P. KODDANDA RAMAYYA, J.

(1) A short and interesting question is raised in this second Appeal i. e. , whether the Civil Court can grant a bare declaration that the defendants are only sub-tenants leaving the parties for the relief of eviction to the Special Tribunals constituted under A. P. Buldings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 15 of 1960 (hereinafter called the.)

(2) THE case arose this way. The plaintiff filed impleading two of his tenants the present suit out of which this appeal arose tor perpetual injunction restraining them from subletting all or any portion of the mulgi-bearing municipal No. 15-2-280, Maharaj Gunj, Hyderabad. Defendants 1 and 2 are tenants. The 1st defendant died and his legal representatives were added as defendants 3 to 8. The suit is filed on 17-4-1976 for an injunction restraining the defendants from letting the property to the tenants. In fact the plaintiff filed an application for eviction on 20-7-1976 against these defendants before the Special Tribunals under the above act on the ground that they are guilty of subletting.

(3) WRITTEN Statement was filed on 21-10-76 denying subletting but contending they entered into a partnership and they are carrying on a joint business with the third parties but not a case of subletting.

(4) THE Trial Court found that the contention, that the defendants entered into a partnership with third parties but never sublet the premises cannot be accepted and held they were guilty of subletting but held that the plaintiff is at liberty to seek appropriate legal remedies against the defendants and their subtenants if the defendants do not evict the subtenants within a month and with this direction the suit is decreed for perpetual injunction as prayed for.

(5) AGAINST this judgment and decree the defendants filed appeal. The appellate Court while agreeing with the trial Court that the defendants sublet the premises held that the relief of perpetual injunction cannot be granted but the plaintiffs suit was decreed declaring that the defendants 1 and 2 sub-leased the suit premises to M/s. Sentil Dall Mill and M/s. P. A. Tangavelu Company contrary to the terms of agreement of tenancy covered by Ex. A-1 and that the said tenancy does not bind the plaintiff. Against this judgment and decree the present appeal is filed.

(6) BOTH the learned counsel agreed that the injunction cannot be granted and the direction of the trial Court that the tenant should vacate within a month is also unsustainable but the counsel are at variance on the question whether the decree for declaration is sustainable. The plaintiffs counsel maintained that the provisions of the do not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the suit as originally framed and filed is well founded and the subsequent induction of the sub-tenants by the defendants should not oust the jurisdiction granted by the appellate court is well founded. On the otherhand the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the suit is laid for injunction alone and once the injunction cannot be granted the relief of declaration declaring that the sub-tenancy was created and the same is not binding on the plaintiff, is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as the Special Tribunal constituted under the above act, is the only competent authority to make the equiry and at any rate when such application for eviction was already filed the court should not exercise ihe d;scretion of granting a declaratory judgment in favour of the plaintiff so that the proceedings before the Special Tribunal will be concluded automatically without any need for enquiry and such relief cannot be granted in the present suit without canvassing the finding recorded against the defendants regarding the sub-tenancy he urged that the courts below erred in recording the findings but should have directed the plaintiff to pursue his remedies under the special Act.

(7) IT is clear that the plaintiffs counsel is right in saying that the civil courts jurisdiction is not barred for riling a suit as per the provisions of the. This court held construing an identical provision of previous act 25 of 1949 that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to pass a decree is not ousted but such a decree may not be executable as per the provisions of the Vide Venkataratnam M. vs. Venkatarao do not find any express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. No doubt the jurisdiction can be barred by implication as provided in Sec. 9 C. P. C. The barring of jurisdiction under Sec. 10 of the, also contemplates that to the extent of prohibiting the Civil Court for executing the decree or evicting the tenant otherwise, and thus it can fairly be concluded that the Civil courts jurisdiction is not ousted for passing a decree but is. ousted for evicting a tenant either in execution of decree or othewise, as protection was given to the tenant governed by the not to be evicted except under the provisions of the.

(8) HOWEVER, the question still remains, when the relief of possession cannot be granted to the plaintiff, it is proper that the Civil Court should exercise the jurisdiction of granting a declaration. So we should examine the general rule of declaratory judgments and the correct rule of discretion as contemplated under Sec. 34 of ihe Specific Relief Act, generally "the declaration claimed must relate to some legal right, and must confer some tangible benefit on the plaintiff. There is no jurisdiction to make a declaration on a subject relief in respect of which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court". When the plaintiff must necessarily seek relief of eviction on proof of sub-tenancy and such relief cannot be granted in the Civil Court he should not be permitted to seek a bare declaration to enable him to use this judgment before the Special Tribunals. The dicta of Lord Herschell in Barraclough vs. Brown may usefully be recalled wherein it was held ihat such declaratory relief cannot be granted. Where a person was given the remedy to recover expenses in a court of summary jurisdiction he sought a declaration in the High Court and it was held by land Herschell "it was argued for the appellant that, even if not entitled to recover the expenses by action in the Hight Court, he was, at all events, entitled to come to that court for a declaration that on the true interpretation of the statute he had a right to recover them. It might be enough to say that no such caie was made by the appellants claim. But, apart from this, I think it would be very mischievous to hold that when a party is compelled by statute to resort to an inferior court he can come first to the high Court to have his right to recover-the very matter relegated to the inferior court-determined. Such a proposition was not supported by authority, and is, I think, unsound in principle. " (emphasis added). Further as observed by Stirling, J. , in Grand Junction Water Works Co. vs. Hamption Urban Council. When the Court is simply asked to make a declaration of right, without giving any consequential relief, the Court ought to be extremely cautious in making such a declaration and ought not to do it in the absence of any very special circumstances", (emphasis added). This principle was accepted in subsequent authorities. The specific Relief Act 47 of 1963 also gives a wide discretion in granting a declaratory relief under Sec. 34. Though the section empowers the court to grant a declaratory relief without any consequential relief the statute gives a clear judicial discretion to the court stating the Court may in its discretion. So it is necessary to establish that very special circumstances exist and a great prejudice will ensue to the plaintiff if such declaratory relief is not granted. In this connection a Full Bench judgment of Allahabad high Court may be referred. In Fateh Singh vs. Gopal Narain it was held that "where a suit is filed before a Civil Court for a declaration the effect of which, if granted, would be to affect the decision of a revenue Court in a pending suit within the exclusive juridiction of that court the proper course for the Civil Court to adopt is to refuse the declaration asked for on the ground that such relief, if granted, would be nugatoiy. " The plaintiff wants to use this declaration in a Civil Court to conclude the enquiry before the Special Tribunal. Though I am not holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction but the civil court in exercise of its discretion shall refuse a declaration of this kind when it is to turn out to be purely nugatory and can be called Brutum Fulman. Once sub-tenants are inducted the suit for injunction has become infructuous. The adjudication on the issue of sub-tenancy and the consequent eviction is entrusted to the special Tribunals and the Civil Court should not give declarations in respect of those questions just to enable the parties to forestall if not prevent the enquiry before the Special Tribunals.

(9) IN this case the plaintiff filed an application for eviction before the Tribunal even before the written statement is filed by the defendants and prosecuting both the remedies. Under these circumstances I am clearly of the opinion that the court should decline to grant a bare declaratory relief as the very issue on which the declaration is sought has to be adjudicated by the special Tribunal. Hence I hold that in the absence of any very special circumstances in the case mere declaratory relief regarding sub-tenancy granted by the Civil Court is not in proper exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it and it shall reject it. The remedy of the plaintiff is to seek his redress before the special Tribunals under the.

(10) IN the result, the Second Appeal is allowed and the decree of the appellate Court is set aside and the suit shall stand dismissed as it has become infructuous, I make no order as to costs. S. A. allowed.