DEBANGSU BASAK, J.:-
1. Six matters have been heard analogously as they involve similar issues. Out of the six matters, one is an appeal being MA 17 of 2020 directed against the order dated January 13, 2020 passed in WP No. 269 of 2019. Of the remaining five matters, three are writ petitions while two are public interest litigations.
2. The writ petitioners have assailed notifications bearing Nos. 273, 274 and 275 dated October 22, 2019. By such notifications, the Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands has framed rules called the Andaman &Nicobar Islands Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 2019, fixed minimum reference circle rates, and prescribed stamp duty charges payable for registration of certain documents.
3. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocateappearing for the writ petitioners in WPA (P) 81 of 2020 and WPA (P) 84 of 2020 has contended that, Indian Stamp Act was enacted in 1899. Constitution of India has come into force on January 26, 1950. Article 246 of the Constitution of India has prescribed the Union List, State List and the Concurrent List. She has referred to Serial 91 in the Union List and contended that Union Government can make laws in respect of rates of stamp duty relating to bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, Bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts. She has also referred to Serial 63 of the State List and contended that State Government has the power to make laws in respect of rates of stamp duty of documents other than those specified in the Union List with regard to rates of stamp duty.
4. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate has contended that, regulation governing the rates of stamp duty was promulgated by the President of India. By such regulation, Schedule 1A had been inserted to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
5. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate has contended that, on April 25, 1959 President delegated certain powers to the Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in relation to Clause 9 of Section 2 and Sections 33, 70, 74, 76A and 78 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. No other power had been delegated to the Lieutenant Governor of these islands.
6. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate has contended that, there is no provision under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 whereby State Government is empowered to increase the stamp duty. She has contended that, Section 9 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 empowers the Government to reduce, remit or compound the duties payable. Such section, according to her, does not empower the Government to increase the stamp duty.
7. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate, has contended that, none of the Sections of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 which had been delegated by the President to the Lieutenant Governor, deals with prescribing rates of stamp duty.
8. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate has referred to the compilation of documents relied upon on behalf of the administration and contended that, such documents clearly show that the President never delegated the powers of prescribing rates of stamp duty to the Lieutenant Governor of these islands. In particular, she has referred to the notification dated June 2, 1965 to contend that, function of State Government in respect of provision of Section 9 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 was delegated to the Chief Commissioner of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Chief Commissioner of Andaman and Nicobar Islands have, in exercise of such powers delegated issued several notifications regarding remission. Such notifications are not for the purpose of enhancement.
9. Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate has contended that, unless the President delegates his power to prescribe rates of stamp duty, the Lieutenant Governor cannot prescribe the same. She has relied upon 2020 Volume 14 Supreme Court Cases 664 (K. Lakshminarayanan vs. Union of India and Another) to contend that, Central Government means the President for the Union Territory and not the Administrator. She has contended that, President amended the regulation in 1961 and modified the rates in Schedule 1A.
10. With regard to the registration fees, in terms of the Indian Registration Act, Ms. Anjili Nag, Advocate, has contended that, State Government is empowered to fix the fees for registration. According to her, State Governments so far as Union Territory is concerned is the Central Government which means the President. President has not issued any notification prescribing the fees for registration. However, by the notifications dated August 10, 1970 and April 1, 1937, the Chief Commissioner of these islands had prescribed the fees for registration of certain documents. She has contended that, position of Chief Commissioner was completely different from that of the Lieutenant Governor. According to her Governor General had delegated the powers to the Chief Commissioner to prescribe registration fee which ceased to exist after the independence of India.
11. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz,Advocate appearing for the appellant and two writ petitioners has contended that, the Lieutenant Governor in purporting to exercise powers under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 enhanced the stamp duty in Andaman and Nicobar Islands by superseding the Presidential Regulation issued under Article 240 of the Constitution of India and notified in the Extraordinary Gazette on July 26, 1950.
12. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate has contended that the appellant in MA 17 of 2020 executed six several gift deeds and one sale deed on July 17, 2019. The executants of such deeds had paid the requisite stamp duty as applicable on the relevant deed. However, the authorities had kept such deeds pending. The authorities had directed return of all the deeds pending registration with a direction to pay the stamp duty in terms of the notification dated October 22, 2019.
13. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate has contended that, assuming that the notification dated October 20, 2019 is valid, such notification cannot have retrospective operation. Such notification on the face of it does not provide for retrospective operation.
14. Referring to the two public interest litigations, Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate has contended that, Lieutenant Governor does not have authority or jurisdiction to issue or notify the three notifications dated October 22, 2019 whereby stamp duty and registration charges and circle rates were enhanced. He has contended that, Indian Stamp Act, 1899 came into effect from January 26, 1956. He has referred to the three lists in the Constitution and contended that, under Serial 91 of the Union List, Central Government has the authority to make laws in respect of stamp duty and subjects notified therein. Under Serial 63 of the State List, State Government has powers to make laws in relation to rates of stamp duty other than those specified in the Union List.
15. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate has contended that, President, in exercise of powers under Article 240 of the Constitution promulgated the Indian Stamp (Andaman and Nicobar Islands Amendment), Regulation, 1957. Such regulation have not been produced by the respondents despite repeated directions of the Court. However, the writ petitioners have brought the same on record by way of a supplementary affidavit. He has contended that by virtue of such regulation of 1957 Schedule 1A was inserted in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Such regulation had been amended in 1961 and the rates of stamp duty prescribed under Schedule 1A is being followed for more than 70 years.
16. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate has submitted that, the contention of the respondents that President by notification dated April 25, 1959 delegated powers to the Lieutenant Governor and that, the impugned notifications were issued in exercise of such power, is unacceptable. He has contended that, the notification dated April 25, 1959 delegatespowers to the Lieutenant Governor in relation to Clause (9) of Section 2 and Section 33, 70, 74, 76A and 78 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. He has pointed out, no delegation of power under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 had been made to the Lieutenant Governor. Therefore, the action of the Lieutenant Governor in exercising powers under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is without any authority.
17. Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz, Advocate for the writ petitioner has referred to the compilation filed by the respondents. He has contended that, the respondents failed to trace the source of power to issue the impugned notifications. He has relied upon K. Lakshminarayanan (supra) in support of the contention that, Lieutenant Governor is not the authority to issue the impugned notifications.
18. So far as the notification dated October 22, 2019 prescribing registration charges is concerned, Mr. Mohammed Tabraiz has contended that, Lieutenant Governor purported to exercise under Section 78 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 which again was not delegated to him. He has pointed out that no notification or document was produced by the respondents to establish such delegation of power.
19. Referring to the notification dated October 22, 2019 prescribing the circle rate, he has contended that, the same has the effect of taxation. He has contended that executive instructions cannot impose tax on a citizen. Again, Lieutenant Governor has no power to prescribe the circle rate. He has contended that, circle rate can be prescribed only by enacting a Rule under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
20. Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, Advocate for the administration has contended that, the notification bearing No. 276 dated October 22, 2019 was issued in exercise of powers under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. He has pointed that the notification No. 274 is consequent to the notification No. 273. He has contended that, the notification No. 275 has been issued in exercise of powers under Section 78 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 read with the notification of the Government of India dated April 1, 1937.
21. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, stamp duty and registration charges have not been revised for over fifty years. According to him, revision of stamp duty and registration charges are matters purely within the economic/fiscal/tax measures where the courts are slow to interfere unless it is established that there is a breach of fundamental rights. In support of such contention he has relied upon 2008 Volume 4 Supreme Court Cases 720 (Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. vs. Laxmi Devi) and 2021 Volume 8 Supreme Court Cases 511 (Small Scale Industrial Manufactures Association (Registered) vs. Union of India).
22. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, none of the petitioners have any cause of action to challenge the vires of the three impugned notifications. No fundamental rights of the petitioners have been breached by the impugned notifications. Revision in stamp duty or higher imposition of stamp duty or registration charges cannot be contended to have violated any fundamental or constitutional rights of the petitioners.
23. Mr. Chakraborty has referred to Section 78 of the India Registration Act, 1908 and contended that, it empowers the State Government to prepare a table of fees payable for the registration of documents. Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has empowered the State Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act which would include the charge of stamp duty on instruments as per Section 3 read with Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 read with other provisions including Sections 33 and 74 thereof.
24. Mr. Chakraborty has referred to Section 3 (60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and contended that in case of the Union Territory, State Government is defined to mean the Central Government in respect ofthings done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act. He has pointed out that, the rates of stamp duty except in case those which are mentioned in Entry 91 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, are within the domain/competency of the State Government under Entry 63 of the State List. Likewise, registration of deeds and documents under Entry 6 of the Concurrent List is under the domain/competency of a State Government. Since, for the purpose of the Union Territory, State Government has to be read as the Central Government, the impugned notifications cannot be said to be ultra vires.
25. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, theimpugned notifications have been issued by the Lieutenant Governor, validly and with due authority. He has contended that powers of the Lieutenant Governor, earlier known as Chief Commissioner or Administrator, historically flows from Section 94 to 96 of the Government of the India Act, 1935. Central Government had issued a notification on April 1, 1937 under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 stating that the functions of the Chief Commissioner would continue until further orders are issued to discharge those functions subject to the control of the Central Government, then Governor General in Council. He has contended that, the powers flowing from such provisions have continued even after the Constitution came into force. He has contended that, where the Central Government intended to restrict the powers of the Chief Commissioner/Lieutenant Governor under the Government of India Act, 1935, it did so by issuing asubsequent notificationrestricting those powers. In support of such contentions, he has referred to a notification dated February 7, 1967 issued in respect of Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911.
26. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, unlike the provisions of the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, there has been no restriction or abridgement of the powers of the Lieutenant Governor so far as the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or the Indian Registration Act, 1908 are concerned, both being pre-independent legislations.
27. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 is not relevant inasmuch as the Lieutenant Government is a successor to the Commissioner and subsequently to the Administrator.The fact that different nomenclatures have been used before and after coming into force of the Constitution is not relevant. In support of such contention he has relied upon 1998 SCC OnLine Cal 666 (Central Agricultural Research Institute vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court).
28. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, the Lieutenant Governor has issued at least 23 notifications in the last 70 years under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Indian Registration Act, 1908 including prescribing table of fees payable and remission of stamp duty. He has referred to the details of notifications as appearing in the compilation of documents. He has also referred to notifications dated April 25, 1959 and June 2, 1965 for which Central Government delegated powers to the Lieutenant Governor under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
29. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, the burden of proof on the issue of ultra vires or un-constitutionality is on the writ petitioner, more so when exercise of legislative power has stood the test of time. In support of such contention, he has relied upon 2004 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases 476 (Peoples Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India).
30. Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, in order to put an end to the controversy the Administrator has written to the Joint Secretary (UT) Ministry of Home Affairs on March 15, 2024 to provide all documents relating to delegation of powers to the Lieutenant Governor under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1895 and Indian Registration Act, 1908. Ministry has responded by a letter dated April 1, 2024 stating that the matter is being examined and inputs have been shared in due course. Consequently he has submitted that, the matter should be adjourned till such time the issue is settled at the ministry level.
31. Referring to the merits in the appeal being MAT 17 of 2020, Mr. Chakraborty has contended that, the learned Single Judge noted availability of alternative remedy. Since there exists a statutory alternative remedy, he has submitted that, the appeal should not be entertained. In support of such contention, he has relied upon 1969 (3) SCC 813 (Dadh Nathu Rajah vs. Angha Nathu Jamal),2011 Volume 6 Supreme Court Cases 739 (Thirumalai Chemicals Limited vs. Union of India and Others) and 2015 Volume 4 Supreme Court Cases 33 (Videocon International Limited vs. Securities Exchange Board of India). He has also relied upon 1999 SCC OnLine Cal 363 (Md. Kasem Ali Mondal vs. Shri Ajoy Rande & Ors.) in support of his contention as to the right to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865.He has contended that, the parties will lose a forum of appeal, if, the statutory alternative remedy is not explored.
32. The issues that have fallen for consideration may be summarized as follows :-
"i. Whether Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands is vested with requisite competence to issue notification No. 273 and 274 dated October 22, 2019 under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
ii. Whether the Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands is vested with requisite competence to issue notification No. 275 dated October 22, 2019 under the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
iii. When a writ petitioner prayed for setting aside the Clause (VI) of Order No. 275 dated October 22, 2019 issued by the Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands was it appropriate to not entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.
iv. To what relief or reliefs are the parties entitled."
33. Three notifications have been impugned in these proceedings. All notifications have been issued by the Lieutenant Governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Administration.
34. Notification No. 273 dated October 22, 2019 has been issued by the Lieutenant Governor in exercise of powers conferred under Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. By such notification, Lieutenant Governor has made rules known as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Stamp (Prevention of Evaluation of Instruments) Rules, 2019 and directed that such rules shall come into force with effect from the date of publication in the Andaman and Nicobar Gazette.
35. Lieutenant Governor has fixed the minimum reference circle rates for the purpose of effecting transfer of interest in Lands/immovable property by way ofconveyance/gift/exchange in various areas with immediate effect by the notification No. 274 dated October 22, 2019.
36. Notification No. 275 dated October 29, 2019 has been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 78 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 read with the notification of the Government of India dated April 1, 1937. By such notification, new table of fees and stamp duty charges payable for registration in respect of 11 kinds of documents have been notified.
37. Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has been cited as the source of power for the Lieutenant Governor to frame the Rules of 2019 by the impugned notification No. 273 dated October 22, 2019. 38. Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is as follows:-
“75. Power to make rules generally to carry out Act.-
The State Government may make rules to carry out generally the purposes of this Act, and may by such rules prescribe the fines, which shall in no case exceed five hundred rupees, to be incurred on breach thereof.”
39. Section 75 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has empowered the State Government to make rules to carry out generally the purpose of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It has empowered the State Government to prescribe fines by the rules so framed, which in no case should exceed Rupees five hundred to be incurred in breach thereof.
40. The Rules of 2019, in Rule 4 has permitted the Lieutenant Governor to issue administrative order for the minimum rates for valuation of land for various district/areas forming part of the district on recommendation of the Principal Secretary (Revenue) and in his absence, the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Revenue).
41. So far as notification No. 275 is concerned the Lieutenant Governor has exercised powers under Section 78 of the Registration Act, 1908. He has also referred to notification of Government of India of the Home Department bearing No. 126/37dated April 1, 1937 in issuing such notification.
42. Section 78 of the Registration Act, 1908 is as follows :-
“78. Fees to be fixed by State Government.- [* * *] The [State Government] shall prepare a table of fees payable
(a)for the registration of documents;
(b)for searching the registers;
(c)for making or granting copies of reasons, entries or documents, before, on or after registration; and of extra or additional fees payable
(d)for every registration under section 30;
(e)for the issue of commissions;
(f)for filing translations;
(g)for attending at private residences;
(h)for the safe custody and return of documents; and
(i)for such other matters as appear to the Government necessary to effect the purposes of this Act.”
43. As noted above, Lieutenant Governor has traced his powers to issue the three impugned notifications to the provisions of Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Section 78 of the Registration Act, 1908. Both those provisions have empowered the State Government to make Rules, prescribe fines as well as fees, as the case may be.
44. Whether, Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands can be said to be a “State Government” within the meaning of Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Section 78 of the Registration Act, 1908 has fallen for consideration.
45. Section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has defined the Central Government and Section 3 (60) thereof has defined the State Government which are as follows :-
“ 3(8) “Central Government” shall,—
(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor General or the Governor General in Council, as the case may be; and shall include,—
(i) in relation to functions entrusted under sub-section (1) of section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, the Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that subsection; and
(ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner’s Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under sub-section (3) of section 94 of the said Act; and
(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,—
(i) in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of article 258 of the Constitution, to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; 1
(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State 2 before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the Chief Commissioner or the LieutenantGovernor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be; 2 and
(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under article 239 of the Constitution;
3(60) “State Government”,—
(a) as respects anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, shall mean, in a Part A State, the Provincial Government of the corresponding Province, in a Part B State, the authority or person authorised at the relevant date to exercise executive government in the corresponding Acceding State, and in a Part C State, the Central Government; 1
(b) as respects anything done 2 after the commencement of the Constitution and before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 , shall mean, in a Part A State, the Governor, in a Part B State, the Rajpramukh, and in a Part C State, the Central Government; 3
(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union territory, the Central Government;
and shall, in relation to functions entrusted under article 258A of the Constitution to the Government of India, include the Central Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that article;”
46. Section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has identified the authorities which would fall within the definition of State Government based on the time capsules specified therein. Three time capsules have been specified, namely, period before the commence of the Constitution, period between the commencement of the Constitution and before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and lastly the period after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. It has prescribed that in respect of anything done after the commencement of the Constitution and before the Commencement of the Constitution (SeventhAmendment) Act, 1956, “State Government” shall mean in a Part A State, the Governor in Part B State, the Rajpramukh in Part C State, the Central Government. It has also prescribed that, in respect of anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean in a State, the Governor and in a Union Territory, the Central Government and shall in relation functions entrusted under Article 258A of the Constitution to the Government of India, including the Central Government acting within the scope of authority given to it under that Article.
47. Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 has come into effect from November 1, 1956. Three impugned notifications have been issued after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.
48. Andaman and Nicobar Islands is a Union Territory and therefore, anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 shall mean the Central Government. Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a Union Territory does not have a Legislative Assembly.
49. K. Lakshminarayanan (supra) has considered the expression “Central Government” as occurring in Section 3 (3) of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 and whether such expression means the Administrator of the Union Territory of Puducherry or not. In deciding such an issue, it has observed that, the 1963 Act did not define the expression “Central Government”. It has therefore, taken the aid of Section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held that the definition of “Central Government” therein is a restrictive and exhaustive definition. It has taken note of Article 239 of the Constitution. It has held that, an Administrator of a Union Territory will be the Central Government when such Administrator acts within the scope of authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution. It has also observed that, the definition of “Central Government” as appearing in Section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which means the President is not controlled by the second expression “and shall include the Administrator”. It has held that in the definition of “Central Government”, an Administrator shall be read when he has been authorized or delegated a particular function.
50. Nothing has been placed on record in the appeal as well as the writ petitions to suggest let alone establish that, the Lieutenant Governor was duly authorized by the President to issue any of the three impugned notifications.
51. Power to issue the three impugned notifications has been traced to the provisions of Section 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Section 78 of the Registration Act, 1908 both of which empowers the State Government. As, Section 3 (60) of the General Clauses Act has prescribed that, “State Government” shall in respect anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (SeventhAmendment) Act, 1956 mean in a Union Territory, the Central Government and as Central Government as defined in Section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in relation to administration of a Union Territory means the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution, and as the Lieutenant Governor is not in a position to establish his authority to issue the impugned notification, he cannot be said to have due competence to issue the three impugned notifications.
52. Laxmi Devi (supra) has recognized the power of the Court to declare an Act of the Legislature to be invalid. However, it has cautioned theCourts that it must always remember that invalidating a statute is a grave step and must therefore, to be taken in very rare and exceptional circumstances. It has noted that, the only ground for declaring an Act or a provision in the Act to be invalidis if it clearly violates some provisions of the Constitution.
53. Small Scale Industrial Manufactures Association (Registered) (supra) has considered the scope of judicial review in respect of economic policy decision. It has observed that, courts cannot strike down a public policy just because a better public policy could have been involved. It has observed that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights.
54. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (supra) has held that, a statute carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proof is on the writ petitioner to establish that a statute is ultra vires or unconstitutional.
55. The ratio laid down inDadh Nathu Rajah (supra) does not assist the administration inasmuch as, it was concerned with the right to appeal from a decree or an order.
56. Thirumalai Chemicals Limited (supra) has decided the issue as to whether the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 was right in rejecting a belated appeal. It has considered the sun set clause. It has observed that, law of limitation is generally treated as procedural lawbut depending on facts it may be substantive also. Law of limitation is capable of effectively depriving persons of accruedrights and therefore they need to be approached with caution.
57. In Videocon International Limited (supra) the Supreme Court has considered the scope of appeal after the amendment of Section 15Z of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
58. In the appeal that we have heard analogously, the learned Single Judge has relegated the appellant to the alternative statutory remedy available. Availability of statutory alternative remedy is no doubt a consideration for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Existence of Statutory alternative remedy, however, is not a complete bar to a writ petition being entertained. Notwithstanding the existence of a statutory alternative remedy, a writ petition is maintainable if, fundamental right of the writ petitioner is breached, or the act complained of is in violation of any constitutional rights of the writ petitioner or, theacts complainedof were taken in colourable exercise of power or in excess of jurisdiction or is vitiated by mala fides or in breach of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the writ petitioner.
59. In the writ petition, the appellant had challenged one of the clauses of one of the impugned notification as being ultra vires. The writ court however, did not decide on the vires of the same and ought to have done so.More so when the impugned notification in such writ petition had been issued wholly without jurisdiction writ petition therefore, at the behest of such a writ petitioner is maintainable. The very statute which had provided the so called alternative remedy was ultra vires the Constitution.
60. In view of the discussions above, therefore, the first two issues are answered in the negative and against the administration. The third issue is answered in favour of the appellant/writ petitioner by holding that the writ petition was maintainable and ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.
61. In respect of the fourth issue we hold that, the three impugned notifications were issued by the Lieutenant Governor beyond his competence and therefore are null and void. The three impugned notifications are therefore quashed.
62. In view of the three impugned notifications being quashed, the Administration will proceed to register the documents presented for registration, in accordance with prevailing law as on the date immediately preceding the date of enforcement of the three impugned notification, in accordance with law.
63. MA 17 of 2020, WPA 123 of 2020, WPA 124 of 2020, WPA 92 of 2020, WPA(P) 81 of 2020, WPA(P) 84 of 2020 along with all connected applicationsare disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.
64. I agree.
