Kanhaiya Singh, J.

(1) Pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 1944 certain properties were attached on the allegations that they belonged to Ragho Prasad who was an accused for the commission of an offence, which is admittedly a scheduled offence, that is to say, an offence mentioned in the schedule to the said Ordinance. If these two appeals certain landed property, a house-standing thereon and a press installed therein are in question. The land and the house are claimed by Sonamati Devi, the wife of Mahabir Prasad. Sonamati is the appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No.. 170 of 195

5. The press installed therein is, however, claimed by her husband Mahabir, who is the appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 171 of 195

5. This Mahabir is the brother of Ragho, the accused. After the attachment, both Mahabir and his wife-preferred a claim to the properties, as provided in Section 4 of the said Ordinance, and their claim was investigated by the District Judge, as provided in Section 5 of the Ordinance. After hearing the parties, the learned District Judge held that the aforesaid properties belonged to Ragho and they were mere name-lenders. He accordingly dismissed their claim, and now they have preferred separate appeals against the decision of the learned District Judge.

(2) These two appeals were heard analogously, and this judgment will govern both.

(3) The learned counsel for the appellants raised two contentions, first, that the finding of the learned District Judge was erroneous, inasmuch as it ignored unreasonably the title deeds in favour of the appellants, and, second, that the attachment was no longer subsisting. Ragho has been acquitted of the charge levelled against him, and in view of this acquittal there was an automatic lifting of the attachment.

(4) None of these contentions, in my opinion, is valid and well-founded. It is true that so far as the press is concerned, the documents on the record show that it stands in the name of appellant Mahabir. There are receipts showing purchases of the materials of the press from different concerns. Reliance was placed particularly upon a letter dated 4-4-1951 (Ext. 4-2), which shows that Mahabir paid the price of the press in instalments and he was allowed time to pay the last instalment. By a letter dated 29-11-1952, (Ext. 3 (a)-2), the final settlement of the price of the press was made between Mahabir and the Company. Similarly, so far as Sonamati is concerned, the title deeds, namely, the sale deeds as well as the municipal receipts and the rent receipts stand in her name. These documents show prima facie that Mahabir and Sonamati were, respectively, the owners of the press and the land together with the house standing thereon. The question is whether these documents are by themselves sufficient to establish their claim conclusively. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that they had not means enough to enable them to purchase either the press or the land and the house standing thereon. The total cost of the press is Rs. 306

1. Mahabir was employed as a mechanic in various places and his salary was from Rs. 20 to Rs. 80. The maximum salary that he drew was thus Rs. 80 only, and besides himself he had to support his wife. There was no other source of income so far as Mababir was concerned, and this circumstance greatly influenced the decision of the learned District Judge. Apparently, a man who all his life drew salary from Rs. 20 to Rs. 80 will hardly afford to purchase a press costing Rs. 3000, and odd, especially when he had to maintain himself, besides his wife, for maintenance itself the salary that he drew was not adequate. Mahabir and Ragho formed members of joint Hindu family. There was an allegation that both of them were separate, but this was not established, and no attempt has been made before me to prove separation between the two. Having regard to the known source of income of Mahabir, it cannot be reasonably urged that he could afford to purchase a press costing Rs. 3000 and odd. The learned District Judge gave due weight to this circumstance and came to the conclusion that this property belonged to the joint family, of which he and Ragho were members. Similarly, with regard to Sonamati he held that she was not possessed of sufficient means for purchasing the land and house standing thereon. The price of the land and the house standing thereon comes to Rs. 11,000. Her case was that she obtained this amount from her husband and her father. Evidence was given of her father also who supported her. This evidence was rejected by the learned District Judge, because neither her father nor her husband was in a position to contribute Rs. 11,000 for the purchase of the land and the house. Her father possessed only about 6 bighas of land, and with this small landed property he could have ill-afforded to give any sufficient contribution to his daughter. As regards Mahabir, I have already shown that his income was very small, not even sufficient for proper maintenance of himself and his wife, and thus he was not in a position to give any aid to his wife in making this purchase. These two considerations are, in my opinion, weighty and sufficient to displace the prima facie inference that may be drawn from the documents which show that they are the ostensible owners. There is no reason why effect to this circumstance should not be given. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that so far as the State was concerned no evidence was adduced in rebuttal of the evidence led on behalf of the appellants, and in that event the mere production of the title deeds was sufficient to establish their claim. I do not think that this is sufficient. After the affidavit sworn to in this case, there is the prima facie inference, on the strength of which the learned District Judge effected the attachment, and under the Act it was for the claimants to establish what interest they had in the property attached. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Ordinance aforesaid provide for lodging claim on the ground that the claimant has an interest in the property attached or portions thereof, Sub-section (2) of Section 5 provides, inter alia, that any person making an objection under Section 4 shall be required to adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in the property attached. The entire scheme of the Ordinance shows that evidence has to be adduced by the claimant in support of his case that he has interest in the property attached, and when that evidence has been adduced, it is for the Court to consider whether that evidence was sufficient to establish his claim, independent of the question whether any evidence in rebuttal had been adduced by the State. If that evidence by itself is not sufficient to, establish the claim laid by the claimant, the claim must fail, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence to the contrary had been led on behalf of the State. Therefore, whether or not there was any evidence on behalf of the State, the question has to be determined whether on the evidence adduced by the claimant his claim is sustainable. If the evidence falls short of that standard, then the claim must be disallowed, irrespective of the question that no evidence to the contrary has been adduced by the State. Now, in this case the learned District Judge carefully considered the evidence adduced on behalf of both the appellants and held that their claim was baseless, I do not think there is any error in the appreciation of the evidence by the learned District Judge, and after hearing the learned counsel I am satisfied that there are weighty circumstances in the case to support the conclusions come to by the learned District Judge. In my opinion, there is no merit in this contention and it is overruled.

(5) The next contention is entirely devoid of merit. This argument is apparently based upon ignorance of the provisions of the Ordinance itself. There is nothing in the Ordinance to show that a criminal proceeding comes to an end after the order of acquittal, nor is there anything to show that the attachment disappears the moment the accused is acquitted. On the contrary, there is a definite provision about the date of the termination of the criminal proceeding and also about how and when the order of attachment will be set aside. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Ordinance lays down what will be the date of the termination of criminal proceedings. It runs as follows:

"For the purposes of this Ordinance the date of the termination of criminal proceedings shall be deemed to be- (a) where such proceedings are taken to the High Court whether in appeal or on revision, the date on which the High Court passes its final orders in such appeal or revision, or (b) where such proceedings are not taken to the High Court, the day immediately following the expiry of sixty days from the date of the last judgment or order of a criminal Court in the proceedings."

This sub-section specifically provides that when an appeal has been taken to the High Court, then the date oh which the High Court passes its final orders is the date of the termination of the criminal proceedings. It is stated at the Bar that an appeal for the acquittal of Ragho has been filed in this Court and therefore under Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Ordinance the criminal proceedings cannot be deemed to have come to an end. This will come to an end only on the date a final order has, been passed by the High Court in the appeal against acquittal. The first part of this contention therefore is without substance.

(6) The next question is whether the attachment will cease to have effect. Now, Section 10 of the Ordinance provides for duration of the attachment. This section lays down as follows:

"An order of attachment of property under this Ordinance shall, unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance, continue in force- (a) where no Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence at the time when the order is applied for, for three months from the date of the order under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 or Sub-section (2) of Section 6, as the case may be, unless cognizance of such offence is in the meantime so taken, or unless the District Judge on application by the agent of the provincial Government thinks it proper and just that the period should be extended and passes an order accordingly or (b) where a Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence, whether before or after the time when the order was applied for, until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceedings."

In this case, cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence had been taken and in fact Ragho had been tried on the basis of that charge. This case, therefore, comes under Clause (b) of Section 10 of the Ordinance, and the order of attachment shall continue in force until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceedings. Section 13 of the Ordinance provides for disposal of the attached property upon termination of criminal proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 is important, and it may be reproduced.

"Where it is reported to the District Judge under Sub-section (1) that cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence has not been taken or where the final judgment or order of the criminal Courts is one of acquittal, the District Judge shall forthwith withdraw any orders of attachment of property made in connection with the offence, or where security has been given in lieu of such attachment, order such security to be returned."

Even when the final judgment or order of the criminal Court is one of acquittal, there will not be termination of the attachment, unless pursuant to Section 13 the District Judge has passed orders in that behalf. When the order of acquittal is final the District Judge shall withdraw any orders of attachment of property made in connection with the offence. Unless and until the District Judge passes orders withdrawing the order of attachment, the attachment as provided in Section 10 will continue in force. If the appellants wanted to take advantage of the order of acquittal, the proper course for them was to approach the District Judge and ask him to withdraw the attachment. There is nothing to show that the District Judge was approached or that the District Judge has recorded any order withdrawing the attachment. The combined effect of Sections 10 and 13 of the Ordinance aforesaid is that notwithstanding the order of acquittal the attachment will continue in full force until the District Judge has passed orders in accordance with the provisions of Section 1

3. Therefore, the acquittal of Ragho had not the effect of terminating the attachment, and the attachment, in my opinion, is in force even now and will continue in force until orders as provided by Sections 10 and 13 are passed by the District Judge. This contention must, therefore, be dismissed. In the result, there is no merit in these appeals. They are, therefore, dismissed with costs.