Harries, C.J.This is a decree-holders second appeal from an order of the learned District Judge of Gaya in an execution matter.

2. The facts of the case can be shortly stated as follows: In 1936 the decree-holder appellant obtained a decree for arrears of rent for 1340 to 1342 F against the respondents, the amount of the decree being Rs. 309. In the year 1937, the decree-holder, who had been the landlord of the holding in question, parted with his interest in favour of his wife and ceased to be a co-sharer in the village. In October 1937, the decree-holder proceeded to execute his decree for the arrears of rent as a money decree and attached certain zamindari properties of the judgment-debtors and proceeded to put them to sale. On 13th January 1939, the judgment, debtors applied to the Rent Reduction Officer u/s 16, Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act, 1938 (Act 9 of 1938) for reduction of the arrears of rent due from them to the appellant.

3. The appellant filed objections, but on 5th June 1939, the Rent Reduction Officer disallowed the objections of the appellant and reduced the rent by 5 annas 4 pies in the rupee. It is to be observed that up to this time no application had been made by the respondents for stay of the execution proceedings which were proceeding. It appears that 21st Jane 1939 was the day fixed for sale; but before this date the judgment-debtor-respondents applied to the Court for a reduction of the decree granted by the Rent Officer and prayed that further execution proceedings should be brought to an end and that the application for execution should be dismissed. By some error the property was put up for sale on 22nd June 1939, before the judgment-debtors application was considered. The property was bought by the decree-holder. On 3rd July 1939, the objections of the judgment-debtors were considered by the Court but were disallowed and the sale was in due course confirmed.

4. The respondents appealed from the order of the learned Munsif in execution to the Court of the District Judge, who by an order dated 26th March 1940, reversed the decision of the learned Munsif and allowed the appeal. The effect of the order of the learned District Judge was to set aside the sale in its entirety. Prom that order of the learned District Judge, the present second appeal has been preferred. The holding in question was an occupancy holding in respect of which produce rent was payable. It was at first argued by counsel for the appellant that the Rent Reduction Officer had no jurisdiction whatsoever to reduce the rent in the present case. The Rent Reduction Officer purported to act u/s 16(1), Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act, 1938, and it was pointed out that that section has no application whatsoever to holdings falling within Section 15 of the Act. Section 15(a) deals with an occupancy holding of which the rent has been settled or reduced u/s 112 or Clause (a)b)d) or (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 112-A, Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, or under certain other enactments; and Clause (b) of that section deals with the case of an occupancy holding in which the rent has not been settled or reduced under the same enactments.

5. The contention was that occupancy holdings were governed by Section 15 of the Act and that Section 16 had no application whatsoever to such holdings. On a careful consideration of the sections, however, it is now conceded that Section 15 of the Act has no application to the present case, because the rent of the holding in question is not a money rent but is produce rent. Such holding is not within Section 15 of the Act but comes within Section 16 and proceedings for reduction of rent of a holding such as the one in the present case can properly be made u/s 16 of the Act. The Rent Reduction Officer, therefore, had jurisdiction to consider the judgment-debtors application for reduction of rent in the present case.

6. It was next contended by counsel for the appellant that the Act had no application whatsoever to the facts of this case, because the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist when these rent reduction proceedings were commenced. It is true that the decree-holder parted with his interest in 1937. The Rent Reduction Officer seemed to have some doubt as to whether this transfer was a genuine one or not, but there has been no finding that it is a farzi transaction and, therefore, it must be accepted that the decree-holder had transferred his interest before the arrears of rent were reduced under the Rent Reduction Act. Section 16(1) which entitles the Rent Reduction Officer to reduce arrears of rent, is in these terms:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, where any arrears of rent are due to a landlord in respect of a holding other than a holding referred to in Section 15 for any period ending before the first day of Asin 1345 Fasli corresponding to Asin Badi 1 of 1994 Sambat, the raiyat may make an application to the Collector for the reduction of such arrears....

7. It is argued that on the plain words of the section the arrears of rent must be due to a landlord in respect of a holding and unless a relationship of landlord and raiyat is subsisting no application can be made under this section. It is abundantly clear that during the period for which arrears of rent were claimed there was a relationship of landlord and raiyat between the decree-holder and the respondents, otherwise no decree for rent could ever have been granted. It must be remembered that one of the main objects of this Act is to grant tenants relief in cases where claims for arrears of rent are made against them. Why should a tenant be deprived of the relief to which he would be otherwise entitled merely on the ground that his landlord subsequent to the accrual of the arrears has transferred his interest to some other person It appears to me that if a relationship of landlord and raiyat existed between the parties during the period in which the rent accrued, then it matters not whether such relationship is subsisting when application is made u/s 16(1) of the Act to reduce the arrears due to the ex-landlord. Mr. Rajkishore Prasad also urged that as the ex-landlord who had transferred his interest in the property could no longer proceed against the holding it should be held that the tenant should not be allowed the benefit of a reduction of arrears of rent under this Act. I cannot see the connexion between the two. If a landlord transfers his ownership and sues for arrears of rent, he can only obtain a money decree; but that is no reason at all why the tenant should be deprived of a benefit which is conferred upon him by the plain terms of the Act, namely a right to claim reduction of arrears against the person entitled to receive the rent, namely the ex-landlord.

8. In my view the tenant was entitled to maintain proceedings for reduction of rent and the Rent Reduction Officer had full jurisdiction to consider the claim. Section 18(1), Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act, 1938, deals with disposal of applications u/s 16. On receipt of an application by the raiyat, the Collector shall fix a date for the hearing of the application, and he must give notice of the application and of the date fixed for hearing to the landlord. If the landlord appears, the Collector must hear the parties, and if he is satisfied that

(i) the raiyat has not paid or tendered to the landlord before the expiry of three months from the date on which this section comes into force at least ten per centum of the arrears mentioned in the application, or

(ii) the raiyat has not paid or tendered to the landlord or deposited with the Collector along with his application any of the instalments of rent for the holding which have fallen due in the agricultural year in which the application is made or

(iii) during the period of five years immediately preceding the date on which the application by the raiyat is made under Sub-section (1) of Section 16, the raiyat has never paid the rent of the holding except after the institution of a suit by the landlord for the realization of the arrear of such rent, the Collector shall dismiss the application.

9. In the present case it appears that the instalments of rent for the agricultural year in which the application was made were paid, but it is clear that no deposit of ten per cent, of the arrears or indeed of any sum has been made. It was urged by Mr. Rajkishore Prasad on behalf of the appellant that as the three necessary conditions laid down in Section 18 of the Act had not been complied with the Collector was bound to dismiss the judgment-debtors application. On the other hand, it was contended that this section gives three alternatives, and if the judgment-debtors have complied with one of the alternatives the Collector must consider their application upon the merits and reduce the rent. In my judgment upon a true construction of Section 18(2)(a) of the Act, the Collector must dismiss the application of the tenants unless the latter have complied with the three requirements of that Sub-section, namely (2)(a)(i), (2)(a)(ii) and (2)(a)(iii). If they have not complied with the whole three, they have no right to claim a reduction of rent.

10. It was further argued that if such be the true construction of the section, then the Rent Reduction Officer in the present case has no jurisdiction whatsoever to make the order which he did, reducing the rent. It may well be that the Rent Reduction Officer was wrong in making the order which he did, but that is very different from saying that he acted without jurisdiction. It is quite clear that in the present case the judgment-debtors being occupancy raiyats paying produce rent were entitled to make an application to the Rent Reduction Officer u/s 16 of the Act. The Rent Reduction Officer had full jurisdiction to call upon the appellant decree-holder to answer the application and to hear the parties and make such orders as he deemed proper in the circumstances. In my view, there can be no question that this application is one which the Revenue Officer had full jurisdiction to enter, tain. This is not a case of inherent want of jurisdiction.

11. As pointed out in Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dasrath Pandey, , there is a confusion between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. A Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken, the decision however wrong cannot be disturbed.

12. This latter case of this Court followed an earlier case, Girwar Narayan Mahton and Others Vs. Kamla Prasad and Others, , in which it was held that a judgment of a Court having pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to the suit, however erroneous, cannot be a nullity but is merely voidable. The question whether a previous suit is or is not barred u/s 109, Ben. Ten. Act, is one within the competency of the Court which decides that suit, and its bar does not constitute inherent want of jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction in such a case is to be decided by the Court itself which otherwise has jurisdiction to try the suit. And the question of Section 109 of the Act being a bar ought to be raised before the decree in the previous suit is "passed. At p. 743 the learned Judges observed:

Thus if the question of jurisdiction is to be decided by the Court itself with reference to the existence or otherwise of a particular fact in bar of trial, there is no want of inherent jurisdiction, and the judgment pronounced may be erroneous but not void and cannot be collaterally impeached. The question of jurisdiction in such a case is, like other questions of fact or law, to be decided by the Court itself which otherwise has jurisdiction to try the suit.

13. In my judgment the revenue authorities had jurisdiction in this case to enter, tain the application. It may well be that they had to decide three facts in favour of the applicants before they could give them relief, and in a sense the existence of these three facts would be necessary to confer jurisdiction; but it was for the Court to consider whether the facts gave it jurisdiction to grant the relief, and the fact that it found the facts wrongly cannot make its decision wholly null and void. It had jurisdiction to entertain the matter, and it is no answer to say that it had decided wrongly in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

14. It is pointed out that Section 22 of the Act makes orders of the Collector final in the sense that they cannot be varied or set aside by a civil Court. Under various rules, however, a person aggrieved by an order of the Collector is not without remedy but may apply by way of revision to the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. Be that as it may, the decision of the Collector cannot be treated as wholly null and void for want of jurisdiction merely because he has decided wrongly that the tenant was entitled to relief. In my judgment the order of the Collector reducing the rent cannot be ignored, and effect would have to be given to it in the execution proceedings. Had the order been wholly without jurisdiction, the executing Court, of course, would have been at liberty to ignore it. The executing Court, however, cannot ignore an order made with jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous it may be.

15.The Revenue Officer not only reduced the rent but ordered the payment of the arrears by three instalments, and it is clear that the respondents have strictly complied with his order and paid the first subsequent instalments due into the Court of the Collector as they became due. In short, the effect of the finding of the Rent Reduction Officer was to reduce the decretal amount and to convert it into an instalment decree, and this the Rent Reduction Officer is fully empowered to do. There can be no doubt that where he acts with jurisdiction his order must be observed by the executing Court but in the present case the executing Court proceeded to sell for the full decretal amount as if it was immediately payable.

16. As I have stated, the decree had been reduced and converted into an instalment decree which gave the decree-holder no right whatsoever to proceed with the execution except in a particular manner when default was made in payment of instalments. The effect of reduction of arrears under Sections 16 and 18 is dealt with u/s 19 of the Act which provides that where proceedings in execution have already been stayed no further steps can be taken by any Court. It also provides that the amount of arrears as reduced are to be deposited by the raiyat within a period of 18 months with the Collector and such deposit must de made either in a lump sum or in such instalments as fixed by the Collector and Sub-section (2) of Section 19 provides for the decree-holders remedy in the event of the judgment-debtor failing to carry out the provisions of the Collectors order. It is clear from Section 19 of the Act, that the moment the Rent Reduction Officer has reduced the arrears and granted instalments, execution of the decree as it originally stood cannot proceed.

17. Mr. Rajkishore Prasad has argued that execution proceedings could only be stayed or stopped if they had already been stayed u/s 17 of the Act. Section 17 allows a Court to stay proceeding pending proceedings for reduction of rent in the Court of the Rent Reduction Officer. Unless such a stay has been obtained, it is contended that the executing Court could proceed to sell the property in spite of an order reducing the rent and granting instalments. In my view whether a previous application had or had not been made to stay proceedings pending the result of rent reduction proceedings, further execution proceedings cannot proceed once the Rent Reduction Officer has made an order reducing rent and grafting instalments. In any event, I am satisfied that before the sale an application was made to the executing Court to stay proceedings on the original decree and to reduce the decretal amount in accordance with the orders of the Rent Reduction Officer.

18. In the present case the executing Court had no right whatsoever to sell the property once the order was made reducing the arrears and granting instalments. Section 19(2) of the Act provides for the decree-holders rights should the judgment, debt or default in performance of the new order. A sale under the original decree in contravention of the plain terms of the Collectors order is, in my view, a sale wholly without jurisdiction, and that being so must be set aside.

19. For the reasons which I have given, I am satisfied that the lower appellate Court was right in setting aside the sale, and I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.

Yarma J.

I agree.