected cases, the trial Court has no authority or jurisdiction to try offences under the provisions of the PC Act. The FIR, charge sheet and the order passed by the trial Court are liable to be quashed. It is further contended that when a moratorium has been imposed on accused No.1 - company and when accused No.2/petitioner was suspended as the Managing Director of accused No.1 - company by NCLT, with malafide intentions, the complaint came to be filed against the petitioner in order to harass as he was a Member of the Legislative Council of Andhra Pradesh. The learned Senior counsel further contended that as far as the offence under Section 120B of IPC is concerned, no offence is made out against the petitioner, inasmuch as the valuers of the collateral securities were appointed by IFCI. The valuers have admitted the valuations given by them in their witness statements. The petitioner does not have anything to do with the valuations of the collateral securities. As far as the offence under Section 420 of IPC is concerned, no offence is made out against the petitioner, inasmuch as Accused No.1 - Company has not diverted any loan funds of IFCI Ltd. Statutory Auditors of Accused No.1 - company provided the end use certificates in the matter of utilization of IFCI loans. The same is available in the charge sheet material. Accused No.1 - Company could not repay the loans as Accused No.1 - Company was declared as insolvent by the NCLT under IBC. Had Accused No.1 - Company being in operation, then Accused No.1 - Company is under liquidation now and Liquidator is also appointed. Non repayment of loans are purely civil in nature and the entire case is purely a civil dispute. Thus, no offence is made out against the petitioner.

11. The learned Senior counsel further contended that the valuation report given by the companies was not referred to by the valuators for the purpose of revaluating the property. Therefore, the investigation and the charge sheet is not sustainable. The IFCL is no more a public limited company and no document is produced to show that it is the public limited company in order to bring the Deputy General Manager-accused No.3 under the P.C. Act and when the said company is no more a public financial institution, the question of filing charge sheet/challan under the P.C. Act does not arise. Therefore, prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings.

12. The learned Senior counsel with respect to his contentions, has relied on the following judgment:

"1. Jayahari And Another Vs. State Of Kerala And Another in Crl. A. No.128/2022 (Spl. Leave Petition (Criminal) No.5489/2020)"

13. Per contra, learned Special Counsel appearing for the respondent-CBI has objected the petitions and with regard to the contention of the petitioner that the CBI does not have consent of the State Government under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the learned special counsel contended that as per the notification issued by the Karnataka Government bearing No.HD 234 PCR 2004 dated 10.01.2005, the State of Karnataka has accorded consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act for exercising powers and jurisdiction by the members of the Delhi Police Establishment within the State of Karnataka for investigation of all types of cases involving either Central Government servants or officers belonging to Public Sector Undertakings under the Central Government under different State and Central Government Acts. Therefore, he has contended that the contention of the petitioner's counsel cannot be accepted. In respect of the contention that the complainant is a public limited company, the learned respondent's Counsel has contended that the complainant company is a public financial institution called as the Industrial Finance Corporation of India which was formed on July 1, 1948 and subsequently, an Act was brought in the name of Industrial Finance Corporation of India Act. The constitution of IFCI was changed in 1993 from a statutory corporation to a company under the Indian Companies Act, 1986. Subsequently, the name was changed as IFCI Limited with effect from October 1999 and the Government of India is the majority stake holder in IFCI Ltd. Therefore, on this ground the CBI has the authority to register a case against accused No.3 who is IFCI Manager.

13. The learned Special Counsel for respondent further contended that accused Nos.1 and 2 approached IFCI for loan and the documents offered for mortgage were referred to accused Nos.4 and 5 for valuation of the property, but they have given an escalated value of more than 100 times, thereby they colluded together with accused Nos.1 to 3 and got sanction of loan of Rs.190 crores and petitioner also became defaulter in payment. Subsequently, the same property was valued and the valuation was very less and thereby, caused loss to the complainant bank. Therefore, the matter requires trial. Accused No.1 company is under liquidation. This Court already rejected the similar relief sought by the MITCON consultancy and Engineering Services Limited (MITCON company) who is accused No.4 in the said complaint. This Court rejected the relief for the reason that they escalated the valuation of the property in their report. They also forged the signature of the director/CEO of the company. Therefore, from the initial stage, there was criminal intention to cheat the complainant institution. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner is not entitled for the relief sought in this petition. The learned counsel also contended that the Deputy Director of the CBI also received bribe and dropped one of the accused in the charge sheet. Therefore, FIR has been lodged against the Deputy Director of the CBI. Hence, prayed for dismissing the petitions.

14. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgments:

"1. In the case of Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. Vs. P. Mohan Raj reported in 2018 SCC Online NCLAT 415

2. In the case of Innovative Industries Ltd. Vs. ICICI Bank and Another reported in (2018) 1 SCC 407

3. In the case of Maharashtra University of Health Sciences and Ors. Vs. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal and Others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 786

4. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin and Others reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718

5. In the case of L.K. Krishna Vs. State by CBI/ ACB/ SPE Ganganagara in Crl.A.No.62/2004 (High Court of Karnataka) decided on 08.02.2011

6. In the case of M. Balakrishna Reddy Vs. CBI reported in (2008) 4 SCC 409"

15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records.

16. It is an admitted fact that accused No.1 - company and the petitioner is accused No.2 who is the Managing Director of accused No.1 company, approached IFCI for sanction of loan by producing the land documents as mortgage. The petitioner-accused NO.2 has also offered surety. It is an admitted fact that Rs.190 crores has been sanctioned by the IFCI to accused NO.1 company where the petitioner is the Managing Director. The said loan of Rs.90 crores were sanctioned on 15.9.2014 and further loan of Rs.100 crores were sanctioned on 15.5.2015 based upon the valuation report submitted by the accused Nos.4 and 5, the valuators of the complainant institution. Admittedly, accused Nos.4 and 5 have given valuation of the property and submitted report for the first loan stating that the value of the property at Rs.282.80 crores as against distress sale value at Rs.226.24 crores. Based upon the report of accused Nos.4 and 5, Rs.90 crores have been sanctioned. Subsequently, again VNR Infrastructure-accused No.1 approached for Rs.100 crores by producing documents wherein the property was said to be situated at Rangareddy district and accused No.5 valued the property at Rs.320.94 crores as against distress sale value of Rs.256.39 crores and accused NO.4 valued the same property at Rs.329.83 crores as against distress sale value of Rs.260.67 crores. Based upon the said report, Rs.100 crores loan were sanctioned by the IFCI. Admittedly, within four months of the sanction of the second loan, accused No.1 company defaulted in repayment and subsequently, it appears that the outstanding loan was Rs.205 crores. It is an admitted fact that the IFCI also filed a recovery suit under the SARFAESI Act, which is pending. Under the SARFAESI proceedings, the complainant company engaged the services of the BKC Advisors Pvt. Ltd. Consultants and Valuators for revaluation of the property, where they valued the property for Rs.23.84 crores and the property situated at Rangareddy district was Rs.6.4 crores. The ITCOT company also carried out the second valuation and they also given valuation report as Rs.5.30 crores. The evaluation report of both MITCON and BKC Advisors Pvt. Ltd. valued at Rs. 28.86. crores and Rs.30.38 crores as against the valuation report issued by accused Nos.4 and 5 at the rate of Rs.487.96 crores and Rs.486.88 cores which reveals 10-20 times more than the value escalated by accused Nos.4 and 5 company which facilitated accused NO.1 company to borrow Rs.190 crores by producing those documents which were worth less than Rs.60.00 crores.

17. Now coming to the objection and contention taken by the petitioner that the complainant company is not a public sector company and therefore, the CBI has no authority to investigate and file charge sheet without permission of the State Government, the same was countered by the respondent's counsel and it was stated by the respondent's counsel that the State Government issued notification dated 10.01.2005 by giving consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Though the petitioner's counsel has stated that the said consent was withdrawn in the year 2008, but no such document was produced by the petitioner's counsel for having withdrawn the said consent. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has produced the notification of the State Government dated 10.01.2005 wherein it is clearly mentioned that the State of Karnataka has accorded consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act for exercising powers and jurisdiction by the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment within the State of Karnataka for investigation of all types of cases involving either Central Government servants or officers belonging to Public Sector Undertakings under the Central Government under different State and Central Government Acts. The Government of Karnataka has also issued a notification for establishment of special court for trying the offences vide notification dated 24.09.2018 in No.LAW 63 LCE 2018. The learned counsel for the respondent has also contended that the consent is already given by the State Government and no further consent or sanction is required on this aspect. Therefore, it is clear that the respondent-CBI established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act is having jurisdiction to register and investigate the case of a person who is the servant under the Central Government institution in the State of Karnataka.

18. As regards the contention raised by the petitioner's counsel that the IFCI is not a banking company and it was not controlled by the Central Government, in this regard, learned special counsel for the respondent has brought to the notice of this Court that the said financial institution has been established and it was referred in the complaint at paragraph No.1 stating that,

"That the complainant company is a public financial institution and the Central Government of India company registered at Delhi. The IFCI was formed on 1.7.1948 as the first development financial institution in the country to cater to the long term finance needs of the industrial sector by an Act called Industrial Finance Corporation of India Act. The constitution of IFCI was changed in 1993 from a statutory corporation to a company under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Subsequently, the name of the company was also changed as IFCI Limited w.e.f. October 1999 and currently, the Government of India is a major stake holder in IFCI limited and the main business of the company is lending/provide loan/granting financial assistance to companies. It is also mentioned that the complaint is filed by one Pooja is Deputy General manager, working at IFCI, New Delhi."

19. From the above said information, it clearly reveals that though the IFCI was created by the statute, but subsequently, named as "Limited Company" which is nothing but a Public Limited Company as per the definition of the Companies Act and the same was registered under the Companies Registration Act. The copy of the registration certificate is also produced herein. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the company was not shown as registered under the Company Registrars of Companies website, but the said contention cannot be acceptable because once the financial institution has been established under the IFCI Act, 1948, subsequently, the said Act was repealed on 2.4.1993 by a repeal Industrial Finance Corporation (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1993 and subsequently, the same was formed as public undertaking company. The learned counsel for respondent has also produced the Company Master Data (Annexure-R4) which reveals the date of incorporation of the company as 21.05.1993 and the category of the company is mentioned as company limited by shares and sub-category is mentioned as Union Government company and the class of company is mentioned as public. Learned Special counsel for the respondent has also brought to the notice of this Court that under Section 4(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. It is referred in sub-clause (a) of Section 4(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, which refers as under:

(a) The name of the company with the last word "Limited" in the case of a public limited company and the last words "Private Limited" in the case of a private limited company.

20. That means, the company of the complainant named as IFCI Ltd. will automatically come under the public limited company in view of Section 4(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. Accused No.3 directly falls under the category of public servant and performing the duty as public duty and it is considered as public duty in view of Section 2(c)(iii) and (viii) of the P.C. Act. The P.C. Act also defines "public duty" in Section 2(b) where, public duty means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. The explanation to Section 2(b) also says the State includes a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. Therefore, the State Financial company is nothing but a public limited company and discharging the duty of the State and the community at large has an interest, thereby the said IFCI company is a Public Financial Limited Institution. Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner's counsel cannot be acceptable that the IFCI is not the Public Limited Company.

21. That apart, as per the reference available in the complaint, the IFCI of India established in the 1948 Act and subsequently in the year 1993 under the repealed Act, the same was formed as the company and registered under the Companies Act, but the name of the corporation has not been changed and continued as IFCI Limited. Therefore, once the company was registered and if the name is not changed, there is no necessity of further registration of the company in view of Section 13 of the Companies Act, 2013, which refers hereunder:

"13. Alteration of memorandum.— (1) Save as provided in section 61, a company may, by a special resolution and after complying with the procedure specified in this section, alter the provisions of its memorandum.

(2) Any change in the name of a company shall be subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 4 and shall not have effect except with the approval of the Central Government in writing: Provided that no such approval shall be necessary where the only change in the name of the company is the deletion therefrom, or addition thereto, of the word "Private", consequent on the conversion of any one class of companies to another class in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(3) When any change in the name of a company is made under sub-section (2), the Registrar shall enter the new name in the register of companies in place of the old name and issue a fresh certificate of incorporation with the new name and the change in the name shall be complete and effective only on the issue of such a certificate."

22. In view of the aforesaid Section, unless, there is a change in the name of company, the issuance of fresh certificate is not mandatory.

23. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner himself has produced certificate of incorporation which is registered on 21.05.1993 and subsequently, a fresh certificate of incorporation consequent upon change of name was also issued on 27.10.1999. Though the learned Senior counsel has contended that the name of the complainant corporation is not mentioned in the certificate of incorporation, but in view of Section 13 of Companies Act, 2013 once the name of company is not changed, then there is no necessity for obtaining any fresh certificate arises. Therefore, on this ground, the criminal proceeding cannot be quashed against the petitioner.

24. That apart, as per the circular issued by the bankers in respect of prevention, classification and reporting frauds, if any fraud committed on the bank as per the guidelines of Reserve Bank of India, a complaint shall be filed before the police, if the amount of fraud is up to Rs.1.00 lakh and if the fraud is more than Rs.1.00 lakh to Rs.3.00 lakhs, the complaint shall be filed before the CID/Economic offences wing of the State concerned. If fraud is above Rs.3.00 crores, the complaint shall be filed before the CBI Anti Corruption Branch. Here in this case, accused Nos.1 and 2, approached accused NO.3, who is Deputy General Manager for borrowing loan and accused NOs.1 to 3 in collusion with accused No.4 and 5 escalated the property value more than 10-20 times and facilitated accused Nos.1 and 2 for sanctioning of loan of Rs.190.00 crores which was sanctioned by accused No.3 and four months after the sanction of Rs.100/- crores, accused No.1 company defaulted in re-payment of loan and on verifying the value of the property with the second evaluators, it had come to the knowledge of the complainant that the property value was only Rs.20 to 30 crores, but not Rs.250/- crores as stated by accused NOs.4 and 5 valuators. Though the learned Senior counsel has contended that the second evaluators were appointed, but the CBI has not sent the property to the third evaluators to verify the actual value of the properties, but the properties are already attached by the banker under the DRT proceedings and recovery proceedings are still pending. Accused No.1 company is already under liquidation and the liquidators are also appointed by the High Court of Telangana State. The accused has also not produced fresh valuation report to show the properties were fetching more than Rs.300/- crores as stated by accused Nos.4 and 5. of course, accused NO.4 and 5 were the evaluators appointed by State Finance Corporation, but it cannot be ruled out that the accused NOs.1 to 3 have not colluded with accused NO.4 and 5 for escalating the value of the property and borrowing huge crores of money and defrauded the public financial institutions and caused loss to the public financial institutions. Therefore, without going to the trial, this Court cannot go into appreciating and re-appreciating the documents while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

25. It is also pertinent to note that this Court has already rejected the petition filed by the MITCON Consultancy Company. In a similar case for the same bank, they issued the evaluation certificate by escalating the value and a case was registered against them and charge sheet has been filed in Spl. Criminal case 36/2020. They approached this Court in Crl.R.P.No.773/2021 which came to be rejected by this Court on 22.09.2021. It is one of the similar cases where the same MITCON Consultancy Company who is accused in the present case also gave the escalated valuation report, based upon the same, accused No.3 sanctioned loan to accused Nos.1 and 2 and subsequently, the case came to be registered.

26. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases and in case of Fertico Marketing and investment private Limited case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in any defective or illegal investigation, taking cognizance by the trial Court cannot be set aside unless illegality in investigation can be shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice. Illegality may have bearing on question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but invalidity of investigation has no relation to competence of court. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell Vs. Ramesh Gelli and others - (2016)3 SCC 788, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically explained the definition of public servant and public duty and held that the manager of the bank comes under the definition of 'public servants' for the purpose of PC Act and the same view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and Others Vs. Brijlal Sadasukh Modani - (2016)4 SCC 417.

Thougb the learned Senior counsel a[[appearing for the petitioner has contended that borrowing loan and non repaytment amounts toi a civil dispute but not attract the criminal prosecution and he has relied upon the unreported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jayahari and another case (supra), but the facts and circumstances of the case is altogether different where accused No.1 and 2 borrowed loan by manipulating the documents with a the help of accused Nos.4 and 5 and they committed fraud on the Central Financial Institution to the tune of more than Rs.200.00 crores. Accused NO.s4 an 5 have given a wrong valuation report even though the value of the property was fetching only Rs.25.00 crores, but accused Nos.4 and 5 gave the property value more than Rs.250.00s to Rs.350.00 crores. Thereby, accused NOs.1 and 2 got sanctioned Rs.190.00 crores from the complainant company. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable. on the fraud has been committed on the public sector financial institution and caused huge loss by the accused Nos.1 and 2 to the public financial institution which affects the interest of the public at large. Merely, the recovery proceeding is pending, that itself cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

27. Therefore, by looking to the entire material on record, there is no case made out by the petitioner to quash the criminal proceedings pending against him before the trial Court. The petitioner requires to face the trial and take all the contentions as defence, if so available.

28. Therefore, at this stage, this Court cannot exercise the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceedings.

29. Accordingly, both the criminal petitions filed by the accused No.2 are hereby dismissed.