Singh, J.

1. The above Civil Rules arise out of common orders which are challenged in two petitions by separate petitioners. This order will govern both Civil Rules so far as the stay orders passed by this Court are concerned.

2. The petitioners in Civil Rule 388 of 1981 obtained ad-interim stay order against the respondents. The order runs as:

Heard Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner.

Let the records be called for. Let a Rule issue calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ should not issue as prayed for; or why such further or other order should not be passed as to this court may seem fit and proper.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Sr. Govt. Advocate for the State of Assam in regard to the stay. Stay the operation of impugned order, Annexure B and F to the petition until further orders.

3. It appears that annexure E to the petition the operation of which was stayed, has been wrongly mentioned as annexure F in the stay order. Annexure F as such is to be read as Annexure E.

4. Similar is the Stay order in the other Civil Rule 389 of 1981, which the petitioner obtained against the respondents, in Civil Rule 389 of 1981, the impugned orders stayed are Annexures C and F to the petition which correspond to Annexures B and E to the petition in the other Civil Rule.

5. The ad-interim Stay orders in both Rules were passed after hearing the learned Senior Govt. Advocate for the State, but without (a) furnishing to the other respondents copies of the petitions and all documents in support of the plea for the interim order; and (b) giving them an opportunity of being heard, as contemplated in clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution. The ad-interim orders were, therefore, ex-parte as against the other respondents, who were affected by the said orders.

6. In both the Civil Rules, the respondent No. 4, who felt aggrieved by the ex-parte order, made applications on 6.7.81 to this court for the vacation and or modification of the said ex-parte order and furnished a copy of such application to the Counsel of the petitioners on the same date. The application filed by the respondent No. 4 for vacating and or modifying the stay order was placed before this court on 9.7.81. On 9.7.81 the court passed the order as follows:

Let the matter come up in the first week of August, 1981 for consideration of the stay order as prayed for by the learned counsel for both the parties. In the meantime, the petitioner may file objection, if any.

7. Similar order was passed in the other Civil Rule. Both the cases were listed for hearing on stay matter on 21.8.81, but on that day also the petitioners counsel took time for a week. The counsel for the respondent made no objection to the adjournment. Hearing for consideration of the vacating and or modification of the stay orders was taken up on 22.9.81, and learned counsel of both parties were heard. It was concluded on 23.9.81.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 submitted that as the application filed by the respondent No. 4 was not disposed of within a period of two weeks from 6.7.81, by this court as enjoined by clause (3) of Article 226 of the constitution, the ex-parte stay order dated 9.4.81 as against it stood vacated ipso-facto. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply submitted that since the application filed by respondent No. 4 was attended to by the court on 9.7.81, the ad-interim stay would continue until it was vacated or modified by the court. In short, the contention was that the expression dispose of occurring in Article 226(3) of the Constitution does not connote final disposal.

9. A perusal of Article 226 shows that in appropriate cases where justice demands, the High Court may pass an interim order ex-parte whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner on, or inany proceeding relating to, a petition under clause (1) without (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard. In cases in which an interim order is made exparte, the party against whom such order was made may make an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnish a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or to the counsel of such party. It is provided that the High Court shall dispose of such application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it was received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished to the party in whose favour such order has been made, whichever is later. If the High Court fails to dispose of such application within the stipulated period, the interim order, shall on the expiry of the said period, stand vacated. Where the High Court is closed on the last day of the said period, the interim order shall stand vacated only if the application is not disposed of before the expiry of the next day on which the High Court is open.

10. In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 is correct. The expression to dispose of would mean in the context to set, place, or turn to a particular end or consequence. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the expression is to arrive at a definite conclusion. This ordinary meaning has to be given effect to, unless the context provides otherwise. I have read and re-read clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution, and I am convinced that the word/ expression dispose of in the context would mean to arrive at a final conclusion on the application filed by the party against whom the exparte order was passed.

11. On a plain reading of the clause (3), there is no escape from the conclusion that the words shall dispose of imposes a peremptory duty on the High Court to dispose of such an application within the specified period and in case the High Court fails to dispose of it, the ex-parte interim order would stand vacated ipso-facto. It is settled law that where that is no ambiguity in the words, there is no question of interpretation. It is a constitutional mandate that such an application shall be disposed of by the High Court within the specified period, the court has no power to extend time. It is also well-settled that provision with respect of time is always obligatory.

12. A similar question came up for consideration before the Rajasthan High Court in Gheesa Lal and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1981 Rajasthan 65. The learned Single Judge held the view that in case the application filed by the party against whom exparte order was passed is not disposed of within the specified period, the exparte stay order should stand vacated automatically. I am in respectful agreement with the views above that the party who obtained exparte order behind the back of the other party should be vigilant to get it affirmed, after admitting an opportunity to the other side of hearing it. In case, after obtaining the ad-interim order the petitioner fails to discharge his duty and prolongs exparte ad-interim order, he can do so at his own peril.

13. In the instant case, on 9.7.81 on the prayer of the learned counsel of the both the parties, it was ordered that the stay matter would be heard in the 1st week of August, 1981. As already pointed out above, the provision of clause (3) in regard to the period within which such application is to be disposed of is mandatory, and it cannot be nullified either by the act of the parties of or of the Court. The consent of the respondent No. 4 to the prayer for adjournment for hearing of the case after the lapse of the period fixed cannot operate as estoppel against it for the simple reason that there can be no estoppel against the law of the land. It appears that both the parties were acting under the common mistake of the period stipulated under clause (3) of the Article 226 within which the application was to be disposed of. The exparte ad-interim order could operate only till 20.7.81. The petitioners wrongly obtained adjournment till 1st week of August, 1981. In such a case, the maxim no man can take advantage of his own wrong would apply.

14. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners next submitted that stay order was not passed against the respondent No. 4. I cannot accept this contention also. The ad-interim order was passed against all the respondents and the respondent No. 4 is one of them. The right of respondent No. 4 was prejudicially affected by the stay order, and the respondent No. 4 made application above for vacating and or modification of the exparte order as against it.

15. In view of the foregoing reasons, the ad-interim stay order passed by this court in both the Rules on 9.4.81 stood automatically vacated on 21.7.81 by operation law. The stay order has ceased to operate with effect from that day, and it is declared as such. A copy of this order be placed in both the rules.