GULAB C. GUPTA, J.

(1.) Petitioners claiming to be beneficiaries of sanction or building as per resolution, of the respondent Cantonment Board dated 30-3-1990 (Document No. 1), feel aggrieved by suspension thereof by order dated 22-6-1991 (Annexure- R/9) and subsequent revocation thereof by resolution dated 5-7-1991 (Annexure-P/22A) and have approached this Court, challenging legal validity thereof by filing this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) Admittedly, the sanction relates to portion of the Plot No. 95/9-A and No. 95-1 of Bungalow No. 4, 3rd Bridge Road, Cantonment, Jabalpur, originally held by one Narmada Prasad Indurakhya. The said Narmada Pd. Indurakhya had sold the disputed plots to R. P. Shukla, who having purchased the same, got the building plan prepared and submitted the same to the respondent Cantonment Board for approval under S. 181 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It appears that there has been an earlier litigation between the said Narmada Prasad Indurakhya and the Commandant Station Head Quarters, M.E.O., Jabalpur and others and the matter eventually went up to the Supreme Court. The matter had also come to this Court in Second Appeal No. 418/ 83 and was decided in favour of the said Shri Indurakhya on 23-6-1984. The decision of this Court was eventually challenged in the Supreme Court, but the challenge failed (see SLP No. 11304-5/84 decided on 23-7-1990). As a result of this litigation, it was held that the said Indurakhya was the owner of the land and the defendants including the respondent Union of India had - no right to enter into the said property. On the aforesaid finding, a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the ownership right of Shri Indurakhya had been granted. Though the respondents do not dispute about the said litigation and results thereof, they dispute that the aforesaid litigation declares Shri Indurakhya as owner of the propery. They, however, admit that a permanent injunction exists against them, restraining them from interfering with the occupation of the said Indurakhya over the land in dispute.

(3.) As noticed earlier, Shri R. P. Shukla had applied for sanction of the respondent Cantonment Board under Section 181 of the Act, by submitting 3 sanctioned maps. The petitioners claim to have become the owner of the plots having obtained the title either directly from Shri R. P. Shukla or from the person claiming title through him. The details of these transactions are given in para 9 of the petition. It is claimed that Shri R. P. Shukla has transferred not only the land, but all his rights over the land including right to construct thereupon, as per building plan sanctioned by the respondent Board. Sale-deeds (Documents 4, 5 and 6) do contain the history and also the fact that the vendor transfers all rights, interest and title over the land in question, without any reservation. The petitioners, therefore, claim to have become entitled to the rights of Shri R. P. Shukla and said Shri Indurakhya over the lands in question. They also claim the right to construct over the said land based on the sanction of the respondent Board, vide resolution dated 30-3-1990 accorded in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla. The petitioners, by their letters dated 25-5-1990 (Document No. 7), 16-7-1990 (Document No. 8) and 11-6-1990 (Documents 9 and 10), claim to have informed the respondent Board of the transfer and consequent acqusition of their right over the land in question. The respondent Board has in its return not denied receiving intimation of the transfer, though it has stated that right to construct, as per sanctioned plan, could not be transferred and, therefore, sanction in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla could not lawfully be transferred. Since to information, pursuance to these intimations, was received by the petitioners, they claim to have started construction and completed almost about 70% thereof.

(4.) It, however, appears that the resolution of the respondent Board came to the notice of the Lt. Gen. G.C.C.-in-Chief, Central Command, Lucknow, who noticed that the sanction was granted without referring the matter to the Defence Estate Officer, as required under Section 181(3) of the Act and was otherwise in violation of the directions under Section 181(1) of the Act, besides violating Sections 183 and 183A of the Act. Consequently, an order dated 22-6-1991 suspending the operation of the said resolution for 4 months was issued. (Annexure-R/1), Neither the petitioners not their predecessor-in-title including Shri R. P. Shukla were sent a copy of this order. The petitioners were, therefore, not aware of this order and claim to have learnt about it only through the return of the respondents in this case. It is, however, admitted that the 4 months period had expired on 22-10-1991 and no further order under Section 52 of the Act has been passed by the Central Command.

(5.) It appears that on receipt of the aforesaid suspension order, a special meeting of the Cantonment Board was called on 5-7-1991 to discuss, among others, the legal validity of sanction of the building plan and it was decided that "the Cantonment Board hereby cancels its Resolution No. 10 dated 30-3-1990. It is further resolved that all constructions on the said site are to be treated as unauthorised". It, however, appears that 5 Members of the Board objected to the aforesaid resolution and claimed that the same was not only violative of the permanent injunction granted in favour of Shri Indurakhya in relation to the plot but also otherwise arbitrary and unjust, inasmuch as, 70% of the, construction is already complete. Their opinion is annexed to the impugned-resolution and is available at pages 109 and 110 of the Paper Book. Consequent upon the aforesaid resolution, notices under Section 185 (2) of the Act were issued on 5-7-1991 (Documents No. 23, No. 24 and No. 25), requiring the petitioners to stop erection forthwith and demolish construction already made within 30 days. It is thereafter that the petitioners not approached this Court, filing the present writ petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India.

(6.) The submission of the petitioners, in the main is that the sanction for construction of building once granted becomes final and could not be revoked in the manner aforesaid. It is also submitted that even if a sanction could be revoked or suspended, the same should have been done within a reasonable time and before start of construction and since the said time has elapsed in the instant case, the revocation was wholly illegal. It is also submitted that the revocation, in effect, amounts to reviewing the earlier resolution passed by the respondent Board and the Act does not vest any such power of review in the Board. The revocation of sanction is, therefore, claimed to be without jurisdiction. It is otherwise submitted that since the revocation of sanction adversely affects the petitioners, who had completed 70% of their construction, they were entitled to notice and opportunity of submitting their defence before revocation and since the same has not been done, the revocation is violative of Article 14. It is ultimately submitted that there is no valid reason for the impugned action. Almost all facts and circumstances had been taken into consideration at the time of granting sanction and, therefore, there would be no justification for the impugned action. It is claimed to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Shri P. S. Nair, Learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the petitioners have no locus standi in the matter and hence the petition filed by them is incompetent. It is also submitted that sanction granted under Section 181 of the Act was in violation of sub-section (3) thereof and was no sanction in the eye of law. It is, therefore, submitted that the revocation only amounts to declaration of a situation, which actually existed and hence no opportunity was required to be given in the matter. It is further submitted that the land in question is covered by the Urban Land Ceiling Act and, therefore, the petitioners could not have made any construction thereupon. In regards to the interest of the petitioners, it is submitted that they can claim compensation under Section 185 of the Act and, therefore, their interests are fully safeguarded and submission based thereupon does not deserve any merit. It is ultimately submitted that the petitioners have a remedy of appeal under Section 274 of the Act and hence this Court should not exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction in the matter. It is, therefore, prayed that the writ petition be dismissed.

(7.) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and given our anxious thought to their submissions, in the context of facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the resolution of the respondent Cantonment Board dated 5-7-1991 (Ann. 22A) revoking the sanction for construction is arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. It is for that reason also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Sanction for construction was admittedly given under Section 181 of the Act and before it could lapse, the construction work had started. The construction undertaken was, therefore, not illegal. Section 185 of the Act, which has been referred to in the resolution revoking the sanction, applies to cases where violation is an offence under Section 184 and not otherwise. Section 184 deals with cases where construction of a building has started or is continuing or has completed without giving any notice under Section 179 or 180 or before the building has been sanctioned or is deemed to have been sanctioned or without complying with direction issued under Section 181 (1) or in spite of refusal of the sanction. The present case does not cover any of the aforesaid situations and, therefor therefore, no action whatsoever under Section 185 could have been initiated. Indeed, there is no provision in this Act, which specifically and clearly authorises the respondent Cantonment Board to revoke the sanction already granted. It was perhaps for this reason that Shri Rajendra Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the impugned-resolution of the Board was without jurisdiction. He has supported his argument by the decision of Allahabad High Court in Vishwanath Goyal v. Cantonment Board, Agra, AIR 1987 All 4 [LQ/AllHC/1985/543] . Allahabad case was, however, different on facts. In the aforesaid case, no clear and specific order granting sanction in spite of a notice given in that behalf was issued and since the construction had started, the Cantonment Board had taken action under Section 185 of the Act. The High Court held that there was neglect or omission on the part of the Board within the meaning of Section 186 (6) of the Act and, therefore, the owner was entitled to assume the existence of deemed sanction. Since the factual situation, in the instant case, is different, the aforesaid decision would not be of any help to the petitioners. The decision of Delhi High Court in Ram Narain v. Cantonment Board, Delhi, AIR 1973 Del 84 [LQ/DelHC/1972/212] also does not deal with this aspect of the matter. That was also the case of deemed sanction and the question of revocation was not in issue. But, power to rescind an order can be traced to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that power to issue an order under any Central Act includes a power to amend or rescind the aforesaid order. In this connection, decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. K. G. Mahavan Pillai, AIR 1989 SC 49 [LQ/SC/1988/478] ; Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576 [LQ/SC/1970/234] ; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 676 [LQ/SC/1957/50] ; and Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 714 [LQ/SC/1975/472] : 1976 Tax LR 1467 may be looked into. The matter has recently received consideration of the Supreme Court in a somewhat similar situation, but in the context of Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 in The Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 1117 [LQ/SC/1991/187] :1991 AIR SCW 1010 and it is held that Section 21 of the General clauses Act clothes the authority issuing the order with the power to rescind the said order. Under the circumstances, this Court is not able to accept the submission that the respondent Cantonment Board does not have the jurisdiction to revoke the sanction.

(8.) This is, however, not to say that a sanction already granted can be revoked without any reason and without following the principles of natural justice. A person inn whose favour the sanction has been granted acquires a right to start construction, which right cannot be taken away without giving him an opportunity to submit why the same should not be revoked. The fact that there are provisions in the Act for payment of compensation for the loss suffered consequent upon such action is no reason why the person likely to suffer loss should not be afforded reasonable opportunity to protect his interest. With the widening scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, the absence of arbitrariness in every executive, quasi-judicial or legislative action has to be read in all provisions permitting exercise of such powers. Violation of this obligation renders such action unconstitutional. The recent statement of this law is also contained in S.C. and Weaker Section Association case (supra) wherein it is held as under at page 1121:

"It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power and the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to an extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the body of persons appointed for that purpose. It is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity to be heard, but on the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed itself necessarily implied an obligation to hear before deciding that the audi alteram partern rule could be imported." (Para 15);

(9.) Earlier in State of . U. P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 [LQ/SC/1989/26] , the Supreme Court had, in the context of cancellation of permission for construction, held that the permission once granted could not be cancelled without following the principles of natural justice, which necessarily consists of giving a show cause notice to the person aggrieved and thereafter giving him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The Cour Court also held that exercise of power of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of quasi judicial complexion and hence the authority exercising the power must bring to bear an unbiased mind an impartial consideration of objections raised by aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with principle of natural justice. The following passage from the judgment being of fundamental importance is reproduced hereinunder for ready reference at page 1009 :-

"It is true that in exercise of power of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the direction of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the Authoritys discretion that is exercised, but someone elses. If an authority "hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires". Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power of the power conferred upon the authority". (Para 24). It is, therefore, apparent that the matter is not only of a mere form, but is of substance and hence order revoking the sanction has to be based on a serious exercise consistent with principles of natural justice. These principles have been applied even to cases where the officer Commanding-in-Chief, exercising its power under Section 52(l)(b) of the Act suspends the operation of the resolution granting sanction. In Cantonment Board, Dinapore v. Taramani Devi, AIR 1992 SC 61 [LQ/SC/1991/479] : 1991 AIR SCW 2728, the Supreme Court has held as under at page 62 :-

".......we go on to rule that the decision of the High Court in making it obligatory on the Officer Commanding-in-Chief to give a hearing to the owner, lessee or occupier of the land, in the given situation, besides that the Board is in consonance with the scheme of our Constitutional set up. Audi alteram partem is a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. The proviso to Section 185(2), whereunder the Board is required to pay to the owner of the building compensation, for any losses actually incurred by him in consequences of the demolition or alteration of any building, which has been erected or re-erected prior to the date on which the order of the Officer Commanding-in-Chief has been communicated to him is indicative of the fact that the owner is an aggrieved party and his rights to be affected deserve recompense and restitution. What is literally provided for the owner is nonetheless valid for the lessee or occupier as otherwise it would be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the Board is obligated to pay loss in the event of its resolution or decision being upset by the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, then confining the right of being heard to the Board, on literal interpretation of the provision alone, serves no purpose as, at its will, the Board may or may not defend its decision or resolution. The real affected party in such situation would obviously be the party ultimately affected by the decision or resolution being wiped out. Much water has flown since decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. Mr. Beenapani, AIR 1967 SC 1269 [LQ/SC/1967/37] relied upon by the High Court and now, there is a plethora of precedents, which have expanded the ever expanding scope of Article 14 of the the Constitution to assert and maintain that no order shall be passed at the back of person, prejudicial in nature to him, when it entails civil consequences. We are thus, in perfect agreement with the High Court in reading such compulsions in the working of the provisions of the Act in providing an opportunity of being heard to the affected party, the respondents herein". (Para 5).

(10.) There is ample authority of this Court also in the matter. In Omprakash Kriparam v. Municipal Committee, Dabra 1976 MPLJ 475, this Court dealt with a case where the petitioner was granted sanction to build, but the same was found to be erroneous and therefore, cancelled. This Court held that the rule of audi alteram partem was violated in cancelling the permission without hearing the petitioner. In this case, objection to the sanction was raised by the third party, which was upheld by the appellate authority, but without giving any opportunity to the person in whose favour the sanction had been granted. The Court ruled that this could not be done. Subsequent decision in Mohanlal v. Union of India, AIR 1980 MP 87 [LQ/MPHC/1979/268] applies this very principle, in the context of a notice under Section 185 of the Act. In this case, this Court clearly and specifically held that the justice of the system of our law must supply the omission in Section 185 (1) of the Act, the omission being an opportunity to the aggrieved party. Although the section in terms does not provide for an enquiry, the Court held that it stands to reason that before finally directing the demolition, the owner, lessee, or occupier concerned must be heard and the Cantonment Board must pass a speaking order why his objections were not accepted. There is, thus, preponderance of judicial law on the subject that an order revoking the sanction already granted must be passed after due compliance with the principles of natural justice, which consists of giving the owner or the occupier an opportunity to submit his objections to the proposed action and hearing and unbiased consideration of the objections, Apparently, this has not been done in the instant case and, therefore, not only the resolution of the respondent Cantonment Board dt. 5-7-1991 (Annex. P/22-A), but also the suspension of sanction under Section 52(1)(b) by order dated 22-6-1991 (Ann. R 9) must be held to be invalid and liable to be quashed.

(11.) The objection of the respondents, however, is that the sanction accrues to the benefit of Shri R. P. Shukla in whose favour it was granted and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to seek invalidation of the impugned resolution. The Court having given its anxious consideration to the submission, finds no substance in the same. It is true that the sanction was granted in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla and, therefore, unless there be something else on record, he alone would be entitled to feel aggrieved by the revocation thereof. Scheme of the Act, however, does not require that construction should be done by the person in whose favour the sanction has been granted. Section 183, which provides for the period during which the construction has to be made, provides that the construction has to begin "by the person who has obtained the sanction or some one lawfully claiming under him". The words "someone lawfully claiming under him" have to be given their full meaning. It must consequently be held that the construction accrues to the benefit of not only the person in whose favour it is granted, but also to the benefit of persons lawfully claiming under him. The petitioners are, without doubt, persons lawfully claiming under the said Shri Shukla. There is, therefore, no justification for the aforesaid objection.

(12.) It may, therefore, be examined if there were good and sufficient reasons before the respondent General Officer Commanding-in-Chief or the Cantonment Board for suspending the resolution according sanction or revoking the same. The return of the respondent No. 3 indicates that the said respondent does not recognise the sale by Shri N. P. Indurakhya in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla and consequently, the right of the petitioners to construct on the basis of sanction in favour of said Shri Shukla. The respondent No. 3 has, in fact, in para 5 of the return specifically pleaded that the disputed property is situated on defence land, which is described in the General Land Register of Jabalpur Cantonment as Survey No. 95 and is held by Shri N. P. Indurakhya on "old grant" on the terms contained in Governor Generals Order No. 179 of 12-9-1836. His further case is that said Shri Indurakhya had no right to sell the land or any portion of the land of the bungalow, as the same belongs to the Government of India. According to this respondent, Shri Indurakhya and his sons only had the "occupancy right" and not the ownership right over the land and an occupancy holder can never validly transfer rights greater than what are held by him. It would, therefore, appear that the res. No. 3 is, disputing the right of Shri Indurakhya to transfer the said land in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla. Since Shri Indurakhya is not a party to this case, we had clearly stated, at the time of hearing, that we would not like to decide this controversy lest he may be prejudiced by our order. It must, however, be mentioned that Shri Indurakhya has claimed full ownership right and further that the said right was recognised by all Courts including the Supreme Court of India, which has permanently injuncted the respondents from interfering with his possession. We are also informed that a similar permission was granted to Shri Indurakhya also and since the same has been revoked, Shri Indurakhya.had filed a civil suit in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, where it is pending decision. Because of the pendency, it would not be proper to say anything about the right or title of Shri Indurakhya. This Court would, however, accept the submission of the respondent No. 3 that Shri Indurakhya could not have transferred anything more than possessed by him over the disputed land. The copy of the lease-deed, which has been filed as Annex. R/4 by the Res. No. 3 sufficiently indicates that the lease holder is "at liberty at any time during the tenancy to make at his own cost such structural alterations to the existing buildin buildings and erect upon the premises such buildings installations, fittings, fixtures, as he may think fit". There should, therefore, be no difficulty in holding that even a person holding the lease of the type granted by Document-R/6 would be entitled to make construction, as per the aforesaid term of the lease. Under the circumstances, the dispute about the ownership of the land would be wholly irrelevant for decision of questions involved in this petition. A right to construct and thereafter occupy the constructed area is a valuable property right, which can be transferred. No law has been brought to our notice to hold to the contrary. Indeed, Clause V(f) of the lease (Annex. R/ 6) gives the right to the lessee to sublet the whole or any part or parts of the said premises without the prior consent of the lessor. Under the circumstances, the claim of the respondent that Shri Indurakhya could not have transferred his rights over the disputed property in favour of Shri R. P. Shukla cannot be accepted.

(13.) The order dated 22-6-1991 suspending the resolution of the Board passed by the res. No. 3 (Annex. R/9), however, mentions that the decision of the Cantonment Board dated 30-3-1990 is suspended for a period of 4 months in exercise of powers under Section 52 (I)(b) of the Act for irregularities noticed in the said decision and mentioned in para-1 of this Order. Section 52(1)(b) of the Act does not authorise suspension of the resolution of the Cantonment Board. It only authorises

"suspension for such period as may be stated in the order of action on any decision of a Board" and not the decision itself. In the instant case, no action whatsoever has been taken by the res. Cantonment Board in pursuance to the aforesaid decision. Indeed, the action on the aforesaid decision has to be taken by the person intending to construct as per sanctioned plan. In this view of the matter, it is apparent that the order passed by the res. No. 3 (Annex. R/ 9) is contrary to law and in excess of his jurisdiction. Then para-1 of this order mentions three irregularities noticed by the res. No. 3 relating to Section 181(1) and (3), Section 183 and Section 183A of the Act. The resolution of the respondent Board (Annex. P/ 1) in so far as electric transformer and underground supply line is concerned only deals with their location at suitable places so as to avoid inconvenience and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be beyond Section 181(1) of the Act. It is true that electricity provision is not specifically mentioned as one of the considerations, but fire, ventilation, etc. are mentioned as necessary considerations. Considering that the use of electricity is now common, location of transformer cannot be said to be contrary to Section 181 of the Act. This, however, was not a matter of such an importance that the respondents could reasonably object to grant of building sanction. Their real case appears to be that the resolution (Annex. P/ 1) of the res. Board violates Section 181(3) of the Act and is consequently void.

(14.) Section 181 (3) of the Act reads as under :- "Section 181. Power of Board to sanction or refuse - (3) The Board, before sanction the erection or re-erection of a building on land which is under the management of the Military Estates Officer shall refer the application to the Military Estates Officer for ascertaining whether there is any objection on the part of the Government to such erection or re-erection; and the Military Estates Officer shall return the application together with his report thereon to the Board within 30 days after it has been received by him". A bare reading of this provision would indicate that it deals with erection of a building on land, which is under the management of the Military Estates Officer. Clearly, therefore, unless the disputed land be under the management of Military Estates Officer, this provisions would not be attracted. Though the order of the res. No. 3 (Annex. R/9) mentions the aforesaid provision, it does not mention that the land in question is under the management of Military Estates Officer. Para 1 only mentions that it was in the management of "Defence Estates Officer". No effort whatsoever has been made to indicate whether the Defence Estates Officer is the Military Estates Officer within the meaning of Section 181(3) of the Act. A Military Estates Officer is defined under Section 2 (XXA) of the Act and means an officer appointed by the Central Government to perform the duties of Military Estates Officer under Rules made under clauses (a) and (b) and sub-section (2) of Section 280 of the Act. Under the circumstances, it was necessary for the respondents to show that the Defence Estate Officer mentioned in the aforesaid order was the same person as Military Estate Officer, which they had failed to do. Then, the lease-deed (Annex. R/6) indicates that the property mentioned in the lease has been handed over by the President of India to the pers person mentioned in the said lease. In such a situation, it is difficult to understand how the property remained in the management of Defence Estate Officer. Clearly, therefore, something more was required to establish the aforesaid fact. The resolution (Annex. P/ 1) clearly mentions that the Civil Court has declared the Bungalow to be a free-hold property and injuncted the Defence Estates Officer to interefere with the possession thereof. This statement makes it obligatory on the part of the respondents to show how provisions of Section 181(3) were attracted in the instant case. Apparently, therefore, it is a case where no one had applied its mind to the provisions of Section 181 (3) of the Act and the Res. No. 3 had mechanically mentioned the same, as a defect justifying invalidity of the sanctioned resolution. Considering the previous history of litigation, it would be difficult to hold that there was any defect of the type mentioned therein. In this view of the matter, this Court is clearly of the opinion that there was no justification either in law or on facts for the Res. No. 3 to suspend the resolution of the Cantonment Board dated 30-3-1990, sanctioning construction, as per plan.

(15.) As regards resolution of the Cantonment Board dated 5-7-1991 (Annex. P/ 22-A), it only illustrates arbitrary working of the Res. Cantonment Board and nothing more. It mentions that resolution sanctioning construction was not based on any clear and good legal opinion, which should have been obtained from the Law Ministry of the Central Government. This would not by itself be a reason or basis for revoking the said resolution. Revocation of the sanction, in so far as it is based on non-availability of the legal opinion of the Central Law Ministry, must be held to be wholly arbitrary and unjustified. The revocation also takes into consideration the order of suspension dated 22-6-1991 passed by the Res. No. 3, which has been held by this Court in earlier part of this Order, to be illegal and unjustified and cannot, therefore, furnish a ground for revocation of sanction. No other reason has been stated for revoking the sanction and, therefore, the resolution must be held to be arbitrary and unjustified, violating fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, this Court finds no rational or reasonable justification for revoking the sanction.

(16.) This leaves two other objections of the Res. relating to locus standi and alternative remedy of appeal under Section 274 of the Act for consideration. The facts and circumstances of the case would clearly indicate that the petitioners are "persons aggrieved" by the impugned action and, therefore, their locus standi in the matter cannot be disputed. Then the concept of locus standi has gone revolutionary changes. In a case like this, where functioning of a public authority in violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners is the real issue, this Court would not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction only because of the traditional concept of locus standi. It is too late for the respondents, therefore, to request the Court to throw away the petition on the said ground. As regards remedy of appeal, the same, even if available, would not be efficacious or effective, in the context of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It is difficult to accept the authority working under Res. Nos. 1 and 3 to grant any relief to the petitioners, in the context of their stand in the matter. Then the question of fundamental rights of the petitioners cannot be made dependant on the existence of such remedy. This Court would, therefore, fail in its duty in accepting the aforesaid objection.

(17.) In view of the discussion aforesaid, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The resolution dated 5-7-1991 passed by the Res. Cantonment Board (Annex. P/ 22A) is hereby quashed. Since the order dated 22-6-1991 passed by the Res. No. 1 suspending the resolution dated 30-3-1990 sanctioning construction has expired, it is not necessary to quash the same and it will be sufficient to hold that the said suspension was illegal and unconstitutional. As a necessary consequence, the sanction resolution dated 30-3-1990 (Annex. P/ 1) would revive, entitling the petitioners claiming through Shri. R. K. Shukla in whose favour the said sanction was granted, to construct. Considering the provisions of Section 183 of the Act, providing for lapse of sanction and with a view to avoid any further controversy between the parties, it is held that the period from 5-7-1991 upto the date of this decision would be treated as dies non for purposes of the aforesaid construction. The petitioners are also held entitled to costs of this petition, from the respondents 2 and 3. Counsels fee Rs. 1,000-00. Petitionallowed.