Spencer, J.This suit was instituted by three plaintiffs styling themselves members and trustees of the Godavari Hindu Samaj, with the sanction of the Advocate-General u/s 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, for the purpose of getting a scheme framed by the Court for carrying-out the trust contained in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Will of the late Rajah Gadicherla Seethayya of Rajahmundry who executed it on April 4th and died on April 15th 1909. By the same Will the testator gave authority to his widow to adopt a son which she did on June 4th, 1911, by adopting the present appellant.

2. Clauses 11 and 12 of the Will run as follows:

11. A sum of Rs. 400 should be spent every year out of my estate, either for the spread (Abhivrithi) of the Sanskrit language, or for the spread of the Hindu religion, or for both The said sum must be a charge on my estate. The executors must make the arrangements necessary therefor to have the same conducted as the then existing trustees of the Raj ahmundry Hindu Samaj may deem fit.

12. Further, it is my desire that the Vedas relating to my Sakha (branch) should be encouraged. And for that purpose it is my desire that chiefly a general Sanskrit or Vedic or Oriental library should be established at Rajahmundry in my name. The executors must make the arrangements necessary therefor.

3. The Will names three executors, one of whom is the first plaintiff. They all declined office and the appellant who came of age on November 1st, 1917, has taken over the estate from the hands of his adoptive mother.

4. The first objection argued at the hearing of the appeal related to the maintainability of the suit. It was urged that the defendant, not being a trustee either by appointment or de son tort, could not be sued u/s 92 merely because he was in possession of the estate, that for every suit under that Section there must necessarily be a trustee see observations in Ashraf Ali v. Mahammad Nurajjama 49 Ind. Cas. 355 [LQ/CalHC/1918/378] : 23 C.W.N. 115 but here there was none, and that the proper course for the plaintiffs to adopt was to bring a suit for administration in order to get the terms of the Will carried out. I do not consider that any of these are fatal objections to the present suit.

5. If a trust has been "created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature" a suit will lie for settling a scheme "where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust" vide Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharlu 26 M. 450 and the person who is the heir-at-law and in possession of the property which is impressed with the character of trust property has an interest and is a proper party to such a suit. Mr. Ganapathy Aiyar then cited Annavarapu Nacharamma Malladi v. Venkatapayya 70 Ind. Cas. 903 [LQ/MadHC/1917/222] and Official Assignee v. Abdul Hussein 28 Ind. Cas. 116 in support of his argument that the present suit was premature as there was no definite fund for the trustee to administer and that the trust was thus incomplete. But the circumstances of those cases appear to be distinguishable. In the latter there was no fund ear-marked to be impressed with the trust, and in the former there was no appropriation of assets and the trust fund was yet to be ascertained. Here the Will definitely assigns a sum of Rs. 400 to trust purposes to be spent every year out of the testators estate and makes it a charge on the estate. Whatever may be thought of Clause 12, there is a definite fund set apart for the purposes mentioned in Clause 11. As noticed by the learned Subordinate Judge, when there is a Will in existence Section 6 of the Indian Trusts Act makes it unnecessary that there should be a transfer of the trust property to the trustees. The suit is, in my opinion, maintainable.

6. I pass now to a consideration of the more serious question whether the trust is void owing to uncertainty as to its objects.

7. If it is possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty the intentions of the testator, the Court will give effect to them. If, however, the trust fails on account of uncertainty of the objects, the trustee cannot repudiate it but holds it for the benefit of the testators her as a resulting trust vide Briggs v. Penny (1851) 3 Mac. & G. 546 : 21 L.J. Ch. 265 . If the testatorys meaning is so extremely vague that the execution of his purposes practically amounts to some one else making a Will for him, then the Court will not lend its assistance or recognise the trust as one capable of execution. See Blair v. Duncan (1902) A.C. 37 : 71 L.J. P.C. 22 and Grimond v. Grimond (1905) A.C. 124 21 T.L.R. 323. This is the principle followed by Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Muthukrishna Naicken v. Ramachandra Naicken 37 M.L.J. 489 though the learned Judge does not refer to those English cases. He says at page 497 Page of 37 M.L.J.--[Ed.]. "The primary rule is to ascertain whether the object aimed at by the testator could be carried out without making a new Will for him." The objects of the trust as disclosed by Clause 11 of the Will, namely, the spread of the Sanskrit language or the spread of Hindu religion appear to be partly for the benefit of one branch of human knowledge, viz., the Sanskrit language and partly religious. In this country religious objects are not necessarily charitable objects, and learning is not quite synonymous with education. But it is unnecessary to embark on a disquisition upon the question whether a religious purpose is also a charitable purpose, which formed the main consideration in Baker v. Sutton 44 R.R. 65 in Townsend v. Carus (1844) 67 E.R. 378 : 3 Hare 257 and in In re White, White v. White (l893) 2 Ch. 41 : 62 L.J. Ch. 342 as Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, speaks of "any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature." It does not signify whether it is of a charitable nature or of a religious nature provided that it is one of these two and also that it is a public purpose.

8. In order to understand the real intentions of the testator I am willing to read Clause 12 of his Will along with Clause 11 and not to treat Clause 12 by itself as creating a precatory trust.

9. I think we should also take notice of the reference in Clause 11 to the Rajahmundry Hindu Samaj as an aid to discovering what the: testator meant. It was also material to take into consideration, as the learned Subordinate Judge has done in paragraph 10 of his judgment, the evidence of P.W. No. 1 that the testator was a member of the Raj ahmundry Hindu Samaj almost from its inception and was keenly interested in the working of this society. In Clode v. Andrews (1907) 97 L.T. 130 use was made of the knowledge that a certain Dr. Maclean was engaged for many years in the work of Christian Missions to interpret a reference to Missionary objects connected with his name in a Will, and in Attorney-General v. Stepney (1804) 32 E.R. 751 : 10 Ves. 22 the known objects of the Welch Circulating Charity Schools were referred to in order to understand the meaning of a Will which had as its object the improvement of Christian knowledge coupled with a mention of those schools. But I am unable to agree with the Subordinate Judge that the objects of the Hindu Samaj set out in Clause 2 of their Rules, exhibited as Exhibit C, are almost exactly the same as the purposes indicated by the testator in his Will. The teaching of Sanskrit is not one of the professed objects of the Association. A library is mentioned as one of the means of carrying out its objects but it is not clear what kind of library is intended. On this point the Will which speaks of a general Sanskrit, Vedic or Oriental library is more specific. Again, the Association aims at the diffusion of the principles of Hinduism, the study of Hindu civilization and the advancement of the Hindu Community. The testator desired to see the spread of the Hindu religion with special attention to the Vedas relating to his branch (Sakha), he being a Yagnavalkya Brahmin. If the testator had absolute confidence in the Managing Committee of the Hindu Samaj, he might have made an outright bequest in their favour and left the spending of the money entirely in their hands without directing his executors to make arrangements to have the trust conducted according to the discretion of the- trustees of the Hindu Samaj. In Grimond v. Grimond (1905) A.C. 124 : 74 L.J.P.C. 35 Lord Moncreiff, whose judgment was adopted by the House of lords, observes, that the trustees own religious views do not affect the question when the trustees have been left with unlimited discretion as to what religious institutions are to be selected for being benefited. So here, if one of the objects of the trust is the spread of Hinduism generally, then, in my opinion, the object is too wide and indefinite to be carried into effect. The scheme framed in the lower Court provides for the submission to the Court by the trustees of a programme for the utilization of the annual grant of Rs. 400 and for the Court sanctioning the same with such modifications as may be found necessary. How is any Christrian, Hindu or Muhammadan Judge to decide whether the proposal so submitted will advance the Hindu religion in the manner contemplated by the testator If, on the other hand, we hold that the scheme should be directed to the best means for inculcating the peculiar sectarian doctrines of the testators own branch of the Hindu faith, then it may reasonably be doubted whether this purpose is such a public one as Section 92 of the Code was intended to cover. The learned Subordinate Judge, who was in favour of upholding the trust as a good one, has been driven after considering Clause 12 to the conclusion in paragraph 19 of his judgment that the object is not clear enough and he has been obliged to treat this Clause as merely recommendatory. To my mind, the trust is even more vague and indefinite, if Clause 12 is omitted from consideration. The words" for the splead of the Hindu religion are no more definite than the words for Missionary purposes" which were held in Scott v. Brownrigg (1881) 9 L.R. 11 246 to be too vague and uncertain to create an executable trust or than the words "most conducive to the good of religion in this diocese" in Dunne v. Byrne (1912) A.C. 407 : 81 L.J.P.C. 202 . It is not enough that in those cases there could he no doubt that the settler was thinking of the Christian religion when he spoke of Missionary or religious purposes, or that in the present case the Hindu religion is designated by name. God is worshipped in many forms by Hindus. A general endowment for the worship of God without specifying the deity for whose benefit the endowment is to take effect is void for uncertainty. Vide Chundi Charan Mitra v. Haribola Das 51 Ind. Cas. 215 [LQ/CalHC/1919/133] : 46 C. 951 .

10. On the other hand, I am inclined to regard the promotion of the knowledge of the Sanskrit language as a valid charitable bequest. In Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124 : 28 L.J. Ch. 396 a fund given to be applied by trustees according to their discretion "for the advancement and propagation of education and learning all over the world" was held to be not too vague; and in Attorney-General v. Flood (1816) Hay & J. App. xxi : Hayes 611 a gift for promoting education in the Irish language was upheld. See also Halsburys Laws of England, Volume 4, Article 174. Here the word "spread" denotes that the testator was thinking of education. The Sanskrit language could only be spread by teaching persons hitherto ignorant of it. It would not be spread by rewarding those who are already learned.

11. If the object is definite enough the Court will find suitable modes for carrying out the wishes of the testator. See Gordhan Das v. Chunni Lal 39 A. 111 . Of course, it is necessary that if a Sanskrit Library is to be founded it should be one open to the public (unlike the Hindu Samaj s library which is limited to Hindus who pay a certain subscription and are grouped in two classes); if Sanskrit Schools are to be formed they must be schools which can be freely attended by the public. Otherwise this will not be a trust for public purposes falling tinder Section 92, Civil Procedure Code.

12. The trust for the spread of Hinduism being too vague, and that for the spread of the Sanskrit language being valid, we must next take note of the fact that the trustee of the Hindu Samaj have been given an absolute discretion to spend the whole sum of Rs. 400 on one or the other object, or oh both. In such a case where one object is void for uncertainty the whole gift is void, since, owing to the use of the. disjunctive "or," there is no indication, as to what pro -portion is to be devoted to the charitable purpose of advancing education: vide In re Macduff, Macduff v. Macduff (1896) 2 Ch. 451 , Blair v. Duncan (1902) A.C. 37 : , Houston v. Burns (1905) A.C. 124 : 74 L.J.P.C. 35 and Theobalds Law of Wills; (7th Edition) page 369. So in the present case the testator having left the application of the fund entirely to the discretion of the trustees of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samaj, it would be open to that body to apply the whole amount to the vague purpose of spreading the Hindu religion, leaving nothing for the encouragement of Sanskrit learning.

13. But on the principle of the above English cases the whole bequest thus is bad and un-excutable. The trustees under the Will in such a case cannot exercise their discretion and allot the whole to charity. [In re Jarmans Estate, Leavers v. Clayton (1878) 8 Ch. D. 584 : 47 L.J. Ch. 675 .

14. I am, therefore, of opinion on the 2nd and 3rd issues that no enforceable trust is created in Clause 11 or 12 of the Will, and I would allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiffs suit with costs throughout.

15. A third point which is the subject of the 5th issue has been raised, namely, whether the adopted son who takes, by survivorship can repudiate dispositions of a portion of the ancestral property made by his adoptive father without its being proved that his natural father was aware of the contents of the Will at the time of the adoption. Mr. Ganapthy Aiyer quotes Balkrishna Motiram Gujar v. Shri Uttar Narayan Dev 50 Ind Cas. 912 [LQ/BomHC/1918/137] : 21 Bom. L.R. 225 in support of his arguments that he can. In the present case the testator was childless when he made his Will and was free to make an absolute gift. Following Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal 7 Ind. Dec. 364, I feel clear that the adopted son cannot, while approbating the provisions of the Will under which his adoption was made, reprobate other provisions of the same Will. It is unnecessary, in view of my finding on Issues Nos. 2 and 3, to pursue this point further. It has also become unnecessary to discuss the objections and the cross-objections to the scheme framed by the Court. The decree of the lower Court is set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs. The Memorandum of Objections is dismissed.

Devadoss, J.

16. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother and I agree with his concurs one on the points argued before us. Inasmuch as this appeal was argued at great length very ably on both sides and as the points involved are of considerable importance, I wish to add, in my own words, the reasons for agreeing with my learned brother.

17. The plaintiffs are the members and trustees of the Godavari Hindu Samajam, commonly known as the Hindu Samajam, located at Rajahmundry: and they have brought this snit for the settlement of a scheme for carrying out the intentions and directions contained in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Will of Sri Gadicherla China Ssethayya Goru, who died on the 15th April 1909 possessed of Zemindari villages and other properties yielding an annual income of Rs. 4,000. The defendant is the adopted son of the said Seethayya Garu. The Additional Subordinate Judge of Rajah-mundry has granted a decree in plaintiffs favour and the defendant has preferred this appeal.

18. The main contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are (1) the suit is not maintainable u/s 92 of the CPC inasmuch as there is no trustee in charge of the alleged trust estate: (2) the terms of the Will are so vague that the bequest must fail on account of uncertainty; and (3) the defendant being the adopted son of the testator is entitled to repudiate the bequest made by the Will as he succeeded to the whole of the testators property by right of survivorship.

19. The first contention, that there is no trustee in charge of the trust estate and, therefore, a suit u/s 92 is incompetent, is an untenable one. Section 92 was enacted for the purpose of safeguarding public trusts of a charitable or religious nature. The Section says: "In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust,...two or more persons having an interest in the trust...can sue after fulfilling certain formalities." It is quite plain that the Section is applicable to cases where the direction of a Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any trust, and it is nowhere said that the suit could only be against trustees defacto crde jure. When the Court is put in possession of facts from which it can infer that there is a public trust of a charitable or religious nature and that for its proper administration the direction of the Court is necessary, the Court has jurisdiction to frame a scheme for the proper administration of the trust. The appellant relies on a number of cases in which it was held that Section 92 did not apply to suits against trespassers. A trespasser claims adversely to the trust and in order to evict him or to claim damages from him no scheme is necessary and the intervention of the Court u/s 92 is uncalled for. It is the duty in such cases of a trustee or trustees to seek the proper remedy against the trespasser or against the person holding the property adversely to the trust.

20. In Gholam Mowlah v. Ali Hafiz 47 Ind. Cas. 3 : 28 C.L.J. 4 the suit was against the purchaser of the trust property. The Court held that, the defendant being an alienee of the trust property, Section 92 had no application.

21. In Arunachella Chetti v. Muthu Chettiar 17 Ind. Cas. 586 the suit was by a trustee against a trespasser. The suit was decided tinder the CPC of 1877 July 1880. It was held that Section 539 had no application to the case.

22. In Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal 9 10 C.W.N. 581 Woodroffe, J., held that suits brought not to establish a public right but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right were not within the Section and that, as against strangers, such as alienees from the trustee and mere trespassers holding adversely to the trust, that Section did not apply.

23. In Bapuji Jagcmnathv. Govlndlal Kasandas 34 Ind. Cas. 167 [LQ/BomHC/1916/19] : 18 Bom. L.R. 335 it was held that Section 92 had no application where the remedy asked for was not for the infringement of a public right but for a private right. In that case one executor sued, another executor for accounts and for an injunction against further management. The Court held that the suit was not bad for want of sanction u/s 93, Civil Procedure Code.

24. In Subbayya v. Krishna 14 M. 186 : 5 Ind. Dec. 132 the Full Bench held that a trustee could be removed though Section 539 did not expressly give the power of the Court.

25. In Ashraf Ali v. Muhammad Nurajjama 49 Ind. Cas. 355 [LQ/CalHC/1918/378] the Court held that to a suit against the lessee in which the trustee was a party Section 92 had no application as no scheme was asked for, the suit being for a declaration that the lease was invalid and that possession should be handed over to the plaintiffs.

26. Strong reliance was placed by the appellant on a decision of the Madras High Court reported as Annavarapu Nacharatnma Malladi v. Venkalapayya 70 Ind. Cas. 903 [LQ/MadHC/1917/222] : 31 M.L.T. 635 : 16 L.W. 932. There the late Chief Justice and Kumar a-swami Sastri, J., held that a suit u/s 92, Civil Procedure Code, for enforcing the terms of a Will which contained provisions for the administration of public trusts was not maintainable. On a careful, reading of the judgment I think the decision does not support the appellants contention. All-that was decide d in that case was that it was not competent for persons to invoke the provisions of Section 92 for the purpose of and mastering the estate of a deceased person with a view to compel the executors to jive effect to charitable bequests. What was found on the evidence in that case was that there was no fund from which the charity could be maintained. The learned Judges held that, in the at of a specific finding that a trust had been created, a suit of that nature would not lie. But the facts of this case are different. Here the amount to be spent on the charity is charged on the whole estate. The estate is worth Rs. 4,000 a year and the amount of the charitable bequest is only Rs. 400 a year. Funds for the trust have teen provided by pointing out the source of the funds and by making the whole of the property bear the charge for the trust. Where it is quite clear that a trust has been properly constituted by Will, it is not necessary that there should first be an administration suit before the trust could be the subject of a suit u/s 92. In the Mofassil, administration suits are almost, unknown, and, if it is considered that an administration suit is essential preliminary tea suit u/s 92, the question would arise as to who should bring the administration suit. The heirs of the testator may be quite unwilling to bring the administration suit and anybody who would ordinarily be entitled to bring an administration suit might be found unwilling to do so. I do not think that the case supports any wide proposition as is contended for by the appellant. Where it is doubtful whether there would be funds for the purpose of satisfying the bequest for charity there it might be necessary to have an administration suit in order to fix the amount that might be available for charitable purposes after meeting the legitimate demands of creditors and specific legatees.

27. The contention that there must be trustees in charge of the funds in order to entitle persons to sue u/s 92 is an obvious fallacy. One can conceive of cases where all the trustees die or refuse to act. It is in such cases the interference of the Court would be deemed most necessary and beneficial and it is to prevent charities lapsing for want of proper management that Section 92, Civil; Procedure Code, was enacted on the lines of Lord Romillys Act.

28. In Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkalacharlu 26 M. 450 the suit was brought u/s 539 of the CPC for a declaration that the defendants were not Dharmakarth is of certain temples, and to have trustees appointed for the due administration of those temples. The learned Judges observe at page 452 as follows: "The substantial question, therefore, for determination in the ease is whether the defendants are the lawful trustees of the temple as claimed by them. If they are so, there is an end of the suit, but, if they are not, then there is a vacancy in the office of one or both of the trusteeships, and the plaintiffs, as persons interested in the institution, prayed for an order of Court directing the appointment of new trustees for the due administration of trusts of the temple. In our opinion such a suit is comprised in the words of the, section, namely, that whenever the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust, and the suit, therefore, falls u/s 539(a) of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of this view we may refer to the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Bishen Chanel v. Nadir Hussein 12 Ind. Jur. 170 7 Ind. Dec. 803 (P.C), in which Sir Barnes Peacock in delivering the judgment of the Committee stated, If there had been any objection that he (i.e., the plaintiff) was illegally substituted as trustee, an application might have been made by any person interested in the performance of the trusts to have him removed and a new trustee appointed by the Court under the Code of 1877. As pointed reference is made to the Cod t of 1877 in which for the first time Section 539 was introduced, there having been no Section corresponding to it in the Code of 1859, it is quite clear that the provision referred to by the Privy Council is Section 539." Incases where there are no trustees or where all the trustees choose to claim adversely to the trust, the interference of the Court is necessaiy1 for the protection of the trust.

29. In Raghubar Diat v. Kesho Ramanuj Das A.W.N. (1888) 276 : 13 Ind Jur. 148 the four defendants between them by an endowment created a trust in respect of the temple of Janaki Ballabji and of the idol contained therein, which endowment consisted of 5 biswas of land, the income of which was to be devoted to the expenses of the temple. The plaint alleged that, since November 1894, the donors changed their minds and had stopped the payment for expenses. Straight, J., observes at page 22: "Now it is not necessary, if I read that Section aright, that there should hove been any breach of trust; but it is sufficient if there be a public religious trust, and the direction of the Court is considered necessary for the administration of such trust. This view has been adopted by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Latifunnissa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi 5 Ind. Dec. 779. Therefore, this may be fairly regarded as a suit, to put it in its narrowest form, in which the plaintiff asks to have the trust administered by the Court. That being so, it seems to me that the sanction of the Collector or such officer as the local Government might appoint was necessary, for the purpose of empowering the plaintiff to bring such a suit."

30. That the defendant need not be a trustce, nor need he admit the existence of a trust in order to enable the plaintiffs to, sue u/s 92,is made clear by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy 2 C.L.J. 431, Mookerjee, J., observes at page 437: "The case is no authority for the proposition that the Court is ousted of the jurisdiction it possesses u/s 539, Civil Procedure Code, by the bare denial on the part of the defendant of the existence of the trust alleged by the plaintiffs. If the view urged by the appellants were well-founded/every case of a public charity might be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court by reason of the most groundless allegation on the part of the defendant that there is no public trust. But, it is an elementary principle that when tie jurisdiction of a Court to take cognizance of a suit instituted before it, is disputed, the Court must adjudicate lipon the question. Page of 13 Bom. L.R.--[Ed.] I. must hold accordingly tharf; if in a suit instituted u/s 539, Civil Procedure Code, the defendant disputes the jurisdiction of the Court to make any decree under that Section on the ground that the trust alleged by the plaintiffs does not exist, the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction but must determine the question upon the evidence."

31. The same principle was laid down in Jafarkhan v. Daudshah 9 Ind. Cas. 358 [LQ/BomHC/1910/139] : 13 Bom. L.R. 49. Batchelor, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observes at page 53 Page of 13 Bom. L.R.--[Ed.]: "We think that no difficulty is caused by the use of the words any alleged breach of any trust occurring in Section 539, for we do not read those words as equivalent to any alleged breach of any admitted trust. The construction which we put upon the Section in this respect has, so far as we are aware, been consistently followed in these Courts and the case of Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev 8 Ind. Dec. 413 is an illustration of that. Reference being made to page 616 of the report, it will be seen that the defendants there pleaded that the Savasthan was not a public, religious or charitable institution and that they were not the trustees but owners of the property in that suit."

32. It is quite apparent from these decisions that the jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by the defendant pleading that he is not a trustee or that there is no trust for which a scheme could be framed. In this case the defendant claims to repudiate the provisions of the Will as the adopted son of the testator. His interests are, no doubt, adverse to that of the plaintiffs, who want to maintain that there is a trust. But in the case of a suit u/s 92, it is not necessary that there should be any active contest as to any breach of trust by a trustee. If the circumstances are such that the intervention of the Court is deemed necessary for the purpose of framing a scheme for any trust which is proved to exist, the Court has jurisdiction to frame a scheme. No doubt, the defendant in this suit could not be made to pay amounts due or to surrender the property, if any, belonging to the trust, he being a stranger to the trust. On the framing of a scheme and on the appointment of trustees, he should be proceeded against by the trustees for such reliefs as they may deem fit. In that sense, no doubt, the suit against the defendant is unsustainable, but the suit is perfectly competent for the purpose of enabling the Court to frame a scheme in respect of the charitable bequest contained in the Will, provided the bequest fulfills other conditions.

33. The second point is one of more difficulty. The contention that the bequest is void for uncertainty should be considered in the light of the provisions of the Will relating to the bequest. Paragraph 11 of the Will runs thus:

"A sum of Rs. 400 should be spent every year out of my estate, either for the spread of the Sanskrit language or for the spread of the Hindu religion or for both. The said sum must be a charge on my estate. The executors must make the arrangements necessary therefor to have the same conducted as the then existing trustees; of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam might deem fit." The next Clause runs thus: "Further, it is my desire that the Vedas relating to my Sakha should be encouraged; and for that purpose, it is my desire chiefly a general Sanskrit or Vedic or Oriental Library should be established at Rajahmundry in my name. The executors must make the arrangements necessary therefor." Clause 12 does not present much difficulty. It is what I may call a precatory trust. There is no definiteness about the trust. The amount to be spent for establishing the Sanskrit or Vedic or Oriental library is not mentioned and the direction to found a general Sanskrit or Vedic or Oriental library is very vague. What sort of Sanskrit books should be in the library or what sort of Vedic books should be collected or what sort of Oriental Library it should be, there is no indication in the Will. I do not think it is necessary to Consider this matter further. I hold that, in the first place, it is precatory and, in the second place, that it is so vague that it cannot be given effect to. Clause n contains a bequest of a sum of Rs. 400 to be spent annually for the spread of the Sanskrit language or the spread of Hindu religion or for both, and the executors should make the arrangements necessary therefor and should conduct as the then existing trustees of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam might deem fit. Here, again, the testators directions are so vague that it will not be possible for any Court of Law to decide what is necessary for the spread of the Sanskrit language or for the spread of the Hindu religion and the executors are asked to make such arrangements as the trustees of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam might deem fit. The trustees of the Samajam may change and the objects of the Samajam are vague and as comprehensive as they can be. The objects of the Samajam are the diffusion of the principles of Hinduism, the study of Hindu civilisation and, in general, the advancement of the Hindu community. Some of the objects of the Association could not be considered charitable or religious u/s 92. The bequest may be a good one if it is to the Samajam; but where a trust is indicated and the Court is asked to frame a scheme u/s 92, the provisions of that Section should be complied with before the Court can be induced to act. In the first place, the trust should be for a public purpose, and, in the second place, it should be of a charitable or religious nature. There are many public purposes which are neither charitable nor religious. There are many purposes which are charitable or religious but not of a public nature. The discretion is given to the executors to make arrangements for the spread of the Sanskrit language. The expression spread of the Sanskrit language is not capable of any clear definition. It may be spread in the sense of intensive culture or of culture benefiting a large number of people. The expression for the spread of the Hindu religion is also vague. It is very difficult for people belonging to various sects to agree as to what the Hindu religion is. Without in any way being disrespectful to the Hindu religion or in any way disparaging the religion, the words Hindu religion do not connote anything specific. It may be the Vedantic religion or the religion of a particular sect and it is not within the province of a Civil Court to r-ay that the Hindu religion is and what should be done to spread it. The trustees of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam may all cease to promote the particular form of Hindu religion which for a time the same trustees were prepared to promote, and the Court will then be called upon to frame another scheme by which the trustees of this particular estate may be left to manage things without reference to the trustees of the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam. These are some of the difficulties which will face any Court which is called upon to frame a scheme for the purpose of carrying out the intentions of the testator. It is a well established principle of law that, where the intention of the testator is so vague the Court cannot give effect to it. The Court can only interpret the Will of a testator, but it cannot be called upon to make a Will for the test for. It is sometimes thought that a charitable bequest should not be allowed to lapse, and, therefore, some sort of scheme should be framed in respect of it. But, with all respect to that view, I think the Court is bound to follow certain principles which have guided the Courts of Chancery for a every long time. The idea of making charitable bequests by Will is new to this country, and it would not be right to throw aside altogether the principles which have guided the Courts of Chancery in England, in interpreting Wills containing bequests for charitable and religious purposes.

34. I shall proceed to examine the English cases that have been cited to us, but before entering upon the mazes of the decisions of the Chancery Courts, it is but right that one should remember that the Law of Trusts in England is subject to certain peculiar restrictions. In the first place, the laws of mortmain prevent bequests of land being made to Associations and Corporations, and, in the second place, realty cannot be disposed of in perpetuity by Will and only personality can be disposed of for a charitable or religious purpose, and even in the case of personality there is a diffierence between impure and pure personality. It was by 51 and 52 Vic, Chap. 42, the law relating to mortmain and the dispositions of land for charitable purposes was consolidated. By 43 Eliz., Chap. 4, charitable bequests were validated. It has been the attempt of Chancery Lawyers to bring bequests within the purview of 43 Eliz. and that is the reason why we find that in the earlier cases the Court of Chancery gave a wide interpretation to the word charity.

35. I shall first deal with the cases relied upon for the respondent in support of the validity of the bequest.

36. The earliest case relied on is Attorney-General v. Stepney (1804) 32 E.R. 751 7 R.R. 325. There a bequest of the residue of personal estate for the use of the Welch Circulating Charity Schools as long as they should continue, and the increase and improvement of Christian knowledge and promoting religion, and to purchase Bibles and other religious books, pamphlets, and tracts, as the trustees should think fit, to go to the same uses with those already bought and to be kept in a house, devised for that purpose, was held good. The Lord Chancellor (Eldon) in the course of his judgment, after referring to the case of Browne v. Yealt 32 E.R. 19 observes: "Lord Thurlows opinion was that the testator, not having given this Court more of specific direction as to the nature of the books to be purchased and circulated, that that they were to be such as may have a tendency to promote the interests of virtue and religion, and the happiness of mankind, had not given direction enough : and, therefore, Lord Thurlow held the next-of-kin entitled. If this was that very case, I should certainly feel myself bound to follow that decision. But this, independent of the peculiarities belong in to it, is very different; and if that be specified Bibles end Testaments, the Court could not have refused to execute that purpose. If, therefore, there was nothing more in this Will, I should be bound to say that whether there is more or less objection to the words "other religious books and tracts", there is a denotation of a religious purpose, to which the fund may be applied; with an option, how it should be applied; and I must execute one term of that option."

37. The next case is that of Mitford v. Reynolds (1842) 41 E.R. 602 : 12 L.J. Ch. 40 . In this case the testators Will contained a bequest in the following terms " I will, devise, give, and bequeath the remainder of my property...to the Government of Bengal, for the express purpose of that Government applying the amount to charitable, beneficial, and public works at and in the City of Dacca in Bengal, the intent of such bequest and donation being that the amount shall be applied exclusively to the benefit of the native inhabitants, in the manner they and the Government may regard to be most conducive to that end." The Lord Chancellor (Lyndhurst) construed it as valid and observed: "According to the construction which I put upon the words of this bequest taken altogether, it is a bequest of money to be applied in the construction or establishment of some works for the general benefit of the native inhabitants of Dacca, for the poor as well as for the rich; and I think that comes within the principle of the cases I have stated, and constitutes, under the Statute of Ellizabeth a good charitable bequest."

38. In Whicker v. Hume 6 W.R. 813 : 115 R.R. 70 a bequest to trustees of funds to be applied by them according to their discretion for the advance and propagation of education and learning all over the world was held to be a good charitable bequest and was not void for uncertainty. The discussion in that case turned mainly upon the meaning of the world learning. If learning had stood alone the Court would have held the bequest bad for uncertainty, but inasmuch as the word education was in front of the word learning the Court upheld the bequest. Lord Chelmsford, in delivering the judgment, stated as follows: "Now the question is, in what sense did the testator use this expression I apprehend that if there are two meanings of a word, one of which will effectuate and the other will defeat a testators object, the Court is bound to select that meaning of the word which will carry out the intentions and objects of the testator; and I think that your Lordships are not without aid in giving the particular limited interpretation (if I may use the expression) to the word learning which is required for the purpose of establishing the validity of this bequest, because when you find that the testator associates with that word learning the word education I think, that from the society itself in which you find the word, Your Lordships may gather, the meaning which it is necessary to put upon it, and that he means the word learning in the sense of impartig knowledge by instruction or teaching. Well, if this construction be correct, then I apprehend there is no difficulty whatever, because it will range itself pretty much within the meaning of the word education although not precisely synonymous with it, and it is admitted in the argument that if the word education had stood alone, the bequest would have been valid." Lord Wensleyda1e said, learning in this case, I consider as equivalent to teaching; learning, as part of education. No portion of the charitable fund could be devoted by the trustees for the purpose of rewarding learned men unconnected with education."

39. Now, applying this case to the case before us, can it be said that the trustees are bound to spend the money in educating people in the Sanskrit language If they choose to give the whole of the amount to a person well versed in Sansikrit so that he may improve his knowledge of the language or as a reward for his past labours, can it be said that they aid a public charitable purpose This makes it quite clear that the bequest can be good only if education is the object.

40. The next case relied on by the respondent is a case under the Income Tax Act. In Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 : 61 L.J.Q.B. 265 : 65 L.T. 621 : 55 J.P. 805 the House of Lords had to consider whether certain allowances in respect of the Income Tax imposed by Schedule A are to be granted by the Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax. The words charitable purpose, they held, as used in the Income Tax Act, were not restricted to the meaning of relief from poverty, but must be construed according to the legal and technical meaning given to these words by English Law. Lord Macnaughten, in the course of his judgment (at page 580), observes, " That according to the Law of England, a technical meaning is attached to the word charity and to the word charitable in such expressions as charitable uses, charitable trusts, or charitable purposes cannot, I think, be denied. The Court of Chancery has always regarded with peculiar favour those trusts of a public nature which, according to the doctrine of the Court derived from the piety of early times, are considered to be charitable. Charitable uses or trusts form a distinct head of equity. Their distinctive position is made the more conspicuous by the circumstance that, owing to their nature, they are not obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities, while a gift in perpetuity not being. a charity is void." This case does not throw any light on the question what are charitable bequests and what are not.

41. In In re White, White v. White (l893) 2 Ch. 41 : 62 L.J. Ch. 342 : 2 R. 380 the Court of Appeal held that a bequest to a religious institution or for a religious purpose is for a charitable purpose. "The testator gave his property to the following religious societies to be divided in equal shares among them." The testator did not give a list of the religious societies among whom he wished the properties to be divided. Lord Lindley, in the course of his judgment, observes, "the gift is for religious purposes; and, secondly, that being for religious purposes, it must be treated as a gift for charitable purposes unless the contrary can be shown. If once this conclusion is arrived at, the rest is plain. A charitable bequest never f also for uncertainty : Mills v. Farmer (1815) 1 Mer. 55 : 35 E.R. 597 settles that point. Lord Eldon was clearly of opinion that the nomination of particular objects is only the mode and not the substance of a gift to charity." In England charity must be of a public nature, but ii. India it is not so. There can be bequests for charity for private purposes and there can be a bequest for a religious purpose of a private nature. There can be a good bequest in favour of an idol or for the peformance of shradh. As I have stated above, Section 92 is only concerned with trusts for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and so the reasoning of the learned Lord Justice cannot apply in its entirety to bequests in Hindu Wills.

42. In Baker v. Sutton (1836) 48 E.R. 292 a bequest of the residue of personal estate for such religious and charitable institutions and purposes within the Kingdom of England as in the opinion of the testators trustees should be deemed fit and proper was held to be a good charitable bequest. In the case before us the question is not whether the bequest is a good bequest, but whether the Court should be called upon to administer the funds given for a particular purpose. If the bequest was to the Hindu Samajam at Rajahmundry, it would be a good bequest. But the real difficulty is in finding out the intention of the testator and in controlling the discretion of the trustees who are to administer the trust. The case of Mills v. Farmer (1815) 1 Mer. 55 is relied upon as showing that a charitable bequest never fails. Lord Eldon, in the course of his judgment, laid down the law thus: "I am fully satisfied as to all the principles which have been laid down in the course of this argument, and accede to them all. There is no question that the Court has not the power to make a Will for the testator but only to carry into execution that which he has made himself; and this it can do only by giving to it such a construction as former precedents have established to be the right construction in every particular instance. Neither is there any doubt that the same words in a Will, when applied to the case of individuals, may require a very different rule of construction from that which would govern them if applied to the case of charity. If I give my property to such person as I shall hereafter name to be my executor, and afterwards appoint no executor; or, if having appointed an executor he dies in my lifetime and I appoint no other to supply his place, in either of these cases, as to individuals, the testator must be held intestate and his next-of-kin will take the estate. But, to give effect to a bequest in favour of charity, the Court will, in both instances, supply the place of an executor and carry into effect that which, in the case of individuals, must have failed altogether. This distinction has proceeded partly, perhaps, on principles in the Roman Law which we do not at this time perfectly comprehend; and partly no doubt, on the religious notions which formerly obtained in this country, according to which it fell to the Ordinarys province to distribute, in case of intestacy. A third principle, which it is now too late to call in question, is that, in all cases In which the testator has expressed an intention to give to charitable purposes, if that intention is declared absolutely and nothing is left uncertain but the mode in which it is to be carried into effect, the intention will be carried into execution by this Court, which will then supply the mode which alone was left deficient."

43. In Cocks v. Manners (1871) 12 Eq. 574 it was held by Sir John Wickers, V.C, that the bequest to the Dominican Convent at C was neither within the letter nor the spirit of 43 Eliz. Chap. 4, he observes: "A voluntary association of women for the purpose of working out their own salvation by religious exercises and self-denial seems to me to have none of the requisites of a charitable institution, whether the word charitable is used in its popular sense or in its legal sense. It is said, in some of the cases, that religious purposes are charitable but that can only be true as to religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification of the public, an annuity to an in dividual; so long as he spent his time in retirement and constant devotion, would not be charitable, nor would a gift to ten persons, so long as they lived together in retirement and performed acts of devotion, be charitable. Therefore, the gift to the Dominican Convent is not in my opinion, a gift on a charitable trust."

44. In this cane it has been very vehemently urged that, inasmuch as the trustees have the choice of spreading the Hindu religion, therefore, the bequest is for a religious purpose and could not fail for uncertainty. Cocks v. Manners (1871) 12 Eq. 574 19 W.R. 105 is an answer to that. As I said above, the trustees may take into their heads to promote the Hindu religion or to contribute to the spread of the Hindu religion by giving the whole of the amount to one person or to a particular Mutt, a religious purpose, which in England should necessarily be a public purpose in order to validate a bequest need not be so in India.

45. In Townsend v. Carus (1844) 67 E.R. 378 Wigram, V.C., held that a gift to be applied to promote the spiritual welfare of Gods creatures was for religious and, therefore, charitable purposes.

46. It is contended that a general bequest for the spread of Sanskrit language is good on the authority of Attorney-General v. Flood (1816) H & J.611. In that case a bequest was given to the Trinity College, Dublin, for the study of Irish language. There can be no objection at all to a bequest to the University or to a College, or even to the Rajahmundry Hindu Samajam being held good if it is for the study of Sanskrit or any other language. Where the bequest is not to a Society but to trustees who are asked to do certain things, and where the Court is not in a position to control the discretion of the trustees, there the Court has to see whether the intention of the testator is specific enough to control the discretion of the trustees. In In re Scowcroft, Ormrod v. Wilkinson (1898) 2 Ch. 638 bequest to the Vicar of a parish for the time being of a building and as a Village Club and readingroom to be maintained for the furtherance of Conservative principles and religious and mental improvement and to be kept free from intoxicants and dancing was held good. In thin case the intention is clear and the object is of a charitable and of a public nature.

47. In Clode v. Andrews (1907) 97 L.T. 130 the testatrix directed her trustees to pay trust monies to M to be applied by him for such Missionary object or objects at home, abroad or in the Colonies as he shall in his atsolute discretion select. I was known by the testatrix to have been engaged in assisting the Christian Mission in Foreign Contries and abroad. Warrington, J., held the bequest to be good. He said: "It is suggested that the words of the gift are too vague, as the words Missionary objects are not necessarily confined to Christian Missions. But there is a widely spread use of the word Missionary as one engaged in the work of relit for s and particularly Christain Missions. I think that I am entitled to consider who Dr. Maclean was, and that he was engaged for many years in the work of Christian Missions, and that he and his work were known to the testatrix. I think that the testatrix used the word Missionary in its ordinary and popular sense, and I hold that the gift was a valid charitable gift." In the course of the arguments the Irish case of Scott v. Brownrigg (1881) 9 L.R. 11 246 was quoted to show that the word Missionary was not capable of any definite meaning. Warrington, J., as the report shows, declined to follow it.

48. In Morice v. Bishop of Durham 32 E.R. 9477 R.R. 232 a bequest in trust for such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve, was not held to be a charitable legacy. The Lord Chancellor(Eldon) in meeting the contention that it was a charitable bequest and the at the trustee might deote every shilling to charitable use, observed as follows : "But the true question is, whether if, upon the one hand he might have devoted the whole to purposes, in this sense charitable, he might not equally according to the intention have devoted the whole to purposes benevolent and liberal, and yet not within the meaning of charitable purposes, as this Court construes those words; and if, according to the intention it was competent to him to do so, I do not apprehend, that under any authority upon such words the Court could have charged him with maladministration, if he had applied the whole to purposes, which according to the meaning of the testator, are be never lent and liberal: though not acts of that species of benevolence and liberality, which this Court in the construction of a Will calls charitable acts.... But the question is whether, according to the ordinary sense, not the sense of the passages and authors alluded to, treating upon the great and extensive sense of the word charity in the Christian religion, this testatrix meant by these words to confine the defendant to such acts of charity or charitable purposes as this Court would have enforced by decree, and reference to a Master. I do not think that was the intention; and, if not, the intention is too indefinite to create a trust. But it was the intention to create a trust; and the object being too indefinite, has failed."

49. In the present case if the trustees choose to apply the whole of the amount to a religious purpose which is not of a public character, could the Court say that it is not within the discretion of the trustees to do so If the trustees be held to have a discretion under the Will to do so, then the Court would be powerless to control that discretion, and, an plying the principle of the case of Morice v. Bishop of Durham 6 Jur. 919, I must hold that the discretion is too wide to be controlled by a Court, and, therefore, the bequest is bad.

50. In re Macduff, Macduff v. Macduff 45 W.R. 154 a bequest of. money for some one or more charitable purposes philanthropic or...was held not bad simply by reason of the existence of the...blank), but should be treated as one for the purpose of charitable or philanthropic purposes. Such a bequest is not a good charitable bequest as there are philanthropic purposes which are not charitable Lord. Lindley after referring to Lord Eldons dictum in Morice v. Bishop of Durham 32 E.R. 947 observes at page 463: "Therefore, when we are dealing with general words, we must consider whether there is such an indication of purpose or of trust that the Court, if called upon to execute it, can see what it has to do can see the limits of its own powers. The words here are purposes charitable or philanthropic Charitable, I suppose, is there used in the popular sense. * * * Then what is the meaning of the word philanthropic * * * The Attorney-General says, What philanthropic purpose is not charitable. My answer is, you are dealing with two words of so vague a meaning that it is extremely difficult to say, but we can suggest purposes which might be philanthropic and mot charitable--purposes indicating good will to rich men to the exclusion of poor men. Such purposes would be philanthropic in the ordinary acceptation of the word that is to say, in the wide, loose sense of indicating good will towards mankind or a great portion of them; but I do not think they would be charitable. I am quite aware that a trust may be charitable though not confined to the poor; but I doubt very much whether a trust would be declared to be charitable which excluded the poor." He refers to the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 and observes, "Now Sir Samuel Romilly did not mean, and I am certain Lord Macnaghten did not mean, to say that every object of public general utility must necessarily be a charity. Some may be, and some may not be. In Kendall v. Granger (1842) 5 Bea v. 300 : 11 L.J. Ch. 405 where the language was for encouraging undertakings of general utility. Lord Langdale came to the conclusion that that was not a charity, and I am not aware that his decision has ever been overruled or questioned. Now, what Lord Macnaghten said is obviously a paraphrase of the words of Sir Samuel Romilly which I have just read: "Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of religion and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads, leaving out those somewhat significant words of Sir Samuel Romilly as to the fourth head, which is the most difficult which showed perfectlj plainly that Sir Samuel Romilly saw, and I do not doubt that Lord Macnaghten saw also, that there might be some purposes of public general utility which might be charitable and some which might not. In deciding the case we must fall back upon the Statute of Elizabeth, not upon the strict or narrow words of it, but upon what has been called the spirit of it, or the intention of it. As Lord Eldon says, this Court has taken great liberties with charities, but the liberty is always restricted by falling back, or professing to fall back upon the Statute of Elizabeth."

51. I may observe that the high water-mark of liberal interpretation as regards the intention of a testator was reached when the House of Lords held that a bequest that a Hospital be established at Dundee to accommodate 100 boys was a good bequest. In Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris (1858) 3 Macq. 134 the Lord Chancellor observed at page 156: "It is said on the part of the respondents that the mere wish to establish an Hospital for a...number of boys is so indefinite and uncertain that it is impossible to carry it out without the danger of defeating instead of effectuating the testators intention. That it is at the best but the indication of a mere floating desire, not of any former and settled determination. But the expression of a wish by a testator that his property should be applied to a particular object amounts to a bequest for that object; and the language of this Will appears to convey with sufficient certainty what the testator desired should be carried into effect. The words establish an Hospital must, I think, be taken to express an intention that a building should be provided which seems to have been assumed as the meaning of the word establish in the case of the Attorney-General v. Williams (1794) 2 Cox. 387 . He held "that the testator having intimated Jus wish to devote his property to the establishing an Hospital, every subsequent writing of the testator, upon the same half sheet of paper, is to a certain extent a confirmation of the previous charitable bequest. It amounts to a declaration that the fund which he had appropriated to that purpose is to be subject to a reduction to the amount of the legacies, and the first of them, after those which relate to the Hospital, had an express reference to this appropriation of his property by its commencing with the words, I further wish."

52. The later decisions of the Court of Chancery in England are for a narrower construction, not only of the word Charity but also of the terms of the Will regarding the intention of the testator. In Dunne v. Byrne (1912) A.C. 407 the Privy Council held that a residuary bequest to "the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane, and his successors to be used and expended wholly or in part as such Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of religion in this diocese" is not a good charitable bequest and is void. The words of the Will are, "I will and bequeath...that the residue of my estate should be handed to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and expended wholly or in part as such Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of religion in this diocese." Lord Macnaghten, who delivered the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council, observes, at page 411, "the language of the bequest (to use Lord Langdales words) would be open to such latitude of construction as to raise no trust which a Court of Equity could carry into execution. Baker v. Sutton (1836) 48 E.R. 292