This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to set aside proceedings in Cr.No.1890/2011/CPE/D4, dated 31-05-2011, of respondent No.1, whereby he has rejected the petitioners appeal as time barred.

The petitioner sent an appeal through registered post against Order, dated 05-01-2011, passed by respondent No.2, confiscating his APE truck. The office of respondent No.1 has received the said appeal on 08-03-2011. By the impugned proceedings, the said appeal was rejected on the ground that it was filed beyond the limitation period of 60 days. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition.

It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that he has received Order, dated 05-01-2011, of respondent No.2, on 06-02-2011. This fact is not disputed by the respondents. If the date of receipt of the said order is reckoned for the purpose of limitation, the appeal will be in time.

The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise, representing the respondents, placed reliance on Section 13 of the A.P.Prohibition Act, 1995 (for short the Act), and contended that if a person is aggrieved by an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, under Section 13 (c) of the Act, he is entitled to file an appeal within 60 days from the date of passing such order, and that limitation will commence from the date of passing of the order and not from the date of its receipt.

In my opinion, this aspect is no longer res integra. While dealing with Section 35-E (3) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, the Supreme Court has held that, where an authority is authorized to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period of limitation prescribed therefor. It was further held that the order or decision of such authority comes into force or becomes operative or becomes an effective order or decision on and from the date when it was signed by him. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that where a party is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing of such an order and that therefore, the Courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy, the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him and not the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances; that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains; that the knowledge of the party affected by such a decision either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision is said to have been concluded or binding on him. (see Collector of Central Excise, Madras vs. M/s.M.M.Rubber and Co., Tamilnadu (AIR 1991 SC 2141 [LQ/SC/1991/442] )).

Dealing with the expression date of the award used in Proviso (b) of Section 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Supreme Court held that, where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned and that it is only the date of communication of the award either actual or constructive that should be the starting point of limitation and not the date on which the award was made. (see Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another (AIR 1961 SC 1500 [LQ/SC/1961/153] (V 48 C 281)).

Since, admittedly, Order, dated 05-02-2011, of respondent No.2, was received by the petitioner on 06-02-2011, he has filed an appeal within the period of 60 days from the date of its receipt. Following the law, which is crystallized in the above-mentioned judgments, I hold that the appeal filed by the petitioner is within the period of limitation and rejection of the same on the ground of delay is not sustainable.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned proceeding, in Cr.No.1890/2011/CPE/D4, dated 31-05-2011, of respondent No.1, is set aside. Respondent No.1 is directed to consider the petitioners appeal on merits and dispose of the same within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order.

As a sequel, WPMP.No.30927 of 2011 is disposed of.