S.K. Mishra,J.

1. All the Criminal Revision Applications were heard on 21.10.2020.

2. Further hearing is taken up today through video conferencing.

3. In this batch of criminal revisions, the petitioners have prayed to quash the orders of taking cognizance and issuance of processes against the petitioners passed on dated 22.02.2013, 18.03.2013, 28.12.2012, 27.02.2013, 25.02.2013, 13.02.2013, 21.02.2013, 06.03.2013, 26.02.2012, 21.02.2013, 13.03.2013, 26.07.2013, 30.01.2013, 24.04.2013 and 20.07.2013 in 1.C.C. No.579/2012, 1.C.C No.677/2012, 1.C.C. No.542/2012, 1.C. C. No.581/2012, 1.C.C. No.657/2012, 1.C.C. No.544/2012, 1.C.C. No.656/2012, 1.C.C. No.543/2012, 1.C.C. No.530/2012, 1.C.C. No.615/2012, 1.C.C. No.580/2012, 1.C.C. No.614/2012, 1.C.C. No.3/2013, 1.C.C. No.529/2012, 1.C.C.31/2013 and 1.C.C.48/2013, respectively, by the learned S.D.J.M., Panposh.

4. The facts of the cases are not disputed. The complainant-opposite party is a supplier of the petitioner-company. It is alleged that he supplied coal to the petitioner-company for valuable consideration. The accused-petitioners issued several cheques amounting to almost 10 crore rupees. All the cheques were presented before the Uco Bank, Rourkela but the cheques were not honoured, which led to issuance of notices as envisaged under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. After service of such notices, there being no payment by the accused, the complaints were lodged before the learned SDJM, Panposh. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in all these cases. Such orders of taking cognizance and issuance of processes have been assailed in all these criminal revision applications.

5. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these cases may be summarized as follows:

It is submitted that in the complaint petition, no where it is mentioned that the Deputy In-charge or the Senior Clerk has been authorized to file the complaint case on behalf of opposite partyM/s. Agarwal Fuel Corporation (P) Ltd.-company about the transaction in question.

It is also submitted that in case a petition is filed by the company, the same can be done through its Director or Principal Officer by a Resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the company in exercise of its statutory power under Section 291 of the Companies Act, 1961. However, in the present cases, opposite parties i.e. the Deputy In-charge, Principal Officer or Senior Clerk of the Company has no statutory power under Section 291 of the aforesaid Act nor they have been authorized by the Board of Directors of the Company to file a complaint case against the petitioners. It is further submitted that Section 142 of the N.I. Act, 1881 contains a non-obstante clause prohibiting the court to take cognizance of offence in case of complaint under Section 138 of the said Act, if the complaint petition is not filed by the payee or the holder of the cheque. It is further stated that Section 2(10) read with Section 3 of the Companies Act defines a company formed and registered under the Companies Act. The petitioner-company has been registered as “Sree Metaliks Ltd.” whereas the case has been filed against “Shree Metaliks Ltd.” and hence it is not maintainable.

In support of his contention, as reflected in the preceding paragraphs, the learned counsel for the petitioners relies on the judgments passed in the following cases.

The cases of Padmabati Naik vs. State of Orissa and others, 2013 (II) OLR 316, Eimco Elecon (India) Ltd. vs. Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & others, 2011 (I) ILR-CUT-833, Sri Kailash Chandra Mishra vs. Shri Ajitsinh Ulhasrao Babar, 2014 (I) OLR 211, State Bank of Travancore vs. M/s Kingston Computers (I) P. Ltd., 2011 AIR SCW 1948, A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and another with G. Kamalakar vs. M/s Surana Securities Ltd. and another, AIR 2014 SC 630 [LQ/SC/2013/1031] , A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and another with G. Kamalakar and another, AIR 2015 SC 1198 [LQ/SC/2015/125] , Smt. Anita Chowdhary vs. M/s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. and others, 2017 (I) OLR 745.

Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, the learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the learned SDJM, Panposh has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the case in view of the fact that the cheques were allegedly dishonoured by the Oriental Bank of Commerce, Barbil Branch in the district of Keonjhar, though those cheques were presented to the Uco Bank, Rourkela. He would further argue that the complaints are liable to be dismissed from non-payment of proper court fees as per the Odisha Amendment to the Court Fees Act.

Considering the aforesaid facts of the case, the ratio decided in the aforesaid cases and the material available on record, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, the impugned orders of taking cognizance of offence by the learned Magistrate on the dates mentioned above, against the petitioners are liable to be set aside as the complaints are not maintainable.

6. Mr. Biswajit Nayak, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties would answer the point raised by the petitionercounsel in the following manner:-

(i) As far as the 1st contention raised by the petitioners that the Senior Clerk or Dy. In-charge is not competent to file the case on behalf of the complainant, it is submitted that at paragraph-1 of the complaint petition, the complainant has specifically averred as follow:

“That the complainant is a private limited company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 in the name & style of Agarwal Fuel Corporation Private Limited, known as Eagle Fuel Private Ltd, having its branch office at Rourkela, in the address noted above. The complainant’s company as per the resolution passed by the Board of Directors authorized to Sri Ratnakar Nayak, Deputy In-charge to file the case against the accused nos. 1 and 2.”

The learned counsel for the opposite parties relies on the following cases of Vishwa Mitter of Vijay Bharat Cigarette Stores, Dalhousie Road, Pathankot vrs. O.P. Poddar and others, (1983) 4 SCC 701 [LQ/SC/1983/278] , National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. vrs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others, (2009) 1 SCC 407 [LQ/SC/2008/2304] , A.C. Narayanan vrs. State of Maharastra and another, 2013 (II) OLR (SC) 884, M.M.T.C. Ltd. and another vs. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 234 [LQ/SC/2001/2653] and The Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. Keshvanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687 [LQ/SC/1997/1701] .

In the case of Vishwa Mitter of Vijay Bharat Cigarette Stores, Dalhousie Road, Pathankot (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph-5, has held as follows:

“ 5. It is thus crystal clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance Under Section190 and unless any statutory provision prescribes any special qualification or eligibility criteria for putting the criminal law in motion, no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. Section 190 of the CrPC clearly indicates that the qualification of the complainant to file a complaint is not relevant. But where any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. Even with regard to offences under the Indian Penal Code, ordinarily, anyone can set the criminal law in motion but the various provisions in Chapter XIV prescribe the qualification of the complainant which would enable him or her to file a complaint in respect of specified offences and no Court can take cognizance of such offence unless the complainant satisfies the eligibility criterion, but in the absence of any such specification, no Court can throw-out the complaint or decline to take the cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.”

In the case of National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-10 has held as follows:

“10. The term `complainant' is not defined under the Code. Section 142 NI Act requires a complaint under section 138 of that Act, to be made by the payee (or by the holder in due course). It is thus evident that in a complaint relating to dishonour of a cheque (which has not been endorsed by the payee in favour of anyone), it is the payee alone who can be the complainant. The NI Act only provides that dishonour of a cheque would be an offence and the manner of taking cognizance of offences punishable under section 138 of that Act. However, the procedure relating to initiation of proceedings, trial and disposal of such complaints, is governed by the Code. Section 200 of the Code requires that the Magistrate, on taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses. The requirement of section 142 of NI Act that payee should be the complainant, is met if the complaint is in the name of the payee. If the payee is a company, necessarily the complaint should be filed in the name of the company. Section 142 of NI Act does not specify who should represent the company, if a company is the complainant. A company can be represented by an employee or even by a non-employee authorized and empowered to represent the company either by a resolution or by a power of attorney”. (underlined to emphasize)

In the case of A.C. Narayanan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 20 and 24 has held as follows:

“20. The stand of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2007 is that no complaint can be filed and no cognizance of the complaint can be taken if the complaint is by the power of attorney holder, since it is against Section 200 of the Code and deserves to be rejected. There is no dispute that complaint has to be filed by the complainant as contemplated by Section 200 of the Code, but the said Section does not create any embargo that the attorney holder or legal representative(s) cannot be a complainant.”

24. In view of the discussion, we are of the opinion that the attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal. xxx”

In the case of M.M.T.C. Ltd and another (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:

“Anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance. It has been held that no court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. In the present case, the only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 is that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criteria is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant Company.

Even presuming, that initially there was no authority with the person lodging complaint on behalf of the company, still the company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on this ground”. (emphasis supplied)

In the case of the Associated Cement Co. Ltd., (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 23 and 25 has held as follows:

“23. The above scheme of the new Code makes it clear that complainant must be a corporeal person who is capable of making physical presence in the court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and it is that natural person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes to be the complainant in the case. In other words, when the component to a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings.

25. Be that so, we suggest as a pragmatic proposition that no magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. There e may be occasions when a different person can represent the company e.g. the particular person who represents the company at the first instance may either retire for, the company's service or may otherwise cease to associate therewith or he would be transferred to a distant place. In such cases it would be practically difficult for the company to continue to make the same person represent the company in the court. In any such eventuality it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court. At any rate for those reasons we are not persuaded to uphold the contention that Section 247 of the old Code (or Section 256 of the new Code) is not applicable in a case where the complainant is a company or any other justice person.”

In support of his contention and the citations relied upon, the learned counsel for the petitioners raises the ground that the learned SDJM, Panposh failed to appreciate that in order to make the petitioner and accused in the proceeding, it is necessary that the liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be presented with a clear averments connecting the petitioners with the company and failure to do so would render the said complaint case unsustainable in law.

7. In addition to the points raised above, the learned counsel for the opposite parties would argue as follows:

“ The present opposite party in his complaint petition has taken clear averments connecting the petitioner with the company. Relevant paragraphs of the complaint petition are quoted herein below.

That the accused no.1 is Shree Metaliks Ltd., being represented through its Managing Director-Mahesh Agarwal (herein accused no.2), having its office at Barbil in the above noted address.

That, the accused no.2-Mahesh Agarwal, the Managing Director of Shree Metaliks Ltd. of Barbil (herein accused no.1)

That the complainant company used to supply coal to the different parties. As per the request of the Accused No.2, the complainant had supplied to cal to the accused No.1 Vide Bill/Tax Invoice No. ACCPL/TCR/TI/27, Dt.09.05.2012 for Rs.12,46, 210.39 and Bill/Tax Invoice No.ACCPL/RKL/TI/76, Dt.31.05.2012 for Rs.35,08,067.17 (In total Rs.76, 95, 166.25 (Rupees seventy six lakh ninety five thousand one hundred sixty six and paise twenty five) only.

That, towards part payment against the aforesaid bills amount, the Account No.2 issued and delivered two cheques bearing No.314894, Dt.28.06.12 for Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees forty five lakh) both drawn on “Oriental Bank of Commerce”, Barbil Branch, Keonjhar, Odisha of Shree Metalicks Ltd., under your signature in favour of the complainant i.e. Agarwal Coal Corporation Pvt. Ltd.

That, at the time of handing over the said cheque, the Accused No.2 assured the complainant that there is sufficiently balance in their bank account and the said cheques will be honored positively on presentation.

That, the complainant served a demand notice (Notice dated 03.11.2012) on 03.11.2012 through his advocate Bulu Patnaik by Regd. Post with A.D. in favour of the Accused Nos.1 and 2 demanding therein to make payment of the said cheques amount i.e. Rs.60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakhs) only to the complainant within 15 (fifteen) days of receipt of the demand notice.

That, the Accused Nos.1 and 2 have received the said demand notices on 08.11.2012, but despite of receiving the demand notice, the Accused Nos.1 and 2 have not given any reply nor have paid the cheques amount to the Complainant till date.”

8. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the opposite parties relies upon the authoritative pronouncements made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases:

A.K. Singhania vs. Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. and another, AIR 2014 SC 71 [LQ/SC/2013/1166] , Gunmala Sales Private Ltd. vs. Anu Mehta and others, (2014) 59 OCR (SC) 1039, Munshi Abdul Maheraj Ali vs. M/s S.S. Marketing, (2015) 60 OCR 172, Rajendra Kumar Sahoo vs. Ramakanta Sahoo, (2015) 60 OCR 206, M. Sreenivasulu Reddy vs. K.S. Raghava Reddy, 2003 Cr.L.J. 4005.

In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd., (supra), as noted earlier, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that:

“the complainant has to be a corporeal person who is capable of making a physical appearance in the court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court. It is held that the court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings. It has further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. It has been held that there may be occasions when different persons can represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court.”

In the case of Samrat Shipping Co. (P) Ltd., vs. Dolly George, (2002) 9 SCC 455 [LQ/SC/1999/1211] , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that:

“the appellant Company has filed a complaint before a Magistrate's Court for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no resolution of the Board of Directors of the petitioner Company authorising the person who represented the Company before the Magistrate's Court. Though the appellant preferred a revision before the Sessions Court, that became futile and he moved the High Court invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition of the appellant in spite of the fact that the appellant produced a copy of the resolution for showing that the Company had authorised the particular individual to present the complaint before the Court. The High Court while dismissing the petition observed thus:

“Having heard the parties' counsel and after going through the record it appears that the resolution which has been filed on record of this court is not certified by any person at p. 13. If it is an uncertified copy, how far it could be taken to be a correct and true copy. But nobody is inclined to take responsibility about its correctness. It is a matter of grave doubt that such a resolution should inure to the benefit of the petitioner, for, it is not a civil suit. It is a criminal prosecution. Authorisation to prosecute, being of the nature of sanction, the Board of Directors is supposed to apply their mind to the facts and circumstances of each case before authorising any person to prosecute any person for any offence in the submission of the learned counsel. It appears plausible at least for the present purpose, for no application has ever been filed before any court seeking permission to file additional evidence, excepting what is filed in this Court for the first time.”

3. Having heard both sides we find it difficult to support the orders challenged before us. A company can file a complaint only through human agency. The person who presented the complaint on behalf of the Company claimed that he is the authorised representative of the Company. Prima facie, the trial court should have accepted it at the time when a complaint was presented. If it is a matter of evidence when the accused disputed the authority of the said individual to present the complaint, opportunity should have been given to the complainant to prove the same, but that opportunity need be given only when the trial commences. The dismissal of the complaint at the threshold on the premise that the individual has not produced certified copy of the resolution appears to be too hasty an action. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and direct the trial court to proceed with the trial and dispose of it in accordance with law. xxx”

9. In applying the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus, the matter can be summarized by the following points.

"(i) Anyone can set the criminal law by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance.

(ii) The court cannot decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.

(iii) It has been held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offence under the statute, then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute.

(iv) In case of N.I. Act, the only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 of theis that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criteria is satisfied if the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant company.

(v) In case of a complainant-company, a complaint can be initiated in its name by an employee of the company or even by a nonemployee of the company.

(vi) when the complainant is the body corporate, it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in the court proceeding.

(vii) Even presuming that initially there was no authority, still the company can at any stage rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. Thus, the complaint should not be quashed on that ground.

(v) In a case the accused disputes the authority of individual to present the complaint, opportunity should be given to the complainant to prove the same, which can be done only when the trial commences. Thus, dismissal of the complaint at the threshold on the premise that the individual has not produced certified copy of the resolution appears to be too hasty an action."

10. In applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand, this Court finds from the record that all the complaints have been filed by M/s Agarwal Fuel Corporation (P) Ltd. represented through Sri Ratnakar Nayak, who is Deputy In-charge of the said company. The employee of the company in his affidavit annexed the complaint petition has stated on oath that he has been duly authorized by the Board of Directors of the company to file the case and that he is competent to swear affidavit on behalf of the company. He further swears to the fact that the averments made in Paragraphs 1 to 9 of the complaint petition are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. The complaint petition has been annexed with a letter addressed to Sri Ratnakar Nayak, the employee, who has signed the complaint petition and sworn the affidavit on behalf of the company by Mr. Vinod K Agarwal, Director of the company that as per the Board of Directors Resolution dated 07.07.2012, Sri Nayak has been authorized to consult lawyers and take necessary steps to file case/cases. So, it is apparent from the record that in these cases, the complaint has been filed by an employee of the company, he was duly authorized by a Resolution of the Board of Directors (as there is nothing on record to disbelieve this document on the face of it), and that the complaint has been made in the name of the company.

11. Two other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely, Mr. Udgata with respect to the court fees and jurisdiction of the learned SDJM, Panposh. It is contended that, as per the Court Fees (Orissa Amendment Act), 2012, the Court-fees to be paid in a case or a complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, for a amount involved in a cheque exceeding one lakh rupees is one thousand rupees. Mr. Udgata, therefore, would argue that as insufficient court fees paid in the cases, the same should be dismissed. It is true that the Court-Fees Act has been amended by the Orissa Legislative Assembly as far as its application to the State of Odisha is concerned with respect to the court fees to be affixed to the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. But, such amendment, which came into force on 17.02.2013, is only a taxing statute, and therefore, will not defeat a cause of action, if there is no other legal impediment. The privy council in the case of Rachappa Subrao Jadhav vs. Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav, AIR 1918 Privy Council 188 has held that:

“ The Court Fees Act was passed not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality against the opponent but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. The privy council further held that it is evident from the character of the, and is brought out by Section12, which makes the decision of the first Court as to value final as between the parties, and enables a Court of appeal to correct any error as to this, only where the first Court decided to the detriment of the revenue. The defendant in the suit seeks to utilize the provisions of the not to safeguard the interests of the State, but to obstruct the plaintiff; he does not contend that the Court wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue but that it dealt with the case without jurisdiction. In the circumstances this plea, advanced for the first time at the hearing of the appeal in the District Court, is misconceived, and was rightly rejected by the High Court.”

12. Thus, it is clear that the Court Fees Act and consequently all the Orissa State Amendment are only to providing for taxing purposes. If insufficient court fees are paid in a proceeding, be it a civil or criminal, the proceeding should not be dismissed at the threshold, rather the Court is under a duty to give a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner in a complaint case or the plaintiff in a civil proceeding to pay the deficit court fees. In no case, a proceeding should be dismissed for payment of inadequate court fees without affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, complainant or the plaintiff to make good deficit court fees. This Court is of the opinion that even at the final hearing of the proceeding, if it is found that insufficient court fees has been paid, the judgment can be pronounced directing the petitioner or complainant to pay the deficit court fees, lest the final order shall not take effect. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reason to dismiss the complaint or to allow the revision setting aside the order taking cognizance and issuance of processes by the learned Magistrate.

13. The other issue is relating to jurisdiction. There is no dispute that the cheques were drawn on the Oriental Bank of Commerce, Barbil Branch in the district of Keonjhar. It was presented in the UCo Bank, Bazar Branch, Rourkela, but the cheques were forwarded for clearance to the Barbil Branch of Oriental Bank of Commerce. Thus, as per the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 9 SCCs 129, the learned JMFC, Barbil has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and try the case. At paragraph-21 of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, Justice Vikramajit Sen speaking for the three Judge Bench, held that interpretation of Section 138 of the N.I. Act leads to the conclusion that the offence contemplated therein stands committed on the dishonor of the cheque, and accordingly JMFC at the place where this occurs is ordinarily where the complaint must be filed, entertained and tried. The cognizance of the crime by the JMFC at that place however, can be taken only when the concomitants or constituents contemplated by the section concatenate with each other. The Supreme Court clarified that the place of issuance or delivery of the statutory notice or where the complaint chooses to present the cheque for encashment by his bank are not relevant for territorial jurisdiction of the complaint even though non-compliance therewith will inexorable lead to the dismissal of the complaint. It cannot be contested that considerable confusion prevails on the interpretation of Section 138 in particular and Chapter XVII in general of the NI Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that vindication of the view is duly manifested by the decisions and conclusion arrived at by the High Court even in a few cases that the Supreme Court has decided by the judgment. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further clarified that the complaint is statutorily bound to comply with Section 177, etc of Code and therefore, the place or situs where the Section 138 complaint is to be filed is not of his choosing. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the territorial jurisdiction is restricted to the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which in the present context is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn.

Thus, to consider whether all the complaints filed by the complainant-opposite party in all these cases before the learned SDJM, Panposh, Rourkela in the district of Sundargarh are liable to be set aside. This question has been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the same judgment of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various courts spanning across the country. After a deep consideration of the matter, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will continue to proceed at that place. To clarify, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications, the category of complaint cases where proceeding have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by Supreme Court from the court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the court where the cases presently pending. The Supreme Court further held that all the complaints (obviously including those where the respondent-accused has not been properly served) shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper court, in consonance with the exposition of the law propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment. If such complaints are filed/re-filed within thirty days from their return, they shall be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or proper filing was itself time-barred.

14. Thus, in a careful examination of the provisions of law as well as the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment of the three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra) is only prospective in nature and it shall not affect the present bunch of cases as admittedly all the cases have been filed before the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on 01.08.2014. So, as per the shaving observation made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the observation that the learned SDJM, Panposh did not have jurisdiction to try the cases will not make the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate vulnerable requiring the same to be set aside. However, as per the 2nd observation given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the trial cannot be proceeded in these cases. It is not disputed in these cases, except in one case, i.e. I.C.C. No.579/2012, evidences have not started. Even in the aforesaid complainant case, only the examination-in-chief in the form of affidavit has been filed. Cross examination has not been started. So, this Court is of the opinion that in all fitness of things, all the cases should be re-filed before the learned JMFC, Barbil, who has the jurisdiction to decide the case and try the offence.

15. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that in the present cases the company has been duly authorized an authorized person. If the accused arrayed in this cases wants to disputes those facts and statements, the said issues may be raised at the time of trial of the cases and opportunities should be given to the complainant to show before the learned Magistrate that in fact, the company made a Resolution to authorize Mr. Ratnakar Nayak to file the complaint on behalf of the company and if necessary examine the Managing Director or any of the Directors of the company.

15.1 Mr. Udgata’s argument that a complaint case has to be filed only the Secretary or any of the Directors or other principal officer of the Corporation is also of no substance as there is no such provision either in the Companies Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the company to file a criminal complaint only through one of its principal officer. I am aware of the provision of Rule-1 of Order XXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1806, which provides that in a suit by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation, who is able to depose to the facts of the case. No such provision appears either in the N.I. Act or in the Companies Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure. So, any person, who is duly authorized by the Board of Director in terms of Section 291 of the Companies Act and who is able to depose to the facts of the case, can present the complaint before the competent court.

15.2 Another contention is raised that there is a spelling difference in the name of the company i.e. complaint-company. But, I am of the opinion that it may be only a spelling mistake and is of no substance.

16. Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the case of L.P. Electronics (Orissa) Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Tirupati Electro Marketing Pvt. Ltd., 2013(II) OLR 318 and the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of M/s SMS Asia Private Limited and another vs. M/s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Limited, CRLMC 1210/2017 on dated 14.12.2017. The arguments in both the cases are almost similar. In that case, the complainant was filed on behalf of the complaint-company by a power of attorney holder. Having carefully examined the facts of both the cases, I am of the opinion that the facts of those cases mentioned above are factually distinguishable in the sense that in the present cases, the person, who has signed on behalf of the company, has been authorized by the Board of Directors to initiate the complaint and from the facts narrated to the complaint petition, it is apparent that he has knowledge about the transaction. In that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to follow the single Bench Judgment in L.P. Electronics (Orissa) Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

17. Hence, I am of the opinion that even though there is some technical clichés regarding the presentation of the complaint in the sense that the complaint has not been initiated by a Director of the company acting on behalf of company but by an employee of the company, who is well acquainted with the facts of the cases, the orders taking cognizance of offences against the petitioners in all the cases cannot be quashed on that ground alone. It is especially so because there is a Resolution of the Board of Directors to authorize Mr. Ratnakar Nayak, Deputy In-charge to initiate the complaint.

18. Furthermore, having considered the facts of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that when the complainant alleges that a large sum of money (approximately ten crores of rupees) were to be paid to it through cheques and all the cheques bounced, the complaints should not be dismissed at the threshold. This observation is in addition to the other considerations discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

19. In the result, on a careful conspectus of the entire material on record as well as the law governing the field, this Court is of the opinion that the cognizance taken by the learned SDJM, Panposh cannot be quashed or set aside because of non-compliance of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1961 or for deficit court fees or for lack of jurisdiction. However, all these complaints filed before the SDJM, Panposh are allowed to be withdrawn to the complainant to be filed before the learned JMFC, Barbil within the period of limitation as prescribed from the date of such withdrawal. The learned SDJM, Panposh shall make an endorsement on each of the complaints filed before him to that effect and allow the complainant to present it before the learned JMFC, Barbil. It is needless to say that no question has been raised regarding the question of limitation. In other words, it is not disputed by the accused-petitioners that the complaint is filed after the lapse of the prescribed period of limitation.

To obviate further dispute or controversy, the complainant, while re-presenting complaint before the JMFC, Barbil, if so advised, may file a copy of resolution(s) of the Board of Directors of the Company authorizing the appropriate person to file the complaints.

20. With the aforesaid observations, all the Criminal Revisions are disposed of.

21. The Trial Court Records bearing I.C.C. No.579/2012 be sent back to the learned SDJM, Panposh immediately by the Registry.

22. As the restrictions due to resurgence of COVID-19 situation are continuing, learned counsel for the parties may utilize a printout of the order available in the High Court’s website, at par with certified copy, subject to attestation by Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, Advocate or by Sri Biswajit Nayak, Advocate along with his seal, in the manner prescribed vide Court’s Notice No.4587, dated 25th March, 2020 as modified by Court’s Notice No.4798, dated 15th April, 2021.